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BY
CHARLES DOWNER HAZEN
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

WITH FIFTEEN COLORED MAPS

Revised and Enlarged Edition

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THE FAR EAST

ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA IN ASIA

Europe has not only taken possession of Africa, but she has taken possession of large parts of Asia, and presses with great force upon the remainder. England and France dominate southern Asia by their control, the former of India and Burma, the latter of a large part of Indo-China. Russia, on the other hand, dominates the north, from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. As far as geographical extent is concerned, she is far more an Asiatic power than a European, which, indeed, is also true of England and of France, and she has been an Asiatic power much longer than they, for as early as 1581 Cossacks from the Don had crossed the Urals and seized a town called Sibir. Pushing onward farther and farther east, and meeting no serious obstacles, the population being small, they conquered most of northern Asia before the Pilgrims came to America, and in 1633 they reached the Pacific. To this country, now Russian, they gave the name Siberia, applying the name of the first region conquered to the whole. In 1648 the town of Okhotsk was founded. Thus for nearly three centuries Russia has been a great Asiatic state, while England has been a power in India for only half that time.

It was not until the nineteenth century, however, that Russia began to devote serious attention to Asia as a field for colonial and commercial expansion. Siberia was regarded merely as a convenient prison to which to send her disaffected or criminal citizens. Events in Europe caused her to concentrate her attention more and more upon her Asiatic development. She sought there what she had long been seeking in Europe, but without avail, because of the opposition she encountered, namely, contact with the ocean, free outlets to the world. Russia's coast line, either in Europe or Asia, had no harbors free from ice the year around. She had attempted to gain this contact at the expense of Turkey, hoping to reach the Mediterranean, but she had not succeeded. She made no progress in this direction in

the nineteenth century. Blocked decisively by the Crimean War, and seeing no chance in Europe, she turned to seek advantage in the East. Her coast line in eastern Siberia was very far north, with the result that its harbors were icebound more than half of the year. She sought to extend that line southward. In 1858 she acquired from China, then involved in a war with Great Britain and France, the whole northern bank of the Amur, and two years later she acquired from China more territory farther south, which became the Maritime Province, and at the southern point of this she founded as a naval base Vladivostok, which means the Dominator of the East. Here her development in eastern Asia stopped.

In another direction, Russian advance was notable. She conquered Turkestan, a vast region east of the Caspian Sea, and this conquest brought her close to India, and gave great importance to Afghanistan as a buffer between them. Turkestan had a population of about 10,000,000, partly nomadic, partly settled in famous cities such as Samarkand, Bokhara, Tashkend. The nomads frequently made incursions into Siberia, and cut off the communications of Russia with her eastern possessions. To secure the safety of Siberia it was necessary to subdue them. The process was a long one (1845–1885), and at times exceedingly difficult, but was in the end entirely successful, and Russia annexed Turkestan, proceeding shortly to connect it with Europe by the Trans-Caspian railroad.

CHINA

Between Russian Asia on the north, and British and French Asia on the south, lies the oldest empire of the world, China, and one more extensive than Europe and probably more populous, with more than 400,000,000 inhabitants.[1] It is a land of great navigable rivers, of vast agricultural areas, of mines rich in coal and metals, as yet largely undeveloped. The Chinese were a highly civilized people long before the Europeans were. They preceded the latter by centuries in the use of the compass, powder, porcelain, paper. As early as the sixth century of our era they knew the art of printing from movable wooden blocks. They have long been famous for their work in bronze,

[1] Mr. W. W. Rockhill, late minister of the United States at Peking, came to the conclusion in 1904, after careful inquiries, that the official Chinese estimates had for a hundred and fifty years been greatly exaggerated and that the number of inhabitants did not much exceed 270,000,000.

in wood, in lacquer, for the marvels of their silk manufacture. As a people laborious and intelligent, they have always been devoted to the peaceful pursuits of industry, and have despised the arts of war. Their greatest national hero is not a soldier but a philosopher and moralist, Confucius. Their really vital religion is ancestor worship, and they worship, not simply the souls of their ancestors, but their ideas and customs as well. Hence the most salient feature of their civilization, its immobility. For that civilization, so ancient, and in some respects so brilliant, lacked the very element that gives to European civilization its extraordinary interest, namely, its restlessness, its eagerness, its buoyancy, its daring, its constant struggle for improvement, its adaptability to the new, its forwardness of view, in short, its belief in progress. The one emphasized the past, the other the present and the future. The history of the former was one of endless repetition from generation to generation, and from century to century; the history of the latter was one of evolution. The reverence for ancestral ideas, for immemorial customs as the perfection of wisdom, rendered the Chinese hostile to all innovations in the realm of thought or in the realm of action. Foreigners they regarded as barbarians.

Their kingdom they called the Middle Kingdom, i.e., the center of the world. They called themselves Celestials. Their Emperor was the "Son of Heaven." He was, in theory, an absolute monarch. He was represented in the eighteen provinces into which China was divided by Viceroys. The office-holding class, called by foreigners the *mandarins*, was chosen from the educated by an elaborate and severe series of examinations in the literature and learning of China. The programme of studies in vogue until recently was the same that had been in vogue for a thousand years. The reigning dynasty, the Manchu, had been on the throne since 1644, when it succeeded in overthrowing the former or Ming dynasty.

China, then, had always lived a life of isolation, despising the outside world. Something was known of it in Europe, yet remarkably little. Marco Polo in the thirteenth century brought home marvelous accounts which were one of the great inspirations of the age of geographical discovery. Explorers and, later, missionaries and merchants sought out the fabulous land. At times they even received some favors from the more enlightened Emperors. But, speaking broadly, the connection between Europe and China was of the slightest down to the nineteenth century. Foreigners were permitted in the eighteenth century

to trade in one Chinese port, Canton, but even there only under vexatious and humiliating conditions. China had no diplomatic representatives in any foreign country, nor were any foreign ambassadors resident in Peking. China did not recognize any equality on the part of England, France, Spain, or any other country. "There is only one sun in the heavens, and there is only one Emperor on earth," was a Chinese saying. Inhabiting a country larger than Europe, with every variety of soil and climate, and with an old and elaborate civilization, it is not surprising that the Chinese were self-sufficient and indifferent to the outside world. They even forbade foreigners learning the Chinese language.

Obviously a policy of such isolation could not be permanently maintained in the modern age, and as the nineteenth century progressed it was gradually shattered. This isolation began to be broken down by the outside world as a result of the so-called Opium War between China and Great Britain. Opium, a very harmful and dangerous drug, is made from a certain kind of poppy that is grown in India. The Chinese government, anxious to preserve its people from the effects of the usage of this drug, forbade its importation in 1796. Yet the trade, though declared illegal, was carried on by smugglers with whom corrupt Chinese officials connived for the sake of gain. This illicit traffic flourished greatly. Four thousand chests were imported into China in 1796, thirty thousand in 1837. Each chest was supposed to be worth from six to twelve hundred dollars. The profits were enormous. The trade was a source of great income to British India, which did not wish to do without it.

In 1837 the Chinese government proposed to stop this smuggling, and sent a Viceroy of great energy, Lin, to see that it was done. In this it was entirely within its rights. Lin seized about 20,000 chests of opium and destroyed them. Unfortunately, by his later arbitrary and arrogant proceedings, he put himself in the wrong. Out of this situation arose the Opium War, which began in 1840, and lasted about two years, ending in the victory of Great Britain. This was the first war between China and a European power. The consequences, in forcing the doors of China wider open to European influence, were important. By the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, she was forced to pay a large war indemnity, in part as compensation for the destroyed opium; to open to British trade four ports in addition to Canton, namely, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai, on the same conditions as those established for Canton; and to cede the island of Hong

Kong, near Canton, to England outright. Hong Kong has since become one of the most important naval and commercial stations of the British Empire. A step was taken also toward the recognition of the equality of Great Britain with China. It was provided that henceforth British officials should be treated as the equals of Chinese officials of similar rank. The question of the opium trade was left undecided. The Chinese refused to legalize it, declining, as they said, "to put a value upon riches and to slight men's lives." They were, however, afraid after their defeat to enforce their prohibition of it, and the smuggling began again and flourished more than ever. Owing to the fact that, practically, the Chinese were not permitted by a Christian nation to abolish an infamous traffic because it was a very lucrative one, and owing to the humiliation of their defeat, the relations with Great Britain continued unstable, and even led to another war.

Other powers now proceeded to take advantage of the British success. The United States sent Caleb Cushing to make a commercial treaty with China in 1844, and before long France, Belgium, Holland, Prussia, and Portugal established trade centers at the five treaty ports. Some years later trouble arose in Canton between the English and the Chinese which led to a second war with China. England was joined by France this time, the reason for French intervention being the murder of a French missionary, an act for which no reparation could be secured. The allies resolved to carry the war to the very neighborhood of Peking, the capital. The Chinese Emperor, therefore, in 1858, assented to the double Treaties of Tientsin. By the one with England, China agreed henceforth to receive a British ambassador, also to open more ports to commerce and to receive British consuls at the treaty ports. The treaty with France was of much the same nature, though differing in details. These treaties represented a great step forward in the recognition of the equality of European powers with China, and in furthering commercial intercourse. But, the Chinese not carrying them out, hostilities were renewed. The allies again marched upon Peking, burned the Emperor's beautiful summer palace just outside, and prepared to bombard the city. The result was that China confirmed the Treaties of Tientsin and agreed to pay additional war indemnities (1860). Thus she was brought into more direct connection with the outside world.

Russia, which had taken no part in these proceedings, knew how to profit by them. It was at this time that she induced

China to cede to her the Maritime Province, which extended her Pacific coast line seven hundred miles farther south, enabling her to found at its southern port Vladivostok, as has already been mentioned (1860).

The period of greatest importance in China's relations with Europe came in the last decade of the nineteenth century as a result of a war with Japan in 1894–5. To appreciate this war it is first necessary to give some account of the previous evolution of Japan.

JAPAN

The rise of Japan as the most forceful state in the Orient is a chapter of very recent history, of absorbing interest, and of great significance to the present age. Accomplished in the last third of the nineteenth century, it has already profoundly altered the conditions of international politics, and seems likely to be a factor of increasing moment in the future evolution of the world.

Japan is an archipelago consisting of several large islands and about four thousand smaller ones. It covers an area of 147,000 square miles,[1] which is smaller than that of California. The main islands form a crescent, the northern point being opposite Siberia, the southern turning in toward Korea. Between it and Asia is the Sea of Japan. The country is very mountainous, its most famous peak, Fujiyama, rising to a height of 12,000 feet. Of volcanic origin, numerous craters are still active. Earthquakes are not uncommon, and have determined the character of domestic architecture. The coast line is much indented, and there are many good harbors. The Japanese call their country Nippon, or the Land of the Rising Sun. Only about one-sixth of the land is under cultivation, owing to its mountainous character, and owing to the prevalent mode of farming. Yet into this small area is crowded a population of about fifty million, which is larger than that of Great Britain or France. It is no occasion for surprise that the Japanese have desired territorial expansion.

The people of Japan derived the beginnings of their civilization from China, but in many respects they differed greatly from the Chinese. The virtues of the soldier were held in high esteem. Patriotism was a passion, and with it went the spirit of unquestioning self-sacrifice. "Thou shalt honor the gods

[1] Exclusive of territories acquired since 1894.

and love thy country," was a command of the Shinto religion, and was universally obeyed. An art-loving and pleasure-loving people, they possessed active minds and a surprising power of assimilation which they were to show on a national and momentous scale.

In the middle of the nineteenth century their state and society were thoroughly feudal, and presented many interesting points of similarity with forms long outlived in Europe. The Mikado or Emperor, reputed to be the descendant of the gods, was the head of the nation. But while he had formerly been a powerful personage he had for two centuries and more sunk into a purely passive state. He lived in complete seclusion in his palace in Kioto, took no part in the actual government, had become, in fact, a figurehead, invested with a kind of religious authority or halo, so that many foreigners thought that he was not the Emperor but a sacred ecclesiastical personage. The real authority was the Shogun. The comparison is often made between the Shogun and the Frankish mayor of the palace in Merovingian times. Reigning as a mere servant of the Mikado, he had known how to acquire from the latter more and more power in the actual direction of affairs until he was practically the ruler. He had his own palace at Yedo, which was the real seat of government, and his power became hereditary, passing from the Shogun to his heir without disturbance. The Mikado was the nominal, the Shogun the real ruler. There were thus practically two dynasties. Beneath the Shogun was the military aristocracy, the Daimios, owners of great estates, governors of provinces, and beneath them their retainers, the Samurai, or class of warriors, completely armed in coats of mail, helmets, and cuirasses, not greatly dissimilar from those with which Europe had been familiar centuries before. These were the directing classes of the state. Beneath them were the masses of the people, of no importance politically, merchants, peasants, artisans. Such was the system that remained intact until the remarkable revolution which began in 1868. That revolution was a direct result of the insistence of foreign nations that Japan should enter with them into the ordinary relations that exist among nations.

For about two hundred years Japan had been almost hermetically sealed against the outside world. In the period of geographical discoveries of the fifteenth century, Zipangu had been one of the mysteries and allurements of the venturesome navigators. Europe had a vague knowledge of the existence of this island, which was placed on pre-Columbian maps somewhat east

of the present United States. To clear up this obscurity, and to find a convenient route to the riches which were associated in men's minds with the East generally, was one of the objects of the Spanish and Portuguese discoverers. One of the latter, Pinto, was the first to reach the famous land, in 1542. He was well received, as were for a time other visitors. In a few years missionaries came, among whom was Francis Xavier, the Jesuit. Later other missionaries appear to have had very considerable success. It is said that in 1581 there were two hundred churches and 50,000 converts, and for some years before 1590 it is estimated that there were 10,000 converts a year. But bitter persecutions of the Christians finally broke out, apparently occasioned by the pretensions and tactlessness of the bishops, and possibly by their political intriguing. A reaction naturally resulted. More than 20,000 converts were put to death in 1591, amid fearful tortures. The spirit of persecution flamed up from time to time in the years following, costing thousands of victims. The anti-foreign feeling grew so strong that in 1638 Japan adopted a policy of isolation, more rigorous than that of China. Foreigners were forbidden to enter the country under pain of death, and the Japanese were forbidden to leave it. They were also forbidden to buy foreign goods, and they might sell only those articles which the Government permitted, and then only to the Dutch, who were allowed a trading station on the small peninsula of Deshima. This was Japan's sole point of contact with the outside world for over two centuries.

This unnatural seclusion was rudely disturbed by the arrival in Japanese waters of an American fleet under Commodore Perry in 1853, sent out by the government of the United States. American sailors, engaged in the whale fisheries in the Pacific, were now and then wrecked on the coasts of Japan, where they generally received cruel treatment. Perry was instructed to demand of the ruler of Japan protection for American sailors and property thus wrecked, and permission for American ships to put into one or more Japanese ports, in order to obtain necessary supplies and to dispose of their cargoes. He presented these demands to the Shogun, supposing him to be the sovereign. He announced further that if his requests were refused, he would open hostilities. The Shogun granted certain immediate demands, but insisted that the general question of opening relations with a foreign state required careful consideration. Perry consented to allow this discussion and sailed away, stating that he would return the following year for the final answer. The dis-

cussion of the general question on the part of the Shogun and the Daimios, or ruling military class, was very earnest. Some of the latter believed in maintaining the old policy of complete exclusion of foreigners. Others, however, including the Shogun, believed this impossible, owing to the manifest military superiority of the foreigners. They thought it well to enter into relations with them in order to learn the secret of that superiority, and then to appropriate it for Japan. They believed this the only way to ensure, in the long run, the independence and power of their country. This opinion finally prevailed, and when Perry reappeared the Shogun made a treaty with him (1854) by which two ports were opened to American ships. This was a mere beginning, but the important fact was that Japan had, after two centuries of seclusion, entered into relations with a foreign state. Later other and more liberal treaties were concluded with the United States and with other countries.

The reaction of these events upon the internal evolution of Japan was remarkable. They produced a very critical situation, and precipitated a civil war. The epoch-making treaty had been made by the Shogun, and one of its results was the speedy overthrow of the Shogunate and of the entire feudal system. The Mikado and his supporters resented the high-handed action of the Shogun, nominally a mere subordinate, who, in a matter of supreme importance, had not consulted the sovereign. All those members of the feudal nobility who opposed the admission of the foreigners sided with the Mikado in opposition to the Shogun. The Shogun and his supporters stood for the policy of entering into relations with the outside powers for the simple reason that the latter had the military force to enable them to impose their demands. The supporters of the Mikado were themselves now convinced of that superiority in a decisive manner. The popular hatred of foreigners resulted in outrages, several of them by the Mikado's partisans. One of these was upon an Englishman, Richardson, murdered in 1862. The English forthwith bombarded Kagoshima, the stronghold of the anti-foreign Daimios (1863). This had the result of convincing these Daimios of the superiority of other nations to Japan, of the uselessness of combating them or trying to keep them out of Japan, of the desirability of adopting their civilization in order to make Japan equally powerful. Thus they completely reversed their position, and became friends of the new foreign policy, instead of its bitter opponents. Other Daimios hostile to the foreigners were taught a similar lesson at Shimon-

oseki (1864). The situation remained, however, confused and troubled.

In 1866 the Shogun died, and in 1867 the Mikado. The successor to the latter was Mutsuhito, then fifteen years of age, and destined to rule until 1912. A civil war shortly broke out between the representatives of the Mikado and the supporters of the Shogun. The latter were repeatedly defeated. The Shogunate was abolished. Henceforth the Mikado was the real as well as the nominal head of the state. He abandoned the retirement in which his predecessors had lived so long, left Kioto in order to emphasize this fact, and established himself in Yedo, previously the Shogun's capital, to which was now given the name Tokio, the Capital of the East (1868).

The collapse of the Shogunate, and the restoration of the Mikado to absolute power constituted the initial step of a remarkable and sweeping transformation of Japan, the beginning of a new era, which the Mikado himself called the era of "enlightened rule." Japan revolutionized her political and social institutions in a few years, adopted with ardor the material and scientific civilization of the West, made herself in these respects a European state, and entered as a result upon an international career, which has already profoundly modified the world, and is likely to be a constant and an increasing factor in the future development of the East. So complete, so rapid, so hearty an appropriation of an alien civilization, a civilization against which every precaution of exclusion had for centuries been taken, is a change unique in the history of the world, and notable for the audacity and the intelligence displayed. The entrance upon this course was a direct result of Perry's expedition. The Japanese revolution will always remain an astounding story. Once begun with the abolition of the Shogunate, it proceeded with great rapidity. In 1871 the Daimios or nobles, most of whom had sided with the Mikado, voluntarily relinquished their feudal rights, and the feudal system, which had lasted for over eight hundred years, was entirely abolished. The old warrior class of Samurai, numbering about four hundred thousand, gave up their class privileges, and became ordinary citizens. All this cleared the way for a general adoption of European institutions. In place of the former military class arose an army based on European models. Military service was declared universal and obligatory in 1872. The German system, which has revolutionized Europe, began to revolutionize Asia. Soldiers entered upon military service at the age of twenty, served

three years in the active army, and four in the reserve, and were liable to be called out in any time of crisis until the age of forty. The army was thus made national. European officers were imported to train it. A navy was started, and dockyards and arsenals were constructed.

The first railroad was begun in 1870 between Tokio and Yokohama. Thirty years later there were over 3,600 miles in operation. To-day there are 5,000. Steam navigation was begun, a telegraph system commenced in 1868, a postal system instituted, and in 1878 a Stock Exchange and a Chamber of Commerce were opened at Tokio. The educational methods of the West were also introduced. A university was established at Tokio, and later another at Kioto. Professors from abroad were induced to accept important positions in them. Students showed great enthusiasm in pursuing the new learning. Public schools were created rapidly, and by 1883 about 3,300,000 pupils were receiving education. In 1884 the study of English was introduced into them. Compulsory military service and the system of education tended to fuse the people into a homogeneous whole, permeated with the same spirit of progress, optimism, and patriotism. Newspapers, first permitted in 1869, multiplied rapidly, until in 1882 there were over a hundred. Translations of foreign books were published unceasingly. Vaccination was introduced, and in 1873 the European calendar was adopted. The codes of law, civil and criminal, and the code of judicial procedure were thoroughly remodeled after an exhaustive study of European systems. The equality of all citizens before the law was proclaimed, and to crown this work of peaceful revolution a constitution was granted by the Mikado. The Mikado had promised this in 1881, and had declared that in 1890 Japan should have a parliament. He was true to his word. In 1881 a commission, at whose head was Count Ito, went to Europe to study the political systems in operation there. After its return the information gathered was carefully studied by a special body appointed for the purpose. This body drafted a constitution in which the influence of England, the United States, Germany, and other countries can easily be traced. Eight years were spent upon the elaboration of this document, which was proclaimed in 1889. It established a parliament of two chambers, a House of Peers, and a House of Representatives. The vote for the latter body was given to men of twenty-five years of age who paid direct taxes to the state of about seven dollars and a half. This was reduced in 1900 to those paying about five dollars. The members

of the popular house receive salaries. The constitution reserves very large powers for the monarch. Parliament met for the first time in 1890.

Thus Japan, as soon as she recognized the superiority of foreign nations, reversed her long-established policy of seclusion, and, instead of lying helpless before them, studied them carefully, adopted all of the machinery of their civilization, political, military, industrial, intellectual, that seemed to promise advantage, and in a few years emerged completely revolutionized and immensely strengthened. Not that such far-reaching reforms occasioned no dissatisfaction, for they did — and even a rebellion — which was easily put down. The test of rejuvenated Japan came in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth, and proved the solidity of this amazing achievement. During those years she fought and defeated two powers apparently much stronger than herself, China and Russia, and took her place as an equal in the family of nations.

CHINO-JAPANESE WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

A war in which the efficiency of the transformed Japan was clearly established broke out with China in 1894. The immediate cause was the relations of the two powers to Korea, a peninsula lying between China and Japan, about six hundred miles long, with an area one-fifth less than that of Great Britain, and a population of ten or twelve million. This territory was a kingdom, but both China and Japan claimed suzerainty over it. Japan had an interest in extending her claims, as she desired larger markets for her products. Friction was frequent between the two countries concerning their rights in Korea, as a consequence of which Japan began a war in which, with her modern army, she was easily victorious over her giant neighbor, whose armies fought in the old Asiatic style with a traditional Asiatic equipment. The Japanese drove the Chinese out of Korea, defeated their navy in the battle of the Yalu, invaded Manchuria, where they seized the fortress of Port Arthur, the strongest position in eastern Asia, occupied the Liao-tung peninsula on which that fortress is located, and prepared to advance toward Peking. The Chinese, alarmed for their capital, agreed to make peace, and signed the treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), by which they ceded Port Arthur, the Liao-tung peninsula, the island of Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands to Japan, also agreeing to pay a large war indemnity of two hundred million

ATLANT. OC.
BRITISH ISLES
NORWAY
SWEDEN
RUSSIA
EUROPE
FRANCE
SPAIN
PORTUG.
GERMANY
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
ITALY
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ALGERIA
TRIPOLI
TURKISH EMPIRE
Asia Minor
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Aral Sea
Kirghiz Steppe
Turkestan
BOKHARA
PERSIA
AFGHANISTAN
BALUCHISTAN
ARABIA
Red Sea
Hejaz
Yemen
Hadramaut
Arabian Sea
Persian Gulf
Gulf of Oman
Hindustan
BRITISH INDIA
Deccan
INDIAN OC.
Russian-Japanese War 1904/05
China
Manchuria
Korea
Liaotung
Port Arthur
Korea Bay
YELLOW SEA
SEA OF JAPAN
RR in Operation
RR in Construction

ASIA
IN 1914
625
1250
Miles
Railroads
Russian
English
French
Portuguese
Dutch
Spanish
German
United States
Japan
Bering Sea
Bering Str.
I. St. Lawrence
Pribylov I.
I. St. Matthew
Anadir Gulf
Aleutian Is. (U.S.)
Kamchatka
Okhotsk
Sea of Okhotsk
Province of Primorskaya
Stanovoi Mts.
Yakutsk
Verkhoyansk
Siberia
New Siberia
Wrangel I.
Liakhov I.
Bear Is.
Kolyma
Chukotski Pen.
Behring Str.
Arctic Circle
Lena
Irkutsk
Werchinsk
Khabarovsk
Nikolaievsk
Amur
Sea of Japan
Yezo
La Perouse Str.
Kurile Is.
Shumshu
Paramushir
Kamchatka Pen.
Hokkaido
Honshu
Japan
Tokohama
Tropic of Cancer
Bonin Is. (Jap.)
Volcano Is. (Jap.)
Ladrone or Marianne Is. (G)
Guam (U.S.)
Pacific Ocean
Caroline Is. (Ger.)
Yap
Wolea
Lamotrek
Ruk I.
Palau Is.
Admiralty Is.
New Britain
New Ireland
New Hanover
New Guinea
Papuan Gulf
Torres Str.
Cape York
Somerset
Arafura S.
Timor
Timorlaut
Frederick H.
Amboina
Banda Is.
Ceram
Moluccas
Celebes
Macassar
Celebes S.
Sulu Archipelago
Mindanao
Mindoro
Manila
Luzon
Philippine Is.
Samar
Leyte
Basilan
Sulu Sea
Borneo
Labuan
Brunei
Sarawak
Natuna I.
Kuching
Pontianak
Bandjermasin
Java Sea
Java
Sunda S.
Sunda Is.
Batavia
Madura I.
Sourabaya
Bali
Flores
Dutch (Port.)
Kupang
Cambridge G.
Palmerston
Carpentaria Gulf
York Peninsula
AUSTRALIA
Sumatra
Malacca
Malay Peninsula
Singapore
Gulf of Siam
Cochin China
Cambodia
Bangkok
Tonkin
Gulf of Tonkin
Hainan
Macao (Port.)
Hongkong (Br.)
Kwangchau Bay
Kiung Chow
Canton
Yunnan
Formosa (Jap.)
Fuchow
Wenchow
Changchow
Amoy
Swatow
Shanghai
Nanking
Hankow
Singan
Chinkiang
Hang Chow
Ningpo
Chinese
Empire
Mongolia
Desert of Gobi
Peking
Tien-tsin
Su-chou
Yellow Sea
Chefoo
Port Arthur
Talienwan
Manchuria
Mukden
Harbin
Kirin
Vladivostok
Ussuri
Khabarovsk
Nikolaievsk
Amur
Yakutsk
Verkhoyansk
Siberia
Irkutsk
Werchinsk

taels (about $175,000,000). China recognized the complete independence of Korea.

But in the hour of her triumph Japan was thwarted by a European intervention, and deprived of the fruits of her victory. Russia now entered in decisive fashion upon a scene where she was to play a prominent part for the next ten years. The advance of Russia in eastern Asia had early aroused the apprehension of the Japanese. The building of the Trans-Siberian railroad, begun in 1891, seemed to them to indicate that Russia was cherishing ulterior ambitions. The Japanese felt that a further increase of Russian power in Asia would be a menace to themselves. Their anxiety proved well founded. Russia showed that she entertained plans directly opposed to those of the Japanese. She induced France and Germany to join her in forcing them to give up the most important rewards of their victory, to which the conquered Chinese had consented in the treaty. These powers were determined that Japan should not have Port Arthur, should not have any foothold on the continent of Asia. They therefore demanded, "in the cause of peace and amity," that the treaty be revised. The reason given by the Russian Government to the Japanese Government was that "the possession of the peninsula of Liao-tung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital of China, would, at the same time, render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East," and the Tsar advised the Mikado "to renounce the definite possession of the peninsula of Liao-tung." This was a bitter blow to the Japanese. Recognizing, however, that it would be folly to oppose the three great military powers of Europe, they yielded to the "advice," restored Port Arthur and the peninsula to China, and withdrew from the mainland, highly indignant at the action of the powers, and resolved to increase their army and navy and develop their resources as rapidly and as fully as possible, believing that their enemy in Asia was Russia, with whom a day of reckoning must come sooner or later, and confirmed in this belief by events that crowded thick and fast in the next few years.

The insincerity of the powers in talking about the integrity of China and the peace of the East was not long in manifesting itself. The intervening powers immediately set about reaping their reward. Russia secured the right to run the eastern end of the Trans-Siberian railroad across Manchuria, a province of China, to Vladivostok, and to construct a branch line south from

Harbin into the Liao-tung peninsula, with a terminus at Talienwan. At the end of a certain time, and under certain conditions this railroad was to pass into the possession of China, but meanwhile Russia was given the right to send her own soldiers into Manchuria to guard it. This was the beginning of Russian control of Manchuria. She poured tens of thousands of troops into that Chinese province, and gradually acted as if it were Russian. She also acquired extensive mineral and timber rights in the province.

In 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in the province of Shantung. The German Emperor immediately sent a fleet to demand redress. As a result Germany secured (March 5, 1898) from China a ninety-nine-year lease of the fine harbor of Kiauchau, with a considerable area round about, and extensive commercial and financial privileges in the whole province of Shantung. Indeed, that province became a German "sphere of influence."

This action encouraged Russia to make further demands. She acquired from China (March 27, 1898) a lease for twenty-five years of Port Arthur, the strongest position in eastern Asia, which, as she had stated to Japan in 1895, enabled the possessor to threaten Peking and to disturb the peace of the Orient. France and England also each acquired a port on similar terms of lease. The powers also forced China to open a dozen new ports to the trade of the world, and extensive rights to establish factories and build railways and develop mines.

It seemed, in the summer of 1898, that China was about to undergo the fate of Africa, that it was to be carved up among the various powers. This movement was checked by the rise of a bitterly anti-foreign party, occasioned by these acts of aggression, and culminating in the Boxer insurrections of 1900. The "Boxers" were one of the numerous secret societies which abound in China. They were vehemently opposed to foreigners and to the foreign ideas which their own Emperor, after the defeat at the hands of the Japanese, wished to adopt. They enjoyed the support of the Empress-Dowager, aunt of the Emperor, a woman of remarkable force, who had been for many years the real ruler of China during the minority of the latter. She now emerged from her retirement, and by a coup d'état pushed the Emperor aside, stopping abruptly the liberal reforms which he was inaugurating. The Government, for she was henceforth the leading power in the state, was in sympathy and probably in direct connivance with the Boxers. This movement grew rapidly, and spread over northern China. Its aim was to drive the

"foreign devils into the sea." Scores of missionaries and their families were killed, and hundreds of Chinese converts murdered in cold blood. Finally, the Legations of the various powers in Peking were besieged, and for weeks Europe and America feared that all the foreigners there would be massacred. In the presence of this common danger the powers were obliged to drop their jealousies and rivalries, and send a relief expedition, consisting of troops from Japan, Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States. The Legations were rescued, just as their resources were exhausted by the siege of two months (June 13–August 14, 1900). The international army suppressed the Boxer movement after a short campaign, forced the Chinese to pay a large indemnity, and to punish the ringleaders. In forming this international army, the powers had agreed not to acquire territory, and at the close of the war they guaranteed the integrity of China. Whether this would mean anything remained to be seen.

The integrity of China had been invoked in 1895 and ignored in the years following. Russia, France, and Germany had appealed to it as a reason for demanding the evacuation of Port Arthur by the Japanese in 1895. Soon afterward Germany had virtually annexed a port and a province of China, and France had also acquired a port in the south. Then came the most decisive act, the securing of Port Arthur by Russia. This caused a wave of indignation to sweep over Japan, and the people of that country were with difficulty kept in check by the prudence of their statesmen. The acquisition of Port Arthur by Russia meant that now she had a harbor ice-free the year round. That Russia did not look upon her possession as merely a short lease, but as a permanent one, was unmistakably shown by her conduct. She constructed a railroad south from Harbin, connecting with the Trans-Siberian. She threw thousands of troops into Manchuria; she set about immensely strengthening Port Arthur as a fortress, and a considerable fleet was stationed there. To the Japanese all this seemed to prove that she purposed ultimately to annex the immense province of Manchuria, and later probably Korea, which would give her a large number of ice-free harbors and place her in a dominant position on the Pacific, menacing, the Japanese felt, the very existence of Japan. Moreover, this would absolutely cut off all chance of possible Japanese expansion in these directions, and of the acquisition of their markets for Japanese industries. The ambitions of the two powers to dominate the East clashed, and, in addition, to

Japan the matter seemed to involve her permanent safety, even in her island empire.

Meanwhile, the other powers, observing the increasing Russian control of Manchuria, repeatedly asked that power her intentions. Russian annexation of Manchuria would probably mean the closing of that province to the commerce of the rest of the world. The powers were, therefore, insistent, particularly the United States and England, in urging the policy of the "open door." Russia gave the powers the formal promise to withdraw from Manchuria "as soon as lasting order shall have been established" there, but she steadily refused to specify the date, and this became, therefore, one of the subjects of diplomatic negotiation.

Japan's prestige at this time was greatly increased by a treaty concluded with England in 1902, establishing a defensive alliance according to which the two powers "actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the extreme East, being, moreover, especially interested in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations," agreed, among other things, to remain strictly neutral in case either power became involved in a war concerning these matters, but also agreed that if a third power should join the enemy against the ally, then the second power would drop its neutrality and come to the assistance of its ally, making war and peace in common with it. This meant that if France or Germany should aid Russia in a war with Japan, then England would aid Japan. In a war between Russia and Japan alone England would be neutral. This treaty was, therefore, of great practical importance to Japan, and it also increased her prestige. For the first time in history, an Asiatic power had entered into an alliance with a European power on a plane of entire equality. Japan had entered the family of nations, and it was remarkable evidence of her importance that Great Britain saw advantage in an alliance with her.

Russia, with the other powers, had recognized the integrity of China. Her position differed from theirs in that she had a large army in Manchuria, a Chinese province, and a leasehold of the strong fortress and naval base of Port Arthur. She had definitely promised to withdraw from Manchuria when order should be restored, but she declined to make the statement more explicit. Her military preparations increasing all the while, the Japanese demanded of her the date at which she intended to

withdraw her troops from Manchuria, order having apparently been restored. Negotiations between the two powers dragged on from August 1903 to February 1904. Japan, believing that Russia was merely trying to gain time to tighten her grip on Manchuria by elaborate and intentional delay and evasion, and to prolong the discussion until she had sufficient troops in the province to be able to throw aside the mask, suddenly broke off diplomatic relations and commenced hostilities. On the night of the 8th–9th of February, 1904, the Japanese torpedoed a part of the Russian fleet before Port Arthur and threw their armies into Korea.

The Russo-Japanese war, thus begun, lasted from February 1904 to September 1905. It was fought on both land and sea. Russia had two fleets in Asiatic waters, one at Port Arthur and one at Vladivostok. Her land connection with eastern Asia was by the long single track of the Trans-Siberian railway. Japan succeeded in bottling the Port Arthur fleet at the very outset of the war. Controlling the Asiatic waters she was able to transport armies and munitions to the scene of the land warfare with only slight losses at the hands of the Vladivostok fleet. One army drove the Russians out of Korea, back from the Yalu. Another under General Oku landed on the Liao-tung peninsula and cut off the connections of Port Arthur with Russia. It attempted to take Port Arthur by assault, but was unable to carry it, and finally began a siege. This siege was conducted by General Nogi, General Oku being engaged in driving the Russians back upon Mukden. The Russian General Kuropatkin marched south from Mukden to relieve Port Arthur. South of Mukden great battles occurred. That of Liao-yang, engaging probably half a million men and lasting several days, resulted in a victory of the Japanese, who entered Liao-yang September 4, 1904. Their objective now was Mukden. Meanwhile, in August, the Japanese had defeated disastrously both the Port Arthur and Vladivostok fleets, eliminating them from the war. The terrific bombardment of Port Arthur continued until that fortress surrendered after a siege of ten months, costing the Japanese 60,000 in killed and wounded (January 1, 1905). The army which had conducted this siege was now able to march northward to co-operate with General Oku around Mukden. There several battles were fought, the greatest since the Franco-German war of 1870, lasting in each case several days. The last, at Mukden (March 6–10, 1905), cost both armies 120,000 men killed and wounded in four days' fighting. The Russians

were defeated and evacuated Mukden, leaving 40,000 prisoners in the hands of the Japanese.

Another incident of the war was the sending out from Russia of a new fleet under Admiral Rodjestvensky, which, after a long voyage, was attacked at its close by Admiral Togo as it entered the Sea of Japan and annihilated in the great naval battle of the Straits of Tsushima, May 27, 1905.

The two powers finally consented, at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, to send delegates to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to see if the war could be brought to a close. The result was the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5, 1905. The war between Japan and Russia had been fought in lands belonging to neither power, in Korea, and principally in Manchuria, a province of China, yet Korea and China took no part in the war, were passive spectators, powerless to preserve the neutrality of their soil or their independent sovereignty.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth Russia recognized Japan's paramount interests in Korea, which country, however, was to remain independent. Both the Russians and the Japanese were to evacuate Manchuria. Russia transferred to Japan her lease of Port Arthur and the Liao-tung peninsula, and ceded the southern half of the island of Saghalin.

Japan thus stood forth the dominant power of the Orient. She had expanded in ten years by the annexation of Formosa and Saghalin. She did not long regard Korea as independent, but a few years after the war annexed her (1910). She possessed Port Arthur, and her position in Manchuria was one which gave rise to much diplomatic discussion. She had an army of 600,000 men, equipped with all the most modern appliances of destruction, a navy about the size of that of France, flourishing industries, and flourishing commerce. The drain upon her resources during the period just passed had been tremendous, and, appreciating the need of many years of quiet recuperation and upbuilding, she was willing to make the Peace of Portsmouth. Her financial difficulties were great, imposing an abnormally heavy taxation. No people had accomplished so vast a transformation in so short a time.

The lesson of these tremendous events was not lost upon the Chinese. The victories of Japan, an Oriental state, over a great Occidental power, as well as over China, convinced many influential Chinese of the advantage to be derived from an adoption of European methods, an appropriation of European knowledge. Moreover, they saw that the only way to repel the aggressions

of outside powers was to be equipped with the weapons used by the aggressor.

The leaven of reform began to work fruitfully in the Middle Kingdom. A military spirit arose in this state, which formerly despised the martial virtues. Under the direction of Japanese instructors a beginning was made in the construction of a Chinese army after European models and equipped in European fashion. The acquisition of western knowledge was encouraged. Students went in large numbers to the schools and universities of Europe and America. Twenty thousand of them went to Japan. The state encouraged the process by throwing open the civil service, that is, official careers, to those who obtained honors in examinations in western subjects. Schools were opened throughout the country. Even public schools for girls were established in some places, a remarkable fact for any Oriental country. In 1906 an edict was issued aiming at the prohibition of the use of opium within ten years. This edict was later put into execution and the opium trade was declared suppressed. If it still continued to a certain extent, it was as an outlawed and illicit traffic.

Political reorganization was also undertaken. An imperial commission was sent to Europe in 1905 to study the representative systems of various countries, and on its return a committee, consisting of many high dignitaries, was appointed to study its report. In August, 1908, an official edict was issued promising, in the name of the Emperor, a constitution in 1917.

But the process of transformation was destined to proceed more rapidly than was contemplated. Radical and revolutionary parties appeared upon the scene, demanding a constitution immediately. As the Imperial Government could not resist, it granted one in 1911 establishing a parliament with extensive powers. To cap all, in central and southern China a republican movement arose and spread rapidly. Finally a republic was proclaimed at Nanking and Dr. Sun Yat Sen, who had been educated in part in the United States, was elected president. A clash between this republican movement and the imperial party in the north resulted in the forced abdication of the boy Emperor (February, 1912). This was the end of the Manchu dynasty. Thereupon Yuan Shih K'ai was chosen President of the Republic of China. The situation confronting the new Republic was extremely grave. Would it prove possible to establish the new régime upon solid and enduring bases, or would the Republic fall a prey to the internal dissensions of the Chinese, or to foreign

aggression at the hands of European powers, or, more likely, at the hands of an ambitious and militaristic neighbor, Japan? These were the secrets of the future.

Yuan Shih K'ai was elected for a term of five years. His administration was marked by a growing tension between his increasingly autocratic tendencies and the liberal and radical tendencies of Parliament. In the midst of his term, the President died, June 6, 1916. He was succeeded by Li Yuan-Lung, the Vice-President, generally considered more loyal to republican principles.

CHAPTER XXXIV

RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR WITH JAPAN

We are now in a position to continue with some understanding our study of the recent history of Russia, a history at once crowded, intricate, turbulent. The next chapter of that history is the record of the reaction of the Japanese War upon Russia herself, the record of what is now commonly spoken of as the first Russian Revolution.

That war was from the beginning unpopular with the Russians. Consisting of a series of defeats, its unpopularity only increased, and the indignation and wrath of the people were shown during its course in many ways. The Government was justly held responsible, and was discredited by its failure. As this added greatly to the already existing discontent, the Government found itself powerless to repress the expression of that discontent in the usual summary fashion. There was for many months extraordinary freedom of discussion, of the press, of speech, cut short now and then by the officials, only to break out later. The war with Japan had for the Government most unexpected and unwelcome consequences. The very winds were let loose.

The war began early in February 1904. At a meeting of the Institute of Mining Engineers at St. Petersburg on February 23, a resolution was passed stating "that the war with Japan has its origin in a policy conceived solely in the interests of a small privileged minority, to the detriment of the vast majority of the Russian people, and that it is the result of the spirit of reckless adventure which characterizes the enterprises of the Government in the Far East." The Institute accordingly expressed its "profound dissatisfaction with the Government, which is the responsible author of this fresh national misfortune," and denounced the war as "at once inhuman and contrary to the interests of the people."

The Minister of the Interior, in whose hands lay the maintenance of public order, was at this time Von Plehve, one of the most bitterly hated men in recent Russian history. Von Plehve had been in power since 1902, and had revealed a character of

unusual harshness. He had incessantly and pitilessly prosecuted liberals everywhere, had filled the prisons with his victims, had been the center of the movement against the Finns, previously described, and seems to have secretly favored the horrible massacres of Jews which occurred at this time. He was detested as few men have been. He attempted to suppress in the usual manner the rising volume of criticism occasioned by the war by applying the same ruthless methods of breaking up meetings, exiling to Siberia students, professional men, workmen. He was killed July 1904 by a bomb thrown under his carriage by a former student. Russia breathed more easily. There immediately appeared a document which threw a remarkable light on the meaning of assassination in the minds of the more radical revolutionists in Russia. This was "an appeal to the citizens of the world," issued by the central committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party. Assuming responsibility for the "righteous act," and announcing its decision to put an end to Tsardom, it stated that Plehve had been "executed" because of the relentless policy of repression and reprisals, which he had applied against all those who strove for freedom in Russia. "The necessary violence of our methods of combat," the appeal concluded, "should not hide from any one the truth. We disapprove absolutely . . . a terrorist policy in countries that are free. But in Russia, where, owing to the reign of despotism, no open political discussion is possible, where there is no redress against the irresponsibility of absolute power throughout the whole bureaucratic organization, we shall be obliged to fight the violence of tyranny with the force of revolutionary right."

The Emperor Nicholas II now showed a disposition to depart somewhat from the rigorous policy of Von Plehve. He appointed as Minister of Home Affairs in September, Prince Sviatopolk Mirski, a man of liberal tendencies. The new minister announced "that though the Russian people are as yet unfit for constitutional government, the local representative institutions of the Empire (the zemstvos) might be given greater freedom of action and larger opportunities without risk to the established system," and he spoke of "sincere confidence in the people" as essential to good government. This aroused the hopes of the liberals. The press was allowed great freedom, which it used to express the people's demands, and in November 1904 representatives from the zemstvos were permitted to meet in St. Petersburg to state and discuss what they considered the needs of the country. Many other bodies did the same. Lawyers, academic and pro-

fessional faculties, learned societies, city councils, all criticised existing abuses and demanded remedies. Never had the Russian people uttered their desires so freely. A few months before under Plehve such meetings would have been broken up and their participants treated with customary severity.

It appeared from all these expressions of opinion that though the liberals differed from each other on many matters, they were agreed on certain points. They demanded that the reign of law be established in Russia, that the era of bureaucratic and police control, recognizing no limits of inquisition and of cruelty, should cease. They demanded the individual rights usual in western Europe, freedom of conscience, of speech, of publication, of public meetings and associations, of justice administered by independent judges, of legal trials for alleged lawbreakers. They also demanded greater participation of the people in local government, some sort of a national parliament which should share in making the laws of the Empire, and which should control the officials, and a national constituent assembly, to be summoned immediately, with power to frame a constitution embodying these privileges in fundamental law. The last two demands were considered by far the most important — a convention to give a constitution to Russia, and a parliament henceforth to make the laws. But, however passionate and universal the demands, the Tsar showed no inclination to grant them, and the discontent continued, fanned by the disclosures of the war, which grew ever more unpopular and disastrous as it progressed. Thousands of soldiers of the reserve, called out, escaped to Germany and Austria. Others were forced, only at the point of the bayonet, into the trains that were to carry them to Manchuria. Hundreds of thousands of workmen were thrown out of employment by the failure of business enterprises, caused by the war; the harvest was bad, and it was found that the officials were enriching themselves at the expense of the nation's honor, selling for private gain supplies intended for the army, even seizing the funds of the Red Cross Society. The war continued to be a series of humiliating and sanguinary defeats, and on January 1, 1905, came the surrender of Port Arthur after a fearful siege.

The revolutionary agitation continued. The people desired concessions from the Tsar, but none came from him. University students in Moscow and St. Petersburg marched through the streets shouting, "Down with autocracy!" "Stop the war!" Finally, the Tsar spoke. Toward the end of December 1904

he issued a decree in reply to the public demands. In it he stated the reforms which he considered were most needed, and ordered the ministers to prepare the laws necessary to effect them. Some of these were identical with the wishes expressed by the zemstvos and the other assemblies, but the reformers noticed one critical omission. There was no mention of a national assembly. It was clear that, while the Emperor might grant some reforms, he had no intention of reducing his own autocratic powers, of restricting the bureaucracy, or of allowing the people any share in the government.

The agitation, therefore, continued unabated, more and more embittered as the war progressed. January was signalized by an event that aroused the horror of the civilized world — the slaughter of "Bloody Sunday" (January 22, 1905). Workmen in immense numbers, under the leadership of a radical priest, Father Gapon, tried to approach the Imperial Palace in St. Petersburg, hoping to be able to lay their grievances directly before the Emperor, as they had no faith in any of the officials. Instead of that, they were attacked by the Cossacks and the regular troops and the result was a fearful loss of life, how large cannot be accurately stated.

All through the year 1905 tumults and disturbances occurred. Prince Sviatopolk Mirski, ill, foiled at every step, and undermined by reactionaries, was replaced by Buliguin (February 1905). The Government resumed its customary methods. Deeds of violence and repression on its part were met in turn by assassinations and bomb-throwing on the part of the revolutionists. Immense strikes were organized. Peasants burned the houses of the nobles. Mutinies in the army and navy were frequent. The uncle of the Tsar, the Grand Duke Sergius, one of the most pronounced reactionaries in the Empire, who had said "the people wants the stick," was assassinated. Russia was in a state bordering on anarchy. Finally the Tsar sought to reduce the ever-mounting spirit of opposition by issuing a manifesto, concerning the representative assembly which was so vehemently demanded (August 19, 1905).

In this he announced that "while preserving the fundamental law regarding the autocratic power," he had resolved to call, not later than January 1906, a state council, or Duma, consisting of elected representatives from the whole of Russia. But this manifesto was only another disappointment to the reformers, as the Duma was to be merely a consultative body, not a real legislature, as the elections to it were to be conducted by the

very class most hated and distrusted, the bureaucracy, as the working and professional classes were not given the suffrage, and as the sessions of the Duma were not to be public. How small the electorate was to be was shown from the fact that St. Petersburg, with a population of over a million and a half, would have only nine thousand five hundred voters.

Feeling, therefore, that the Emperor's concessions were inadequate and illusory, that Russia must be assured far greater liberties, the revolutionary parties continued their agitation. An agency of great effect when completely applied was now resorted to, the general strike. Under certain conditions, when governments dispose of large, well-equipped armies against which the people are powerless to fight, this is a weapon of great value. It is, however, difficult to set in operation, involving, as it does, the co-operation of vast numbers in a strike, which can be maintained only if the strikers have reserve funds large enough to prevent starvation. In Russia in October 1905 the attempt was made. It began with a railway strike, which included the whole Empire, and which cut off all communication both within Russia and with the outside world. Any one wishing to travel was forced to use the ordinary highways or the water, if that were possible. Commerce was tied up. Merchants could neither ship nor receive goods. Similar strikes occurred in most of the great factories. Practically all shops, except provision stores, were closed. In the large towns the gas and electric light companies ceased to operate. Druggists refused to sell medicines until reforms should be granted. The students of the universities struck, lawyers also; the law courts were closed. No newspapers appeared. Stocks fell rapidly.

This sharp, sweeping suspension of the ordinary and necessary activities of life created an insupportable situation, and excited a terrific pressure on the Government. It was an extraordinarily dramatic protest against misrule. Forced to yield, at least somewhat, the Tsar issued a manifesto October 30, 1905, granting "the immutable foundations of civic liberty," freedom of speech, of conscience, of association, extending the suffrage to those then lacking it, leaving the matter of the permanent franchise to be determined by the Duma, and, most important of all, establishing "as an immutable rule that no law can come into force without the approval of the Duma, and that it shall be possible for the representatives of the people to participate effectively in the supervision of the legality of the acts of the public officials." Count Witte was at the same time ap-

pointed prime minister, and Pobyedonostseff, hated by all liberals as the very soul of the cruel government of the last twenty years, was removed from his position.

But it was evident that the police and bureaucrats intended to continue their usual practice of breaking up meetings, shooting, and arresting at will. Moreover, the revolutionists were not satisfied with the Tsar's concessions, but demanded the convocation of an assembly elected by universal suffrage which should draw up a constitution for Russia, as a preliminary step absolutely essential to reassure the people. This the Tsar would not grant. The strike went on through November, new classes joining it, such as the letter carriers and telegraph operators. Dangerous mutinies in the army and navy were frequent, and brutal and bloody attacks upon the Jews, inspired in many cases by Government officials, shocked the western world. There was much street fighting in Moscow and other places. The Government refused the constituent assembly, but it ordered the elections for the Duma to be held. Moreover, it made concessions to Finland which brought peace to that distracted country, by restoring the rights enjoyed by the duchy before the late usurpations. Russia continued in a highly troubled state, in fact, an irregular kind of civil war between reactionaries seeking to recover lost ground and revolutionists bent upon preventing a return to the old conditions. That the old odious methods were still extremely vigorous was shown by the fact that, in January 1906 alone, 78 newspapers were suspended, 58 editors arrested, and thousands of people thrown into prison or exiled to Siberia, and most of Russia placed under martial law; all this after the Tsar in October had recognized the civil rights of the individual.

The Tsar had promised the Duma, which was to be a law-making body and was to have a supervision over the actions of officials. But before it met he proceeded to clip its wings. He issued a decree constituting a Council of the Empire, that is, a body consisting largely of official appointees from the bureaucracy, or of persons associated with the old order of things, as a kind of Upper Chamber of the legislature, of which the Duma should be the Lower. An elective element was to be introduced into the Council of the Empire. Laws must have the consent of both Council and Duma before being submitted to the Tsar for approval.

The elections to the Duma were held in March and April 1906, and resulted in a large majority for the Constitutional Democrats, popularly called the "Cadets," a name derived

from the initial letters of the name of the party. Count Witte now resigned and was succeeded by Goremykin, whose first act was to issue in the name of the Tsar certain "organic laws," laws that could not be touched by the Duma. Thus the powers of that body were again restricted, before it had even met.

The Duma was open by Nicholas II in person with elaborate ceremony, May 10, 1906. It was destined to have a short and stormy life. It showed from the beginning that it desired a thoroughgoing reform of Russia along the well-known lines of western liberalism. It was combated by the court and bureaucratic parties, which had not been able to prevent its meeting, but which were bent upon rendering it powerless, and were only waiting for a favorable time to secure its abolition. It demanded an amnesty for all political offenders. "The first thought at the first assembly of the representatives of the Russian nation should be for those who have sacrificed their freedom for their country," said one orator. It was only able, however, to secure a partial amnesty. It demanded that the Council of the Empire, the second chamber, should be reformed, as it was under the complete control of the Emperor, and was thus able to nullify the work of the people's chamber. It demanded that the ministers be made responsible to the Duma as the only way of giving the people control over the officials. It demanded the abolition of martial law throughout the Empire, under cover of which all kinds of crimes were being perpetrated by the governing classes. It passed a bill abolishing capital punishment. As the needs of the peasants were most pressing, it demanded that the lands belonging to the state, the crown, and the monasteries be given to them on long leases.

The Duma lasted a little over two months. Its debates were marked by a high degree of intelligence and by frequent displays of eloquence, in which several peasants distinguished themselves. It criticised the abuses of the Government freely and scathingly. Its sessions were often stormy, the attitude of the ministers frequently contemptuous. It was foiled in all its attempts at reform by the Council of the Empire, and by the Tsar.

The crucial contest was over the responsibility of ministers. The Duma demanded this as the only way of giving the people an effective participation in the government. The Tsar steadily refused. A deadlock ensued. The public was inflamed and disorders were rife among the people. A radical party among the peasants demanded that all the land of the country be given to them outright, without payment. The Tsar cut the whole

matter short by dissolving the Duma, on July 22, 1906, stating that he was "cruelly disappointed" that "the representatives of the nation, instead of applying themselves to productive legislation, had strayed into spheres beyond their competence, had inquired into the acts of local authorities established by himself, and had commented upon the imperfections of the fundamental laws, which could only be modified by his Imperial will." March 5, 1907, was fixed as the date for the meeting of a new Duma. Stolypin was appointed prime minister in the place of Goremykin. Many of the members of the Duma went to Viborg in Finland, where they issued a manifesto, signed by 230 of them, protesting against the dissolution of the Duma, and calling upon the people "to stand up for the downtrodden rights of popular representation," and to give the Government neither soldiers nor money, as it had no right to either without the consent of the people's representatives. They declared invalid all new loans that might be contracted without the approval of the Duma. As the people remained inactive, either because of indifference or because terrorized, the manifesto proved a mere flash in the pan. Most of those who signed it were prosecuted later, and were provisionally disfranchised and prevented from being elected to the second Duma.

The second Duma was opened by the Tsar March 5, 1907. It did not work to the satisfaction of the Government. Friction between it and the ministry developed early and increased steadily. Finally the Government arrested sixteen of the members and indicted many others for carrying on an alleged revolutionary propaganda. This was, of course, a vital assault upon the integrity of the assembly, a gross infringement upon even the most moderate constitutional liberties. Preparing to contest this high-handed action, the Duma was dissolved on June 16, 1907, and a new one ordered to be elected in September, and to meet in November. An imperial manifesto was issued at the same time altering the electoral law in most sweeping fashion, and practically bestowing the right of choosing the large majority of the members upon about 130,000 landowners. This also was a grave infringement upon the constitutional liberties hitherto granted, which had, among other things, promised that the electoral law should not be changed without the consent of the Duma. The Tsar asserted now that "the right of abrogating the law and replacing it by a new law belongs only to the power which gave the first electoral law — the historic power of the Tsar of Russia."

The Government declared by word and by act that the autocracy of the ruler was undiminished. Illegalities of the old, familiar kind were committed freely by officials. Reaction ruled unchecked. The third Duma, elected on a very limited and plutocratic suffrage, was opened on November 14, 1907. It was composed in large measure of reactionaries, of large landowners. It proved a docile assembly.

The Government did not dare to abolish the Duma outright, as urged by the reactionaries. The Duma continued to exist, but was rather a consultative than a legislative body. With the mere passage of time it took on more and more the character of a permanent institution, exerting a feeble influence on the national life. However, the Government of Russia became again in practice what it had been before the war with Japan, what it had been all through the nineteenth century. The tremendous struggle for liberty had failed. There had been no "revolution." The former governing classes recovered control of the state, after the stormy years from 1904 to 1907, and applied once more their former principles. Among these were renewed attacks upon the Finns, increasingly severe measures against the Poles, and harsh treatment of the Jews. Russia was still wedded to her idols, or at least her idols had not been overthrown. Her medieval past was still the strongest force in the state, to which it still gave a thoroughly medieval tone. Whether the war of 1914 would result in accomplishing what the war with Japan began but did not achieve, a sweeping reformation of the institutions and policies, ambitions and mental outlook of the nation, was, of course, the secret of the future.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE BALKAN WARS OF 1912 AND 1913

THE PEACE MOVEMENT

The contemporary world, to a degree altogether unprecedented in history, has been dominated by the thought of war, by extraordinary preparations for war, and by zealous and concerted efforts to prevent war. Finally a conflict came which staggered the imagination and beggared description and whose issues were incalcuable, a conflict which soon clamped the entire world in its iron grip. This was a ghastly outcome of a century of development, rich beyond compare in many lines. It is, however, not inexplicable and it is important for us to see how so melancholy, so sinister a turn was given to the destinies of the race.

The rise and development of the militaristic spirit have been shown in the preceding pages. The Prussian military system, marked by scientific thoroughness and efficiency, was imitated by most of the countries of the Continent. Europe became in the last quarter of the nineteenth century what she had never been before, literally an armed continent. The rivalry of the nations to have the most perfect instruments of destruction, the strongest army, and the strongest navy, became one of the most conspicuous features of the modern world. Ships of war were made so strong that they could resist attack. New projectiles of terrific force were consequently required and the torpedo was invented. A new agency would be useful to discharge this missile and thus the torpedo boat was developed. To neutralize it was therefore the immediate necessity and the torpedo-boat destroyer was the result. Boats that could navigate beneath the waters would have an obvious advantage over those that could be seen, and the submarine was provided for this need. And finally men took possession of the air with dirigible balloons and aëroplanes, as aërial auxiliaries of war. Thus man's immemorial occupation, war, gained from the advance of science and contributed to that advance. The wars of the

past were fought on the surface of the globe. Those of the future were to be fought in the heavens above, and in the earth beneath, and in the waters under the earth.

But all this was tremendously expensive. It cost more than a hundred thousand dollars to construct the largest coast defense gun, which carried over twenty miles, and its single discharge cost a thousand dollars. Fifteen millions were necessary to build a dreadnought, and now we have super-dreadnoughts, more costly still and more destructive. The debts of European countries were nearly doubled during the thirty years preceding 1914 largely because of military expenditures. The military budgets of European states in a time of "armed peace" amounted to not far from a billion and a half dollars a year, half as much again as the indemnity exacted by Germany from France in 1871, after the Franco-German war. The burden became so heavy, the rivalry so keen that it gave rise to a movement which aimed to end it. The very aggravation of the evil prompted a desire for its cure.

In the summer of 1898 the civil and military authorities of Russia were considering how they might escape the necessity of replacing an antiquated kind of artillery with a more modern but very expensive one. Out of this discussion emerged the idea that it would be desirable, if possible, to check the increase of armaments. This could not be achieved by one nation alone but must be done by all, if done at all. The outcome of these discussions was the issuance by the Tsar, Nicholas II, on August 24, 1898, of a communication to the powers, suggesting that an international conference be held to consider the general problem.

The conference, thus suggested by the Tsar, was held at the Hague in 1899. Twenty-six of the fifty-nine sovereign governments of the world were represented by one hundred members. Twenty of these states were European, four were Asiatic — China, Japan, Persia, and Siam, — and two were American — the United States and Mexico. The Conference was opened on May 18 and closed on July 29.

The official utterances of most of the delegates emphasized the frightful burden and waste of this vast expenditure upon the equipment for war, when all nations, big and little, needed all their resources for the works of peace, for education, for social improvement in many directions. Most of the delegates emphasized also the loss entailed by compulsory military service, removing millions and millions of young men from their careers, from productive activity for several precious years. A German

delegate, on the other hand, denied all this, denied that the necessary weight of charges and taxes portended approaching ruin and exhaustion, declared that the general welfare was increasing all the while, and that compulsory military service was not regarded in his country as a heavy burden, but as a sacred and patriotic duty to which his country owed its existence, its prosperity, and its future.

With such differences of opinion the Conference was unable to reach any agreement upon the fundamental question which had given rise to its convocation. It could only adopt a resolution expressing the belief that "a limitation of the military expenses which now burden the world is greatly to be desired in the interests of the material and moral well-being of mankind," and the desire that the governments "shall take up the study of the possibility of an agreement concerning the limitation of armed forces on land and sea, and of military budgets."

With regard to arbitration the Conference was more successful. It established a Permanent Court of Arbitration for the purpose of facilitating arbitration in the case of international disputes which it is found impossible to settle by the ordinary means of diplomacy. The Court does not consist of a group of judges holding sessions at stated times to try such cases as may be brought before it. But it is provided that each power "shall select not more than four persons of recognized competence in questions of international law, enjoying the highest moral reputation and disposed to accept the duties of arbitrators," and that their appointment shall run for six years and may be renewed. Out of this long list the powers at variance may choose, in a manner indicated, the judges who shall then hear and decide any given case.

Recourse to this Court is optional, but the Court is always ready to be invoked. Arbitration is entirely voluntary with the parties to a quarrel, but if they wish to arbitrate, the machinery is at hand, a fact which is, perhaps, an encouragement to its use.

The work of the First Peace Conference was very limited and modest, yet encouraging. But that the new century was to bring not peace but a sword, that force still ruled the world, was shortly apparent. Those who were optimistic about the rapid spread of arbitration as a principle destined to regulate the international relations of the future were sadly disappointed by the meager results of the Conference, and were still more depressed by subsequent events. For almost on the very heels of this Conference, which it was hoped would further the interests


EUROPE
in 1912
0 250 500
English Miles.
Greenland
ARCTIC OCEAN
Jan Mayen
Iceland
Reikjavik
Arctic Circle
Faroe Is. (Den.)
Shetland Is.
Rockall
Hebrides
Orkney Is.
NORTH SEA
GREAT BRITAIN
England
Edinburgh
Belfast
Dublin
Cork
Liverpool
Manchester
Birmingham
London
St George Channel
Southampton
Landsend
English Channel
Channel Is.
Brest
Paris
Le Havre
Rouen
Dieppe
Calais
Boulogne
Amsterdam
The Hague
NETHERLANDS
Bremen
Hanover
Berlin
Magdeburg
Leipzig
Dresden
Breslau
Prague
Brunn
Vienna
Helgoland
Hamburg
DENMARK
Copenhagen
Malmo
Skagerrack
Kristiansand
Stavanger
Bergen
Christiansund
Trondhjem
Lofoden Is.
Brussels
BELGIUM
Lille
Liege
Luxemburg
Metz
Nancy
Strasbourg
Dijon
Nantes
Bay of Biscay
C. Finisterre
Bordeaux
Bayonne
Bilbao
Burgos
Toulouse
Pyrenees
Andorra
Marseilles
G. of Lion
Geneva
Berne
SWITZERLAND
Lausanne
Lyons
Turin
Milan
Venice
Trieste
AUSTRIA
Bosnia
Adriatic Sea
Florence
SAN MARINO
Rome
Naples
Mt. Vesuvius
Tarentum
Apennines
Corsica
Sardinia
Tyrrhenian Sea
Palermo
Messina
Sicily
C. Spartivento
C. Passaro
Malta (Br.)
Ionian Sea
Oporto
Lisbon
PORTUGAL
Madrid
Toledo
Saragossa
Barcelona
Valencia
Balearic Is.
Palma
C. St Vincent
Seville
Granada
Murcia
Algeciras
Gibraltar (Br.)
Malaga
Tangier
Str. of Gibraltar
Melilla (Sp.)
SPAIN
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Algiers
Bona
Constantine
Tunis
Biserta
Gabes
Tripoli
Tripolitania
Fez
Morocco
Mogador
Agadir
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ALGERIA
MOROCCO
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
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70
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Nova Zembla
Kara Sea
Waigach I.
Jugor Str.
Pobdorsk
Obi R.
Samarovo
Tobolsk
Irtish R.
Obi
C. Kanin
Petchora R.
Archangel
Mesen R.
Onega
Dwina
Kem
Onega L.
Petrosavodsk
Ladoga L.
St. Petersburg
Finland
Vinga
Perm
Ekaterinburg
Isset R.
Uralsk
Yaroslav
Nijni Novgorod
Volga
Kazan
Tver
Moscow
Smolensk
Tula
Orel
Kursk
Kharkov
Don R.
Saratov
Simbirsk
Samara
Orenburg
Orsk
Turgai
Kirghiz Steppes
Emba R.
Guriev
Astrakhan
Caspian Sea
Alexandrovsk
Stavropol
Mosdok
Tiflis
Kura
Baku
Erivan
Tabriz
Van
Kurdistan
Mesopotamia
Mosul
Tigris R.
Euphrates R.
Bagdad
Aleppo
Antakieh
Damascus
Beirut
Palestine
Jerusalem
Arabia
Persian G.
Bushire
Ispahan
Mt. Demavend
Teheran
Asterabad
Chekishlyar
Krasnovodsk
Black Sea
Sea of Azov
Crimea
Sevastopol
Sulina
Galatz
Odessa
Kherson
Nikolaiev
Tiraspol
Jassy
Kishinev
Czernowitz
Bukharest R.
Rustchuk
Varna
Bulgaria
Balkan Mts.
Philippopolis
Adrianople
Constantinople
Bosporus
Marmora
Brussa
Smyrna
Aidin
Mytilene
Rhodes
Candia
Crete (autonomous)
Cyprus (Br.)
Athens
Aegean Sea
Port Said
Alexandria
Egypt
Cairo
Asia Minor
Armenia
Taurus
Kaisarieh
Angora
Konieh
Adana
Lake Van
Lake Urmia
Lake Sevan
Kura R.
Araxes R.
Tiflis
Batum
Trebizond
Erzerum
Erivan
Tabriz
Van
Kurdistan
Tigris R.
Mosul
Mesopotamia
Euphrates R.
Bagdad
Aleppo
Antakieh
Damascus
Beirut
Palestine
Jerusalem
Arabia
Persian G.
Bushire
Ispahan
Mt. Demavend
Teheran
Asterabad
Chekishlyar
Krasnovodsk
Caspian Sea
Alexandrovsk
Astrakhan
Guriev
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Kirghiz Steppes
Orsk
Orenburg
Turgai
Uralsk
Ural R.
Samara
Saratov
Simbirsk
Tambo
Tula
Orel
Kursk
Kharkov
Don R.
Sarepta
Volga
Stavropol
Mosdok
Tiraspol
Galatz
Sulina
Sevastopol
Crimea
Sea of Azov
Kherson
Nikolaiev
Odessa

of peace, came the devastating war in South Africa, followed quickly by the war between Russia and Japan. Also the expenditures of European states upon armies and navies continued to increase, and at an even faster rate than ever. During the eight years, from 1898 to 1906, they augmented nearly £70,000,000, the sum total mounting from £250,000,000 to £320,000,000.

Such was the disappointing sequel of the Hague Conference. But despite discouragements the friends of peace were active, and finally brought about the Second Conference at the Hague in 1907. This also was called by Nicholas II, though President Roosevelt had first taken the initiative. The Second Conference was in session from June 15 to October 18. It was attended by representatives from forty-four of the world's fifty-seven states claiming sovereignty in 1907. The number of countries represented in this Conference, therefore, was nearly double that represented in the first, and the number of members was more than double, mounting from one hundred to two hundred and fifty-six. The chief additions came from the republics of Central and South America. The number of American governments represented rose, indeed, from two to nineteen. Twenty-one European, nineteen American, and four Asiatic states sent delegates to this Second Conference. Its membership illustrated excellently certain features of our day, among others the indubitable fact that we live in an age of world politics, that isolation no longer exists, either of nations or of hemispheres. The Conference was not European but international, — the majority of the states were non-European.

The Second Conference accomplished much useful work in the adoption of conventions regulating the actual conduct of war in more humane fashion, and in defining certain aspects of international law with greater precision than heretofore. But concerning compulsory arbitration and concerning disarmament or the limitation of armaments, nothing was achieved. It passed this resolution: "The Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 in regard to the restriction of military expenditures; and, since military expenditures have increased considerably in nearly every country since the said year, the Conference declares that it is highly desirable to see the governments take up the serious study of the question."

This Platonic resolution was adopted unanimously. A grim commentary on its importance in the eyes of the governments was contained in the history of the succeeding years with their ever-increasing military and naval appropriations, their tenser

rivalry, their deepening determination to be ready for whatever the future might have in store.

That future had in store, for 1912 and 1913, two desperate wars in the Balkan peninsula and, for 1914, an appalling cataclysm.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

We have seen with what enthusiasm the bloodless revolution of July 24, 1908, was hailed by all the races of Turkey. It seemed the brilliant dawn of a new era. It proved, however, to be the beginning of a long series of disasters for the Turkish Empire. From that day to the outbreak of the European War six years later the Balkan peninsula was the storm center of the world. Event succeeded event, swift, startling, and sensational, throwing a lengthening and deepening shadow before. No adequate description of these crowded years can be attempted here. Only an outline can be given indicating the successive stages of a portentous and absorbing drama.

The ease with which the Young Turks overthrew in those July days of 1908 the loathsome régime of Abdul Hamid, and the principles of freedom which they proclaimed, aroused the happiest anticipations, and enlisted the liveliest sympathy among multitudes within and without the Empire. The very atmosphere was charged with the hope and the expectation that the reign of liberty, equality, and fraternity was about to begin for this sorely visited land where unreason in all its forms had hitherto held sway. Would not Turkey, rejuvenated, modernized, and liberalized, strong in the loyalty and well-being of its citizens, freed from the blighting inheritance of the past, take an honorable place at last in the family of humane and progressive nations? Might not the old racial and religious feuds disappear under a new régime, where each locality would have a certain autonomy, large enough to ensure liberty in religion and in language Might not a strong national patriotism be developed out of the polyglot conditions by freedom, a thing which despotism had never been able to evoke? Might not Turkey become a stronger nation by adopting the principles of true toleration toward all her various races and religions? Had not the time come for the elimination of these primitive but hardy prejudices and animosities? Might not races and creeds be subordinated to a large and essential unity? Might not this be the final, though unexpected, solution of the famous Eastern Question?

Even in those golden days some doubted, not seeing any authentic signs of an impending millennium for that distracted corner of the world. At least the problem of so vast a transformation would be very difficult. The unanimity shown in the joyous destruction of the old system might not be shown in the construction of the new, as many precedents in European history suggested. If Turkey were left alone to concentrate her entire energy upon the impending work of reform, she might perhaps succeed. But she was not to be left alone now any more than she had been for centuries. The Eastern Question had long perplexed the powers of Europe, and had at the same time lured them on to seek their own advantage in its labyrinthine mazes. It was conspicuously an international problem. But the internal reform of Turkey might profoundly alter her international position by increasing the power of the Empire.

Thus it came about that the July Revolution of 1908 instantly riveted the attention of European powers and precipitated a series of startling events. Might not a reformed Turkey, animated with a new national spirit, with her army and finances reorganized and placed upon a solid basis, attempt to recover complete control of some of the possessions which, as we have seen, had been really, though not nominally and technically, torn from her — Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Crete, possibly Cyprus, possibly Egypt? There was very little evidence to show that the Young Turks had any such intention or dreamed of entering upon so hazardous an adventure. Indeed, it was quite apparent that they asked nothing better than to be left alone, fully recognizing the intricacy of their immediate problem, the need of quiet for its solution. But the extremity of one is the opportunity of another.

On October 3, 1908, Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria-Hungary announced, through autograph letters to various rulers, his decision to incorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina definitely within his Empire. These were Turkish provinces, handed over by the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to Austria-Hungary for "occupation" and administration, though they still remained officially under the suzerainty of the Porte. On October 5 Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed, amid great ceremony, the complete independence of Bulgaria from Turkish suzerainty, and assumed the title of Tsar. Two days later the Greek population of the island of Crete repudiated all connection with Turkey and declared for union with Greece. On the same day, October 7, Francis Joseph issued a proclamation to the

people of Bosnia and Herzegovina announcing the annexation of those provinces. Against this action Serbia protested vigorously to the powers, her parliament was immediately convoked, and the war spirit flamed up and threatened to get beyond control. Ferdinand was prepared to defend the independence of Bulgaria by going to war with Turkey, if necessary.

These startling events immediately aroused intense excitement throughout Europe. They constituted violent breaches of the Treaty of Berlin. The crisis precipitated by the actions of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria brought all the great powers, signatories of that treaty, upon the scene. It became quickly apparent that they did not agree. Germany made it clear that she would support Austria, and Italy seemed likely to do the same. The Triple Alliance, therefore, remained firm. In another group were Great Britain, France, and Russia, their precise position not clear, but plainly irritated at the defiance of the Treaty of Berlin. A tremendous interchange of diplomatic notes ensued. The British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, announced that Great Britain could not admit "the right of any power to alter an international treaty without the consent of the other parties to it," and demanded that, as the public law of the Balkans rested upon the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, and that as that treaty was made by all the great powers, it could only be revised by the great powers, meeting again in congress. But neither Austria nor Germany would listen to this suggestion. They knew that Russia could not intervene, lamed, as she was, by the disastrous war with Japan, with her army disorganized and her finances in bad condition. And they had no fear of Great Britain and France. Thus the Treaty of Berlin was flouted, although later the signatories of that treaty formally recognized the accomplished fact.

Of all the states the most aggrieved by these occurrences was Serbia, and the most helpless. For years the Serbians had entertained the ambition of uniting Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro, peopled by members of the same Serbian race, thus restoring the Serbian empire of the Middle Ages, and gaining access to the sea. This plan was blocked, apparently forever. Serbia could not expand to the west, as Austria barred the way with Bosnia and Herzegovina. She could not reach the sea. Thus she could get her products to market only with the consent of other nations. She alone of all the states in Europe, with the exception of Switzerland, was in this predicament. Fearing that she must thus become a vassal state, probably to her enemy,

Austria-Hungary; seeing all possibility of expansion ended, all hopes of combining the Serbs of the Balkans under her banner frustrated, the feeling was strong that war, even against desperate odds, was preferable to strangulation. However, she did not fly to arms. But the feeling of anger and alarm remained, an element in the general situation that could not be ignored, auguring ill for the future.

But trouble for the Young Turks came not only from the outside. It also came from inside and, as was shortly seen, it lay in large measure in their own unwisdom.

The new Turkish Parliament met in December, 1908, amid general enthusiasm. It consisted of two chambers, a Senate, appointed by the Sultan, and a Chamber of Deputies, elected by the people. Four months later events occurred which threatened the abrupt termination of this experiment in constitutional and parliamentary government. On April 13, 1909, without warning, thousands of troops in Constantinople broke into mutiny, killed some of their officers, denounced the Young Turks, and demanded the abolition of the constitution. The city was terrorized. At the same time sickening massacres occurred in Asia Minor, particularly at Adana, showing that the religious and racial animosities of former times had lost none of their force. It seemed that the new régime was about to founder utterly. A counter-revolution was to undo the work of July. But this counter-revolution was energetically suppressed by troops sent up from Salonica and Adrianople, and the Young Turks were soon in power again. Holding that the mutiny had been inspired and organized by the Sultan, who had corrupted the troops so that he might restore the old régime, they resolved to terminate his rule. On April 27, 1909, Abdul Hamid II was deposed, and was immediately taken as a prisoner of state to Salonica. He was succeeded by his brother, whom he had kept imprisoned many years. The new Sultan, Mohammed V, was in his sixty-fourth year. He at once expressed his entire sympathy with the aims of the Young Turks, his intention to be a constitutional monarch. The Young Turks were thus in power once more.

From the very beginning they failed. They did not rise to the height of their opportunity, they did not meet the expectations that had been aroused, they did not loyally live up to the principles they professed. They made no attempt to introduce the spirit of justice, of fair play toward the various elements of their highly composite empire. Instead of seeking to apply the

principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, they resorted to autocratic government, to domination by a single race, to the ruthless suppression of the rights of the people. They did just what the Germans did in Alsace-Lorraine and Posen, what the Russians did in Finland and in Poland, what the Austrians and Hungarians did with the Slavic peoples within their borders. The policy of oppression of subject races, the attempt at amalgamation by force and craft, provided Europe with much combustible material and the combustion finally came. The government of the Young Turks was just as despotic as that of Abdul Hamid and its outcome was the same, a further and decisive disruption of the Empire.

From the very first they showed their purpose. They, the Turks, that is the Mohammedan ruling race, determined to keep power absolutely in their own hands by hook or crook. In the very first elections to Parliament they arranged affairs so that they would have a majority over all other races combined. They did not intend to divide power with the Christian Greeks and Armenians or the Mohammedan Arabs. Their policy was one of Turkification, just as the Russian policy was one of Russification, the German of Germanization. They made no attempt to punish the perpetrators of the Adana massacres in which over thirty thousand Armenian Christians were slaughtered. The Armenian population was thus alienated from them. They tried to suppress the liberties which under all previous régimes the Orthodox Greek Church had enjoyed. As they intended to subject all the races of the Empire to their own race, so they intended to suppress by force all religious privileges. They thus offended and infuriated the Greeks, whom they also alarmed and embittered by a commercial boycott because the Greeks would not agree to their repressive policy in regard to the Cretans. Their treatment of Macedonia was the acme of folly. They sought to reënforce the Moslem elements of the population by bringing in Moslems from other regions. This aroused the Christian elements, Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian. Large numbers of these Christians fled from Macedonia to Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, carrying with them their grievances, urging the governments of those countries to hostility against the Turks.

The Turks went a step farther. In the west were the Albanians, a Moslem people who had hitherto combined local independence with loyal and appreciated services to the Turkish authorities, in both the army and the government. The Turks decided

to suppress this independence and to make the Albanians submit in all matters to the authorities at Constantinople. But the Albanians had been for centuries remarkable fighters. They now flew to arms. Year after year the Albanian rebellion broke out, only temporarily subdued or smothered by the Turks, who thus exhausted their strength and squandered their resources in fruitless but costly efforts to "pacify" these hardy, war-loving mountaineers.

Thus only a few years of Young Turk rule were necessary to create a highly critical situation, so numerous were the disaffected elements. There had been no serious attempt to regenerate Turkey, to bring together the various races on the basis of liberty for all. Turkey lost hundreds of thousands of its Christian subjects who fled to surrounding countries rather than endure the odious oppression. These exiles did what they could to hit back at their oppressors.

The Young Turks from the very beginning failed as reformers because they were untrue to their promises. Their failure led to war in the Balkans and the war in the Balkans led to the European War. They spent their time in endeavoring to assert themselves as a race of masters. They sowed the wind and they quickly reaped the whirlwind.

THE TURKO–ITALIAN WAR OF 1911

While the Turkish Empire was in this highly perturbed condition and while the Balkan states were aglow with indignation at the treatment being meted out to the members of their races resident in Macedonia and were trembling with the desire to act, trouble flared up for the Young Turks in another quarter. Italy had for years been casting longing eyes on the territories which fringe the southern shores of the Mediterranean. She had once hoped to acquire Tunis but had unexpectedly found herself forestalled by France, which seized that country in 1881. At the same time England began her occupation of Egypt. All that remained, therefore, was Tripoli, like Egypt a part of the Turkish Empire. For many years the thought that this territory ought to belong to Italy had been accepted as axiomatic in influential quarters in the Italian government and diplomatic circles. Schemes had been worked out and partly put into force for a "pacific penetration" of an economic character of this land. Now, however, the time seemed to have arrived to seize it outright. Austria-Hungary had annexed Bosnia and Herze-

govina, and Bulgaria had declared her independence in 1908, and there had been no successful opposition on the part of Turkey or of any of the Great Powers. Was not this the ripe moment for Italy's project?

She evidently thought so, for, in September, 1911, she sent her warships to Tripoli and began the conquest of that country. It proved a more difficult undertaking than had been imagined. While she seized the coast towns, her hold on them was precarious and her progress into the interior was slow and costly, owing to the fact that the Turks aroused and directed the natives against the invaders. Italy had given her ally, Austria-Hungary, to understand that she would not attack Turkey directly in Europe, as European Turkey was a veritable tinder-box which, if it once caught fire, might blaze up into a devastating and incalculable conflagration. But as month after month went by and Italy was producing only an uncertain effect in Tripoli, she resolved on more decisive action nearer Constantinople, hoping to bring the Turks to terms. She attacked and seized Rhodes and eleven other Turkish islands in the Ægean, the Dodecannese. This, and the fact that an Albanian revolution against the Turks was at the same time attaining alarming proportions, made the latter ready to conclude peace with Italy so that they might be free to put down the Albanians. On October 15, 1912, was signed at Ouchy, or Lausanne, a treaty whereby Turkey relinquished Tripoli. It was also provided that Italy should withdraw her troops from the Dodecannese as soon as the Turkish troops were withdrawn from Tripoli, a phrase about which it was easy to quibble later.

The great significance of this war did not lie in the fact that Italy acquired a new colony. It lay in the fact that it began again the process, arrested since 1878, of the violent dismemberment of the Turkish Empire; that it revealed the military weakness of that Empire, powerless to preserve its integrity; and, what is most important, that it contributed directly and greatly to a far more serious attack upon Turkey by the Balkan states, which, in turn, led to the European War. The tinder-box was lighted and a general European conflagration resulted. The Italian attack upon Tripoli was momentous in its consequences.

THE BALKAN WARS

During the war the Balkan states were negotiating with each other with a view to united action against Turkey. This union

was not easy to bring about, as Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece disliked each other intensely, for historical, racial, sentimental reasons, too numerous and too complex to be described here. However, they disliked the Turks more and they were suffering constantly from the Turks. Terrible persecutions, even massacres of the Christians in Macedonia in which large numbers of Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbians lost their lives, inflamed the people of those states with the desire to liberate their brothers in Macedonia. By doing this they would also increase their own territories and diminish or end an odious tyranny. These nations found it possible to unite for the purpose of overwhelming the Turks; they might not find it possible to agree as to the partition among themselves of any territories they might acquire, since here their old, established ambitions and antipathies might conflict. It was because of the strength of these rivalries and hatreds that neither the Turks nor the outside powers considered an alliance of the Balkan states as at all among the possibilities. But the statesmen of their Balkans had learned something from the troubled history of the peninsula, and saw the folly of continuing their dissensions. They also realized that now was their chance, that they might never again find their common enemy so weak and demoralized, the general European situation so favorable.

Thus it came about that in October, 1912, the four Balkan states, Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, made war on Turkey. The war was brief and an overwhelming success for the allies. Fighting began on October 15, the very day of the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne between Italy and Turkey, although technically the declarations of war were not issued until October 18. The Greeks pushed northward into Macedonia, gaining several victories over the enemy, and on November 8, only three weeks after the beginning of the campaign, they entered the important city and port of Salonica, with Crown Prince Constantine at their head. Farther west the Serbians and Montenegrins were also successful. The Serbians won a great victory at Kumanovo where they avenged the defeat of their ancestors at Kossova which they had not forgotten for five hundred years. They then captured Monastir.

Meanwhile the Bulgarians, who had the larger armies, had gone from victory to victory, defeating the Turks brilliantly in the battles of Kirk Kilissé and Lulé Burgas. The latter was one of the great battles of modern times, three hundred and fifty thousand troops being involved in fierce, tenacious struggle for

three days. The result was the destruction of the military power of the Turks. By the middle of November the Bulgarians had reached the Chataldja line of fortifications, which extend from the Sea of Marmora to the Black Sea. Only twenty-five miles beyond them lay Constantinople.

The collapse of the Turkish power in Europe was nearly complete. Only the very important fortresses of Adrianople in the east, and Janina and Scutari in the west, had not fallen. In a six weeks' campaign Turkish possessions in Europe had shrunk to Constantinople and the twenty-five-mile stretch west to the Chataldja fortifications. This overthrow and collapse came as a staggering surprise to the Turks, to the Balkan allies themselves, and to the Great Powers. The Ottoman Empire in Europe had ceased to exist, with the exception of Constantinople, Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari. The military prestige of Turkey was gone.

In December delegates from the various states met in London to make peace. They were unsuccessful because Bulgaria demanded the surrender of Adrianople, which the Turks flatly refused. In March, 1913, therefore, the war was resumed. One after another the fortresses fell, Janina on March 6, Adrianople on March 26, Scutari on April 23. Turkey was now compelled to accept terms of peace. On May 30, the Treaty of London was signed. It provided that a line should be drawn from Enos on the Ægean Sea to Midia on the Black Sea and that all Turkey west of that line should be ceded to the allies, except a region of undefined dimensions on the Adriatic, Albania, whose boundaries and status should be determined by the Great Powers. Crete was ceded to the Great Powers, and the decision as to the islands in the Ægean which Greece had seized was also left to them. In December, 1913, Crete was incorporated in the kingdom of Greece. The Sultan's dominions in Europe had shrunk nearly to the vanishing point. After five centuries of proud possession he found himself almost expelled from Europe, retaining still Constantinople and only enough territory round about to protect it. This great achievement was the work of the four Balkan states, united for once in the common work of liberation. The Great Powers had done nothing. Europe felt relieved, however, that so great a change as this in the map of the Balkan peninsula had been effected without involving the Great Powers in war.

The Treaty of London, however, had not long to live. No sooner had the Balkan states conquered Turkey than they fell to fighting among themselves over the division of the spoils.

The responsibility for this calamity does not rest solely with them. It rests in part with the Great Powers, particularly with Austria and Italy. It was the intervention of these powers and their insistence upon the creation of a new independent state, Albania, out of a part of the territory now relinquished by the Turks, that precipitated a crisis whose very probable issue would be war. For the creation of this new state on the Adriatic coast absolutely prevented Serbia from realizing one of her most passionate and legitimate ambitions, an outlet to the sea, an escape from her land-locked condition which placed her at the mercy of her neighbors.

Before beginning the war with the Turks, Serbia and Bulgaria had defined their future spheres of influence in upper Macedonia, should the war result in their favor. The larger part of Macedonia should go to Bulgaria, and Serbia's gains should be chiefly in the west, including the longed-for Adriatic seacoast. But now Albania was planted there and Serbia was as land-locked as ever. Austria was resolved that Serbia should under no conditions become an Adriatic state. She had always been opposed to the aggrandizement of Serbia, because she had millions of Serbs under her own rule who might be attracted to an independent Serbia, enlarged and with prestige heightened. Moreover she believed that Serbia would be the pawn of Russia, and she would not tolerate Russia's influence on her southern borders and along the Adriatic, if she could help it. She did not propose to be less important in those waters than she had been in the past. Therefore Serbia must be excluded from the Adriatic. It was the blocking of Serbia's outlet to the sea that caused the second Balkan war between the allies. Intense was the indignation of the Serbians, but they could do nothing. They therefore sought as partial compensation larger territories in Macedonia than their treaty with Bulgaria had assigned them, arguing, correctly enough, that the conditions had greatly changed from those contemplated when that agreement was made and that the new conditions justified and necessitated a new arrangement. But here they encountered the stubborn opposition of Bulgaria, which refused any concessions along this line and insisted upon the strict observance of the treaty. Instantly the old, bitter hatred of these two countries for each other flamed up again. The Serbians insisted that the expulsion of the Turks had been the work of all the allies and that there should be a fair division of the territories acquired in the name of all. On the other hand, the Bulgarians argued that it had been they who had done

the heavy fighting in the war, which was true, that they had furnished by far the larger number of troops, that it was their victories at Kirk Kilissé and Lulé Burgas that had annihilated the power of the Turks in Europe, that they were entitled to annex territories in Macedonia which they declared were peopled by Bulgarians. Other considerations also entered into the situation.

Suffice it to say that Bulgaria intended to have her way. Her army was elated by the recent astounding successes, was rather contemptuous of the Serbians and Greeks, emphatically minimized the services rendered by these to the common cause, thought that it could easily conquer both if necessary, and could take what territories it chose. It was Bulgaria, whose war party had lost all sense of proportion, all sense of the rights of her former allies, that began the new struggle. She treacherously attacked Greece and Serbia at the end of June, 1913. Fierce fighting ensued for several days.

Bulgaria's action in plunging into this avoidable conflict was all the more foolhardy as her relations with her northern neighbor, Roumania, were also unsettled and precarious. Roumania had demanded that Bulgaria cede her a strip of territory in the northeast of Bulgaria, in order that the balance of power among the Balkan states might remain practically what it had been. Bulgaria had refused this so-called compensation. The result was that Roumania also now went to war with Bulgaria. The Turks, too, seeing a chance to recover some of the land they had recently lost, plunged into the mêlée.

Thus Bulgaria was confronted on all sides by enemies. She was at war with five states, not three, for Montenegro was also involved. By the middle of July she saw that the case was hopeless and consented to make peace, by the Treaty of Bucharest, signed August 10, 1913, by which Serbia and Greece secured larger possessions than they had ever anticipated, and by which Roumania was given the territory she desired. Turkey also recovered a large area which she had lost the year before, including the important city and fortress of Adrianople. All this was at the expense of Bulgaria, who paid for her arrogance and unconciliatory temper by losing much territory which she would otherwise have secured, by seeing her former and hated allies victorious over her in the field and in annexations of territory which she regarded as rightfully hers. Bulgaria was deeply embittered by all this and only waited for an opportunity to tear up the Treaty of Bucharest which she refused to consider as morally binding,

as in any sense a permanent settlement of the Balkans. The year 1913 will remain of bitter memory in the minds of all Bulgarians.

The two Balkan wars cost heavily in human life and in treasure. Turkey and Bulgaria each lost over 150,000 in killed and

wounded, Serbia over 70,000, Greece nearly as many, little Montenegro over 10,000. The losses among non-combatants were heavy in those who died from starvation, or disease, or massacre, for the second war was one of indisputable atrocity. On the

other hand, Montenegro, Greece, and Serbia had nearly doubled in size. Bulgaria and Roumania had grown. The Turkish Empire in Europe was limited to a comparatively small area.

We must now examine the reaction of all these profound and astonishing changes in the Balkans upon Europe in general. In other words, we must study the causes of the war of 1914. For the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 were a prelude to the European War of 1914. The sequence of events from the Turkish Revolution of July, 1908, to the Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia in July, 1914, is direct, unmistakable, disastrous. Each year added a link to the lengthening chain of iron. The map of Europe was thrown into the flames. What the new map would be no one could foresee.

It may be said in passing that the new Albanian state proved a fiasco from the start and that it disappeared completely when the war began in August, 1914, the powers that had created it withdrawing their support and its German prince, William of Wied, leaving for Germany, where he joined the army that was fighting France. He had meanwhile announced his abdication in a high-flown manifesto.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE WORLD WAR

In August, 1913, the long-drawn-out crisis in the Balkans seemed safely over with the Treaty of Bucharest, to the apparent satisfaction of the people of Europe. It had not resulted in what had been greatly feared, a European war. That had been avoided and the world breathed more freely. But that this feeling was not shared by the governments of Austria and Germany has since been revealed. Though this was not publicly known until more than a year afterward, it is now established that on August 9, 1913, the day before the Treaty of Bucharest was formally signed, Austria informed her ally, Italy, that she proposed to take action against Serbia. She represented this proposed action as defensive and as therefore justifying her in expecting the aid of Italy under the terms of the treaty of the Triple Alliance. Italy through her prime minister, Giolitti, refused to accede to this view, stating that such a war would not be one of defense on the part of Austria, as no one was thinking of attacking her. The treaty of Triple Alliance required its members to aid each other only in the case of a defensive war forced upon a colleague. Austria, then, planned war upon Serbia in August, 1913. Whether she was restrained from it by the knowledge that Italy would not support her or by other considerations is a matter for conjecture.

Prince von Bülow, who for nine years had been Chancellor of Germany, has declared that the collapse of Turkey was a blow to Germany, which meant that it imperiled the plans which Germany was nourishing for expansion or influence in the Balkans and the East. It was on this ground that in 1913 new army and taxation bills, extraordinarily increasing Germany's preparedness for war, were carried through. This inevitably led to similar, though not to as sweeping, legislation in France.

Austria and Germany, therefore, were far from pleased at the outcome of events in the Balkans, and the former, a great European state of fifty millions, was planning action by arms against Serbia, a nation of now perhaps four millions, a nation both exhausted and elated by two years of war. Of course

Austria knew that any such action would bring Russia upon the scene, and that was the reason for her desiring the eventual support of her two allies. While, for reasons that are somewhat obscure, Austria finally did not consider the moment opportune for making war on Serbia in August, 1913, she did consider it opportune in July, 1914, and from her action at that time came swiftly and dramatically the Great War.

The relations of Austria-Hungary and Serbia have already been alluded to, the former's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, and her part in the creation of the new state of Albania for the same purpose, to prevent Serbia's getting any outlet to the sea. Yet, though successful in this, she had not been able to prevent the growth of Serbia. Serbia had, however, submitted in 1908 and 1909 and in 1913, to demands which emanated from Austria-Hungary and which were deeply humiliating. On both sides there was, as there had long been, plenty of bad blood.

ASSASSINATION OF ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND

Suddenly a horrible crime occurred which set in motion a mighty and lamentable train of events. On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, and heir to the throne, was, with his wife, assassinated in the streets of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The men who had done the infamous deed were Austrian subjects, natives of Bosnia. But they were Serbians by race. An outburst of intense indignation followed against the Serbians, "a nation of assassins," it was declared. Serbia was, by Austrian opinion, held responsible, although the crime occurred on Austrian soil and was committed by Austrian subjects, and although Austrian methods of rule in Bosnia were of such a character as sufficiently to account for the dastardly crime. At any rate, the desire for war was expressed in many Austrian newspapers, which held the Serbian Government responsible.

But four weeks went by and the Austrian Government took no action. No information could be obtained by the diplomats in Vienna as to what she proposed to do. They saw no reason for any particular worry, as the Government was evidently so self-contained, and they therefore took their usual vacations. It was intimated that Austria would make some demands upon Serbia, but that they would be of a moderate character. There was wide-spread sympathy with her and a general feeling that

she would be justified in demanding certain things of Serbia. The representatives of the various European governments were kept in ignorance. A despatch, which was destined to shake the very foundations of the world, was being fashioned in utter silence and mystery.

THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM

On July 23, Austria delivered this despatch to Serbia. It began by accusing the Serbian Government of not having fulfilled the obligations it had assumed in 1909 toward Austria. It demanded that the Serbian Government should publish an official statement, the terms of which were dictated in the despatch, expressing its disapproval of the propaganda in Serbia against Austria-Hungary and its regret that Serbian officials had taken part in this propaganda. In the despatch the murder of the Archduke was ascribed to that propaganda. Then followed ten demands upon the Serbian Government concerning the suppression of the Pan-Serbian propaganda carried on by the newspapers and the secret societies of Serbia. The despatch demanded that the Serbian Government should suppress any publication which fostered hatred of and contempt for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, should take the most comprehensive measures for the suppression and extinction of the secret societies, should eliminate from the schools all teachers and from text-books anything that served or might serve to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, should remove from the army and from government positions all officials involved in the same propaganda, whose names the Austrian Government reserved the right to communicate, and that Serbia should accept the co-operation of Austrian officials in the work of investigating the conspiracy of June 28. Other clauses in this fateful despatch concerned the arrest of the accomplices in the assassination and the prevention of the trade in arms and explosives across the frontier. Annexed to the despatch was a memorandum asserting that the murder of the Archduke and the Archduchess had been plotted in Serbia and had been executed through the complicity of Serbian officials.

This despatch, harsh in its language, dictatorial in its demands, was an ultimatum, for it required the acceptance of it in its entirety within forty-eight hours, and it allowed no time for investigation or discussion of the charges made and the problems created by the peremptory demand. No nation would issue

such a note to an equal without intending and without desiring war. Issued to a power vastly inferior, it could mean only unprecedented humiliation or national extinction, if followed up at the expiration of forty-eight hours.

This Austrian ultimatum created a grave crisis. The ultimatum was not a passionate and unreflecting outburst of the Austrian Government, swept away by a natural anger at the foul murders. It was a cold-blooded and deliberate document, composed after four weeks of secret preparation. The Russian ambassador had not been told that it was coming and had left Vienna for his vacation. The Italian Government had not been informed, although it was an ally and was particularly concerned with anything that affected the Balkan peninsula in any way or part. In this fact Italy was to find her justification for remaining neutral when the war finally broke out, as she regarded that war as an aggressive one begun by Austria. The ultimatum gave Serbia the alternative of accepting egregiously humiliating conditions, practically reducing her to the state of a vassal of Austria, or of accepting war.

England, France, and Russia tried to induce Austria to extend her time limit as the only way in which diplomacy might seek to act in the matter; as, moreover, required if the relations of nations were to be governed by a reasonable consideration for each other's rights or wishes. Their efforts were in vain. They then turned to Serbia, urging her, in the interests of Europe in general, to make her answer as conciliatory as possible. The result was that Serbia in her reply yielded to the greater part of what Austria demanded and that she offered, in case Austria was not satisfied with her answer, to refer the question to the Hague Tribunal or to a conference of the Great Powers.

No state ever made a more complete submission under particularly humiliating circumstances. Austria, however, immediately declared the Serbian answer unsatisfactory and prepared for war. She well knew that such action would necessarily draw Russia into the controversy. She had every reason a state could have for knowing that, after the defiance of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, another attack upon a small Slavic people would deeply offend the leading Slavic power. Austria could not and did not expect to be able to wreak her vengeance upon Serbia without having to take Russia into account. Hers, therefore, is the responsibility for a deliberate and highly dangerous provocation of a great state. Russia, a Slavic power, could not be ignored by Teutonic powers in

Lincoln Sea
Markham I.
Hazen Ld.
Wyckoff
Heilprin Ld.
Grant Ld.
East Greenld
Hall Ld.
Grinnell Ld.
Washington Ld.
Academy Ld.
Ellesmere
Inglefield Ld.
Lincoln Ld.
Prudhoe Ld.
Pr. Patrick I.
Parry Is
GREENLAND
Melville I.
Bathurst
North Devon
Melville Sd.
BAFFIN BAY
Upernivik
Barrow Str.
Pr. Albert Land
Baffin Ld.
Davis Str.
C. Barrow
Arctic Circle
Yukon
Dawson
Klondike
Ft. Norman
Great Bear L.
ALASKA
Great Slave L.
Hudson Bay
Ft. Churchill
Lawrence I.
St. Paul
Sitka
Queen Charlotte I.
Vancouver I.
Victoria
Portland
Winnipeg
Labrador
Aleutian Is
Minneapolis
Quebec
Montreal
St. John's
Newfoundland
Halifax
Chicago
New York
Boston
Washington
Philadelphia
Denver
San Francisco
St. Louis
UNITED STATES
New Orleans
Charleston
Bermuda Is.
Necker I.
Tropic of Cancer
Honolulu
Hawaii
Johnston I.
Mazatlan
Mexico
Revilla Gigedo Is.
Acapulco
Havana
Progreso
Jamaica
HAITI
Trinidad
Caracas
Curaçao
Palmyra
Fanning I.
Howland I.
Christmas I.
Clipperton I.
Equator
Cocos I.
Galapagos Is.
Quito
Phoenix Is.
Malden
Starbuck Is.
Tokelau Is.
Manihiki Is.
Wallis I.
Savaroi I.
Marquesa Is.
Apia
Samoa
Pagopago
Society Is.
Cook I.
Tahiti
Niue
Hull I.
Tongatabu
Tabuai
Tropic of Capricorn
Rapa I.
Pitcairn I.
Sister I
Warekauri Is.
Lima
Antofagasta
Sabre
Salay Gomez
S. Ambrosio
Valparaiso
Mas a tuera
Juan Fernandez
Santiago
Pernambuco
Bahia
Rio de Janeiro
Asuncion
PARAGUAY
URUGUAY
Montevidio
Buenos Aires
Tristan da Cunha
Falkland Is.
Magellan St.
Tierra del Fuego
Staten I.
C. Horn
S. Georgia I.
Sandwich I.
Elephant I.
S. Orkney
S. Shetland
Graham Land
Alexander I. Land
Florida
Bahama Is.
West Long to Greenwich
Gr. Abaco
Sabloy
Nassau
Bahama
Andros
Tueyan Is.
Tropic of Cancer
Havana
Cuba
Gr. Inagua
Caicos I
Ide Pinos
Gr. Cayman
Jamaica
Haiti
Santa Domingo
S. Juan
Kingston
Santo Domingo
Porto Rico
Virgin Is.
St. Thomas
Montserrat
Barbuda
Guadeloupe
Dominica
Martinique
St. Lucia
Barbados
St. Vincent
Grenada
Tobago
Trinidad
Margarita
Curavao
Aruba
Buen Ayre
CARIBBEAN SEA
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Colombia
Venezuela
WEST INDIES
British
French
United States
Danish
Dutch
W. Long from Greenwich
COLONI
EUROP

OCEAN
ASIA
RUSSIAN EMPIRE
SIBERIA
CHINESE EMPIRE
JAPANESE EMPIRE
INDIA
INDIAN OCEAN
AUSTRALIA
Arctic Circle
Tropic of Cancer
Equator
Tropic of Capricorn
Antarctic Circle
East Longitude from Greenwich
French
Spanish
Danish
Belgian
SSESSIONS
POWERS

determining the future of Slavic peoples. If there was a single well-known fact in the whole domain of European politics it was that Russia was greatly interested in the fate of the Slav states of the Balkans. If there was any other well-established commonplace of European politics, it was this, that every Balkan question has always been considered as of general concern, as distinctly international. As a matter of fact, Serbia's obligations of 1909, already referred to, were undertaken to the Powers, not to Austria alone.

It is not unlikely that Austria and Germany believed that Russia, when confronted with the grim, blunt choice of war with them or abandonment of all support of Serbia, would do what she had done in 1908 and 1909, and bend before the challenge, leaving the Serbs to their own resources. Thus the Central Powers would emerge from this diplomatic brush with an easy and signal victory, with heightened prestige in Europe, and with a very clear indication to all the powers that the latter would, at their peril, seek to intervene in the solution of Balkan questions, which would henceforth be considered a closed field, reserved for the Central Powers alone. A word to the wise, when uttered with this emphasis, might prove sufficient. But, if Austria and Germany entertained these views, they also knew full well the risk involved in case Russia's attitude should prove different from that of 1908.

Austria's official position, then, was that her action concerned herself and Serbia alone; that no other nation or nations were involved or had any rights in the matter. In this she was supported from start to finish by Germany. Both Austria and Germany were aware that warlike steps against Serbia might bring Russia into the question and that, owing to the obligations of the Triple and Dual Alliances, a general European war might result, yet both steadily refused to consider that Russia had any right to intervene; it was all a matter solely between the two, Austria and Serbia.

Russia, however, did not take this view. Her warnings having proved unavailing, when Austria began to prepare for the attack upon Serbia, Russia began to mobilize. The policy of Germany through that last week of July was to support Austria in her contention that this was her affair. She asserted that the quarrel was solely one between those two and that no outside power had the right to intervene, that, if the trouble could be kept confined to those two, there would be no general disturbance of the peace, that if the Tsar, however, interfered

there would be "on account of the various alliances, inconceivable consequences." If this was all that Germany did for peace, which she asserts she made every effort to maintain, then she did simply nothing, for this policy of "localization of the conflict" begged the whole question. It assumed that neither Russia nor any other power was in any way concerned. This was an absolutely untenable position in the light of history, of reason, of interest. The question was a part of the Eastern Question which over and over had been considered and known to be emphatically international. No aspect of that question was to be left to the determination of a state of fifty millions in conflict with one of four or five.

ENGLAND'S PROPOSAL

A proposal was made by England that the question at issue should be submitted to a conference to be held in London by the Great Powers not directly concerned, namely Germany, France, England, and Italy. Perhaps these four might bring about the adjustment of the difficulties between Serbia and Austria and Russia. Russia signified her willingness, but the proposal was declined by Germany. Other suggestions of a somewhat similar nature looking toward delay and diplomatic discussion or mediation likewise fell before the opposition or indifference of Germany. Then when England asked Germany herself to suggest some method of mediation for the preservation of peace, she had nothing to suggest. She simply reaffirmed her position that the whole matter concerned merely Austria and Serbia. She was willing to appeal and did appeal to Russia to keep out, to refrain from mobilizing, but her appeal was always based on this thesis that the quarrel did not concern Russia, but did concern simply Austria and Serbia, a point of view which, naturally, Russia did not and could not share. Germany was ready to co-operate with other powers in bringing pressure to bear upon Russia, but not upon her ally Austria, who had begun the whole trouble and to whom she gave a free hand in her procedure toward Serbia.

The attitudes of Germany and Russia were irreconcilable. Germany held that Russia should allow Austria entire liberty of action. Russia believed that Austria's uncompromising and violent procedure demanded a Russian mobilization "directed solely against Austria-Hungary" as the only method that might cause that country to moderate her procedure and induce her

to recognize the rights of others. If Russia remained inactive, then Austria would do what she liked with Serbia. Russia emphatically claimed the right to be consulted in the settlement of Balkan matters. Austria had mobilized and on July 28 had begun a war upon Serbia. Russia accordingly ordered a general mobilization along the Austrian and German frontiers as a warning to both powers that she was prepared to defend Serbia if attacked, and that she was in earnest and would not acquiesce this time as she had in 1908, owing to her weakened condition after the Japanese war, in a threat of the two Central Powers to have their way in the Balkans. Germany considered this action a menace to herself, and on July 31 sent an ultimatum to Russia demanding that Russia begin to demobilize her army within twelve hours: otherwise Germany would mobilize. As Russia did not reply to this peremptory demand, Germany, on August 1, declared that a state of war existed between Russia and Germany. The German declaration of war against Russia was followed on August 3 by one against France, which the Germans intended to crush as they intended to crush Russia and so to cripple her as to prevent her for ever from crossing their path again. As the German constitution forbade the Emperor to declare war except in the case of invasion of Germany by the enemy a preposterous charge was made, for which no proofs were given and which the Germans later admitted was without foundation, that French airplanes had attacked Nuremberg. Not only was the accusation both frivolous and false but France had, on the contrary, in order to avoid all appearance of provocation withdrawn her troops ten kilometers behind the French frontier.

We have seen that the Dual Alliance was the inevitable outcome of the existence and power of the Triple Alliance, concluded between Germany, Austria, and Italy in 1882. The Dual Alliance grew out of the need, which both Russia and France felt, of outside support in the presence of so powerful a combination. If there was to be anything like a balance of power in Europe, Russia and France must combine. Both alliances were defensive. The action of Austria against Serbia brought Russia upon the scene. Russia's action brought Germany forward. Germany's action necessitated action on the part of France.

One state was free to act as it saw fit, its conduct not controlled by any entangling alliance, England. The Triple and Dual Alliances rested on definite treaties, neither of which had been made public, and imposed obligations upon the contracting

parties. There had in recent years also grown up what was called the Triple Entente. The commercial rivalry of Germany and England, during the past fifteen or twenty years, expressing itself in a struggle for markets, in colonial competitions, in a striking development of naval power, had been an outstanding fact in recent European history. Great Britain, seeing that her policy of isolation was possibly becoming dangerous with so active and successful a rival in the field, sought, in the first decade of the twentieth century, to settle long-continued misunderstandings with France and Russia. This she did by a treaty with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907. These agreements settled certain problems and provided certain measures in common, the former in Africa, the latter in Asia. During succeeding diplomatic crises the three powers worked in substantial harmony. But the Triple Entente was not an alliance: it was simply a diplomatic group that might be found working together when the interests of its members happened to coincide. There was no actual alliance between Great Britain and France and there was no understanding of any kind between Great Britain and Russia, with regard to any European policy or contingency. When the crisis of 1914 arose Great Britain was free to act as she chose, in the light of what she considered her interests. The diplomatic correspondence shows that this was understood in Berlin and Vienna as it was understood in Paris and St. Petersburg.

But while Great Britain had no alliances that necessarily involved her in the present war, yet as a European power, and as a great, imperial, colonial state, she had many and important interests for which she must care. It was for her interest that there should be no European war and it was also for the interest of Europe and the world. The negotiations of that week in July, from the issuance of the ultimatum to Serbia to the declarations of war, abundantly demonstrate that she made earnest, repeated, and varied efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problems that had been so suddenly thrust forward. She was wedded to no particular scheme or formula and invited Germany to make suggestions that might effect the adjustment, if dissatisfied with hers. But despite her efforts a war had come involving at least four large states, Austria, Russia, Germany, and France, and one small state, Serbia. Would the conflagration spread? What would England do?

It was certainly not to her interest that France should be conquered by Germany, as that would reduce France to the

position of a satellite and would immensely augment the power and prestige of Germany. And if Germany were to conquer Russia and France, she, the mightiest military power in the world, would henceforth dominate the continent and would constitute a grave menace to England herself and to her colonial empire. Their turn would come next. If England cared to continue to exist as a Great Power she must bestir herself now. Later it would be too late. Moreover, England was bound in honor to prevent any attack upon the Atlantic seacoast of France, as, since 1912, she had had a naval agreement with France whereby the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean in order that England might keep larger naval forces in the home waters. It seems probable that England would have been drawn into the war necessarily if France was attacked, which was, of course, the purpose of Germany. But her participation was rendered inevitable by Germany's attack upon Belgium.

Three of the small states of Europe, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland, had been by international agreements declared neutral territory forever. By these agreements the countries concerned should never make war, nor should they ever be attacked. The powers that signed the treaties bound themselves to respect and preserve that neutrality. The treaty guaranteeing the neutralization of Belgium was signed by England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. For over eighty years that obligation had been scrupulously observed. Now, on August 2, Germany sent an ultimatum to Belgium, demanding that she allow the German armies to cross her territory, promising to evacuate it after peace was concluded, and stating that, if she refused, her fate would be determined by the fortunes of war. Belgium replied that she had always been faithful to her international obligations, that the attack upon her independence would constitute a flagrant violation of international law, that she would not sacrifice her honor and at the same time be recreant to her duty toward Europe, but that her army would resist the invader to the utmost of its ability.

As Austria's ultimatum of July 23 meant the annihilation of the independence of one small state, Serbia, Germany's ultimatum of August 2 meant the annihilation of the independence of another small state, Belgium. Germany's action was the baser and the more dishonorable, as she had formally and by treaty promised to respect the neutrality of the country which she was now about to destroy.

GERMANY VIOLATES NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM

The reason for this action was that the easiest way for German armies to get into France was over Belgian soil. Germany intended to crush France as rapidly as possible, then to turn upon Russia and crush her. The invasion of France direct from Germany would necessarily be slower, if possible at all, as that frontier was strongly fortified. The official statement of the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, made in the Reichstag on August 4, declared that Germany was acting in self-defense: "Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law. The French Government has, it is true, notified Brussels that it would respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as the enemy respected it. But we know that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we have been obliged to ignore the just protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The injustice, I speak frankly, the injustice that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened and is fighting for his highest possessions can think only of one thing, how he is to hack his way through." Thus the official, authoritative spokesman of Germany pronounced her own act unjust, thereby proclaiming the faithfulness of Belgium to all her obligations, admitted that Germany was doing Belgium a wrong, and that the action was in defiance of the law of nations. It was justified by necessity, he said.

A nation of sixty-five millions attacked a nation of seven millions, whose neutrality it had sworn to maintain, because, as the German Secretary of State, Jagow, said on that same August 4, with frankness, "they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them."

ENGLAND ENTERS THE WAR

England could correctly assert that she had worked for peace "up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment." Now she entered the war because she had vital interests in the

independence of Belgium, and because of her explicit treaty obligations. For hundreds of years her policy had been to prevent the control of the Belgian coasts from being a menace to her own coast across the narrow channel, as they would be in the hands of a strong military power. Over this question England had fought or acted repeatedly for centuries against the Spaniards, against the French; now it was to be against the Germans. That in protecting her vital interests she would also be keeping her solemn promises and defending a small and peaceful state against the wanton aggression of a ruthless and mighty military power, engaged, according to its own admission, in a flagrant violation of the law of nations, was to her vast moral advantage in securing the spontaneous sympathy and support of her own people and widespread approval beyond her borders.

On the 23d of July, 1914, there was a dull midsummer peace in Europe. By August 4 seven nations were at war. The responsibility for this tragic, monstrous, unnecessary crime against civilization, against humanity, was lightly assumed. The situation was created by the authorized heads of various states. Any power that in that crisis showed a willingness to delay, to negotiate, to confer, was working in the interest of peace. Any power that declined to do this, that adopted a peremptory attitude, that issued ultimatums with incredibly short time limits, hastened the appalling entanglement and was ready for war, whether it desired or intended it or not.

The opinion of the outside world as to where that responsibility lies has been overwhelmingly expressed. That opinion was shared by a state that had for thirty-two years been the ally of Austria and Germany and was an ally in August, 1914. When asked on August 1, by the German ambassador, what were Italy's intentions, the Italian Government replied through its Minister of Foreign Affairs that "as the war undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy would not be able to take part in the war."

There are those who would place the responsibility of the war, not simply upon Austria and Germany, but upon the Great Powers generally. The bitter rivalries and hatreds of the nations, running back for generations, their efforts to score advantages over each other at every possible point and in every field, their malevolent and suspicious and intriguing diplomacies,

their frenzied competition for colonies and markets and raw materials and armies and navies, in short, their soaring and conflicting ambitions, these, it is asserted, and not the Austro-Serbian dispute, were the deep and therefore the true causes of the war and consequently, as all were involved in these ruinous rivalries, all were responsible for the final calamity. Clashing imperialisms, we are told, caused the war and as the imperialisms of England and France and Russia had on the whole been more successful than those of Germany and Austria, they must not be allowed to escape their full share of guilt in the settled judgment of mankind. Inflammable material was all about and consequently a fire broke out, apparently by spontaneous combustion.

To this explanation of the origin of the war it may be replied that imperialisms do not clash of themselves, that they are not impersonal forces subject to no human control, that as a matter of fact they are directed at any given moment, and were in July, 1914 by certain individuals, and that consequently it is both pertinent and imperative to inquire what the actual conduct of those individuals, the chiefs of states, was in that crisis. Because there are sources of friction between states is no reason why war must inevitably result between them. Rivalries and rancors have been repeatedly adjusted and assuaged, and apparently impending wars averted, because those in charge of the fortunes of the states concerned have had sufficient wisdom and good will to smooth out their difficulties before it was too late and for the very purpose of avoiding the risky and costly appeal to arms. England and France and England and Russia had more than once been on the verge of hostilities and yet those conflicting "imperialisms," or more correctly those individuals temporarily representing them, had deemed it wiser to stop short of the plunge over the brink and had not only avoided war but had, through study and negotiation, ultimately become friendly to each other and had even ended in forming, indeed, a cordial understanding.

The history of Europe from 1871 to 1914 shows again and again that friction does not necessarily mean fighting, that international difficulties are not insuperable, that it is possible to keep the peace if there is a mutual desire to keep it. Those years had witnessed the rise of many international crises as serious as that of 1914, all of which had been conjured away without resort to arms. It is certainly reasonable to believe that what had been done many times in the history of Europe might

have been done in 1914 had all the powers been willing to delay, to discuss, to seek a peaceful way out, to explore the possible grounds of compromise, had they, in short, been willing to do what had been done on many critical occasions in the past. But two of those powers showed no penchant for such a procedure. Quite the contrary — and war resulted.

THE WAR IN 1914

Austria's determination to wreak her wrath upon Serbia, to punish, humiliate, and master that small but independent and successful state, had led straight, and with incredible swiftness, to an appalling issue. Five great nations, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and England, and two small nations, Serbia and Belgium, had passed, within a space of twelve momentous days, from a state of peace to one of war. From the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, hundreds of millions of men found themselves caught in the meshes of a gigantic conflict, whose cost in human life and happiness and treasure must inevitably be tremendous. The world was stunned by the criminal levity with which Austria-Hungary and Germany had created this hideous situation.

The sinister and brutal challenge was, however, accepted immediately and with iron resolution by those who had done their utmost during those twelve days to avert the catastrophe, and not only great powers like France and England, but small ones, like Belgium and Serbia, never hesitated, but resolved to do or die. That the contest was not merely a material one, but that the most precious moral and spiritual interests were involved, was clearly seen and stated at the very beginning of the war by the responsible statesmen of France and England. In those early days Mr. Asquith, prime minister of Great Britain, expressed the common resolution of the western powers when he declared: "We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." A cause dedicated to such aims as those was worthy of the supreme sacrifice it would pitilessly exact.

Why these references to Belgium and France? Because, in the military plans of Germany, these two were to be overrun and conquered first, then Russia, and then the dominance of Europe by Germany would be achieved and rendered unassailable. After that, let the world look out. It would henceforth receive its orders from Berlin and it would know full well the meaning of disobedience.

Germany had demanded free passage for her troops through Belgium. King Albert, one of the unsullied heroes of a war rich in heroes, had at that critical moment embodied the spirit of his people and had added luster to the name of Belgium forever when, in reply to the arrogant demand, he announced that "the Belgian Government is firmly resolved to repel with all the means in its power every attack upon its rights." Then the thunder-cloud broke. The mighty German army burst upon the land, resolved to get to Paris by the shortest route, the valley of the Meuse. The fortress of Liége stood in the way. It was bombarded by powerful artillery and forced to surrender on August 7. Brussels was occupied on August 20. But the fall of Liége did not clear the route to France. Namur stood in the way and here the Belgians were aided by the French, and by the British, hurrying to the scene their "contemptible little army," as the Kaiser is said to have called it. Namur was occupied on August 22. Mons was next attacked and the French and English were compelled to begin a retreat. Withdraw they must or the German armies would envelop them and a disaster like that of Sedan in 1870 might result. The great retreat from Mons southward continued day after day, night after night, rapid, harrowing, critical, incessant, annihilation constantly threatening. City after city in northern France fell into the hands of the Germans, who advanced to within fifteen miles of Paris. The government of France was removed to Bordeaux. The completion of German victory seemed at hand. August was a month of gloom for the Allies.

Then General Joffre, commander of the French armies, issued his famous order, stating that the retreat was over. To his generals he sent this message: "The hour has come to hold fast and to let yourselves be killed rather than to yield." And to the army Joffre issued this: "At the moment when we are about to engage in battle it is imperative that every one should remember that the time has passed for looking backward; every effort must be devoted to attacking and repulsing the enemy. Troops that can no longer advance must, at all cost, keep the ground

they have won and be shot down where they stand rather than retreat. In the present circumstances no weakness can be tolerated."

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

The decisive moment had arrived. There was no faltering, but the whole French army was nerved to supreme effort. From September 5 to September 10, along a line of more than a hundred miles from Paris to Verdun, raged the famous Battle of the Marne, one of the decisive battles of the world's history. The spirit in which these men fought was typified in General Foch, one of Joffre's subordinates, who at a critical moment telegraphed to his chief: "My right is in retreat; my center is yielding. Situation excellent. I shall attack." And attack he did, with great success.

The Germans were defeated. Their terrific, crushing blow, intended to eliminate the French from the war, had failed. They retired as precipitately as they had advanced, the French at their heels. Only when they were across the Aisne and in trenches already prepared for them were they safe. At the Battle of the Marne France had saved herself and Europe and the world.

After the Battle of the Marne the Allies sought to break through the German lines along the Aisne but were unsuccessful. Thereupon there ensued a race to the sea, an extension of the trenches northward to the English Channel. The Germans overran the western part of Belgium, seized Antwerp (October 10) and Ostend and tried to get to Dunkirk and Calais, but were arrested at the Yser River by the combined Belgian, French and English armies. This First Battle of the Yser lasted from October 10 to November 21, and was, on the whole, an Allied success. By the end of October the opposing sides were entrenched against each other all the way from Nieuport to Switzerland. The "war of positions," which was to last with only minor changes down to March, 1918, had begun.

As the result of all these events the Germans were in possession of a large area of northeastern France and of nearly all of Belgium. The possession of this territory greatly augmented their power to make war, for it carried with it ninety per cent. of the iron ore of France, and fifty per cent. of the coal of France, and the harbors of the Belgian coast became favorable bases for the submarine warfare adopted later.

The Germans had not only won great and rich territories in a two months' campaign: they had also won great hatred and



a moral condemnation so general and so intense that it is hard, if not impossible, to find its equal in human history. From the moment they stepped upon Belgian territory they trampled under

foot all considerations of humanity, of decency, of honor. No people was ever subjected to a greater display of heartlessness and cruelty than Germany showed in her treatment of Belgium. Not only were conscienceless pillage and systematic looting the order of the day, not only were towns and cities fined and mulcted of enormous sums of money, not only were villages fired, not only were works of art and public monuments destroyed, but large numbers of civilians, men, women, and little children, were murdered in cold blood or subjected to treatment worse than death. The Germans deliberately carried out a policy of "frightfulness," of terrorism, with all its horrors. It is no wonder that Belgium's most distinguished poet and man of letters, Maurice Maeterlinck, called the German "the foulest invader that the world has ever borne." A prosperous and peaceful people was ruined, and threatened with starvation from which it was only saved by the charity of the world. Intense was the indignation of the outside world as the martydom of Belgium was unrolled. The Germans were regarded as "barbarians" in their method of making war.

Such was the course of events in western Europe after the fateful August 4, 1914. Meanwhile events were occurring elsewhere. Russia, mobilizing far more rapidly than the Germans had supposed she could, invaded East Prussia about the middle of August, gaining several victories. The Germans were forced to withdraw some of their troops from the western front to meet this unexpected menace, and this contributed to the German defeat at the Marne. The victories of the Russians were short-lived, for under the command of General von Hindenburg the Germans defeated them disastrously in the battle of Tannenberg (Aug. 26–Sept. 1, 1914) and at the Mazurian Lakes (Sept. 6–12). Hindenburg was henceforth the idol of Germany. A legend of invincibility began to grow up about his name although the Russians were able to win a victory at Augustowo (Sept. 29–Oct. 4) and to invade East Prussia once more.

The Russians were more successful against Austria. Invading the Austrian province of Galicia they captured Tarnopol and Lemberg and Jaroslav and began the siege of Przemsyl, which surrendered in March, 1915. An invasion of Hungary was intended as the next step.

As Austria was thus fully occupied with Russia, the Serbians were able to expel the Austrian armies which had invaded their country (December, 1914). They crowned their successes by retaking their capital, Belgrade.

TURKEY ENTERS THE WAR

Other events of those months of 1914, which must be chronicled, are: the entrance of little Montenegro into the war out of sympathy for Serbia, the Montenegrins being Serbians by race (August 7); and the entrance of Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers (November 3). The latter was an event of considerable importance. Though European Turkey had been greatly reduced as a result of the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Empire was still extensive, including Asia Minor, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Arabia, in all over seven hundred thousand square miles, or an area more than three times as large as the German Empire, and with a population estimated at twenty-one millions. Its capital, Constantinople, was a city of over a million inhabitants, and its location incomparable, lying, as it does, at the point where Europe and Asia meet, and barring the entrance to and the exit from the Black Sea, that is, to and from southern Russia. The Sultan ruled over a most motley collection of peoples, over Turks, a minority of the whole population, and over Arabs, Greeks, Syrians, Kurds, Circassians, Armenians, Jews, and numerous other races. The only unity that these races knew was to be found in the oppression they all experienced from their government, which was an unrestrained tyranny. The government was strongly pro-German. Enver Pasha was minister of war, a man who had been a military attaché in Berlin, and had formed the most intimate relations with the German military circles. During most of his reign the Emperor of Germany had striven successfully to build up German influence in Turkey and by 1914 Turkey was the willing and eager tool of Germany, her army largely officered by Germans. The expected therefore occurred when the Turkish Government permitted two German warships, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, to enter the Bosphorus, whence they sailed into the Black Sea and bombarded Russian ports. Russia thereupon declared war upon Turkey, November 3, 1914, and England and France immediately did the same.

Turkey's entrance into the war was intended to be and was a threat at the Balkan states and at the British Empire, that is, at India and Egypt. It involved Asia and Africa in the war, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt. An immediate consequence was the dethronement of the Khedive of Egypt, who was plotting with the Sultan to expel the British. Great Britain

declared Egypt a protectorate of the British Empire, thus ending its nominal connection with Turkey, and appointed the uncle of the dethroned Khedive in his place, with the title of Sultan. Turkish attempts to invade Egypt and get control of the Suez Canal, thus cutting England's connection with India, were frustrated in the following year (February, 1915).

JAPAN ENTERS THE WAR

Still another power entered the war almost at the beginning, Japan (August 23, 1914). Japan had two reasons for participating. One was loyalty to her alliance with Great Britain which, concluded originally in 1902, had been renewed in 1905 and 1911. That treaty had been of the greatest service to Japan, increasing her international prestige and guaranteeing her territorial rights. It was a defensive alliance, each side promising the other support in certain contingencies in case of war.

Such a case having arisen, England now applied to Japan for assistance in protecting her trade in the East, and Japan loyally responded. But that protection could not be secured as long as Germany held her strong naval base at Kiauchau. The Japanese knew how Germany had acquired that base, seventeen years before, after having in conjunction with Russia and France forced Japan to relinquish the fruits of her victory in her war with China.[1] They therefore took pleasure in requiting this injury and in expressing their demand in the same language that Germany had used to them nineteen years before. On August 15, 1914, an ultimatum was issued by Japan to Germany demanding that she withdraw her fleet and surrender Kiauchau as necessary "to the peace of the Far East" and requesting an answer by August 23. Germany sent no answer to this ultimatum, but the Kaiser telegraphed to Kiauchau: "It would shame me more to surrender Kiauchau to the Japanese than Berlin to the Russians." On August 23, war was declared by Japan against Germany, and by the middle of November she had conquered the German colony. On October 7 she also occupied the Marshall Islands. From that time on until 1918 her participation in the war was slight. She was, however, one of the Allies, having agreed with England, France, and Russia not to make a separate peace.

[1] See above, pp. 623-624

ENGLAND CONTROLS THE SEAS

Meanwhile another aspect of the war was being played upon the high seas. The immense importance to the Allies of the naval preponderance of Great Britain was shown from the first days of the war and was made each day increasingly apparent. The British won a naval victory near Heligoland in August, the Germans won a naval victory off the coast of Chili in November, which was avenged by England in a complete defeat of a German fleet off the Falkland Islands (December 8). The total result of these events was the sweeping of German naval vessels from the high seas and the bottling up of the main German fleet in the Kiel Canal; also the sweeping of German merchant shipping from the ocean. Now and then a German raider might still get out and do damage. The submarine danger was as yet not serious. Owing to Great Britain's practical control of the great water routes of communication the transport of troops to the scene of battle from England, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and the transport of munitions and merchandise, and the exchanges of commerce, could go on, in the main, unimpeded. The importance of this fact cannot be exaggerated. It enabled the Allies vigorously to prosecute the war, and it kept industrial and commercial life active, a source not only of comfort and convenience, but of wealth, and wealth was necessary to the maintenance in full and increasing vigor of armies and navies and all the various war services.

Thus we see how crowded with decisive events were those months from August to December, 1914. The flames so lightly and joyously ignited by Austria and by Germany were spreading rapidly and portentously. By the end of that year ten nations were at war, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey on the one side, Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Montenegro, and Japan on the other. Two great nations, the United States and Italy, and many small ones, had declared their neutrality. Whether they would be able to maintain it, in a war which, as was already clear, affected every nation, not only in its economic life, but in its intellectual, moral, and spiritual outlook, remained to be seen.

The year 1914 closed with the Allies holding the Germans on the western front, having defeated them at the battle of the Marne.

THE WAR IN 1915

The Germans had conquered all but a small section of Belgium, had conquered northeastern France, and had dug themselves in from the North Sea to Switzerland. Attempts on the part of the Allies to dislodge them and to break through the line were made repeatedly in 1915. At the battle of Neuve Chapelle the English under Sir John French attacked over a front of a little more than four miles. The attack was preceded by the most terrific artillery engagement ever known in warfare. On that narrow front more than three hundred British cannon opened fire on March 10. After they had prepared the way the infantry pressed forward, gaining a mile. On the two following days the Germans delivered repeated counter-attacks but without success. The British held their new front but the casualties were extremely heavy. A mere local dent had been made in the German line. The battle was important as showing sharply how tremendous must be the effort and the sacrifice if the Germans were to be driven out of France and Belgium. Both England and Germany lost more in killed, wounded, and captured than the English and Prussians had lost in the battle of Waterloo.

From April 22 to April 26 occurred a similar battle on a narrow front, this time begun by the Germans. Here gas was used for the first time. The French line collapsed. Those who survived the gas retreated three miles. The battle is famous for this new feature of warfare, and for the remarkable coolness, heroism, and spirit of sacrifice of the Canadians. "On the Canadians the storm broke with its full force and Canadian militia repeated the glories of British regulars from Mons to the Marne. In British imperial history the Second Battle of Ypres will be memorable." But it broke no line and, like the battle of Neuve Chapelle, it was mere "nibbling," a word that now passed into current use to describe the character of the fighting.

All through the summer of 1915 there was only desultory fighting on the western front, broken by special attempts to break the line which would not break. One incident of importance was the relieving of Sir John French and the appointment of General Haig as commander-in-chief of the British armies. The issue was to prove that England had at last found her leader.

GERMANY INVADES RUSSIA

Other disappointments were reserved for the Allies during that bitter year of 1915. Germany's original plan of campaign had been, as we have seen, first to crush France and to eliminate her from the war, then to turn eastward and eliminate Russia, after which she would dictate whatever peace she chose to Europe. The battle of the Marne and the solid line of the French and English from Nieuport in Belgium to Switzerland had blocked this plan. France was not easily to be eliminated. Therefore the Germans adopted a new plan, namely, to crush and eliminate Russia, then to turn westward, settle accounts with France and bring England to her knees. Of course while attending to their eastern enemy, they must hold their western front tight, and even attack, if the opportunity offered. There must be no suspension or relaxation of effort anywhere, but the main emphasis must be put upon the eastern campaign, as it was the more inviting and promised the more immediate gains. There was an additional argument in favor of making the main effort in the east. Hindenburg, the new idol of Germany, from long years of study was minutely acquainted with all the natural features of that theater of war. What he had done at Tannenberg he could do again, and again, perhaps.

Therefore eastward the path of empire took its way. The developments there were destined to exceed the wildest imagination of the Germans. After Tannenberg the Russians, recovering, resumed the offensive, and again invaded East Prussia, whereupon Hindenburg fell upon them, administering a crushing defeat in the battle of the Mazurian Lakes (February 12, 1915). The Russians lost in killed and wounded a hundred and fifty thousand and a hundred thousand of them were taken prisoners.

This was a mere beginning. East Prussia was freed from the presence of the Russians. But they had overrun Galicia, a northern province of Austria. They must be expelled and then no foreign soldiers would stand on the soil of the Central Empires. Moreover the war should be carried straight over into Russia. The tables must be turned, and turned they were in a memorable fashion. All through the summer, from April to August, a mammoth drive of Germans and Austrians combined, under Hindenburg and Mackensen, went on over a wide front. Victory followed victory in rapid succession. The Russians were driven out of Galicia. Przemysl fell on June 2; Lemberg on June 22.

Russian Poland was invaded. Warsaw, its capital, was captured on August 5. All of Poland was conquered and Lithuania and



Courland were overrun but the real German objective, the destruction of the Russian army, had not been attained. When the campaign was over the Russian line was still intact, but it

had been forced far back and now ran from Riga, in the north, to Czernowitz, in the south, near the northern border of Roumania.

It was a notable summer's work. Mackensen took his place beside Hindenburg, as a national hero. The process of Russian disintegration which two years later was to lead to the shameful Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had begun. Russia had lost 65,000 square miles of territory, a territory larger than New England. The military statistics of this war are uncertain, being subject to no control outside official circles, but it is said that Russian losses in killed and wounded were a million two hundred thousand and nearly a million in prisoners. The Russian commander, Grand Duke Nicholas, was removed from chief command and sent to the Caucasus. So much for the eastern front. As 1914 had seen the Germans seizing Belgium and northern and eastern France, 1915 had seen them seizing a large part of Russia. The Germans were entitled to the elation which they experienced and which they volubly expressed.

THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

The Allies suffered another notable discomfiture during that year 1915, and a serious diminution of prestige, this time in the extreme southeastern point of Europe. They attempted the capture of Constantinople, the capital of the Turkish Empire, an extraordinarily difficult thing to do owing to topographical reasons. Could they accomplish this, then the Balkan states not yet in the war would probably enter it on the side of the Allies, and with that alignment Austria could be attacked and invaded from the south and east; also Turkey might be compelled to sue for peace or at any rate would be put on the defensive. And could the Allies control the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, they could secure a connection with Russia through the Black Sea. They could thus send to Russia the war supplies she so greatly needed and could receive from her the food supplies she produced.

In February and March a British and French fleet tried to force the Dardanelles. Penetrating the channel as far as the "Narrows," they could get no farther. The shores were powerfully fortified, and in the battle between the forts and the ships of war, several of the latter were destroyed. The fleet was forced to withdraw. Constantinople could not be reached that way. Next an attempt was made by land. After a costly delay Anglo-French troops, reënforced by troops from Australia and New

Zealand, called "Anzacs,"[1] who had been brought up by way of the Red Sea, landed on the peninsula of Gallipoli, Sir Ian Hamilton in command. But the Turks had had their warning and, under the command of a German general, Liman von Sanders,

were ready for them. The landing was effected only at a heavy cost and the positions which the Allies confronted proved impregnable. A flanking movement from Suvla Bay likewise proved

[1] A composite word made by the initial letters of the words Australian New Zealand Army Corps.

unsuccessful. The Allies held on all through the year, but they were foiled and in December they abandoned the attempt. Their losses had been enormous and nothing had been accomplished, save that possibly the expedition had kept the Turks from pressing any attack upon the Suez Canal. The reaction of this conspicuous and complete failure upon the hesitating Balkan states, Bulgaria and Greece, was disastrous. They, hitherto neutral, began to think that the Central Powers would ultimately be victorious and that it would be more prudent as well as pleasanter to be on the winning side.

BULGARIA JOINS THE CENTRAL POWERS

Bulgaria's dislike of Serbia, Roumania, and Greece was intense. She resented bitterly the Treaty of Bucharest [1] and only awaited a favorable opportunity to tear it up. With the Russians retreating week after week and month after month before the terrific onslaughts of Hindenburg and Mackensen, with the Turks and Germans blocking the straits of the Dardanelles and holding the British tightly to the coasts of Gallipoli, it seemed evident to Tsar Ferdinand and to his minister Radoslavoff that the Germans were the predestined victors in this gigantic war. Therefore, after a disreputable display of double-dealing, they enlisted Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers (October 4, 1915). This action of Bulgaria had two immediate consequences. It linked the Central Powers with Turkey, completing the "corridor" to the East, to Asia. And it sounded the doom of Serbia.

Serbia had been the unwilling pretext of a war which had so soon broken all bounds, dragging the world with it toward the abyss. Austria's ultimatum to Serbia had been the signal for the general mêlée. Austrian armies had immediately invaded Serbia and had seized Belgrade, though only after having encountered a stubborn resistance, during which the Serbians had at one moment won a brilliant victory (August 20, 1914, and succeeding days), the first general battle on a European front. The Serbians, aided by the Montenegrins, fought desperately against the Austrian invasion, and by the middle of December their victory was complete. Belgrade was reoccupied on December 15. The Austrians retreated precipitately out of the land for which they had had such lordly contempt. Their retirement was a rout. Serbia even invaded Austria. A Serbian

[1] See above, pp. 652-653

author may be pardoned for writing: "In ten days the Serbian victory over five Austrian army corps was complete. Since the days when Scipio saved Rome from Hannibal, or when England destroyed the might of Spain, the world has never seen such a

spectacle, and never has victory been more deserved." General Misitch was the hero of this Serbian hour.

Such was the first chapter of Serbian history in the Great War. The second was very different. The Germans and

Austrians, fresh from their successes in Russia and Galicia, invaded Serbia in great strength in October, 1915, under General von Mackensen. At the same time the Bulgarians invaded her from the east. For two months the Serbians fought single-handed and with unquenchable valor against the overwhelming forces of Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria, left in the lurch, moreover, by their ally Greece, which was by treaty bound to aid them in a contingency like this. Serbia was completely conquered and crushed. A remnant only of her armies was able to reach safety on the coast of Albania, whence it was transported in Allied vessels to the island of Corfu. It is difficult to find words adequately to characterize the awful retreat across the barren Albanian Mountains, the unspeakable hardships endured. The war exacted another martyrdom. The Austro-Germans followed up their conquest by overrunning Montenegro (January, 1916).

Simultaneously with this conquest and extinction of Serbia another train of events was being started, whose full significance was not to be made manifest until two more eventful and discouraging years had passed. In October, 1915, an Anglo-French force landed at Salonica, the leading port of Greece. It had come to aid Serbia in response to an invitation from the prime minister of Greece, Venizelos. Constantine, the King of Greece and a brother-in-law of the German Emperor, did not propose to aid Serbia, although by treaty bound to do so. He now dismissed Venizelos and began a tortuous pro-German policy which was ultimately to cost him his throne.

The Anglo-French army marched northward to help the Serbians, but was unsuccessful and had to withdraw behind the lines of Salonica. But out of the union of this force, subsequently greatly enlarged, with the reorganized and reinvigorated remnant of the Serbian army which had found refuge in the island of Corfu, was to emerge in time salvation for the stricken land.

ITALY JOINS THE ALLIES

While the situation had, during the year, grown worse for the Allies in the East and in the Balkans, there had been a distinct and a promising gain for them in another quarter. Italy had entered the war on their side. For over thirty years Italy had been a member of the Triple Alliance, concluded in 1882, with Germany and Austria-Hungary. That alliance she had renewed

as late as 1912 and that renewal was to run until 1920. But when the war broke out in 1914 and when Italy was asked by her allies to co-operate with them, she declined on the ground that she was obliged to aid them only if they were attacked. Instead of being attacked they had themselves begun the war. Italy therefore adopted a policy of neutrality, which she maintained until May 23, 1915. Then, at the moment when the Russians were in full retreat, she entered the war on the side of the Western Powers. This was the great gain of the year for the Allies and one that bade fair to redress the balance of power in their favor.

The Italian Government, in acting thus, was but responding to a widespread popular demand. Ever since the Kingdom of Italy had been formed in the decade between 1859 and 1870 the Italians had been restless under the thought that their unification had been incomplete, that outside the boundaries of the state as determined at that time there were hundreds of thousands of Italians still subject to Austria, in the Trentino to the north, and in Trieste and the peninsula of Istria to the northeast. This was Italia Irredenta or Unredeemed Italy. This territory the Italian Government now endeavored to acquire, at first peacefully through direct negotiations with Austria-Hungary, then, that method failing, through war. Another motive also influenced the Government, the insistent popular demand that Italy do her share in the work of the defense of civilization against *Kultur*, of democracy and liberty against autocracy and despotism. The strong instinct of the Italian people was that they belonged with the Allies by reason of the principles they held in common with them. Their action in entering the war was naturally greeted with enthusiasm in France and England, and with deep resentment in Germany and Austria.

Italy declared war upon Austria-Hungary on May 23, 1915, upon Turkey on August 21, and upon Bulgaria in September. It was not until August 27 of the following year, (1916), that she declared war upon Germany. The reasons for this delay are none too clear. Whatever they may have been, the delay is now generally regarded as a mistake.

The intervention of Italy was followed shortly by that of the little independent republic of San Marino, which declared war upon the Central Powers, June 3, 1915.

Another Allied gain during 1914 and 1915 was the conquest of the German colonies. Japan seized Kiauchau, as we have seen, soon after her entrance into the war. In Africa, British and

French troops easily overran Togoland and Kamerun. German Southwest Africa was conquered by South African troops under General Smuts. A campaign against German East Africa was begun early and resulted in soon freeing that colony of most of the German troops, some of whom, however, remained untracked and undefeated until the end of the war. In the main, the vast German colonial empire had shrunk to very small proportions by the close of 1915.

In the same year, 1915, occurred an event which shocked the world by its wanton and cowardly barbarity and which was in time to have far-reaching consequences, the sinking, on May 7, of the mammoth Atlantic liner, the *Lusitania*, off the coast of Ireland. This incident may best be described later. It should, however, be included in this untoward list of events which darkened, for the Allies, the year 1915.

THE WAR IN 1916

We have seen that Germany's original plan of war was to crush France first and then to turn against Russia and force her to her knees. This plan had been attempted in 1914, but had not succeeded. France had not been crushed but had, in the famous battle of the Marne, defeated the Germans, driving them precipitately back to the Aisne, had saved her own field army intact, had saved Paris and the most important fortresses of France, Verdun, Belfort, Toul, and Epinal. Unconquered and undaunted France was all through 1915 and in 1916 the hope and the mainstay of the world, the flaming and resolute soul of the Allied cause. After a year and a half of war Russia had, however, been badly defeated and had given many signs of that weakness and disintegration which were later to develop so rapidly and appallingly. England was not yet fully conscious of the part she must play; she had not yet brought herself to adopt universal military service, although she had accomplished wonders in volunteering. Italy had done little to justify the great hopes with which the Allies had greeted her entrance into the war. Belgium had been virtually wiped off the map; so had Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania; all had been overrun by the armies of the Central Powers and were securely held. France, however, stood defiant and resolute, tense, straining every nerve, steeled for every contingency.

But France had suffered terribly and the German military authorities believed it was possible to do, in 1916, what they had

failed to accomplish in 1914. This is the meaning of Verdun. The German General Staff thought that, by delivering one terrific, irresistible, deadly blow against the French army, they could smash it. Then peace would be in sight, as France would recognize the hopelessness of further struggle, the sheer impossibility of ever recovering Alsace-Lorraine. Verdun was a strong position, but, once taken, no equally stout defense could be made between there and Paris. The capital would fall and the fall of Paris would certainly mean the elimination of France. Incidentally, as the German Crown Prince was in command near Verdun, blinding military glory would irradiate the person of the heir to the Prussian throne. Could anything be more desirable or more appropriate?

VERDUN

On February 21, 1916, at 7.15 in the morning the storm broke upon Verdun, a place long famous in the military annals of France, but destined now to win a glory beyond compare. Never had there been so pulverizing an artillery fire as that which inaugurated this attack. The Germans had made enormous preparations, had enormous armies and supplies. It seemed humanly impossible to prevent them from blasting their way through. But the impossible was done. The French disputed every inch of ground, with incredible coolness and inexhaustible bravery. Nevertheless they lost position after position and in four days of frenzied fighting were driven back four miles. Then French reënforcements arrived, hurried thither by thousands of motors. And one of Joffre's most brilliant subordinates, Pétain, reached the scene and infused new energy into the army of defense. Superb and spirit-stirring was Pétain's cry to his soldiers: "Courage, comrades! We'll get them."

It is impossible to summarize this battle, for it raged for six months, from February to October, and was characterized by a multitude of incidents. The fighting back and forth for critical positions continued week after week and month after month. Douaumont and Vaux are the names of two subsidiary forts which stand forth most conspicuously in the murderous welter of repeated attack and counter-attack, of thrust and counter-thrust. The Germans were resolved to take Verdun, cost what it might. They were ready to pay the price but victory they would have. They paid the price, in irreparable losses, but victory they did not win. The French stiffened, under Pétain

and later under Nivelle, and with the electrifying cry, "*Ils ne passeront pas!*" "They shall not pass!", they baffled the fury of the enemy and at the end pitched him out of most of the positions he had won. Verdun did not fall. The military reputations of Pétain and Nivelle had grown enormously and the latter soon succeeded Joffre as commander-in-chief. The Crown Prince did not emerge from this enterprise irradiated with any blinding effulgence of glory.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

The course and outcome of the later phases of the Verdun campaign were affected by another campaign which was being carried on simultaneously in another sector of the long line that ran from Belgium through France to Switzerland. This was the Battle of the Somme. This was an Anglo-French attack, stretching from Arras to some distance south of the Somme River, the English under General Haig, the French under Foch, the Germans under Hindenburg, who had been transferred to the west after his great successes in the east. England was now striking a new pace, which she was to continue and to increase, in participation in the war on land. In 1914 she had had only a small regular army of a hundred thousand men. This was rapidly increased by volunteering, which achieved notable proportions but not notable enough. Finally in January, 1916, she had adopted conscription for single men, and, in May, for married men as well. Thus she now had universal service for all between the ages of 18 and 41. She was training the new recruits hastily and was increasing her munition supplies enormously. She had taken over more and more of the line until she was now manning about ninety miles from the sea to the Somme.

The people of the Allied countries expected that their armies, thus enlarged and elaborately equipped, would attempt to break through the German lines. The Battle of the Somme was an endeavor to bring to an end the long deadlock on the western front. After a terrific bombardment, which had by this time become the customary prelude to an offensive, the general assault was begun on July 1. For a few days the Allies made progress, though on the whole very slowly. The railroad centers, Bapaume and Péronne, were their objectives. The German line stiffened and fiercely counter-attacked. The battle dragged and the rainy season set in, making it almost impossible to move the heavy guns over the muddy roads. While both the English and

the French took a number of towns and considerable bodies of prisoners, they were unable to attain their objectives. All through the summer and well into the fall the desperate struggle went on, dying down in October. The total area won by the Allies was small, about 120 squares miles. Nowhere had they advanced more than seven miles from their starting point. Nevertheless Haig was right when he announced that the campaign had been a success for three reasons, namely, because it had relieved Verdun; because, by holding large masses of Germans on the western front, it had enabled Russia to win a considerable victory on the eastern front; and because it had worn down the German strength. It was in the second phase of this battle of the Somme that a new and redoubtable engine of war was introduced by the British, powerful armored motor cars, quickly nicknamed "tanks," which could cross trenches, break through barbed-wire entanglements, and at the same time could scatter a murderous fire all about from the guns within. Machine gun fire against them was entirely ineffectual. Only when squarely hit by powerful missiles from big cannon were the tanks disabled.

There was also serious fighting during 1916 on the Italian and on the Russian fronts. The Austrians, supposing the Russians had learned their lesson in the previous year and that they would think twice before again assuming the offensive, left their eastern front lightly guarded and prepared to punish the Italians, their historic enemy, and now more hated than ever because of their "treachery" in breaking the Triple Alliance. In May the Austrians began an attack from the Tyrol. Controlling the passes of the Alps, they were able to form a large army and to threaten Verona and Vicenza. The Italians resisted desperately but lost a large number of guns and men. They also lost about two hundred and thirty square miles of Italian territory. But the Austrians had weakened their eastern front so seriously that the Russians were winning great victories over them in that theater. This in turn reacted upon the Italian campaign by forcing the Austrians to recall many troops in order to ward off the new danger. Therefore they were obliged to forego for the time being their dream of breaking into the plains of Venetia.

While the Russians had been forced by Hindenburg and Mackensen to make a great retreat in 1915, they had not been put out of the war and, in June, 1916, they began, under Brussilov, a new offensive, this time between the Pripet Marshes and the Austrian province of Bukowina. Brussilov's drive was for a while successful and netted far larger territorial gains than were

made on the western front in the Battle of the Somme. Brussilov was able to push the Austrians back from twenty to fifty miles, to take a large number of prisoners and to capture many towns and cities, including the important ones of Lutsk and Czernowitz. The campaign lasted from June to October, but after the first month no great progress was made and the offensive gradually wore down and stopped. Russia was far from having recovered what she had lost in the previous year. Indeed, she recovered practically nothing in the north from the Pripet Marshes to the Baltic Sea.

The interplay of these various campaigns was unmistakable. The Somme helped Verdun, the Russian drive helped Italy by freeing her of the Austrians and by enabling her to begin an offensive along the Isonzo which yielded Gorizia on August 9 and brought her to within thirteen miles of coveted Trieste. But while there was this interplay, this relieving of pressure in one region by bringing pressure to bear in another, the teamwork was most imperfect. The desirability of a unified command of all the Allied forces had hardly begun to dawn. It took the experiences of another year and more to drive that idea into the minds of the governing authorities of the various countries concerned.

ROUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR

The unhappy consequences of the lack of proper co-ordination in a common cause were conspicuously shown in another field in this same year of 1916, namely, in Roumania. Roumania entered the war on the side of the Allies on August 27, 1916. Her chief motive was to assure "the realization of her national unity," by which phrase was meant the liberation from Austria-Hungary of the three million Roumanians who lived in the eastern section of the Dual Monarchy, in Transylvania, and their incorporation in the Kingdom of Roumania. The principle of nationality was at the basis of Roumania's action, the principle that kindred peoples desiring to be united should be united. Roumania's declaration of war was naturally warmly applauded by the Allies. It was followed immediately by a Roumanian invasion of Transylvania, which achieved very considerable successes.

But the Germans were resolved to prevent this threatened mutilation of their ally and also this threatened cutting of the connection between the Central Powers and Turkey. Roumanian success, if unimpeded, would widen out into the Balkans and

imperil the famous "corridor" through Bulgaria and Serbia. The German General Staff determined, therefore, to strike with all the force at its command, to deal a blow that should be both swift and memorable. Two large armies composed of Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks, and under the com-

mand of Falkenhayn and Mackensen, were sent against Roumania. They conquered the southern part of the kingdom with comparative ease and entered Bucharest, the capital, on December 6. What was left of the Roumanian army withdrew to the north. Jassy became the provisional seat of Roumanian government. Peace was not concluded until much later, but meanwhile the Central Powers controlled most of the territory

of Roumania, and exploited its rich resources in wheat and oil. The corridor to Constantinople was widened rather than cut. From this time forth the German ambition to create a Middle

Europe, dominated by Germany, became more and more pronounced and more and more insistent.

The Roumanian disaster was due to the immense superiority

of German resources, equipment, and generalship; also to the mistakes of Roumania. One of these mistakes was the lateness of her decision to enter the war. None of the Allies was in a position to help her, except Russia, whose conduct was now equivocal. Had Roumania declared war in June at the moment of Brussilov's great victories, the outcome might have been very different. As it was she declared it when Brussilov's drive had been brought to a standstill. This was but one more proof of the fact that the Allies must bring about a closer correlation of their efforts, if they were to win.

One more state entered the European War in 1916, Portugal. On February 23, Portugal seized the German ships in her harbors, claiming that the shortage of tonnage created by Germany's submarine campaign justified the action. Whereupon Germany declared war upon her, March 9. A few days later it was officially announced by the Portuguese minister to the United States that "Portugal is drawn into the war as a result of her long-standing alliance with England, an alliance that has withstood unbroken the strain of five hundred years." This, it is curious to note, is a reference to a treaty signed in London on June 16, 1373, by which each country pledged itself to assist the other in case of war, a treaty quite as legitimate as that of the Triple Alliance, much more venerable, and far less injurious to the welfare of Europe. During all these centuries the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance has continued, frequently reaffirmed, the friendship it was designed to bring about still exists, the treaty concluded in 1373 has been broken by neither party and is still considered in force. Portugal participated in the war by sending an army to France and by aiding England in Africa.

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF JUTLAND

The year 1916 witnessed also a great naval engagement between England and Germany, the Battle of Jutland. England had given since the outbreak of the war remarkable evidence of her might upon the ocean. The mobilization of her fleet in the opening days was quite as noteworthy in its way as the mobilization of the German army, and as the latter entered forthwith upon a career of victory, so also did the former. The pressure of the British navy began at once to be felt where it was intended it should be, in Germany. A blockade of the German coast was established at the very outset, which was destined to be made steadily more effective. Germany's merchant shipping was swept

from the ocean, the vast fabric of her sea-borne commerce collapsed. The British fleet prevented Germany from importing such essentials as foodstuffs, petroleum, cotton, coffee, rubber, zinc, tin, so necessary in the work of war. The blockade was not perfect, as now and then a German raider could get through, sure, however, in the end, to be hunted down. But the attention of the world, the attention even of England herself, was not riveted upon this incessant naval war as it was upon the military operations on land. One reason for this was that the naval war was silent and unseen, although its effects were most important. Another was that the war on land was bitterly contested and gave rise to numberless incidents, was a tense, critical, and doubtful struggle, while the war on the sea was, generally speaking, devoid of incident. England's command of her element was never in doubt, and was even challenged only infrequently. Submarines could and did do occasional damage, even in one instance sinking three English war vessels, and there had been, as we have seen, two or three sea fights between small fractions of the fleets, Germany winning a victory in the early days off Chili, England a far more significant one subsequently off the Falkland Islands. These events were, however, of minor importance. But the main German fleet stuck tightly to its base, the harbor of Kiel, and the unremitting, perpetual stress of the blockade offered no sensations to a world which was surfeited with sensations as a result of the land warfare.

But on May 31, 1916, the German High Seas fleet, commanded by Admiral von Scheer, steamed forth, and skirted up the western coast of Denmark. It was sighted by the British scouts under Admiral Beatty, about 3.30 in the afternoon, an engagement immediately began, the main British squadron, under Admiral Jellicoe, coming up only later. The battle continued for several hours until darkness came on, between eight and nine. It was the greatest naval battle since Trafalgar and, in the strength and power of the units engaged, undoubtedly the greatest in all history. The result was inconclusive. Both sides lost important ships but both claimed to be victorious. That the real victor, however, was England was proved by the fact that the German fleet was obliged to return to Kiel and did not again emerge from that refuge. Britannia still ruled the wave, and it was extremely fortunate for the safety of democracy in England, France, Italy, and the United States, and for liberty everywhere, that she did.

Had England rendered no other service than this of making the seas safe for freedom and dangerous for despotism, the debt

of humanity to her would be incalculable. But she was doing far more than this. The utterances of her statesmen, like those of France, from the first of August, 1914, defined the issues at stake, and set forth adequately the appalling gravity of the crisis. Not only were those utterances profoundly educative but they were veritable trumpet blasts, summoning to action, in the interest of all that men in Western Europe and in America had long held most precious. In the darkest hours, and there were many such during those first three years, there was no faltering in high places, no talk of compromise of right with wrong, no weakening of resolution, no abatement of effort. It must never be forgotten that the leaders of France and England, and the nations they represented, were constant and valorous defenders of the New World, as of the Old, that it was their heroism and their immeasurable spirit of sacrifice that barred the way of a mighty and conscienceless military power toward universal domination. Never did men die in a holier cause. And they died in enormous numbers, literally by the million.

ENTRANCE OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE WAR

In such a contest as that the United States belonged, body and soul. If she was to preserve a shred of self-respect, if she was to maintain inviolate the honor of the American name, if she was to safeguard the elementary rights of American citizens, if she was bound in any sense to be her brother's helper in the defense of freedom in the world, then she must take her stand shoulder to shoulder with the hosts of freemen in Europe who were giving and had long been giving the last full measure of devotion to that cause, then she must spend her manhood and her wealth freely and without complaint, as France and England and Belgium and Serbia had done.

From very early in the war there were Americans who endeavored to arouse their country to a sense of its danger and its duty, to persuade it to prepare, to fire it with the resolve to keep the nation's 'scutcheon clean. Among those who, by their quick and intelligent appreciation of the situation, by their courage and activity, rendered invaluable service in the campaign of national education were Ex-President Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood. Many Americans enlisted in foreign legions.

From August, 1914, to April, 1917, America passed through a painful, humiliating, and dangerous experience. Her declara-

tion of war was the expression of the wisdom she distilled from that experience. Her entrance into the war was the most important event of the year 1917, though not immediately the most important, for the collapse of Russia, occurring also in that year, had a quicker and more direct bearing upon the military situation. But in the end, if America kept the faith, she could tip the scales decisively.

We entered the war finally because Germany forced us in, because she rendered it absolutely impossible for us to stay out unless we were the most craven and pigeon-hearted people on the earth. Any one who counted on that being the case was entertaining a notion for which he could certainly cite no evidence in our previous history.

How did Germany force us into this war? What specific things did she do that could be answered in the end in one way and one way only?

GERMAN OFFENSES AGAINST AMERICA

The record is a long one, of offenses to the moral, the intellectual, the spiritual, the material interests of America. First, the wanton attack upon Serbia, a small state, by two great ones, Austria and Germany, and the flouting of all suggestions of arbitration or attempts to settle international difficulties, methods in which America believed, as had been shown by her own repeated use of them, and by her enthusiastic support of the efforts of the two Hague Conferences to perfect those methods and to win general adhesion to them. Second, the invasion of Belgium and the martyrdom of that country, amid nameless indignities and inhumanities. The indignation of America was spontaneous, widespread, and intense. The sentiment of horror, thus needlessly aroused, coupled with admiration for the brave resistance of the Belgians and sympathy for their sufferings, contributed powerfully to the creation of that state of mind which finally gained expression on April 6, 1917.

But the conquest and the inhuman treatment of Belgium were no direct infringement of our rights. The national indignation was profoundly stirred, the national sympathy aroused, but neither the sovereignty of the Government nor the persons or property of the citizens of the United States were affected. These were, however, not long to remain immune from attack. German and Austrian officials, accredited to our Government and enjoying the hospitality of our country, proceeded to use

their positions here for the purpose of damaging Germany's enemies. They fomented strikes among American munition workers and seamen; they caused bombs to be placed on ships carrying munitions of war; they plotted incendiary fires, and conspired to bring about the destruction of ships and factories. In 1915 the ambassador of Austria-Hungary, Dumba, and the German military and naval attachés, Papen and Boy-Ed, were caught in such activities, and were forced to leave the country. Under the supervision of Papen a regular office was maintained to procure fraudulent passports, by lying and by forgery, for German reservists. American territory was used as a base of supplies, and military enterprises against Canada and against India were hatched by Germans on American soil. These German plots were in gross defiance of our position as a neutral and of our sovereignty as an independent nation.

GERMANY'S SUBMARINE POLICY

While the diplomatic representatives of Germany were engaged in plotting criminal enterprises against Americans at home, the German Government itself had embarked upon a course of procedure that inevitably ended in the destruction of American lives and property on the high seas. In February, 1915, Germany proclaimed the waters around the British Isles "a war zone" and announced that enemy ships found within that zone would be sunk without warning. Neutrals were expected to keep their ships and citizens out of this area. If they did not, the responsibility for what might happen would be theirs, not Germany's.

Such was the announcement of Germany's submarine policy, a policy that was to have more momentous consequences than its authors imagined. A submarine is a war vessel and as such has a perfect right to attack an enemy war vessel without warning and sink her if she can. But neither a submarine nor any other war vessel has any right, under international law, to sink a merchantman belonging to the enemy or belonging to a neutral, except under certain conditions, and one of the conditions is that the persons on board, crew and passengers, shall be removed to the ship attacking or their lives otherwise absolutely safeguarded.

President Wilson, six days after the German proclamation, despatched a note to Germany announcing that the United States would hold the German Government to "a strict accountability" should any American ships be sunk or American lives lost, and

that the United States would take all steps necessary "to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

To this the German Government replied that neutral vessels entering the war zone "will themselves bear the responsibility for any unfortunate accidents that may occur. Germany disclaims all responsibility for such accidents and their consequences." This was a clear announcement that not only did she propose to sink enemy merchantmen, but neutral merchantmen as well, were they found within the prohibited zone, without removing the passengers to safety or even giving them the warning necessary to enable them to take to the lifeboats, which, on the high seas, would themselves not be places of safety but which at least might perhaps give some chance for life.

On March 28, a British steamer, the *Falaba*, was torpedoed and one American was drowned. On May 1, an American ship, the *Gulflight*, was torpedoed without warning. The vessel managed to remain afloat and was later towed into port, but the captain died of heart failure caused by the shock, and two of the crew who jumped overboard were drowned. The Government of the United States began at once to investigate the case, as here apparently were all the elements calling for strict accountability. But before the investigation was completed, indeed before a week had passed, the case was overshadowed by another, the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

Germany's ruthless submarine campaign, in force since February, had resulted by the first of May in the sinking of over sixty merchant ships in the war zone, several of them belonging to neutral nations, with a loss of about two hundred and fifty lives, all of them the lives of noncombatants. Germany had deliberately adopted a policy that involved the killing of as many noncombatants, hitherto protected by international law and the usages of warfare among civilized nations, as might be necessary to enable her to achieve her ends. What she had done on land to hundreds and thousands of peaceful, unarmed, non-fighting people in Belgium and France she was now ready and resolved to do on the sea. But while she was torpedoing many vessels, yet England's commerce went on as before, thousands of ships entering and clearing British ports, and Great Britain was transporting an army to France without the loss of a single man. As the German people had been told that the submarines would quickly bring England to her knees and as they were not doing so,

something spectacular and sensational must be achieved to justify the promises and expectations, and to silence criticism or discouragement at home. Consequently, the largest trans-Atlantic British liner still in service was selected for destruction. The world, it was believed, would then take notice and people would think twice before entering the war zone. On May 7, off the Irish coast, the *Lusitania* was torpedoed twice without warning and sank in less than twenty minutes. Nearly twelve hundred men, women, and children were drowned, among them over a hundred Americans. This cold-blooded, deliberate murder of innocent noncombatants was the most brilliant achievement of Germany's submarine campaign and was celebrated with enthusiasm in Germany as a great "victory." The rest of the world regarded it as both barbarous and cowardly. The indignation of Americans at this murder of Americans was universal and intense. When, three years later, American soldiers in France went over the top, in the campaign of 1918, shouting "*Lusitania*" at their foes, they were but expressing the deep-seated indignation of an outraged people, an indignation and resentment which time had done nothing to assuage.

On May 13, President Wilson despatched a message to Germany denouncing this act as a gross violation of international law, demanding that Germany disavow it and make reparation as "far as reparation is possible," and declaring that the Govenment of the United States would not "omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

Germany replied on May 28, evading the main issues of the American note and making many assertions that were quickly proved to be false. A correspondence ensued between the two governments, in which the President repeated his demand for disavowal and all possible reparation. In the end Germany offered to pay for lives lost but refused to admit that the sinking of the ship was illegal. No agreement was reached between the two nations. No action, however, was taken by the American Government.

All through 1915, torpedoing of vessels continued, and several Americans were drowned. The Government steadily proclaimed our rights, the German Government evading the fundamental principles involved, trying to confuse the issue by raising irrelevant points.

On March 24, 1916, occurred another major event in this

campaign of indiscriminate murder of innocent noncombatants, namely the torpedoing without warning of an English ship, the *Sussex*, while crossing the English Channel. Two Americans were injured and about seventy others, who were on board, were endangered. President Wilson again protested and declared the United States could "have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether," unless the German Government "should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels." Finally, on May 4, Germany agreed that henceforth merchant vessels should not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships should attempt to escape or offer resistance. But she appended a condition, namely that the United States should compel Great Britain to observe international law. If the United States should not succeed, then Germany "must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision."

President Wilson accepted the promise and repudiated the condition on the ground that our plain rights could not be made contingent by Germany upon what any other power should or should not do. To this note Germany sent no reply.

That the promise was entirely insincere, that it was the intention to keep it only as long as it should be convenient, that ruthless submarine warfare was to be resumed whenever it seemed likely to be successful, was admitted later by the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. Sinkings continued to occur from time to time throughout 1916, and finally, on January 31, 1917, the mask of hypocrisy and duplicity was thrown aside and a policy of unrestricted and ruthless submarine warfare was proclaimed. Germany announced that beginning the next day, February 1, she would prevent "in a zone around Great Britain, France, and Italy, and in the Eastern Mediterranean, all navagation, that of neutrals included. . . . All ships met within that zone will be sunk." The insulting concession was made that one American passenger ship per week might go to England, if it were first painted in stripes, the breadth of which was indicated, and if it carefully followed a route laid down by Germany. "Give us two months of this kind of warfare," said the German Foreign Secretary, Zimmermann, to Ambassador Gerard, on January 31, "and we shall end the war and make peace within three months."

There was only one answer possible to such a note as this, unless the people of the United States were willing to hold their

rights and liberties subject to the pleasure and interest of Germany. On February 3, the President severed diplomatic relations with Germany, recalled our ambassador and dismissed von Bernstorff. Toward the end of the month Secretary Lansing made public an intercepted despatch from the German Foreign Secretary, Zimmermann, to the German Minister to Mexico, instructing him to propose an alliance with Mexico and Japan and war upon the United States, Mexico's reward to be the acquisition of the states of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. In other words, the United States was to be dismembered.

When, on April 2, 1917, President Wilson appeared before Congress and in an address, which was a scathing arraignment of Germany before the world, recommended a declaration of war against this "natural foe to liberty," he had a predestined and enthusiastic response, for he was merely expressing the pent-up wishes of the American people, who did not intend to have war made upon them indefinitely without their hitting back at the aggressor with all the force at their command, and who were resolved to share in the enterprise of saving the world from Prussian domination, or, in the words of the President, "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world, as against selfish and autocratic power" and "to make the world safe for democracy." On April 6, Congress passed a resolution to the effect "that the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared," and it shortly proceeded to pass a series of important military, financial, and economic measures designed to enable the country to play a worthy part in the great struggle. The United States did not declare war upon Austria-Hungary until December 7, nor did it then or later declare war upon Bulgaria and Turkey. With the two latter diplomatic relations only were broken.

Thus a war, begun with incredible lightness of heart by Austria-Hungary and Germany upon the banks of the Danube, had expanded to include not only most of Europe, but Asia and Africa and now all of North America. Canada had been in the war since its beginning and had greatly distinguished herself on many fields. Now came the United States, unprepared, save for her navy, which at once began to prove its mettle and its value to our Allies, but potentially an immense addition to the fighting ranks, should its enormous and varied resources be developed and properly applied. The entrance of the United States into the war was followed by the entrance of the republics of Cuba and

Panama on the following day (April 7). In June, 1917, King Constantine of Greece was deposed and Greece joined the Allies July 2. Siam declared war on Germany July 22, Liberia on August 4, China on August 14, Brazil on October 26, and in the same year several Central and South American states broke off diplomatic relations with Germany.

Of more immediate and direct influence upon the course of the war than this intervention of the United States, which could only make itself greatly felt after a period of preparation, was a series of far-reaching and startling occurrences in another quarter.

REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

The most important event of 1917 was the collapse of Russia and its withdrawal from the war. This meant an enormous increase of Germany's power and at the same time imposed a new and mighty burden upon the Allies, a burden which threatened to be too great for them to bear.

Russia had been badly defeated by Hindenburg in 1915, and Brussilov's campaign of 1916, after important initial successes, had been brought to a standstill. The result of these events was to arouse criticism of the government. The belief spread that the old familiar "dark forces" were in control once more, that they were using the distresses of the nation for their individual advantage, that the court was pro-German, that the Tsar was meditating a separate peace with Germany. Charges of incompetence and dishonesty were made against certain officials. The leading members of the Duma demanded that a responsible ministry be created, a demand supported by the army and the people, and that radical changes be made in the government in the direction of greater efficiency, such as were being made in France and England. In February 100,000 workingmen went on strike in Petrograd, and 25,000 in Moscow. An acute food crisis developed and lawless raids on bakeries occurred. When ordered to fire on the mobs some of the soldiers refused to do so, an ominous sign. On March 11 the Tsar dissolved the Duma, wishing to get rid of it. But the Duma refused to dissolve. A revolution was in full swing. There was considerable street fighting, the police being the particular objects of popular wrath. Revolutionary bands captured some important buildings and seized the Prime Minister Golitzin, and a former Prime Minister Stürmer, under suspicion of being involved in pro-German intrigues. The Duma now effected a *coup d'état*, voting to

establish a Provisional Government. The Tsar was informed of this change and required to abdicate. This he did on March 15. Thus ended the reign of Nicholas II, the last of the Romanoffs, a family which had ruled in Russia for three hundred years and more.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The Provisional Government was a coalition representing the three different parties which had had most to do with bringing about this surprising change. Prince Lvov, the head of the ministry, represented the business men and landowners of a liberal type; Paul Miliukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, long associated with Russian reform movements, represented the Constitutional Democratic party; and Kerensky represented the third group, namely the soldiers and workingmen. Kerensky was a Revolutionary Socialist, sympathetic with the popular demand for a juster division of the land in the interest of the agricultural masses. The ministry proceeded to give back to Finland her constitution, to promise self-government and unity to Poland, to endow the Jews with equal political, civil, and military rights. On March 31 it abolished the death penalty. A general amnesty was proclaimed and exiles in large numbers returned from Siberia and were greeted with frenzied enthusiasm. The public mood was optimistic and excited.

Revolutions once successful are difficult to arrest and have a way of passing rapidly through several stages, each more radical than its predecessor. The Russian Revolution formed no exception to this rule, but rather illustrated it afresh. The period of reasoned liberalism, of rational and ordered reform, did not last long. The Socialists entered aggressively upon the scene, organizing *soviets* or councils of workingmen and soldiers. These *soviets*, particularly the one in Petrograd, began to oppose the Provisional Government as much as they dared, and to impose their views. In regard to the war the Lvov ministry declared that free Russia did not aspire to dominate other countries or to get their territory, but that it would not allow its own country to come out of the war weakened or humiliated. On May 2 it announced to the Allies that Russia would continue in the war until a complete victory was achieved. The Petrograd Council or Soviet, on the other hand, was in favor of a general peace to be secured by the workers of all lands, and asserted that the war had been begun and was being carried on in the interest of

kings and capitalists. This Council was powerful as representing the capital and was striving hard to dominate the Provisional Government. On May 16 Miliukov, the able Foreign Minister, was forced out of the Government on the ground that he was an imperialist, he having expressed the hope that Russia would acquire Constantinople. A Socialist was appointed in his place and Kerensky now became Minister of War. This reorganized ministry was in favor of continued co-operation with the Allies and against a separate peace.

Kerensky soon became the dominant personality in the government. As Minister of War he endeavored to check the demoralization which was making serious inroads into the army. Discipline was disappearing, acts of disobedience, if not actual mutiny, were occurring at various points. Kerensky succeeded for a while in checking this alarming disorganization and even in arousing the army in Galicia to begin a new "drive" which made an advance of ten miles, only to be brought to a standstill by renewed mutinies, so that all that had been gained was lost (July, 1917).

On July 22 Kerensky became head of the Provisional Government and remained such until he and his colleagues were overthrown, on November 7, by the Bolsheviki of Petrograd. Kerensky was a Socialist and was strongly opposed to a separate peace with Germany, but was in favor of a revision of peace terms by the Allies, in the direction of the formula, "no annexations, no indemnities." The breakdown of discipline in the army continued to increase portentously. During the retreat in Galicia, generals found that they were obliged to discuss their orders with numerous committees of soldiers, and to secure their consent, before those orders could be executed. Officers were in some cases shot by their soldiers. Large numbers of troops retreated without making any resistance, so thoroughly pacifistic had they become as a result of the Socialistic propaganda carried on among them. Kerensky publicly characterized these acts as shameful and labored incessantly and with extraordinary energy to stop the growing anarchy and to restore the army as a fighting force, necessary even for the defense of the country, since the country was again threatened. His efforts were unavailing and conditions steadily grew worse. The Germans took the important city of Riga on September 2, with practically no opposition. The shame and impotence of a great state were being demonstrated every day anew.

THE BOLSHEVIKI SEIZE THE GOVERNMENT

That shame and that impotence were illustrated in perfection by the policy and conduct of the new rulers of Russia, the Bolsheviki, who succeeded in overthrowing Kerensky by violence on November 7, and in seizing the government, under the leadership of Lenine and Trotzky. Several of the ministers were arrested, and army headquarters were captured. Kerensky managed to escape, and was not heard of again for several months, when he finally appeared in London. Lenine became Prime Minister and Trotzky Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The new government announced its policy at once; an immediate democratic peace, the confiscation of all landed property, the recognition of the supreme authority of the *soviets* or workingmen's and soldiers' councils, the election of a constitutional convention. The Bolsheviki revealed themselves adequately, though not completely, in these demands. They were extreme Socialists, resolved to effect a Socialistic revolution at once. They were unwilling to fight Germans or Austrians. They were willing to fight their own fellow-citizens for the purpose of robbing them of their property. They cared nothing about national honor. "Honor" was not a word in their vocabulary; it was only a conception of hypocritical capitalists interested solely in feathering their own nests and exploiting the downtrodden. The Bolsheviki cared nothing for the good faith of Russia, for they wished and intended to desert Russia's allies and to make a separate peace with her enemies despite the fact that Russia had signed a treaty promising not to make a separate peace. Their moral standards were not above considering a treaty a scrap of paper, were not, therefore, superior to the standards of the Germans, in whose pay they were accused of being. As destroyers of a great nation, as artists in anarchy, as ruthless murderers of fellow-Russians, they were a great success.

It was evident that with such men in power Russia's participation in the war was over and that the burden imposed upon the Western Allies would be far greater than ever. The Bolsheviki immediately started peace negotiations with the Germans, concluding with them an armistice at Brest-Litovsk (December 15), where three months later they supinely signed what were probably the most disgraceful and disastrous treaties known in the history of any European nation, treaties that will be described later.

The Russian Revolution and the rise of the Bolsheviki brought about the rapid disintegration, not only of the Russian people, but of the Russian state as a territorial entity. Finland declared its independence. The Ukraine, an immense region in the south, did the same. Siberia later followed suit. The Germans had control of Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Provinces and consequently declarations of independence were not in order there. General Kaledin, the leader of the Cossacks, declared war upon the Bolsheviki in the name of the safety of the country. None of Russia's allies and none of the neutral states recognized the Bolsheviki as the lawful government of Russia. It was reserved for the Germans and Austrians and Turks to do that.

In December the Constituent Assembly, called by the Bolsheviki, met in Petrograd. When this proved unsatisfactory to the latter at its first session they sent a body of sailors into the chamber to disperse it. That ended the Constituent Assembly and gave a further illustration of the meaning of the Bolshevist formula about the self-determination of peoples.

The revolution in Russia in its immediate effects and the intervention of the United States in its possible ultimate effects were the two most outstanding events in the history of 1917. But, also, during that year military events of importance occurred. The eastern front saw comparatively little activity as, after the Russian Revolution, the Germans were content to watch the development of affairs in that country and in the main merely to guard the positions they had gained in Russia and Roumania, probably in the expectation of shortly imposing peace upon those countries and then being able to withdraw their troops from them and throw them with decisive force upon the western front.

THE WAR IN 1917

In the early months of 1917 the effects of the Battle of the Somme of the previous year were shown to be more important than had been supposed, for when the English and the French renewed their campaign in the same region they encountered a weakened resistance, the enemy withdrawing before them. Then ensued, in March and April, a retreat of the Germans to the famous "Hindenburg Line," called by their leaders a "strategical retreat." The Germans retired along a hundred mile front, from Arras to the neighborhood of Noyon, evacuating more than a thousand square miles of French territory which had formerly contained over three hundred towns and villages. But, com-

pelled to abandon this territory, they committed deeds which only deepened the odium in which German military practices were held in Allied and neutral countries. They devastated the country as no country in Europe had ever been devastated before, and they did it with scientific thoroughness and satisfaction. France recovered only a scene of indescribable desolation. Buildings, public and private, schools and churches, works of art, historical monuments and priceless historical records were ruthlessly destroyed; private homes were stripped clean of furniture which was carted away by the Germans, wells were filled with dung, orchards were cut down, roads and bridges and railways were blown up. If they must retire, the Germans were resolved to leave a region, hitherto one of the most fertile in France, ruined and blasted for years and even for decades to come. An eye-witness wrote as follows: "With field glasses I could see far on either side of every road for miles and miles; every farm is burned, fields destroyed, every garden and every bush uprooted, every tree sawed off close to the bottom. It was a terrible sight and seemed almost worse than the destruction of men. Those thousands of trees prone upon the earth, their branches waving in the wind, seemed undergoing agonies before our eyes."

Other events on the western front in 1917 were: the battle of Arras fought by the British, from April to June, and in the course of which the Canadians distinguished themselves at Vimy Ridge; the long-drawn-out battle of the Aisne, fought by the French from April to November, famous for the fighting about the *Chemin des Dames;* the British offensive in Flanders, from July to December, which yielded Passchendaele Ridge and other positions; the battle of Cambrai, in November and December, in which the Germans were compelled to retire several miles on a front of twenty miles.

THE INVASION OF ITALY

But while on the French front the Allies made considerable gains, in another region they sustained a serious reverse, in Italy. The Italians had seized Gorizia in 1916 and in the summer of 1917 they carried on a successful offensive along the Isonzo and the Carso Plateau. But with the breakdown of Russia and the spread of pacifism in the Russian armies the Germans were able to send large bodies of troops and a great quantity of heavy artillery to the aid of their ally, Austria. On October 28, 1917,

the Austro-German army seized Gorizia; on the 30th Udine fell; a rapid retreat of the Italians followed to the Tagliamento. The Germans announced that they had captured 180,000 prisoners and 1500 guns. The Tagliamento could not be held and the Italians were driven back to the Piave. For days the Allied world held its breath, fearing that what had happened to Serbia in 1915, to Roumania in 1916, was now in 1917 to happen to Italy, and that she would be conquered and eliminated from the war. But the Piave held and the attempts of the Central Powers to outflank it in the mountains to the north of Venetia, along the Asiago Plateau and other ridges, failed. There the



Farthest Italian Advance. .....Austrian Invasion, October, 1917.

invasion was halted. French and English troops were rushed to the aid of Italy and their arrival greatly helped and encouraged the Italians. But the world had had a bad shock and was apprehensive still, lest the Italian line should be broken. The Germans announced that the campaign had netted them 300,000 prisoners and nearly 3000 guns. Whether this was true or not, certain it was that they had freed Austria of the enemy and that they now themselves occupied four thousand square miles of Italian territory and that they were in a position to threaten the richest section of Italy, which contained, among other things, the great munition plants.

The Allied gains on the western front and those in Asia, which

will be referred to later, were but a slight comfort in view of the Russian and Italian disasters. The year ended in gloom in the Allied camp. But there was at least some satisfaction to be derived from the fact that Venice had not been taken, and that that matchless creation of art had not been damaged by the ruthlessness of the enemy as had the incomparable cathedral of Rheims, the masterpiece of Gothic architecture, the living embodiment of French history, whose every stone spoke of long lines of kings — and of Joan of Arc.

FIGHTING IN THE ORIENT

The year 1917, therefore, closed in gloom. The collapse of Russia, the disaster in Italy, were more alarming in their possible, if not probable, consequences than the scattered and costly gains of the Allies on the western front and the entrance of America into the war, perhaps too late to be of any material value, were reassuring. In western Asia, it is true, the year brought some encouragement to the Allies, but how durable or significant the successes there would prove to be it was quite impossible to forecast. As the Germans had loudly proclaimed their intention to link Berlin with Bagdad, and erect a Middle-Europe, and to extend it through Turkey and the great valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and as this was nothing less than a direct threat at the British Empire in India and Egypt, it was natural and inevitable that England should accept the German challenge in that part of the world as she had accepted it in western Europe and on the high seas. Consequently, as early as 1915 an expedition had been sent out from India, under General Townshend, to prevent the consummation of the German plans. But the expedition failed disastrously. After having advanced two hundred miles up the Tigris and after having seized the city of Kut-el-Amara, General Townshend found himself besieged in that place by the Turks and after a few months, no relief having reached him, he was forced to surrender with his entire army, about ten thousand men, on April 28, 1916, after a siege of a hundred and forty-three days. Not only was this a serious reverse in itself, but it gravely injured Great Britain's prestige in the East. There was nothing for her to do but endeavor to repair the damage done. She at once organized another expedition on a larger scale and with more careful preparation, which she sent into Mesopotamia under General Maude, early in 1917. This expedition was successful. Kut-el-Amara was recaptured on

February 24 and on March 11 the British entered Bagdad in triumph. Bagdad was not of great strategic importance, but its capture exercised a decided moral effect throughout the world.

Toward the close of the year the British achieved other victories over the Turks, farther west, in Palestine. During the earlier years of the war the Turks had seriously menaced England's control of the Suez Canal and Egypt. The English resolved to eliminate this danger once for all by sending an army into Palestine, under General Allenby. This army gradually forced its way northward, captured Jaffa, the seaport of Jerusalem, in November, and entered Jerusalem itself in triumph on December 10, 1917. Great was the rejoicing throughout the Christian world at this recovery of its sacred city after seven centuries of Mohammedan control. The achievement of the medieval Crusaders was being repeated. Would the new victory of the Christian over the Infidel prove ephemeral, as had the earlier one?

The Germans were not downcast over the turn of events in these remote theaters of war. Nor had they any reason to be. On the whole they were holding the western front, and the eastern front had disappeared under the terrific blows they had delivered to Russia and which had laid her low. On the 22d of December the German Emperor was undoubtedly expressing the prevalent German opinion of the general situation when he said to the army in France: "The year 1917 with its great battles has proved that the German people has, in the Lord of Creation above, an unconditional and avowed ally on whom it can absolutely depend. . . . If the enemy does not want peace, then we must bring peace to the world by battering in with the iron fist and shining sword the doors of those who will not have peace. . . . But our enemies still hope, with the assistance of new allies, to defeat you and then to destroy forever the world position won by Germany in hard endeavor. They will not succeed. Trusting in our righteous cause and in our strength, we face the year 1918 with firm confidence and iron will. Therefore, forward with God to fresh deeds and fresh victories!"

THE BOLSHEVIKI AND PEACE

The first of the fresh victories were to be achieved on the diplomatic field and were to be supremely satisfactory to the Germans. They consisted of the treaties of peace imposed by them upon

Russia and Roumania, and upon the big fragments of former Russia which had declared their independence rather than remain connected with a country controlled by the Bolsheviki, namely the Ukraine and Finland.

The Bolsheviki demanded immediate peace and when they succeeded in driving Kerensky from power, and themselves assumed control, they began negotiations to that end. They signed an armistice at Brest-Litovsk, the German army headquarters, on December 15, 1917. The leading personages in the ensuing discussion were Kühlmann for Germany, Czernin for Austria-Hungary, and Trotzky for Russia. The negotiations were long and frequently stormy. Trotzky urged that the peace be based upon the principles of "no annexations, no indemnities." The Central Powers pretended to accept this formula. Their insincerity and duplicity in announcing their adhesion to this principle and to that of the right of peoples to determine their own allegiance were shortly made apparent. They refused to withdraw their troops from the occupied parts of Russia and they indicated clearly that their aims were the opposite of their professions. At this Trotzky balked and withdrew from the conference and the Russian Government announced that it would not sign "an annexationist treaty," but at the same time it announced that the war was at an end and it ordered the complete demobilization of the Russian troops on all fronts.

Germany, however, refused to accept this solution of "no war, but no peace." It insisted on a treaty in black and white. As the negotiations had been broken off by the departure of the Russian delegates on February 10, the German army immediately assumed the offensive and began a fresh invasion of Russia, advancing on a front of five hundred miles and to within seventy miles of Petrograd. This speedily brought the Russians to terms and they signed on March 3, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the most notorious "annexationist treaty" on record. Its principle provisions were: Russia surrendered all claims to Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia; she also renounced all claims to Finland and the Ukraine and agreed to recognize their independence and to make peace with them; she surrendered Batum, Erivan, and Kars in the Caucasus to Turkey, and she promised to cease all revolutionary propaganda in the ceded regions and in the countries of the Central Alliance.

Subsequently and in direct violation of the plain intent of one of the articles of the treaty, the promise of a large money indemnity was exacted from Russia.

By this treaty Russia lost an enormous territory, about half a million square miles, a territory more than twice as large as the German Empire. She lost a population of about 65,000,000, which was about that of the German Empire. A year or less of Bolshevism had sufficed to undo the work of all the Russian Emperors from Peter the Great to Nicholas II. So complete a mutilation of a great country Europe had never seen. Russia was thrust back into the condition in which she had been in the seventeenth century and which even then was found intolerable. Never in modern times has a great power surrendered such vast territories by a single stroke of the pen. Pacifism and internationalism had borne their natural fruit with unexpected swiftness. Gorky, the Russian novelist, and considered a radical until the Bolsheviki appeared and gave a new extension to that word, has estimated that this treaty robbed Russia of 37 per cent. of her manufacturing industries, 75 per cent. of her coal, and 73 per cent. of her iron.

What the future of the ceded territories should be was not indicated beyond the statement that "Germany and Austria-Hungary intend to decide the future fate of these territories by agreement with their population." A few weeks later the Central Powers dictated a pitiless treaty to Roumania, the Treaty of Bucharest, forcing large cessions of territory and minutely and ingeniously squeezing her of her economic resources for their advantage.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk laid bare the soul of Imperial Germany. It proved to all the world that, whatever her professions might be, her greed was unabashed and unrestrained. And this greed was characteristic not simply of her rulers, military and civil. All Germany applauded. The same Reichstag which in July, 1917, had voted in favor of the principle of "no annexations, no indemnities" now enthusiastically ratified the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Socialists joining in. The rest of the world now knew, if it had not known before, what it might expect, if it was forced to pass under the same yoke. Germany stood completely unmasked. Her ideal was revealed in all its nakedness.

Having arranged matters in the East to her satisfaction, and no longer threatened or preoccupied in that quarter, Germany now turned practically her entire attention to the western front, confident that, by concentrated energy of attack, she could at last conquer there and snatch the victory which had so long eluded her and which would end the war. Transferring thither

her large eastern armies she was confident that now she could compel a decision and could force a settlement to her taste. One more campaign in France and all would be well. The spring drive was to be begun early, the intention being to separate the French and English armies and then defeat each in turn swiftly — before the Americans should arrive in any such numbers as to be able to influence the course of events.

THE WAR IN 1918

The drive opened on March 21, 1918. The mood in which it was begun was expressed by the Kaiser the day before: "The prize of victory," said he, "must not and will not fail us. No soft peace, but one corresponding to Germany's interests." A month later the German financial secretary added an appendant to this Imperial thought when he said in the Reichstag on April 23: "We do not yet know the amount of the indemnity which we shall win."

This great offensive, the greatest of the war, opened auspiciously and for three months proceeded according to the heart's desire. It was ushered in by the greatest gas attack Europe had ever known; also by a long-distance bombardment of Paris by a new gun of greater range than any previous gun had possessed. The ensuing onslaught was one of terrific force and was designed to spring the French and English armies apart at their point of juncture. The objective was Amiens. As a matter of fact the English left was, in the next few days, driven back toward Arras and the English center driven beyond the Somme. This actually made an opening. The English front was broken and a great disaster might have easily resulted, for the Germans now tried to turn the English right by cavalry. They were, however, met and checked by French cavalry just in the nick of time. But between March 21 and March 28, the Germans made great progress. Town after town fell into their hands, Péronne, Bapaume, Ham, Albert, Noyon, Montdidier. It was at this critical moment that General Pershing placed all the forces under his command absolutely at the disposal of Marshal Foch to be used as he might see fit. Foch had, so great was the danger, the greatest since the Battle of the Marne, been appointed, on March 28, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western Front. At last the Allies had achieved unity of command.

After a slight pause the Germans attacked the English in the north, in Flanders, at the point where their army and the Portu-

guese were joined. By April 12 the English had been forced to make a considerable retreat. It was then that General Haig issued a special order to his men which would have discouraged

and demoralized men less self-reliant and less fond of the blunt truth, however unpleasant. This utterance of the English commander will remain historic:

"Three weeks ago to-day the enemy began his terrific attacks against us on a fifty-mile front. His objects are to separate us from the French, to take the Channel ports, and to destroy the British Army. . . . Words fail me to express the admiration which I feel for the splendid resistance offered by all ranks of our army under the most trying circumstances.

"Many among us are now tired. To those I would say that victory will belong to the side which holds out the longest. The French Army is moving rapidly and in great force to our support. There is no other course open to us but to fight it out.

"Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment."

The bitterest fighting continued and the British lost important positions near Ypres, the famous Messines and Wytschaete ridges, and then Mount Kemmel. But French reinforcements came and the Germans were checked. Ypres still held out.

The Germans had suffered very severe losses in making these attacks and gains. They needed time to reorganize their exhausted divisions. Suddenly, on May 27, Ludendorff launched a new attack in an unexpected quarter on a forty-mile front, from Soissons to Rheims. On the 29th Soissons fell. The Germans advanced rapidly. By May 31 they were at the Marne once more after four years. In four days they had taken 45,000 prisoners and an enormous amount of war material. They were held at Château-Thierry on June 2 by French reserves which were rushed to the scene. The Germans were within forty miles of Paris and had gained nearly a thousand square miles of territory.

The Americans were beginning to count. On May 28 they captured Cantigny and two hundred and twenty-five prisoners. Later they helped the French check the Germans at Château-Thierry. They also foiled an attack in Neuilly Wood, advanced two-thirds of a mile, and took two hundred and seventy prisoners. On June 6 and 7 the Marines advanced two miles on a front of six miles and seized Torcy and Bouresches. A little later they occupied a part of Belleau Wood. These were details but useful and auspicious.

On June 9 the Germans made an attack on a front of twenty miles from Montdidier to Noyon, pressing the French center back several miles but at great cost. Then came a lull.

On July 15 they began their fifth and final drive in this re-

markably successful campaign. Attacking on a sixty-mile front east and west of Rheims they pushed forward, crossed the Marne at several points and were evidently aiming at Châlons. They seized Château-Thierry.

From March 21 to July 18, 1918, the Germans had carried on a colossal offensive and had taken many prisoners, much territory, and enormous booty. They were astride the rivers that lead down to Paris, itself not far away. Might not one or two more pushes give them the coveted capital of France and seal the doom of the Allied cause? Elated by four months of victories, which had brought them nearer and nearer the intended prey, inflamed by visions of imminent and unparalleled success, they were eager for the final spring. Then all would be over and a peace could be imposed upon the West similar to that imposed upon the East at Brest-Litovsk. The world would recognize its master, would be re-shaped according to Hohenzollern ideas, and would henceforth receive its marching orders from Berlin.

WAS AMERICA "TOO LATE"?

Not many graver moments, if any, have ever occurred in history. The world stood gripped by an intensity of anxiety and apprehension, painful, heart-sinking, intolerable. Particularly in America did a great and desolating wave of dread and foreboding sweep over the public mind. Minutes seemed like hours and hours like weeks, so racking was the suspense. Had we arrived too late? We had been so slow in seeing our duty, in recognizing our responsibility in the desperate drama of our times, we had finally entered the war so unprepared, that it seemed only too likely that we were to pay, and that the world was to pay, a grievous price for our tardy perception and decision. And would that price include, for us, not only national insecurity, but national dishonor and disgrace? The answer to these questions hung upon events, and events thus far had not been reassuring, had, on the contrary, seemed to be converging toward disaster.

We had done much in material ways for the common cause since our entrance into the war. Our navy, efficient and ready, had begun, from the first day, to render useful and important services. But by the close of 1917, we had less than 200,000 men in France. How many of these were prepared for front-line work it is impossible to say. But certainly they were far too

few for the emergency. On March 27 Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, made an urgent appeal for "American reinforcements in the shortest possible space of time" and declared that "we are at the crisis of the war, attacked by an immense superiority of German troops." The appeal was answered. From then on there was a rapid and increasing movement of American troops to Europe, 83,000 in March, 117,000 in April, 244,000 in May, 278,000 in June, and by the end of July there were 1,300,000 American soldiers in France. By November there were more than two million.

So desperate was the situation in mid-summer, 1918, that the French Government was prepared at any moment to leave Paris, as it had done in 1914.

But this moment was never to come. For Marshal Foch now struck a blow which freed Paris from danger, and which inaugurated a new and, as we now see, the final phase of the war. On July 18 he assumed the offensive, attacking the enemy on the flank from Château-Thierry on the Marne to the river Aisne. With French and American troops he took the Germans by surprise, and achieved a brilliant success. His entire line advanced from four to six miles, reclaiming twenty villages. Thousands of prisoners were taken, the Americans alone capturing over four thousand. A large number of guns were also seized. On the following days, the counter-offensive continued. Each day it achieved successes; each day it gained additional momentum. The Allied world passed through a new experience. An uninterrupted series of triumphs for the armies of Marshal Foch filled the days and then the weeks, after he had seized the initiative on July 18.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE

By July 21 the Germans, threatened on the flank, were forced to withdraw the troops which had crossed the Marne. The Second Battle of the Marne was over and took its place in history, alongside the First Battle of the Marne, having accomplished the same deliverance of Paris and having begun the deliverance of France. In that battle Americans had taken an important part, although it should not be exaggerated. Seventy per cent. of the troops participating in it were French. Forced to recross the Marne, the Germans next took their stand on the river Vesle. Bitter fighting occurred there. Again they were compelled to retreat and their next stand was at the Aisne.

Week after week their backward movement continued, stubbornly yet unsuccessfully contested. Foch's counter-offensive widened out far to the east of Rheims, far to the north of Soissons. Between the Argonne Forest and the river Meuse the main American army, intrusted with a formidable and difficult task, fought desperately day after day, pushing steadily but slowly and at great cost farther and farther north. West of the Argonne the French were driving the Germans back.

At the same time, the French and the British, with contingents of the other Allies, Italians, Belgians, Portuguese, Americans, interspersed, were attacking various points in the long line from Soissons to the English Channel. All these scattered attacks, carefully co-ordinated, were but parts of a comprehensive plan elaborated by Marshal Foch, who was now revealing himself to the world as one of the master-intellects of the war. One does not know which to admire the more, the incomparable conception of this campaign or the marvelous execution. Unremitting pressure everywhere, damaging thrusts here and there, such was the evident policy, the purpose being to maintain in Allied hands the initiative and the offensive which had been seized on the fateful July 18. Without haste, without rest, all through August and September and October the gigantic assault continued. The Allies steadily advanced as victors over ground which a short time before they had been compelled to abandon. Verdun was freed from the German menace, so was Rheims, so was Ypres. It would be impossible in any brief space, or, indeed, at length, even to catalogue the long list of incidents and events, in themselves often of great importance and interest, in this vast and complicated movement. Many towns and villages, some of them in possession of the Germans since 1914, were recovered. All that the Germans had won in their drive from March 21 to July 18 was lost, and the Allies then pressed on to conquer the rest of the territory of France, so long held by the Germans, to smash their retreating lines, wherever established, and to hurl them out of France and out of Belgium.

One detail of importance and of great interest to Americans in this general campaign was the elimination of the Saint-Mihiel salient by Pershing's troops on September 12–13.

By the end of September, after paying a heavy price for their retreat, the Germans were back on the famous Hindenburg Line, an intricate and powerful system of defenses which they had for years been building. Here they planned to hold, and then to institute an aggressive peace propaganda among the nations

supposed to be tired of war. The only way to block this purpose was to smash the Hindenburg Line and to compel the enemy to hurry on incessantly toward Germany. Could this be done?

THE BATTLE OF THE HINDENBURG LINE

The Battle of the Hindenburg Line will perhaps rank in history as the decisive battle of the Great War, as momentous as the "Battle of the Nations" at Leipsic in 1813, which foreshadowed the doom of the Napoleonic Empire. In each case the arrogant dream of world power was summarily dissipated. As, after Leipsic, France had been invaded, so, after the Battle of the Hindenburg Line, the invasion of Germany seemed possible and likely. Napoleon, in a few months, had been compelled to abdicate. Might history repeat itself, after an interval of a hundred and five years? The climax of the four years' war was rapidly approaching.

The battle opened on September 26, with attacks on the two widely separated flanks. On that day the First American Army under General Liggett in conjunction with a French army under Gouraud moved against the Germans on the German left. The Americans fought between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse and at first advanced swiftly, taking many villages. Gouraud on the other side of the Argonne pushed forward. The Franco-American drive was not halted but rendered slower when German reserves were rushed to the scene.

Meanwhile Belgian and British troops had attacked the German right flank far to the north in Belgium and had been successful in driving a wedge between the Germans on the Belgian coast and those in the region of Lille. Again reserves were rushed by Ludendorff to meet this danger. But neither here in Flanders nor at the other extremity in the Argonne was the Allied pressure relaxed.

Finally Foch was ready for his chief blow. On October 8 he attacked the enemy, anxious about both flanks, in the center. The attack was made between Cambrai and Saint-Quentin by three British armies under Byng, Rawlinson, and Horne, aided by the French under Debeney. Here the British achieved perhaps the greatest victory in their history. Hope, repeatedly deferred, was realized at last. In three days the British drove straight through the Hindenburg Line on a front of twelve miles, and where it was strongest, and then pushed on into the open

country. That boasted defense was no longer invincible. Saint-Quentin fell and so, shortly, did Cambrai.



The consequences of this breaking of the Hindenburg Line were enormous. The British pushed on toward Valenciennes. Activity was redoubled along the two flanks and soon advances

were made pretty much along the whole line from the English Channel to Verdun. It was a wonderful co-operative movement with glory enough for all the Allies, and to spare. Laon, a tremendous stronghold, was soon evacuated. By October 16 the Germans had had to give up the Belgian coast, Ostend, Zeebrugge. Then Lille, Roubaix, and Turcoing were evacuated. In three weeks an amazing victory had been won over positions selected and long prepared by the Germans themselves. The Americans pushed steadily down the Meuse. After October 16 it was merely a question of time when the Germans would inevitably be driven back into their own country. Each subsequent day continued the tale of territory recovered, of towns captured, of a growing demoralization of the German army. The greatest battle of the war had been decisively won. It only remained to gather in the harvest. The superiority of French military science over German science was established, and the name of Marshal Foch took its place among the great names of military history.

Meanwhile in other theaters of this far-flung war momentous events were occurring, contributing powerfully to the gathering culmination. From every front and with each new day came news of victories so astounding and so decisive and attended with consequences so immediate and far-reaching that it was evident that the hour of supreme triumph was rapidly approaching, that a terrible chapter in the history of humanity was drawing to a close.

ALLENBY'S CAMPAIGN IN PALESTINE

From Palestine came the news that Allenby, who had taken Jerusalem in December, 1917, was on the go again. With an army of 125,000 men, among whom was a small French contingent, he carried out a brilliant campaign against the Turks. Beginning in the middle of September, and making a rapid and consummate use of cavalry, he was able to get around them and in their rear, enveloping them, and delivering a staggering blow in the plains of Samaria. In the course of a few days Allenby captured 70,000 prisoners and 700 guns and practically all the supplies of the Turkish army. Following up this victory he pushed up to Damascus, which he entered on October 1, 1918, taking 7,000 prisoners. On October 6, a French squadron seized Beirut, the chief seaport of Syria. Then began a rapid drive toward Aleppo, the object being to cut the Bagdad railway and thus isolate the Turks who were fighting in Mesopotamia. On

October 15, Homs, halfway between Damascus and Aleppo, fell, and also the port of Tripoli on the coast. A few days later Aleppo was taken. The fate of Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Arabia was decided. Those regions, which for centuries had been under the blight of Turkish rule, were now freed. The



Turkish Empire in that quarter of the world was a thing of the past. Also the dream of a German road from Berlin to Bagdad now went a'glimmering.

SURRENDER OF BULGARIA

And while the Turkish Empire was being amputated in the East, it was being effectively isolated in the West. Bulgaria, which bordered Turkey in Europe, was being eliminated from the war. Almost at the very time that Allenby began his attack in Samaria, Franchet d'Esperey, a hero of the First Battle of the Marne, and now commander of the Allied army in the Balkans, an army consisting of French, British, Greek, Serbian, and Italian troops, attacked the Bulgarians between the Vardar and the Cerna rivers, and broke their lines in two, rendering their position highly critical. Ten days later, on September 29, Bulgaria signed an armistice which meant nothing less than unconditional surrender. She agreed to evacuate all the Greek and Serbian territory which she had occupied, to demobilize her army, to permit the Allied troops to use any strategic points in Bulgaria

they might wish to, as well as all means of communication. Bulgaria was thus out of the war. The Berlin-Bagdad dream was twice dead. Railroad communication between Turkey and Germany was cut. The grandiose German plan of a Middle Europe, of which the world had heard so much, was rapidly being pushed into the lumber-room of damaged and discarded gimcracks. Turkey was verging swiftly toward her fate. Serbia was quickly reconquered by the Serbians and for the Serbians, and it could only be a question of a short time before Roumania would be able to rise again, and denounce the oppressive Treaty of Bucharest which Germany and Austria-Hungary had imposed upon her less than five months before, on May 7, 1918, a treaty which had practically robbed her of her independence, both economic and political.

It was a matter of detail, though pleasing in itself, when on October 3, the self-styled Tsar of Bulgaria, Ferdinand, who had ruled for thirty-one years, abdicated in favor of his son, Crown Prince Boris, twenty-four years of age. Ferdinand was the second of the Balkan kings to lose his throne as a result of his conduct in the World War, Constantine of Greece having preceded him into exile in June, 1917. The new Tsar Boris III was shortly forced to abdicate and a republic was proclaimed. The republic, however, was short-lived, having failed to gain the necessary support, and the abdication was withdrawn.

VICTORIOUS ITALY

While such shattering events were occurring in the East, in the Balkans and in France, the war flamed up once more in Italy. It was in October, 1917, that Italy had suffered her great reverse at Caporetto. It was then that she was thrown out of Austria, across the Isonzo, and that she herself was invaded as far as the Piave. She had experienced colossal losses in men and in equipment. A year from that date, October, 1918, restored in morale and reinvigorated in every way, Italy assumed, under General Diaz, the offensive against the Austrians. Her attack was successful from the start and expanded steadily until she achieved an amazing triumph which largely effaced the memories of the previous year. The hostile line was broken and the Austrians were compelled to flee pell-mell toward their own country. It was a rout and resulted in the loss of some 600,000 prisoners and 7000 guns, the biggest haul of the war. Such was the battle of Vittorio Veneto (Oct. 24–Nov. 3). Caporetto was avenged.

TURKEY ELIMINATED FROM THE WAR

The atmosphere was clearing rapidly owing to these decisive events. Both Turkey and Austria were ready to quit the war. Both asked an armistice. On October 31 the Allied Powers granted an armistice to Turkey on terms that amounted to unconditional surrender. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were to be freely opened to the Allies, who might also occupy the forts that protected them. Access to the Black Sea was thus guaranteed. The Turkish army was to be immediately demobilized. The Allies were to have the right to occupy any strategic points they might desire or need to. Other terms completed the defeat of Turkey and registered her exit from the war.

AUSTRIA BEGS AN ARMISTICE

The armistice granted on November 4 contained similar conditions and also conditions even more severe. The Austro-Hungarian armies must be demobilized and must relinquish to the Allies and the United States a large part of their equipment. Austria must evacuate all territories occupied since the beginning of the war. Practically, too, she must give up the Trentino, Trieste, Istria and a part of the Dalmatian coast. All military and railway equipment must be left where it was and be at the disposal of the Allies. All German troops must be evacuated from Austria within fifteen days. All Allied prisoners held by Austria must be immediately restored to the Allies. A large part of the Austrian navy must be handed over. Several other provisions only emphasized in detail Austria's complete defeat.

Meanwhile Austria-Hungary was in rapid process of disintegration. Every despatch brought news of popular outbreaks from all parts of the Dual Monarchy. The Czecho-Slovaks declared their independence, dethroned the monarch and proclaimed a republic. Hungary declared her independence and apparently prepared to become a republic. It was rumored that Emperor Karl had fled, had abdicated, had been deposed. The truth was hard to discover, reports being so fragmentary and conflicting. Vienna evidently fell into the hands of the revolutionists and socialists and the German sections of Austria were said to have likewise declared their independence. The ancient empire was breaking up and several new states were rapidly evolving. Nationalistic, democratic, and socialistic forces were

struggling for recognition and control. What the ultimate outcome would be no man could tell. The very winds had been let loose. Whether the House of Hapsburg still existed was uncertain. That it was doomed to vanish completely and that, too, very soon, seemed assured, if, indeed, it had not already vanished. No one knew what the next day or hour would bring forth in this maelstrom of fermentation, in this confusion worse confounded.

The curtain was rapidly descending, the fifth act of the fearful tragedy of our times was closing with unexpected abruptness. Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary were out of the war. There remained the German Empire. Deserted by her Allies, and herself being rapidly driven from France and Belgium, and with the invasion of her own country not only probable but actually impending, what would this arch-conspirator of the age, this "natural foe to liberty," at home and everywhere, what would she do, what could she do, in a world so strangely altered since Brest-Litovsk, since Château-Thierry? The handwriting on the wall was becoming larger and more legible and more terrifying. The evil days were drawing nigh for a dread accounting. What would the proud and mighty German Empire do?

GERMANY SEEKS PEACE

What she did was to make a frantic effort for peace, appealing to President Wilson to bring about a peace conference, announcing her willingness to accept the various terms he had indicated in his speeches of the year as a proper basis for the new age, reforming her government rapidly in order to meet the more obvious criticisms which foreigners had made against it as autocratic and militaristic. The outcome of these manœuvres was the elaboration by the Allies and the United States at Versailles of the terms on which they would grant an armistice. These terms were to be communicated by Marshal Foch to such a delegation as the German Government should send to receive them at a place to be indicated by the Generalissimo. On Friday morning, November 8, Marshal Foch received the German armistice delegation in a railroad car at Rethondes in France and read to them the terms agreed upon for a cessation of hostilities. They were allowed seventy-two hours in which to consult their superiors and in which to sign or reject the armistice.

Meanwhile revolution had begun in Germany. On Thursday, November 7, mutiny broke out at Kiel. Several of the German

warships were seized by the mutineers and the red flag was hoisted over them. On that and succeeding days similar movements occurred in various cities and states, and revolutionary governments, local or regional, generally headed by Socialists, were announced from various localities, with what exactness one could not tell, from Hamburg, Bremen, Tilsit, Chemnitz, Stuttgart, Brunswick, Bavaria, finally from Berlin. Reports circulated like wildfire that reigning princes were abdicating or being dethroned, that workmen's and soldiers' councils or soviets were being formed in various centers and were seizing power. Demands were being made that the Kaiser abdicate. There were all the phenomena of a breaking up of the great deep. German society was being torn by alarming dissensions, the practical unanimity of the past four years was pounding to pieces upon the jagged reefs of defeat, and defeat with discredit and dishonor. The hour of retribution had struck. There was dismay and disarray in the public mind, vacillation and poverty of counsel among the military and political leaders of the land. Moral bankruptcy, as well as material, stared the German nation in the face, that nation which had been a unit in war as long as war offered chances for aggrandizement and loot. Socialists, with the exception of a paltry few, had worked hand in glove with militarists and Pan-Germans and the assorted hosts of embattled adventurers and soldiers of fortune; they had done this for four years, the easy tools of autocracy and egregious militarism. But now this band of international plunderers was falling apart. Each was seeking safety as it might from the fast approaching storm.

On Saturday, November 9, a wireless message picked up by Paris and by London announced, to the stupefaction of the world, that the Emperor, William II, had abdicated, and that his son, the Crown Prince, Frederick William, had renounced his rights to the throne, that a Socialist, Ebert, had been made Chancellor, and that a German National Assembly would be speedily elected by universal suffrage and that the Assembly would "settle finally the future form of government of the German nation and of those peoples which might be desirous of coming within the empire."

On the following day, Sunday, the world heard that the revolution was still spreading, that Cologne cathedral was flying a red flag, that Hanover, Oldenberg, Magdeburg, Saxony and other towns and states were seething with rebellion.

On Monday Americans awoke to the screeching of whistles

and the din of bells which signified that the armistice terms had been accepted by the German Government and that "the war was over," hostilities to cease at eleven o'clock that morning, Paris time. Rushing for their morning papers they ascertained this further fact that William II, German Emperor, who for thirty years had been the most powerful monarch in the world, had fled for refuge in an automobile to Holland. Thus the Last of the Hohenzollerns made his sorry exit from the scene, having plunged the world into turmoil and tribulation indescribable, the memory of which would haunt mankind with nameless horror for decades to come, the heartless, crushing cost of which would afflict and sadden generations yet unborn.

The Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, the very day that Americans were fighting their way into Sedan and Canadians into Mons. In truth, as another has said, a New World had been called in to redress the balance of the Old.

CHAPTER XXXVII

MAKING THE PEACE

For four years, three months, and more, the world had been passing through the hideous ordeal by fire. The end had come suddenly, unexpectedly, as had the beginning in 1914. The agony of uncertainty, the distress of clashing hopes and fears, the tense strain of daily, hourly anxiety, the ever-present sense of indescribable suffering and woe, now gave way to the exultation of victory, to pride in the glory of the achievement, to gratitude to those who had won it. The sacrifice had, at any rate, not been in vain. The golden hour had arrived at last, so often and so long deferred. Liberty had once more triumphed in its century-old struggle with despotism and now the opportunity had come for the spirit of freedom to inherit the earth. Civilization had hung upon the arbitrament of the sword. The unconquerable spirit of the brave had once more saved the world.

But while the worst was over in the appalling tragedy of our times, while war was no longer to slay its thousands daily and create new carnage hourly, the clearing away of the colossal wreckage of the war, the new ordering of the world after a convulsion that had affected every part of it, would, it was obvious, require much time and patience. The Allies had refused to listen for a moment to the ignoble and dangerous suggestion of a peace without victory, since such an outcome would mean nothing less than peace with defeat. "The war has ended," wrote an editor immediately after the armistice, "in the decisive victory of the free peoples of the world — the only end which could be worthy of the ideals for which they have fought and could redeem the sacrifices they have made, the only end which could enable them to build a new and better order of civilization on the ruins of the old."

Mr. Asquith, prime minister of Great Britain, had said at the very outset of the war that England would never sheathe her sword "until the military domination of Prussia" had been "wholly and finally destroyed." That end was achieved at last.

The most mighty military despotism of the world was overthrown; an overweening national pride was abased; a powerful and vainglorious monarch was a fugitive from the wrath of man; the colossal structure erected by Bismarck was in process of dissolution — such were the surprising and dramatic incidents of the closing scene, incidents calculated to impress profoundly the minds of men. In the spring of 1918 the Prussian system was on the verge of a stupendous victory; in the autumn that system crashed in utter ruin. Retribution so swift and so complete has rarely been witnessed on this earth.

"Twenty years after my death," Bismarck once said, "I mean to rise from my coffin, to see whether Germany has stood in honor before the world." Bismarck died in 1898. Had he returned to life in 1918 his rage would have been Homeric at the reckless incompetence of his successors, wasting, in a wild, insensate gamble, the goodly patrimony he had left them, and leaving Germany pilloried before the conscience of mankind. Long before his death, indeed, he had had a presentiment of what might be. "That young man," he had said of the Emperor William II, "will some day play his hand, play it at the wrong time and ruin his country," a prophecy now literally fulfilled. *World-Empire or Downfall* was the title of a notorious book, issued a few months before the Great War began, and received with enthusiasm in the Fatherland. Bernhardi, its author, was right. Downfall it was to be. And the measure of that fall was in part indicated in the terms of the armistice which Germany signed on November 11, and which constituted the first steps toward peace.

THE ARMISTICE

The first clause in this document provided for the cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice. The second clause provided for the "immediate evacuation of invaded countries; Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within fourteen days," the evacuated areas to be occupied by Allied and United States forces. The significance of the clause was great as it assimilated the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, which had occurred forty-eight years before, with the invasion of Belgium, Luxemburg, and France, which had occurred four years before. In other words, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany in 1871 was an act of violence and continued as such all through

the intervening years. The lapse of time had not weakened by jot or tittle the rightful claims of France to the lost provinces. It was just and fitting that Germany should be compelled to disgorge the booty she had acquired by the same process in both wars.

Other clauses provided that Germany must surrender in good condition much war material, 5,000 heavy and field guns, 25,000 machine-guns, 3,000 bomb throwers, 1,700 airplanes; also 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 railroad cars, 5,000 motor cars; also all the German submarines and 74 German surface warships of various kinds.

German armies must evacuate all the country west of the river Rhine, which should then be occupied by Allied and United States garrisons, which should also hold the three principal crossings of the Rhine, Mayence, Coblenz, and Cologne, together with the bridgeheads and areas at these points of a radius of nearly twenty miles. East of the Rhine there was to be a neutral belt of about six miles extending from the frontier of Holland to that of Switzerland. The cost of maintaining the troops of occupation in the Rhine Province was to be charged to the German Government. Other provisions of the armistice required Germany to renounce the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest; to withdraw all German troops immediately from territories which were formerly parts of Austria-Hungary, Roumania, Turkey; to evacuate East Africa, and to repatriate all Allied prisoners of war without the right to have her own subjects liberated from foreign prison camps. Germany must also make restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold which she had extracted from those countries and hand this over to the Allies to be held in trust until the signature of peace. The armistice was to run thirty days and might then be extended. The purpose of these various provisions was to render it impossible for Germany to renew the war with any hope of success.

THE EXECUTION OF THE ARMISTICE

Such were the main provisions of the armistice of November 11. No sooner made than the execution began. On November 19, Marshal Pétain, leading the French army into Metz, the capital of Lorraine, and Germany's strongest fortress west of the Rhine, was received with enthusiasm by the people, welcoming back the tricolor after forty-eight years of German rule. On November 22, Strasbourg set its clocks to French time and

General Gouraud, commanding the Fourth Army of France, made his triumphal entry, amid frenzied acclamations. Even Germans were forced to recognize the actual situation, so unmistakable was the expression of Alsatian feeling, now that the opportunity for expression had arrived. The *Cologne Gazette*, learning of the reception accorded the French when they entered Colmar and Saverne and Wissembourg and other Alsatian towns, said: "It is better not to deceive ourselves with illusions. The hatred of Germany shows itself all through Alsace with the violence of a hurricane. The French are received, in a delirium of enthusiasm, as true liberators."

Not only were Alsace and Lorraine thus recovered for France, in one of the most dramatic climaxes of history, but by the terms of the armistice the Allied armies had the right to occupy the Prussian Rhine Province and the left bank and the main crossings of the river. Accordingly three armies of occupation moved forward, the English to the north establishing themselves in Cologne, the Americans farther south and with their center in Coblenz, the French south of them, with their headquarters in Mayence. The last German soldier was withdrawn beyond the Rhine and Allied soldiers passed over it at the three places named in order to hold the bridgeheads and the surrounding areas.

While this systematic operation was proceeding on land, an event of profound significance was occurring on the sea. On November 18 the German fleet virtually surrendered to the Allied fleets, about fifty miles east of the Firth of Forth. Nearly four hundred warships of the Allies witnessed this event, having formed in two long columns six miles apart, between which moved the German ships. Naval history records no triumph as complete as this. The second naval power of the world, the proud creation of William II and modern Germany, had ceased to be, its ships forced to haul down their flags in the presence of the enemy and to be interned in a British harbor. Germany's sea power was at an end, nor was it likely that it would soon be permitted to revive and to disturb again the peace of the world. The German navy had won few laurels and its end was ignominious. It was now interned in British waters. Over seventy battleships had preferred abject humiliation to a test in battle. "The German flag," Admiral Beatty informed the German Admiral von Reuter, "is to be hauled down at sunset to-day, and is not to be hoisted again without permission."

THE PROBLEMS IN MAKING PEACE

An armistice is a mere suspension of hostilities. It is the first step toward peace, yet it does not always lead to peace. An armistice is concluded quickly under the pressure of circumstances with but little time for deliberation. A peace, however, if it is to be enduring and particularly after a war that has swept the whole world within its destructive range, must be the product of long consideration and reflection. It can hardly be hurried and yet hurried it is likely to be, necessarily, because of the general desire for the speedy resumption of the normal activities of life, and also because delay allows time for the dangerous development of all those revolutionary passions and appetites, those forces of discontent and disintegration which are often loosened and accentuated by war. After the uncertainties and hazards of war must come the certainties and assurances of peace. Moreover, as the iron must be hammered into shape when hot, so the changes effected by war must be speedily clinched and codified, before those who dislike those changes have recovered sufficiently to be able to oppose and block them. Otherwise what was won by the fighters may be lost by the peace-makers.

Thus after the armistice of November 11 and after the execution of its immediate provisions for the weakening of the enemy, the internment of his fleet, the occupation of a part of his land, men turned toward the far more difficult work of making peace.

On examination, how amazingly complicated the task! The variety and gravity of the problems demanding solution far exceeded those of the Congress of Vienna. Those problems fell naturally into several main classes although those classes were not mutually exclusive but were, on the contrary, extraordinarily intertwined with each other. There was first the problem of Germany. Germany must pay, both in territory and in reparations, for the enormous injuries she had done the world. It would be only just if she were to pay the entire cost of the war, yet that would be practically impossible since the war had cost all the nations probably two hundred billions of dollars. But that part of this colossal burden which was not to be borne by Germany must be borne by those upon whom she had forced the war, and for which the latter were not responsible. No "healing peace" could be made with Germany, because such a peace would be flagrantly immoral and unjust. The burden of paying for this German-made war must be placed squarely upon

the shoulders of Germany, as far as that was humanly possible. But the determination of this very point presented great difficulties of detail. An additional difficulty lay in the fact that the fall of the Empire had left Germany in political chaos, rival groups struggling for the control hitherto exercised by the now fugitive William of Hohenzollern.

This struggle and the steps taken by the new government that emerged from it to reorganize Germany will be described in a later chapter.

But the reorganization of Germany, important as it might be, was only one of a long series of measures that would have to be taken before the world could know once more even relative peace of mind. The general problem of European reconstruction presented innumerable aspects, bristled with innumerable difficulties, aroused the most varied hopes and fears. A mere catalogue of the changes introduced and of the questions raised by the world-wide war would be both extensive and disheartening, so great would be the labor necessary to bring order out of chaos, so essential would be unprecedented stores of wisdom and good-will. An adequate survey of these questions is impossible here, but one or two of them may be considered.

Take, for example, the question of national boundaries. In only a few cases could the boundaries of the future be the same as those of the past. From the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, from Archangel to Salonica, changes in political frontiers had been effected by events and must be recognized in practice. A few nations might emerge unaltered from the alchemy of the war, Spain and Portugal, for example, Switzerland, Norway, and possibly Sweden. But where else was there another European state that would issue from the impending readjustment unchanged? The boundaries of the British Empire, of France, of Germany, of Austria and Hungary, of Italy and Russia, of Serbia and Greece and Roumania and Bulgaria, of Albania and the Turkish Empire, all these must be sketched anew. For the dividing lines of the past had joined the snows of yesteryear. The boundaries of Belgium and Holland and Luxemburg and Denmark must perhaps undergo rectifications. One thing at least was certain. The map of Europe on which we had been brought up had passed forever into the limbo of discarded things and men must begin forthwith to familiarize themselves with the features of a new, strange map.

And they must become familiar, not only with a new Europe but with a new Africa and a new Asia and a new Pacific Ocean

as well, for German colonies and large parts of the Turkish Empire were destined to pass into other hands.

The territorial problems confronting the world in 1919 had a far wider sweep than those that existed a century earlier upon the downfall of Napoleon. They arose in large measure from the fact that a war begun for the extinction of one small state, Serbia, had resulted, not in that extinction, but in the destruction of three great empires, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, and in the defeat of a fourth, Germany, and the overthrow of its twenty-two monarchs. Meanwhile Serbia had emerged from the colossal wreckage covered with glory, stronger than ever in its national integrity, and destined to a great enlargement of its territory. It is doubtful if the history of the world contains a more ironical page.

Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey, in 1914, bulked large on the map: Russia, 8,400,000 square miles, or one-seventh of the land surface of the globe; Austria-Hungary, 261,000; Germany, 208,000; Turkey, 710,000, or three and a half times as many as the German Empire; in all, 9,579,000 square miles, or more than three times the continental area of the United States, excluding Alaska, and with a population of two hundred and fifty millions. The Congress of Vienna had a small area and a population of thirty-two millions to provide for as the result of the Napoleonic wars, namely the Duchy of Warsaw, which was only a part of former Poland, parts of Germany on the left bank of the Rhine, and the Italian peninsula.

In all this area of more than 9,000,000 square miles, supporting a population of a quarter of a billion, no man, at the close of the Great War, could point out the boundaries. They had been burned away in the consuming heat of the fray. What should be put in their places remained to be seen. That the drawing of the new map would prove a highly contentious matter was certain beyond peradventure.

One thing the victors of the war were committed to, namely the recognition of two new states, Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia, and the restoration of an old state, Poland. The first of these would consist of territories formerly belonging to Austria and Hungary; the second would consist of Serbia and Montenegro and territories formerly Austro-Hungarian; the third, of territories which for well over a century had been ruled over by Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

Such were a few of the outstanding territorial problems created by the war, and there were many others, which must receive

solution speedily, if peace was to be secured. In most cases the problems were intricate, in some obscure, in all sure to arouse the most heated passions. There was no remotest possibility that they could be settled amicably and in such a way as to leave no ill-feeling. They constituted the very stuff of which resentments and hatreds are made. Nevertheless settled they must be in one way or another.

WORLD PROBLEMS

Not only must Germany be forced to pay for the criminal destruction she had wrought in the war, not only must most of the frontiers of Europe be redrawn, not only must several new states be erected and guaranteed, but the economic development of these new states must be assured as well. Arrangements assuring peace, security, and good government must be devised for the vast territories severed from the Turkish Empire and for the former German colonies; for Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, for Constantinople, for the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Moreover, the future of Russia, of China, of Persia, comprising a third of the population of the world, must be based upon sound institutions, or the peace of the world would be indeed unstable. Again, the whole body of international law, flouted by the Central Powers in this most lawless of wars, must be painfully and laboriously reconstructed anew, for unless nations know their rights and duties, unless they respect them and insist that they be respected by others, international relations rest on sand, and humanity is at the mercy of force and guile.

In short, in whatever direction one might turn in surveying the world on the morrow of the armistice, one could see only a tangle of thorny questions demanding answers, a profusion of perplexing problems of every description, and the prevalence of passions little propitious for a speedy issue out of all these troubles. Four years of world war had accumulated a staggering mass of unfinished business which the peace-makers must now confront, and through which they must hew their way, though dangers manifold should encompass them about on every side. The mere task of feeding the world was formidable, pressing, and acute, and the necessary means and methods hard, if not impossible, to find. In no country in the world was the economic life of the people normal or healthy; in many countries it was highly abnormal, sadly shattered and deranged. Agriculture, the basic industry, manufacturing, trade and commerce, all had been

severely damaged and dislocated by the war. A large fraction of the working population had been drawn from industry and commerce into the armies of the combatants. Less food was produced at a time when more was needed. Markets had been lost or changed. Gradually, under the inexorable pressure of the war, industry had been brought more and more under the control of the state and directed toward serving the needs of war. Business had been increasingly diverted from private to public control.

With peace would come demobilization, the return of millions of men to their homes, seeking their places again in the economic life of the various nations. Other millions would be thrown out of work by the fact that the great war industries, the munition plants, the ship-yards, the various supply services, would now be obliged to curtail production as rapidly as possible. Women had been employed in enormous numbers in place of the men who had gone to the fighting line.

Now an infinite number of such personal readjustments must be made. Herculean were the tasks confronting the governments. They must so order this necessary transition in the economic world from a war basis to a peace basis that there should not be a general outbreak of industrial strife in place of the prolonged and desperate armed strife of the last four years. The relations of capital and labor, always delicate and difficult of adjustment, might easily become more troublesome than ever. The existence and the urgent character of these numerous economic problems would enormously increase the burden resting upon the governments of the various countries, and that too at a time when international affairs of the greatest variety and gravity were likely to occupy their attention and challenge to the utmost their ability. But the war had been a people's war and the domestic interests of the masses must be taken into account, in determining the foreign policies of the governments. Internal and external affairs could not be separated into compartments and treated consecutively. They were intertwined, and government programmes must have simultaneously in mind both sets of interests, those of the masses of the population as well as those of the countries as wholes and as members of the family of nations. It might well prove in practice that the vastly increased responsibilities resting upon statesmen in so troubled and critical a period of history would exceed their powers as human beings and that their achievements in each of the two great spheres of activity, home affairs, foreign affairs, would

fall far short of the hopes and expectations of their constituents, and of themselves.

This was all the more likely to happen since extravagant hopes and expectations had unquestionably been aroused by loose talkers and writers, since programmes of reconstruction had been hastily brought forward in abundance whose realization in definite and concrete reforms could only be accomplished in years, if not in decades, if indeed they could ever be accomplished.

Many were the discordant noises, all declaring that they were the authentic voices of the people but frequently sounding suspiciously like the voices of special classes. In the very multiplicity of counselors, inevitable, it may be, in an age of democracy and a prolific printing press, lay the seed of much confusion and also of much future disappointment.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

One of the ideas which had been discussed during the war was that of a new international organization, which should be designed and empowered to prevent the recurrence of such a hideous catastrophe as that which was then devastating and desolating the world and which inevitably would leave a heavy, heartless heritage of sorrow and of debt behind it. The old organization, or as the critics preferred to say, the old disorganization of the nations had broken down and was utterly discredited. It must be discarded forever. Any attempt to set it up again after the tornado had passed must be defeated. The nations must not be allowed to relapse into their former habits and methods, habits and methods that had led straight to bankruptcy. The old diplomacy, with its alliances, frequently secret, with its intrigues, with its general irresponsibility to the people whose destinies it assumed to control, must give way to a new diplomacy, open and above the board, dedicated to the task of eliminating jealousies, rivalries, and hatreds and of introducing and encouraging the spirit of friendliness and co-operation among the nations. Particularly must war be outlawed. The phrase that this was "a war to end war" became current, as did also the words, "never again." Both expressed the determination to annihilate once for all this immemorial curse of mankind.

This indignant and passionate resolve to find a better way to settle international difficulties in the future than had ever been found in the past enlisted the support of many men in France

and England and America. Societies were formed in those countries for the purpose of arousing public opinion to the feasibility as well as the desirability of a new organization of human society which should serve the interests of mankind, should express the conscience of mankind. In the United States the League to Enforce Peace was founded in Independence Hall in Philadelphia in June, 1915, with Ex-President Taft as president. In the following year President Wilson gave it as his opinion that, "When the great present war is over, it will be the duty of America to join with the other nations of the world in some kind of a league for the maintenance of peace." This thought was quite in line with long-existing aspirations of the American people, as shown in their enthusiastic advocacy, at the Hague Conferences, of peaceful methods in adjusting international contentions and in the approval they had often given to the principle of arbitration.

But a league of nations that could prevent war or even render it less probable could not remain a mere aspiration; it must be translated into a definite organization, with definite powers and obligations, and with a machinery for achieving its lofty purpose. It might easily happen that when the attempt should be made to embody the aspiration in a concrete institution, grave and perhaps insuperable difficulties would arise. No two persons might agree, much less two nations, as to the practical means whereby the aspiration could be realized. To desire a constitution is one thing; to draft it is quite another thing, and much more arduous; and to get the draft accepted by those who are to be bound by it may be something more formidable still. The cause would not be aided by those uncritical and enthusiastic advocates who wrote and spoke as if only a league of nations were needed in order to realize the dreams of poets and seers throughout the ages, of peace on earth, good-will to all. A lush sentimentalism, expressed in high-sounding phrases, would not help things along very far, but would, on the contrary, be likely to do more harm than good.

Such, then, were some of the elements in the general situation revealed by the suspension of hostilities in November, 1918. Humanity had narrowly escaped a great and terrible doom. It had passed through an intense strain of desperate endeavor; it had hovered long over the brink of failure and disaster. In the end it had achieved an astounding victory. Despotism had challenged liberty for the control of the world and despotism had gone under. Reigning houses that had ruled for centuries and

that had held the world in awe had been scattered like chaff before an avenging wind. Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, Romanoff thrones had crashed to earth and all their satellites of petty kings and princes had run madly for cover, thinking themselves happy if they escaped with their lives to Holland or Switzerland. Monarchies became republics overnight throughout central and eastern Europe. Autocracies yielded to democracies. Peoples, little accustomed by their previous experience or training to govern themselves, were now forced to do so, or to yield to new forms of oppression and misrule. The dictatorship of self-appointed radicals might be as ruinous to domestic happiness and to foreign peace as the old dictatorships of divine-right monarchs had been. Nationalistic, racial, social, economic questions surged up in every direction.

It was in a world like this that the Allies who had won the war prepared to meet, in order to confer upon and to determine the terms of peace which they would offer their defeated enemies. Having agreed among themselves what those terms should be they would then submit them to the latter for acceptance. Only after the necessary treaties had been made and ratified could the war be considered at an end; only then could the work of reconstruction be seriously begun.

The function of the Peace Conference was of course to make peace with Germany but did its members approach their task with any definite ideas as to what that peace ought to be? Had they any programme, any body of principles, any chart and compass, to guide them in their work? Had they given any pledges, had they limited their freedom of action by preliminary agreements among themselves or with their enemies?

In a way and to a certain extent they had. The Germans in asking for an armistice had accepted the terms laid down by the President of the United States "in his address of January 8 and his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice." President Wilson's various utterances delivered in 1918 therefore have a direct bearing upon the making of the Treaty. Accepted with certain reservations by the Allies it was understood that they would form the basis of negotiations. The speech of January 8 was the most outstanding of the President's pronouncements. In it he laid down "Fourteen Points" as "the programme of the world's peace," the "only possible programme, as we see it." A month later on February 11, he made another speech in which he laid down "Four Principles"; on July 4 one setting forth "Four Ends"; and on September

27 one stating "Five Particulars." Thus there were at least twenty-seven points or items in the President's programme for peace, which, he asserted, was America's programme. It is quite impossible to summarize them here. Some were quite precise, some quite vague. Some appeared to conflict with others and some were, by November, 1918, no longer relevant to the situation, so rapidly had events moved in that memorable year. But however uncertain and sketchy they were in some respects, they had been accepted as the basis of negotiation by both sides, neither of which was any too confident as to what they meant, for points apparently precise were seen, on examination, to be susceptible of different interpretations.[1] But each side hoped for the best.

[1] The Fourteen Points, succinctly stated, were as follows: (1) "Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view." (2) "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas . . . alike in peace and in war." (3) "The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace." (4) "Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." (5) "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon . . . the interests of the populations concerned which must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined." (6) "The evacuation of all Russian territory. . . ." (7) "Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations . . . without this healing act the whole structure and validity of International Law is forever impaired." (8) "All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored . . . and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine . . . should be righted." (9) "Readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be affected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality." (10) "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." (11) "Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated . . . Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality. . . ." (12) Nationalities under Turkish rule "should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened" to all nations under international guarantees. (13) "An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea. . . ." (14) "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

The place chosen for the Peace Conference was appropriately Paris, which Meredith once called " the goddess of the lightning brain," " valiant unto death for a principle " and which had been the nerve-center of the Allied cause, the throbbing heart of the coalition, from the first day to the last of the racking struggle. The first session of the Conference of Paris was held on January 18, 1919, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This formal meeting had been arranged by the Inter-Allied Supreme War Council and by the representatives of the five Great Powers, which had decided, among other things, the number of representatives that each state should have at the Conference. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan were to have five delegates apiece, and the British Dominions and India were also to be represented, two delegates each from Australia, Canada, South Africa, and India and one delegate from New Zealand; Brazil was given three delegates; Belgium, China, Greece, Poland, Portugal, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Roumania, and Serbia two delegates each; Montenegro, Siam, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay one delegate each. This would make an assembly of about seventy members. While the larger states were given a larger representation, each state was to have but a single vote. This preliminary distribution of delegates was almost immediately altered, owing to the protests of Belgium and Serbia which had fought and suffered from the first day of the war to the last and which now found themselves allotted only two representatives, whereas Brazil, which had not actually fought at all, had three. Belgium and Serbia were forthwith given three apiece and the new Kingdom of the Hedjaz was given two.

President Wilson decided to attend the Conference in person, thus departing from the previous practice of the government. The chief reasons prompting this unprecedented action was his intense desire to secure a league of nations and to see that the peace in general should conform to his principles. If the latter needed interpretation, who would be a more authorized and official interpreter than himself? He appointed as associates on the American delegation, Secretary of State Lansing, Colonel Edward M. House, Mr. Henry White, and General Tasker Bliss. The Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of England, France, Italy attended: namely Lloyd George, Balfour, Clemenceau, Pichon, Orlando, Sonnino. The Prime Ministers of several British Dominions also attended as did those of Serbia and

Greece and Roumania, Pachitch and Venizelos and Bratiano. Belgium sent her Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hymans; Czecho-Slovakia sent Kramar; Poland, Dmowski; and many other men of importance and distinction were among the delegates.

The Conference was opened by President Poincaré of France in a masterly address. "Forty-eight years ago to-day," he said, "on the 18th of January, 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed by an army of invasion in the Palace of Versailles. It was consecrated by the theft of two French provinces. It was thus, from the very moment of its origin, a negation of right and, by the fault of its founders, it was born in injustice. It has ended in opprobrium.

"You are assembled in order to repair the evil that has been done and to prevent a recurrence of it. You hold in your hand the future of the world."

M. Clemenceau was unanimously elected president of the Conference. Subsequently committees were constituted to investigate the great subjects which would require settlement and to report; committees on Responsibility for the War, on Reparations, on International Labor Legislation, on Regulation of Ports, Waterways and Railroads, and on a League of Nations. Of the last of these President Wilson was made chairman, he having announced that his main interest in the work of the Conference was centered in the League of Nations and having emphasized the importance of it in various speeches delivered in France, England, and Italy before the opening of the Conference. Commissions were also appointed on the various territorial problems.

THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS

The Conference of Paris, thus formally opened on January 18, 1919, continued in session throughout the year. The tasks confronting it were so varied, so difficult, and so complicated, and any solutions that might be reached fraught with consequences so grave, that necessarily progress could be made only slowly, if it were to be made wisely. Decisions so momentous for the future as these would inevitably be must be the product of long and mature consideration or they would leave the world in a worse welter than that in which it already found itself. Time was of the very essence of the problem, time to study every suggestion comprehensively and minutely, time to make innumerable adjustments between conflicting plans and interests, time to distil a reasonable unity of agreement from the daily clash of

many minds, time, also, to feel the way into the unknown and the untried, for in much of its necessary work the Conference would be without light or guidance from the past. Yet, and this was the stern paradox of the situation, time was the very thing which the world could least afford to grant unstintingly, for its most urgent need was to begin immediately the stupendous work of rehabilitation, to resume speedily its normal activities and to increase their pace, if body and soul were to be held together. European society, battered and shattered by the agony of the long struggle, impoverished in every way beyond the possibility of calculation, might easily disintegrate still further, might indeed break up into warring factions driven by elemental passions, unless it could quickly concentrate its attention upon the problem of recovery. Thus, circumstances being what they were, the Conference was compelled to work under unfavorable conditions.

The inner history of the Conference of Paris cannot now be written with any assurance of accuracy or completeness. Much of what went on within its councils and committees is veiled in utter secrecy. The records kept of its proceedings have not been published or have appeared only in fragmentary or conjectural or perhaps interested reports, difficult to control.

But a few things may be stated, of a quite general nature. And one is this, that as far as the procedure of the Conference was concerned history repeated itself in a very striking way. There had been, especially in America, much eloquent denunciation of the Congress of Vienna and President Wilson had made himself the spokesman of this indignation and had demanded a new diplomacy which should operate frankly and in the sight of all, should make only "open covenants, openly arrived at." But this was not to be. As a matter of fact the procedure of the Conference conformed, in this respect, quite closely to that of the Congress of Vienna. To be sure the former had several plenary sessions to which the press was admitted, whereas the latter had no general sessions. But the public meetings of the Conference were merely full-dress parades or, at best, only formally ratified decisions reached elsewhere. The real work of the Conference, as of the Congress, was done in numerous committees, in informal conversations, and in the secret sessions of the representatives of the Great Powers, the "Big Five," or the "Big Four" with Japan left out, or the "Big Three" with both Japan and Italy missing. Only fragmentary records of these meetings have been given to the world.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

The immediate and pressing duty of the Conference was to draw up the terms of peace which were to be offered Germany. This must necessarily precede everything else. After several months of investigation and discussion agreement was reached and the result was the draft of a treaty, the longest on record, a treaty which would fill a volume of two hundred pages. This was submitted, on May 7, 1919, to the representatives of the German Government, sent to Versailles to receive it. There was to be no direct and oral negotiation between the German delegates and the members of the Conference, but the former were given a certain length of time in which to study the document and to make in writing whatever suggestions they might care to. In due course they submitted arguments and counter propositions which filled a volume not much smaller than the original draft. Most of these propositions were rejected by the Conferees, a few changes were made to meet the German objections, and the amended treaty was then returned to them on June 16. Acceptance was required by June 23, under threat of a renewal of war and the invasion of Germany. On the last day of this stated period the German National Assembly at Weimar passed, by a vote of 237 to 138, a resolution to the effect that "the National Assembly agrees to the signature of peace." On June 28 the Treaty of Versailles was signed by Dr. Hermann Müller, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Johannes Bell, and by the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, the Chinese delegation refusing to sign as a protest against the Shantung award which will be described later. This historic event occurred in the same Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles where forty-eight years before the German Empire had been proclaimed. Time had brought its complete revenge. By an appropriate coincidence the Treaty of Versailles was signed on the 28th of June, the fifth anniversary of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, Francis Ferdinand, at Sarajevo, which had been made to have such amazing and lamentable consequences.

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The first part of the Treaty of Versailles provides for the creation of a League of Nations. The League is to consist, at the outset, of two classes of states, first, the original signatories

of the treaty, thirty-two in all, and secondly, certain others, thirteen in number, which are to become members on acceptance of the invitation to join.[1] It will be noted at once that the Central Allies, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, were not included in the League, nor was Russia nor any of the states which had recently claimed independence from Russia; nor is Mexico to be found among those invited to accede. Provision is made for the admission of new members by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly, and for the withdrawal from the League of any member, after having given a two years' notice, "provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal."

The chief bodies created by this Covenant for the accomplishment of the purpose of the League are an Assembly and a Council, the latter being, as will be seen, far the more important. Every member of the League is to be represented in the Assembly and may have three representatives, or fewer if it desires. Each state has, however, but one vote. There is thus equality of voting power among all the members, whether large or small. It should be noted that in the Assembly the British Empire has collectively six votes, for, in addition to the single vote allotted to the Empire as a whole, five of the constituent members of that empire have each a separate vote, namely, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and India.

The Council, on the other hand, represents, not the theoretical and assumed equality of states, but their actual and obvious

[1] *Original Members of the League*

United States of America	New Zealand	Hedjaz	Poland
	India	Honduras	Portugal
Belgium	China	Italy	Roumania
Bolivia	Cuba	Japan	Serb-Croat-Slovene State
Brazil	Ecuador	Liberia	
British Empire	France	Nicaragua	Siam
Canada	Greece	Panama	Czecho-Slovakia
Australia	Guatemala	Peru	Uruguay
South Africa	Haiti		

States Invited to Accede

Argentine Republic	Denmark	Persia	Sweden
	Netherlands	Salvador	Switzerland
Chili	Norway	Spain	Venezuela
Colombia	Paraguay		

inequality. It is intended to be at the outset a small body of nine, and five of the nine shall always be the British Empire, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. In addition to these five there shall be four others to be selected by the Assembly "from time to time in its discretion." Until the Assembly is organized and makes its first selection the Covenant itself determines that these four shall be Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece. Each state represented on the Council is to have one vote and may not have more than one delegate. Provision is made for the possible enlargement of the two classes of members that compose the Council, the permanent and the temporary. Any member of the League, not a member of the Council, may, however, be represented on the Council whenever any matter is under consideration which specially affects its interests. Nothing is said as to who shall decide as to whether that case has arisen. Presumably, therefore, it is for the Council itself to decide, not the state which considers itself affected.

The Council shall meet as occasion may require and at least once a year. No such definite requirement exists in the case of the Assembly, which shall meet "at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require." Who is to decide as to whether the occasion has arisen is not stated. Both Council and Assembly may deal at their meetings "with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." This is a charter as liberal as the wind, since the history of the past appears to show that almost anything may, under favoring conditions, affect the peace of the world. Except where otherwise expressly provided in the Covenant or in the other articles of the Treaty all decisions, either in the Council or in the Assembly, must have the unanimous vote of those present, a provision which enables any state, even the smallest and most insignificant, to exercise a veto. Obstruction is easy, as unanimity is generally hard to obtain among any considerable body of human beings.

The seat of the League is to be Geneva, but the Council may at any time establish it elsewhere. There is to be a Secretary General, appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly. A Secretariat, as elaborate as shall be needed, shall be established, to preserve the archives, conduct the correspondence and discharge the clerical work of the League, its expenses to be apportioned among the members of the League.

As the motive force behind the creation of the League was the desire to find some method of maintaining peace and preventing

war, as this is, indeed, the avowed purpose of this organization, the clauses of the Covenant bearing upon this matter are the supreme features of the document, are, in fact, its very pith and marrow. Facile idealists had iterated and reiterated in every strain that this was the last war, the war to end war. If this consummation devoutly to be wished were to be attained it must be through the League; and both before the Covenant was drawn up and after it had been completed it was recommended by its sponsors either as actually assuring this end or as going a long way toward it.

THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT

The supposed causes of war or kinds of contention that have been wont to lead to it in the past are treated in various ways. The swollen armaments of Europe have been regarded, at least for a full generation, as a menace to peace, an incitement to war, and the First Conference of the Hague in 1899 attempted, unavailingly, to restrict their growth, to reduce their size. Now, after the most devastating war in history, the problem is again approached and the Covenant devotes an article to it. And that article says that the Council of the League shall formulate plans for the reduction of armaments for the consideration and action of the several Governments, that after these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments the limits therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the consent of the Council. The Governments shall also consider how the evil effects attendant upon the private manufacture of munitions can be abated and are to exchange frankly and fully with each other information as to military and naval programmes.

Under this article it is possible to bring about a reduction of armaments, just as it has been possible to bring it about by international agreement at any time during the past twenty years, and no more possible now than then. It cannot be said that the Conference of Paris has treated this problem any more effectually than did either of the Conferences at The Hague. It does little more than point out once more the well-known gravity of the problem and promise to study it. Indeed one of its stipulations may tend to impede rather than to further the process of reduction. While the Council is to formulate plans for reduction, no state is obliged to accept those plans. But if a given state does accept them, then it can never in the future increase the size of its army or its navy or its air-service beyond the limits thus

fixed and accepted, without the permission of the Council, giving its unanimous consent. Thus if the Council should recommend for the United States an army of 500,000 men and the United States should agree, then, no matter how grave or desperate the emergency, the United States could not increase its army without the permission of the eight other states, be they European, Asiatic, or American, that are its colleagues on the Council.

THE PREVENTION OF WAR

This is, however, but one aspect of the general problem of the maintenance of peace, and one of the lesser aspects. More important than the reduction of armaments is the prevention or discouragement of their use. If a nation can be impressed with the fact that it is more likely to lose a war which it begins than it is to win it, fewer wars will be begun. This thought was borne in mind by the makers of the Covenant. Article X aims emphatically to give this impression. The war has created several new states and altered the boundaries of many old ones. Article X says, apropos of this: "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." The obligation of every member of the League is as explicit as any obligation can be, the promise is clear and binding to respect and to preserve the territorial integrity and the existing political independence of all the members of the League. While, apparently, the Council only "advises" as to the actual steps to be taken in any given case, the obligation to respect and to preserve has been assumed by all and must be lived up to, otherwise this article is but a scrap of paper. The Conference of Paris put this article into the Covenant in order to throw an impregnable buttress around the entire Treaty by plainly warning any would-be disturber of the peace that if it should attack any member of the League it would be confronted by all the members of the League. With such an imposing array pledged to block its purpose, it might consider discretion the better part of valor, and desist in time. Of course this guarantee could only exercise this sobering effect if it was really believed by the would-be warring state that it would be actually enforced by the

members of the League, that, in other words, the latter were sincere and resolute in making their promises.

But the League aspires to prevent wars by adjusting international disputes before they reach the point of explosion. Any war or threat of war whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not is declared a matter of concern to the entire League. On the request of any member the Council shall be summoned and may take any action it may deem wise to preserve the peace. Any member may also at any time bring to the attention of the Council or the Assembly any circumstance whatever which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. The thought here is that misunderstandings, if freely and fully discussed, are frequently smoothed away, which is true, but it is also unhappily true that discussion often sharpens and envenoms differences of opinion.

By another clause the members of the League agree that if any dispute shall arise between them likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council and that they will in no case resort to war until three months after the award of the arbitrators or the report of the Council. This clause, if observed, will prevent sudden attacks and allow peacemakers a reasonable time to attempt to adjust the difficulty. Had Austria followed such a procedure the war of 1914 would not have burst so suddenly upon the world and might indeed have been entirely avoided. This clause does not prevent war, since after the stated time has elapsed, the parties to the dispute may commence hostilities, but there is less likelihood of their doing so, owing to the intervention of this cooling-off period. The members also agree that certain questions of a justiciable nature, as distinct from questions of national policy, shall be submitted to a court, either one agreed upon by the parties to the dispute or the Permanent Court of International Justice to be established by the League. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, or as to any question of international law would come within this category. If one of the parties accepts the award of the court, the members of the League will not make war upon it, but if one declines to accept it, the Council shall propose the steps that shall then be taken.

If there should arise between members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration, the members agree to submit it to the Council, which shall

investigate the matter and attempt to effect a settlement. If the Council fails it shall publish a report concerning the facts in the case and containing its recommendations, so that the world may judge and the pressure of public opinion may be brought to bear upon the uncomplying party or parties to the conflict. If the report of the Council is unanimous, exclusive of the members representing the parties to the dispute, the members of the League will not go to war with the party complying with its recommendations. If it is not unanimous, then the members shall take such action as they shall consider necessary.

Such a dispute shall be transferred from the Council to the Assembly in case either party to the dispute requests it.

Thus we see that the members of the League agree not to go to war without first submitting their disputes to one form or another of investigation or arbitration. They do not agree necessarily to accept the results of the arbitration, nor do the other members of the League not parties to the quarrel agree to force them to. They merely reserve the right to act as they see fit. Here, then, is no prohibition of war; but, if war comes, it must come only after a certain period of time. It must not come precipitately.

THE USE OF ECONOMIC WEAPONS

But supposing any member of the League disregards its obligations, breaks its promise to allow an investigation or arbitration, and begins a war in the good old way, summarily. What happens then? Something quite important, as laid down in Article XVI. The offending state shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war not merely against its enemy, but against all the other members of the League as well; and those other members "hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all intercourse between their nations and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not." Here is a tremendous force, if applied, and applied it must be "immediately" if the members of the League are to keep their promises. This is the economic pressure about which the world has heard so much recently as a preventive of war. In addition the Council must recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air contingents the members of the League

shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

In other words the economic pressure must come, it appears, instantly, and the nations have no right to delay or to discuss their obligations. These obligations are explicit and peremptory. Whether they have any right to refuse the military force that the Council shall subsequently " recommend " is not clear.

Similar provisions look toward investigation and arbitration, in the case of disputes between states not members of the League, or between such states and those states that are members. And it is agreed that if a state outside the League begins a war upon one within, without first observing the procedure described, then Article XVI, that is, the economic boycott and possible war, shall be applied to that state by all the members of the League.

There are other clauses in this Covenant than those which have been described. Their purpose is the same, the maintenance of peace by the elimination of the causes of war. As, in the opinion of its framers, secret diplomacy has caused many wars in the past, secret diplomacy must be abolished. Henceforth there must be no private arrangements between various powers, but every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter must be forthwith registered with the Secretary of the League and published, else it shall not be binding; and all such engagements hitherto made, if inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant, must be abrogated. But says Article XXI: " Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

As territorial greed and colonial rivalries have been prolific causes of war in the past the Covenant sets up a new system for disposing of the lands that have fallen into the hands of the Allies as a result of the war, such as the German colonies and Turkish territories. These are not to be divided up among the victors as spoils, but are to be regarded as held in trust for the benefit of the peoples concerned. The various areas are to be intrusted by the League to various members of the League under mandates setting forth the degree and kind of authority that they may exercise, guaranteeing certain rights to the natives, and requiring annual reports from the mandatories. The mandates may vary according to the community. But these vast stretches of the earth are not to be annexed to the colonial

empire of any state. They are to be held in tutelage by the League of Nations until such time as they may be able to stand alone. The conduct of any mandatory in the administration of the territory assigned to it is subject to the supervision of the League, that is, to the enlightened opinion of the world. The method by which this supervision and control shall be carried out is vital to the success of the new system.

Such are the main provisions of the Covenant which announces a new experiment in international affairs. The Covenant may be amended at any time by a unanimous vote of the Council and by a majority of the Assembly.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

There was another feature of the Treaty of Versailles which was intended as a sort of companion piece to the Covenant and which provided for another international agency which was to work in close connection with the League of Nations, as an International Labor Organization, to consist of all the states forming the League of Nations. It was hoped and expected that this organization would, by bringing about international co-operation in the industrial sphere, contribute to social peace and therefore to the peace of the world. The commission which drafted the labor clauses of the Treaty of Versailles was presided over by an American, Samuel Gompers, and counted among its members such leaders in the labor movement as Barnes of England and Vandervelde of Belgium. Part XIII of the Treaty represents the work of the commission. It provides for an International Labor Conference and an International Labor Bureau. The Conference is to meet annually and is to draw up agreements for regulating and improving industrial conditions. These agreements are to be put in the form of "draft conventions" and "recommendations" which each member-state is required to lay before the proper legislative body within eighteen months, but which are to become binding only when accepted and enacted by that body. The final decision, therefore, in all such matters, rests with the government or legislature of each country. There is therefore no super-parliament and no compulsion save what may lie in the pressure of public opinion in each instance. The Conference is composed of four delegates from each country, two representing the government and two representing employers' and workingmen's associations. In other words the state and capital and labor are to collaborate in this labor parliament

whose powers are merely advisory. The first International Labor Conference was held in Washington in 1919; the second in Genoa in 1920; the third and fourth in Geneva in 1921 and 1922.

The International Labor Bureau, consisting of experts, recruited from different countries, is the permanent working member of this organization, preparing meetings, conducting investigations, making reports, publishing the results of its inquiries, and acting, in general, as a clearing-house of information and suggestion in regard to labor problems and conditions. It is required to be established at the seat of the League of Nations. The relations of the Labor Organization to the League are defined in the Treaty. The Labor Bureau is "part of the organization of the League": it is "entitled to the assistance of the Secretary-General in any matter in which it can be given," but it is not subject to the control of the Council of the League nor is the Labor Organization as a whole subject to the Assembly of the League, except in the matter of its financial support. It is practically a co-ordinate and autonomous body, connected with the League by the fact that it is designed to serve the same purpose, namely the promotion of peace throughout the world. It has its own building, its own staff, its own library, its own organs of publication. Its chief director has thus far been M. Albert Thomas, a French Socialist who had been Minister of Munitions during the war.

THE TREATY WITH GERMANY

Of the four hundred and forty articles of the Treaty of Versailles only twenty-six are devoted to the League of Nations. The remainder set forth the measures and precautions which the Allied world has seen fit to adopt in regard to Germany, the determination of the future boundaries of that country, the political changes in Europe which she must recognize, stipulations in regard to her future military organization, and in regard to penalties and reparations. Elaborate sections of the Treaty concern financial and economic matters, German colonies, ports, waterways and railways, labor organization and legislation. These sections represent the price that Germany must pay for the unexampled losses, the immense sacrifices, the incredible exertions which her aggression imposed upon the world. Considering the infinite complexity of the problems raised by the war, the multitudinous details that must be studied and adjusted

as a result of a struggle that left no human being, no corner of the world, unaffected, the wonder is that the Treaty of Versailles is not far longer than it is. The reader should carefully study the entire document if he would see how grave a thing it is to tear up the charters of the world, to throw into the caldron the established and beneficent institutions, relations, and usages of men. Only a few of the more conspicuous features of the Treaty can be described in this chapter.

THE BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY

The boundaries of Germany are drawn anew. She loses Alsace-Lorraine, which reverts to France. Slight changes are provided for along the Belgian frontier. Provision is made for the people of the larger part of Schleswig to resume their former connection with the kingdom of Denmark if they so desire. For the purpose of discovering their sentiments Schleswig is divided into two zones, and plebiscites are to be taken in each, conducted, not by the German authorities, but under the authority of an International Commission. The northern zone will vote as a unit and if the majority favors reincorporation in Denmark it is to occur forthwith. The voting in the southern zone will be by communes and the Five Great Powers shall, after the plebiscite, draw the boundary line between Schleswig and Germany, a line which shall take into account the result of the voting and also geographical and economic conditions. Germany agrees to abide by their decision. In these plebiscites, as in others provided for by the Treaty, women are to vote as well as men.

Thus another of the wrongs committed by Bismarck and his policy of blood and iron is to be righted. The territorial booty of the war of 1864 must be, in part, disgorged, just as that of the war of 1870 must be. In another region, in the eastern part of Prussia, wrongs committed by Frederick the Great a century and a half ago are also to be righted. Germany recognizes the Republic of Poland, that miracle of our times, and extensive areas of Prussia are renounced in favor of this old, new state. Some of these are ceded outright by the Treaty and in others plebiscites are to be held to determine the wishes of the people. Thus in a part of Upper, or Southern, Silesia, seized by Frederick in his famous raid of 1740, and in a part of the province of East Prussia the exact boundaries would not be known until the people should have been consulted and until the Five Great Powers

should have finally determined the frontier. But whatever the outcome might be, Germany agreed to abide by it. Not all of Frederick's annexations would be lost — only those parts which were mainly Polish in race and in sentiment, but the eastern contours of Germany would differ greatly from those of the past. In this redrawing of the map of Germany two other changes must be noted. Germany renounces, in favor of the Five Great Powers, Memel, in the extreme northeastern tip of Prussia, and agrees to accept whatever disposition may be made of it. She also renounces in their favor the city of Danzig, which is henceforth to be a free city and to be placed under the League of Nations. Danzig had belonged to the former kingdom of Poland, but had been seized by Prussia in the second partition in 1793. The Poles, both because they regarded this city as rightfully theirs and also because it was their only possible seaport, pleaded for its inclusion in the new state, but the Conference of Paris did not grant it to them. It took Danzig from Germany, but did not give it to Poland, but it undertook to negotiate a treaty between the Free City and the Republic of Poland whereby the latter might include the former within its customs boundaries and might enjoy its use as a port, quite without restriction. The executive of the Free City, under the League of Nations, is to be a High Commissioner appointed by the League. Danzig is connected with Poland by a strip of territory, a " corridor " which thus separates the main body of the Prussian state from that part which lies east of the corridor, namely what is left to Prussia of the province of East Prussia. These terms of the Treaty have given great dissatisfaction both to Germany and to Poland.

Thus, by the Treaty, Germany has lost probably five million of her population, but, in the main, she has only lost those peoples conquered by force and belonging to other nationalities. She has only lost, or is to lose, her French and Danish and Polish subjects. The liberation of these peoples is one more triumph of the powerful and unconquerable spirit of nationality, a force which has greatly transformed Europe since the French Revolution and which is still transforming it.

In still another region Germany has lost control, at least provisionally, of territory that was hers before the war, of the Saar Basin, contiguous to France. This region, in part, had belonged to France, but had been acquired by Prussia in 1815. It is not to be returned outright to France. Like Danzig since 1793, it has become Germanized and as the framers of the Treaty of Versailles have professed the principle that peoples must not be

subjected to alien states, a principle to which they have conformed more or less in their actual conduct, a quite complicated arrangement has been worked out in regard to the Saar Basin, a territory having an area of about 700 square miles and a German population of about seven hundred thousand. As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in northern France and as part payment toward the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, the coal mines of the Saar Basin. But Germany does not cede the territory itself to France, only the mines. But in order that the French may have complete freedom in working these mines, without, however, extending their sovereignty over the territory itself and over its German population, which, say the conferees of Paris, would create or tend to create another Alsace-Lorraine with the Germans this time as the victims, the framers of the Treaty have evolved elaborate and intricate arrangements for the immediate future of the Saar. Germany renounces, not the territory, but the government of the territory to the League of Nations, which is for fifteen years to act as trustee for the inhabitants, who at the end of that period shall have the right to indicate by a plebiscite under which sovereignty they prefer to be, whether that of Germany, or that of France, or whether they wish to continue indefinitely under the League of Nations. The voters having indicated their desires, the League of Nations shall finally decide on the sovereignty under which the territory is to be placed. Meanwhile, during these fifteen years the government shall be in the hands of a commission of five representing the League and appointed by it. Within the territory of the Saar Basin this Governing Commission shall have all the powers of government hitherto belonging to the German Empire or to Prussia or to Bavaria.

Not only does Germany agree in this Treaty to recognize the independence of Poland, but also that of the Czecho-Slovak Republic in whose favor she renounces certain territories in Silesia. She also recognizes the independence of Austria with whatever boundaries may be determined upon by the Five Great Powers and Austria. She agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. This means that Austria shall not be joined with Germany, even if the people of both countries desire it, save with the approval of the nine states represented in the Council.

Germany also agrees to respect as permanent and inalienable the independence of all the territories which were part of the former Russian Empire on August 1, 1914, and she undertakes to recognize all treaties that may be entered into by the Five Great Powers with states now existing or coming into existence within former Russia and to recognize the frontiers of any such states as determined therein. She also agrees to the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaties and all other agreements she has made with Bolshevist Russia. Outside of Europe she not only cedes her colonies to the Five Great Powers, but she renounces treaty rights and privileges which she has hitherto enjoyed in Morocco and Egypt, and she recognizes the French Protectorate of the former, the English Protectorate of the latter, and abandons all rights of intervention. She renounces, in favor of Japan, all the rights and privileges she has enjoyed in China since 1898, that is, her rights in the province of Shantung.

DESTRUCTION OF GERMAN MILITARISM

Such are Germany's territorial losses as set forth in the Treaty of Versailles. Another important section of the Treaty severely limits her freedom of action in another field, in the field of her greatest interest hitherto. If the terms of a treaty can prevent Germany from again becoming a great military and naval power, able to menace the world, prevented she will be. In great detail the Treaty determines just what forces she may have in the various war services, just what equipment. In a general way these clauses reduce the armed power of Germany to a standard hitherto reached and exceeded by many a small state. If these clauses are enforced Germany will no longer be able, by rattling her shining saber, to alarm or terrify her neighbors. Any campaign that she may undertake against them can only be economic or political and propagandist, not military. But will it be possible to enforce these provisions?

After 1920 her army may not exceed one hundred thousand men, including not more than four thousand officers. Universal compulsory military service is abolished and the German army may only be constituted and recruited by voluntary enlistment, and the period of service is made so long as to act as a deterrent. Privates and non-commissioned officers must enlist, if they enlist at all, for twelve consecutive years; officers for twenty-five. Not more than five per cent. of these may be discharged for any

reason in any one year before the expiration of their term of service.

These clauses reveal the fact that the authors of them had learned one of the minor lessons that history has to teach. Napoleon, after his conquest of Prussia in 1806, forbade that the Prussian army should henceforth number more than forty-two thousand men. The Prussian Government accepted the requirement under compulsion, but it hit upon the ingenious device of having these men serve with the army only a short time, only long enough to learn the essentials of the soldier's life. Then they would be mustered out and others would pass through the same training. By this method several times forty-two thousand men received a military training and were able to take the field in those final campaigns which landed Napoleon at St. Helena. The framers of the Treaty of Versailles intended that, in this respect at least, history should not repeat itself. But not feeling sure that the German of to-day might not in his turn hit upon some device of gaining indirectly what he is forbidden to get directly, they have provided that "educational establishments, universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, and, generally speaking, associations of every description, whatever be the age of their members, must not occupy themselves with military matters" and must, in particular, neither instruct their members nor allow them to be instructed or exercised in the profession or use of arms. Nor may government officials, such as customs officers, forest guards, coastguards, or the local police, be assembled for military training. All military schools not absolutely necessary for the training of the officers of the army are abolished, as is also the Great General Staff, which has bulked so large in the thought and imagination of mankind during recent years.

Thus Germany may henceforth produce only a certain number of soldiers. She may also produce only a certain amount of munitions and equipment and that amount is laid down in tables printed in the Treaty. It is also provided that the manufacture of arms and munitions or any war material shall be carried out only in factories approved by the Five Great Powers. All other such establishments shall be closed within three months of the coming into force of the Treaty. Moreover importation into Germany of arms, munitions, and war material of every kind is strictly prohibited, as also is the exportation of such products from Germany. Nor may Germany manufacture or import

asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, nor armored cars or tanks.

Germany is forbidden to maintain or to construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank in a zone extending fifty kilometers or about thirty miles east of the Rhine. All existing fortresses and fortified works within that area and also west of the river are to be disarmed or dismantled.

The German navy is to be restricted to six battleships of the large type, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats and the personnel of the navy must not exceed fifteen thousand men, inclusive of officers, who must not exceed fifteen hundred. The warships interned under the armistice of November 11 are to be surrendered. All German submarines are to be handed over to the Five Great Powers, and Germany is forbidden to acquire in the future any submarines, even for commercial purposes.

The fortifications, military establishments and harbor of Heligoland are to be destroyed, nor shall they ever be reconstructed. The Kiel Canal shall be free and open to the commercial and war vessels of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality.

The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces. The manufacture or importation of aircraft, or engines for aircraft, is forbidden in all German territory. All material of this nature already existing in Germany must, with a slight exception, be delivered over to the Five Great Powers.

Such are the drastic provisions, which, if executed, will destroy that German militarism which has cost the world so intolerable a price. But how are they to be enforced? The Treaty provides that the Five Powers shall establish Inter-Allied Commissions of Control which shall be charged with the duty of seeing to their complete execution by the German authorities. These Commissions may establish their organizations in the capital of Germany, may proceed themselves, or send agents, into any part of Germany, may demand whatever information or aid they may desire of the German Government, which shall bear all expenses connected with the delivery, the destruction, the dismantling, the demolition provided for by the Treaty.

The Treaty also provides another novelty in the art of terminating wars which may in the future have a tendency to restrain would-be disturbers of the general peace and to cause

them to think twice before gaily plunging ahead. It publicly arraigns William II, formerly German Emperor, "for a supreme offence against international morality and the sancitity of treaties" and it announces that a court shall be constituted to try him, consisting of five judges, one appointed by each of the following, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. It shall be the duty of this court to fix the punishment it may consider appropriate "with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality." Also military tribunals are to be established to try other persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war, such persons to be handed over by the German Government on request to the Allies, which Government also agrees to furnish whatever documents and information may be needed.

REPARATION

There is another and extremely important section to this Treaty, that concerning the reparation which Germany must make for the enormous economic injury she has inflicted upon her enemies. By the Treaty she accepts the responsibility of herself and her associates for all the loss and damage to the Allied governments and the Allied peoples caused by the war. But as the payment of so monstrous a sum is quite beyond her and their resources, she is to escape from a large part of what would be only a just penalty. But she definitely undertakes to make compensation for all the damage done to the civilian population of her enemies. This means that she must make good in money and in materials and in labor the desolation and destruction she has caused, must help restore the ravaged lands to their former condition, rebuild the demolished villages and cities, restore the loot she has carted away to Germany, replace tool for tool, factory for factory, ship for ship, and, in general, work and pay for the rehabilitation of the countries she has overrun and devastated. But how much does all this mean? Obviously this can not be determined off-hand, but only after an exhaustive investigation. The Treaty provides, consequently, that the amount of the above damage for which compensation is to be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission to be called the Reparation Commission, which shall make the necessary investigation and shall notify the German

Government on or before May 1, 1921, as to the extent of her obligations. This Commission will be one of the chief agencies for the execution of the Treaty. It will sit in Paris and, no doubt, its activities will run for many years. It will consider from time to time the resources and the capacities of Germany, and will issue specific demands and will indicate how they are to be satisfied.

In order to enable the Allied powers to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial and economic life, pending the full determination of their claims, Germany shall pay over to the Reparation Commission before May 1, 1921, twenty billion gold marks, normally about five billion dollars. What she must pay beyond that remains to be determined, but may easily run up to a hundred million marks. Germany also agrees to the direct application of her economic resources to reparation, that is, agrees to deliver ships and coal and dyestuffs and chemical products and live stock and other things to her enemies, the amounts in general to be determined by the Commission — all these commodities being credited to her reparation account. For instance, as an illustration, she is to hand over all her merchant ships of 1600 tons and upward, half of her ships of a tonnage between 1000 and 1600 tons, a quarter of her tonnage of steam trawlers and a quarter of her tonnage of other fishing boats; and in addition she must, for a period of five years, build ships for the Allies to the amount of 200,000 tons a year. All this is retribution for her merry years of submarine piracy. "A ton for a ton" may well take its place alongside "a tooth for a tooth" as an expression indicating the operation of even-handed, methodical justice among men.

This equitable principle is to be applied in the realm of sentiment and the human spirit, as well as in the realm of matter. Germany undertakes to furnish to the University of Louvain manuscripts, printed books, maps, corresponding in number and value to those destroyed in the burning by Germany of the Library of Louvain. She is to restore to France certain archives and diplomatic papers, trophies and works of art, carried away from France by the German authorities in the course of the war of 1870–1871, and particularly the French flags taken in that war. She must give back to the King of the Hedjaz the original Koran of the Caliph Othman, stated to have been presented to Emperor William II by his friend the Sultan. And certain works of art must be restored to Belgium also.

COMMENTS OF LLOYD GEORGE ON THE TREATY

Such are a few of the provisions of this monumental treaty. In presenting it to Parliament a few days after it was signed the British Premier Lloyd George said in discussing this very reparation section just described: "I do not think any one can claim the terms imposed constitute injustice to Germany unless he believes justice in the war was on the side of Germany." The terms of the Treaty in some respects were terrible, he said, but terrible were the deeds which justified them, and still more terrible would have been the consequences had Germany triumphed. "The world is rocking and reeling under the blow that failed. If the blow had succeeded the liberty of Europe would have vanished." Concerning the territorial terms of the Treaty Lloyd George declared that the territory taken from Germany was a matter of restoration, a restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, taken by force from the land to which its people were deeply attached, a restoration of Schleswig, the taking of which he described as the "meanest of Hohenzollern frauds, robbing a helpless country on the pretence that they were not doing it and then retaining the land against the wishes of the population," a restoration of a Poland torn to bits by Russian, Austrian, and Prussian autocracy and now reknit under the flag of Poland. "They are all territories," he added, "which ought not to belong to Germany."

And he also said concerning other aspects of the Treaty: "Having regard to the uses Germany made of her army there is no injustice in scattering and disarming it. If the Allies had restored the colonies to Germany after the evidence of the ill treatment of the natives, and the part the natives have taken in their own liberation, it would have been a base betrayal. Then take the trial of those responsible for the war. If wars of this kind are to be prevented, those personally responsible for them, who have taken part in plotting and planning them, should be held personally responsible. Therefore, the Entente decided that the man who undoubtedly had the primary responsibility, in the judgment, at any rate, of the Allies, should be tried for the offenses he committed in breaking treaties he was bound to honor, and by that means bringing on the war. It was an exceptional course, and it's a pity it was, because if it had been done before there would have been fewer wars."

The Premier proceeded to argue that this was not a vengeful

peace, that it was not vengeance "to take every possible precaution against a recurrence of the war and to make such an example of Germany as will discourage ambitious rulers and peoples from ever again attempting to repeat this infamy. The German people approved the war, and, therefore, it was essential in the terms to show, if nations entered into unprovoked wars of aggression against their neighbors, what lies in store for them."

It might well be considered ominous that even before the Germans had signed this Treaty in the famous Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on June 28, 1919, two of its explicit terms had been already broken. On the very eve of signature the Germans had sunk the fleet that lay interned since the armistice in Scapa Flow, thus avoiding the surrender provided by the Treaty. And in Berlin the French flags captured by the Germans in 1870 had been burned in front of the statue of Frederick the Great in Unter den Linden. German officers and soldiers of the Guard Cavalry Division had entered the War Museum and taken out the flags, already packed for delivery to the French. They had soaked the flags in gasoline and as they had tossed them into the flames the crowd had sung "Deutschland über Alles." While the Treaty had not been signed at the time these incidents occurred, yet the German Government had already announced that it would accept the terms which had been submitted to it weeks before. The world was given a sufficient hint that breaches or attempted breaches of the Treaty might be confidently expected in course.

RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY

The fate of the Treaty now lay with the parliaments of the various countries to which it was submitted for ratification. With it were coupled in the case of the English, French, and American parliaments certain treaties between the United States and France and between France and Great Britain by the terms of which the two powers agreed to move immediately to the aid of France if any unprovoked act of aggression should be made against her by Germany. These treaties were signed at Versailles on the same day as the treaty with Germany and were designed to reassure the French, who did not feel that an untried and uncertain League of Nations offered them a sufficient protection against a neighbor much larger than France and quite likely at the opportune moment to try to wipe out the humiliation of 1918

by beginning a war of revenge. It was provided that this virtual Franco-Anglo-American Alliance should remain in force until the Council of the League of Nations should decide that the League itself assured sufficient protection.

It was provided in the Treaty of Versailles that it should come into force as soon as the ratifications of Germany on the one hand and of three of the Five Great Powers on the other should have been deposited in Paris. The German National Assembly ratified on July 9, by a vote of 237 to 138, 5 deputies refusing to vote. A few days later the British Parliament approved it, and also the Anglo-French Treaty, with practical unanimity, after only a few days' debate. The French Parliament ratified in October and the Italian Government announced its adhesion in the same month. The necessary number, therefore, had ratified. Would the enforcement of the Treaty begin forthwith? Would the League of Nations begin immediately to function?

AMERICA AND THE PEACE

The European nations were reluctant to set the new machinery in motion without the co-operation of America. And in America the Treaty hung fire. There was at that time but slight opposition among the people of the United States to that part of the Treaty which directly concerned Germany. The overwhelming opinion was that the terms imposed upon her were just and necessary. Only three of these four hundred clauses and more aroused any vigorous protest and those were the three that concerned the disposition of Shantung, the transfer of Germany's rights and privileges in that Chinese province to Japan. But the twenty-six articles concerning the League of Nations precipitated a long and bitter debate, both in the Senate and among the people. All through the summer and fall of 1919 the League was the theme of constant discussion, increasing in intensity and acrimony as it progressed. Both in its fundamental principles and in its special provisions it was attacked and defended in many able speeches. The lines of cleavage were mainly between the Democratic Administration supporters and the Republican opposition, which was in a slight majority in the Senate. Every shade of opinion was expressed during the course of the debate. There were those who favored accepting the Treaty exactly as it stood without the elimination of a letter or a phrase. There were those who favored rejecting it outright and in its entirety.

And between these extremes were men who wished a few changes and those who wished many. Of these some wished to effect the changes through amendments, which would involve resubmission of the entire Treaty to the Peace Conference, and some wished to make them through "reservations," which, they held, would not require resubmission.

On September 10, 1919, the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the Treaty to the Senate with several amendments and four reservations recommended by the Republican majority of the Committee and opposed by the Democratic minority. The debate proceeded. Finally toward the end of October the amendments came to a vote and were defeated. Many voted against them not on principle, but simply because they were opposed to any procedure that might necessitate reopening negotiations with Germany. They were willing to vote for the same changes if expressed in the form of resolutions. After the defeat of the amendments the tense and crucial struggle began. Finally after much debate the majority of the Senate adopted a series of fifteen reservations which were included in the ratifying resolution. These reservations stated the conditions under which the United States would accept the Treaty of Versailles, including the Covenant of the League of Nations. Most of them, indeed, had reference only to the Covenant and embodied many of the criticisms leveled against that document during the discussion. One of them provided that if the United States should desire to withdraw from the League it should be the sole judge as to whether it had fulfilled all its obligations. Another had reference to the famous Article X and announced that "The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any country or to interfere in controversies between nations or to employ the military and naval forces of the United States under any article of the Treaty, unless Congress shall in any case so decide, Congress possessing the sole power under the Constitution to declare war." In other words not the Council of the League, nor the President of the United States, but Congress should determine whether the army or navy should be used and for what purpose, and Congress would have the same right to decline as to accept the recommendations of the Council. Another reservation asserted that no mandate should be accepted by the United States except by action of Congress, which meant that the President might not alone commit the United States to such an undertaking. Another reservation declared that the United States reserved to itself

exclusively the right to decide what questions were of a domestic nature and refused to submit any such either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations. Another concerned the Monroe Doctrine, declaring that the doctrine was to be interpreted by the United States alone and lay wholly outside the jurisdiction of the League of Nations. Still another withheld the assent of the United States from those clauses of the Treaty which concern the transfer to Japan of Germany's rights in Shantung. The United States was to have full liberty of action in any controversy that might arise under those clauses between China and Japan. Another reservation provided that, if the United States should at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the League of Nations, it should nevertheless retain the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the Council whenever the United States should be threatened with invasion or be engaged in war.

Such were the more important of the so-called Lodge reservations. Embodied in the clause ratifying the Treaty they would require a two-thirds vote of the Senate. This they could not secure unless a considerable number of Republicans and Democrats should combine. But most of the Democrats were opposed to them and in favor of ratifying the Treaty without reservations. President Wilson denounced the Lodge reservations as amounting to a "nullification" of the Treaty and urged the Democratic Senators to vote against the ratifying resolution in which they were incorporated. Thus it came about that on November 19, 1919, the Senate refused, by a vote of 55 to 39, to pass the ratifying resolution, that is, refused to ratify the Treaty. In March of the following year the treaty was again brought before the Senate and again failed of ratification, the vote being fifty-seven in favor to thirty-seven opposed. The necessary two-thirds were lacking by seven votes. The question was now made a prominent feature of the presidential election of 1920. The result of that election was the defeat of the Democratic party by the largest plurality known in our history. The ratification of the treaty was now quite out of the question. Separate treaties of peace with Germany, Austria, and Hungary were therefore negotiated by the new administration and were ratified by the Senate on October 18, 1921. The United States has thus far refused to become a member of the League of Nations.

TREATIES WITH AUSTRIA AND BULGARIA

Meanwhile, before the era of peace could fully dawn upon a weary world many other negotiations would have to be brought to a head, many other treaties would have to be made and ratified. The Treaty with Germany, no doubt the most important of the series, would be but one. Nor could it stand alone, as others would be needed properly to complete it. This was foreseen in the document itself, which repeatedly required German assent to other treaties not yet made. After Germany came Austria, and the Conference of Paris submitted its terms to Austria before the Germans had accepted theirs, on June 2, 1919. Then followed a period of examination and consultation, followed by counter proposals. Finally the amended treaty was submitted to Austria on July 20, and was signed by her on September 10.

This treaty sealed the doom of the Dual Monarchy, which had broken up into its component parts. The House of Hapsburg was gone and several states had divided its coat of many colors. Henceforth there were to be a Republic of Austria, a Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, presumably a Republic of Hungary, and parts of the former empire were to go to Italy, Roumania, and Jugo-Slavia. The treaty was made with Austria alone, now sunk to the rank of one of the small states of Europe.

This document will be known in history as the Treaty of Saint-Germain, as it was signed in the former royal castle in that suburb of Paris. In general terms it follows the scheme of the German treaty. The Covenant of the League of Nations comes first, which Austria is compelled to accept, although, like Germany, she is not to be admitted to the League until the other members so decide. The boundaries of Austria are carefully defined and she recognizes the new states that have arisen out of her collapse. Her disarmament is required in as great detail as that of Germany. Henceforth her army is not to exceed thirty thousand men, and the size and character of its equipment are strictly limited. All surplus armament must be turned over to the Allies. The manufacture of arms is restricted to a single factory controlled by the state. Compulsory military service is abolished. Austria's navy henceforth is to consist of three patrol boats on the Danube. No military or naval air forces may be maintained. The amount that Austria is to pay for the damage done to the civilian population of her enemies and to their property is to be determined by the Reparation Commission,

which shall take into account her resources and capacity. She, too, must build " ton for ton and class for class " in replacement of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to her activity in the war. She, too, must devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of invaded allied territory and she must surrender certain works of art, and certain designated pieces of jewelry and of furniture and also certain historical records, taken from Italy, in times past, by the House of Hapsburg.

On September 19, 1919, another treaty was started on its way by the Conference of Paris, that with Bulgaria, requiring her assent to the League of Nations, the reduction of her army to ten thousand men, the recognition of new frontiers, and the obligation to pay over from time to time to the Reparation Commission at Paris certain sums of money, fixed in the original draft at approximately $445,000,000. After several weeks of discussion, this treaty was signed toward the close of November, 1919. It will be known in history as the Treaty of Neuilly.

Conditions in Hungary were so unstable and uncertain that the Conference of Paris had adjourned before the negotiations with that state were brought to completion by the signature of the Treaty of Trianon, on June 4, 1920. That Treaty will be described in a later chapter. Nor did the Conference make peace with Turkey, a matter that was, indeed, destined to hang fire for several years. Russia, too, remained necessarily outside the range of profitable, if possible, negotiation.

WIDESPREAD DISCONTENT

Thus as the year 1919 drew to its close the outlines of the new Europe were only partially sketched, the stupendous work of settlement of a distracted globe was only in its initial stages. Whether even that which had been accomplished would be soon overturned by new irruptions of disorder and dissension, no one could predict with confidence. The air was filled with the clamor and the clangor of discordant voices and strident passions. Everywhere the mind of the nations was unsettled, everywhere there was deep unrest, everywhere a fermentation of revolutionary doctrine, everywhere disappointed expectations. Explosive materials were only too abundant and the danger of new conflagrations only too real. The twelve months following the armistice with Germany will not rank among the happy years of history, so rancorous and so ubiquitous was the spirit of contention

that filled it. Labor unrest in every country, strikes in every industry, induced by the high cost of living, by the sight of conscienceless profiteering, and furthered in some cases by political plotters and intriguers of every hue. In every country there were those who were eager to overturn existing institutions, who fostered and favored subversive doctrines and tried to exploit industrial unrest for their own sinister purposes. Everywhere there were those who believed in the "socialization" of great industries, such as railroads and mines, that is, the taking over of the industries by the state or by the workers themselves, and the expulsion, even the expropriation, of those who owned them.

In another sphere, also, there were manifestations of the spirit of disorder which constituted points of danger. The newer states were quarreling with each other over boundaries; racial hatreds and the old, familiar lust of power were showing themselves still unvanquished. Decisions of the Conference of Paris were in certain quarters being flouted or treated with scant consideration. How far this defiance would go no one could foresee, nor what its consequences might be.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE

Nevertheless the great results of the war were so obvious and so substantial that the public mind could not remain permanently depressed. The great and memorable tragedy of our times could not end in roaring and ignoble melodrama. What had been won by the sacrifice and sorrow of countless millions was not likely to be lost by the levity or malevolence of blunderers and marplots. The sober sense of mankind would reassert its sway and would insist that human destinies should not be made the sport of class or faction. Leadership would not pass to the patrons of disorder, to the preachers of sedition, to sophisters and quacks and missionaries of moonshine. It was quite safe to say that the race had distilled enough wisdom from its stern and costly experience to be unwilling to jeopardize its future and to imperil civilization by following false gods, by embracing the spirit of unreason.

That future lay no longer in the hands of hereditary rulers or of privileged aristocracies. It lay in the hands of the people themselves. The challenge was to them and to them alone. It was unbelievable that those who had so magnificently responded to the demands of duty should now cease to feel its commanding spell. "France," said Premier Clemenceau to the school children

of that country, "is calling us in peace as she did in war." And President Poincaré said on the same occasion and to the same audience: "The dead alone have the right to rest; but we must continue their work and realize their wishes. Yesterday France found soldiers. To-day she must find citizens." These utterances of the official leaders of the great country which fought the good fight and kept the faith from the beginning to the end of the greatest war of history might well be the watchword of the future and the trumpet call to action among every people and in every land.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

GERMANY SINCE THE REVOLUTION

On November 9, 1918, Germany swept her kings and princes from their thrones and proclaimed the republic. A miracle had happened, the sudden and complete collapse of a proud and mighty empire which had for nearly half a century exulted in its strength, and which had imposed with singular force upon the imagination of the world. No change so astounding had occurred within the memory of living men. Twenty-two thrones were vacant, hastily abandoned by their occupants, who, preferring personal safety to the risks of a struggle for their retention, had decamped, each as best he could, to some place of refuge, their leader, William of Hohenzollern, to Holland, and their next greatest, of the House of Wittelsbach, to some château in the mountains of Bavaria. A most conspicuous feature of the revolution was everywhere the dissolution of the army which was in full process. That wonderful machine, which generations of experts had made a monument of mechanical efficiency, was, as a result of defeat, going precipitately to smash.

German army officers and the German conservative parties have an explanation of the Revolution which they are trying to make the German people believe, namely that the army was not beaten in the field but that it was "stabbed in the back," by the radical elements of the population, that the disasters that had fallen on the Fatherland were not due to the mistakes or the incompetence of the Great General Staff or of the Government but to the civilians who failed to support the authorities in the hour of need, who were traitors to the national cause, who, in short, caused the Revolution. If this conception should be generally accepted, then the high army command and the monarch would come forth unscathed and responsibility for the disaster would be fixed upon the people, particularly upon the Socialists. In the opinion of these interested critics, the people, not their rulers, military and civil, were the authors of this "national crime," the Revolution of November, 1918.

The facts do not bear out this explanation, so considerate of the Ludendorffs and Tirpitzes who in the latter part of the war

not only controlled the military and naval policy of Germany but who practically controlled the state as well. The Imperial Government would not have been overthrown, had the German army been able to withstand the enemy, had it not been forced back step by step all through the late summer and early fall of 1918, had not catastrophe in the field been seen rapidly approaching. That government had faced serious internal troubles during the war and had overcome them easily. Such discords, dangerous to the national cause, had remained circumscribed in scope and had proved but temporary, because the German people as a whole had continued steadfast in their support of the authorities and of the task in hand. The revolutionary propaganda which was being carried on by the extreme wings of the Socialist party had but slight effect upon the general public.

The general public, in fact, was quite unaware of the situation. It had been systematically kept in ignorance. Ludendorff knew as early as October 1, 1918, that it was necessary to end hostilities as soon as possible and had insisted that the government should propose an armistice to the Allies. But the people were ignorant of this. They knew that the Bulgarian armies were being routed, but that the Entente could win was a view not entertained — at worst there would only be a peace without victors or vanquished. Had not Admiral Tirpitz, the great promoter of submarine warfare, assured the German people that "American aid was and would remain a phantom." Had not Stresemann, head of the National Liberal party declared, on October 31, that there was "no immediate danger on the western front." Had not a former Vice-Chancellor of the Empire announced hardly two weeks before the armistice; "We do not dream of abandoning our conquests in the East; we shall stick to the good old German dictum 'Keep what you have.'"

The German Revolution did not come, as German conservatives claim, from the interior of Germany, was not the result of Socialist agitation among the people and in the army. The Revolution was the natural result of defeat. The people who had endured heavy privations for four years would have held out still longer had only the army held. It was because the military front was giving way that the imperial régime was overthrown. Germany was to learn the lesson which France had learned under two Napoleons that the price of safety for military autocracies is continuous victory or at least is the absence of serious defeats. But now defeats were coming thick and fast in the months of September and October, 1918, German defeats in France, defeats

of the allies of Germany in Turkey, in Bulgaria, and in Austria-Hungary. These had their natural repercussion, popular effervescence everywhere, shaking thrones, the crumbling of the established order, the overthrow of those whose ambition and whose folly had led their peoples to the abyss.

In Germany the spirit of revolt first flamed up, not among factory workmen influenced by Socialist propaganda, as conservatives to-day declare, but in Kiel, Germany's chief naval port, and in the warships lying there. At Kiel on November 4, occurred the first revolutionary rising. A Soldier's Council seized the ships and the local authority. This was the signal for a widespread and spontaneous movement. In one city after another councils of workingmen and soldiers sprang into existence and assumed control. The revolution did not break out in Berlin until after it had swept through the states of the south, of the north, and of the west of Germany. It was in Bavaria that a republic was first proclaimed, with Kurt Eisner, a Jewish journalist, an Independent Socialist, as chief minister. The news from Munich precipitated events in the imperial capital. The Majority Socialists woke up, anxious lest the more radical Socialists, the Independents and the Spartacists should install themselves in power. On November 8, they issued an ultimatum to the Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, demanding the abdication of the Emperor, the renunciation of the Crown Prince, and the complete submission of the military to the civil government. Prince Max withdrew from office, handing over his powers to Friedrich Ebert, one of the leaders of the Majority Socialists. On the following day, November 9, another of the leaders of that party, Scheidemann, proclaimed the German Republic from the balcony of the Reichstag. At the same moment the leader of the extreme Socialists, Karl Liebknecht, was waving the red flag from another balcony, that of the Emperor's Palace, where in August, 1914, William II had harangued the people and the soldiers amid wild acclaim. While these surprising and unexpected events were occurring in Berlin, William II was making all haste toward Holland as a refuge from the wrath of men. The author of the famous phrase, "our future lies upon the sea," was now swept from his throne by a revolution which issued from that very fleet which had been designed and built up in order to assure that future, and was now a fugitive in a country which would be under the sea had not the hand of men erected artificial barriers against its assaults.

The German Revolution of 1918 cannot be compared with

the French Revolution of 1789. It was no outgrowth of active, sustained and bitter criticism of existing institutions, no work of a people dissatisfied with the social and economic conditions of their country, no indignant protest against a long-continued denial of political liberty and political education to the people. It had no background of preparation. It was a storm that had suddenly blown up, not the explosion of a slowly gathering hurricane. It was a distinctly limited revolution with none of those aspects of roseate optimism, of that generous and ardent faith in the coming of a new era for suffering humanity that had characterized the French Revolution of the eighteenth century. It was not the culmination of a long-delayed movement of reform but was only a sudden change of régime, brought about by military defeat.

This brief and sudden crisis, which swept away the supposedly strongest monarchy in Europe and set up a republic in its stead, greatly changed the face of German political life and was likely to change much more. Not only did the Emperor disappear from the scene which he had dominated for thirty years, but the Bundesrat, the organ of the princes, vanished necessarily when they vanished, and the Reichstag, in the whole affair, gave no sign of life. The conservative political parties, which had controlled the Reichstag since the founding of the Empire, now collapsed with the collapse of the royal power. They were destined to reappear later, with different names and programmes, but upon the course of events at this juncture they exercised no influence. They shared the general discredit which had fallen upon everything connected with the old régime, a régime which had seemed so strong and which had proved so weak in a moment of adversity. All tried to recoup their damaged popularity by assuming popular names. Even the Catholic Center, sacrificing to the spirit of the hour, changed its historic appellation for one which might sound better to the general ear, the Christian Popular Party.

Since these former inveterate supporters of a discarded government were now prone upon the ground, there remained to govern Germany only the Socialists, who had constituted an opposition party during the Empire, who had never been entrusted with power, and who had had no actual experience and training in governing. Unfortunately for them, however, the convulsions of a period of unprecedented war and of popular ferment had worked its ravages upon them as well as upon the parties of the right. United under a single banner all through the Empire, a compact and growing party, their unity had been destroyed

by the issues of the war. The Social Democratic party, famous for its spirit of discipline, its power of cohesion, a party for which over five million Germans had cast their votes in 1912 and which was much the largest group in the Reichstag, was now cut in two and was apparently in process of further disintegration. An opposition party for fifty years, having steadily voted against the military appropriations which had made Germany so redoubtable on land and sea, and which had encouraged the aggressiveness of the governing classes, the Socialists in 1914 ceased their opposition and were drawn along in the wake of the militarists, whether because, after all, they felt themselves patriots first and Socialists afterwards, or because they felt their weakness in the presence of the mighty passions evoked by the outbreak of the war. But some of them were uneasy from the beginning in their new and strange position of supporters of militarism. In December, 1914, Karl Liebknecht, the son of William Liebknecht, the well-known collaborator with Bebel in the upbuilding of the party, was the first to vote against the war appropriation bills. In 1915 another member of the Reichstag joined him. A little later, three of the most influential Socialists, Karl Kautsky, expounder of pure Marxism, Edward Bernstein, the advocate of revisionism, and Hugo Haase, another party leader, published a document condemning a war of conquest and urging the Reichstag to reject further war appropriations. Twenty members acted in this sense in December, 1915. In 1917 a new party was formed under Haase, calling itself the Independent Social Democratic party. The bulk of the Socialists, however, remained within the old organization and continued to be known as the Social Democratic party. With the advent of Bolshevism to power in Russia in 1917, there was a still further splitting up, an advanced wing of Communists, advocating Russian methods, appearing upon the scene, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. These Communists were generally called Spartacists.

Thus when the government of Germany fell for the first time into the hands of the Socialists on November 9, 1918, it found them seriously divided into three main fractions. Would the gravity of the situation, would the unexpected opportunity for the realization of their aims cause them to forget their differences and to co-operate in bringing about the socialized state which all three fractions professed to desire?

At first the two chief groups, the Majority and the Independent Socialists united, each group appointing three commis-

sioners. These six men constituted the new government. They adopted some very important measures. Universal suffrage was proclaimed, the vote being given to all men and women over twenty years of age. The right of unrestricted public meeting was guaranteed. Censorship of the press was abolished. New insurance laws were promised. But this harmony did not last long. From the beginning there was friction between the two factions. The differences that divided them were really fundamental. The Social Democrats or Majority Socialists were a relatively moderate party, not emphasizing the particular tenets of socialism. They believed that the first requirement of the situation was the introduction of free, democratic institutions and processes so that the political education of the citizens of the German republic might begin at once. They considered it dangerous and unwise to try to set up immediately the Socialist economic system. The Independents, on the other hand, believed that Germany should break completely with the past, that advantage should be taken of the unexpected opportunity to found the new Germany solidly upon the social and economic principles which Socialists had been proclaiming for half a century as the only true and scientific bases for society. The Social Democrats believed in democratic and parliamentary government, the Independents advocated the dictatorship of the proletariat. The former desired that a national constituent assembly should be elected as speedily as possible; the latter desired the postponement of the elections and of the making of the constitution. The quarrel became acute. Troubles broke out in Berlin and blood was shed. At the end of December the three Independents withdrew from the Government. The Government, born of the revolution of November 9, was forced to turn its arms against the revolutionists. The experiment of a Socialist revolution was abruptly ended after a month and a half of trial.

The Social Democrats or Majority Socialists then attempted to run the government alone, the Independents having been eliminated. New riots occurred in Berlin, more serious than the preceding ones. On January 16, 1919, Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, leaders of the Spartacists or extreme Communists, were killed. It soon became quite evident that the Social Democrats could not alone govern Germany. The elections to the National Assembly, held on January 19, 1919, did not give them an absolute majority, which, moreover, they did not give to any other party.

It was evident that if the Social Democrats wished to continue to govern they must have the support of the moderate bourgeois, the Democratic party and the Center, and this would necessarily mean compromise and an abatement of the demands of the Socialists. Such a combination was effected and continued until June, 1920. The National Constituent Assembly met in the small and quiet city of Weimar, rather than in Berlin, because of the state of unrest which prevailed in the capital. The People's Commissioners resigned. Ebert was elected President of the Republic; Scheidemann, a leader of the Social Democrats, became the head of the ministry.

The new ministry faced a very troubled situation, both at home and abroad. At home the Communists, bent upon revenge for the murder of their leaders, only waited the favorable moment for a new insurrection. During an entire week in March (March 4–10, 1919) Berlin was the scene of frenzied street fighting. The Social Democrats, in order to put down the Communists, turned toward the officers and soldiers of the old imperial army and, under the vigorous leadership of Noske, organized a force capable of resistance. The more the Government was threatened by the radicals, the more it veered toward the conservatives. This had a momentary advantage and a more serious disadvantage. The advantage was that the Communist insurrection was put down, after much loss of life and property; the disadvantage lay in the fact that to accomplish this the Government had been compelled to appeal to those who were secretly opposed to the whole new régime brought about by the Revolution and who were only biding their time to attack it. To strengthen the national sentiment against the disruptive internationalism of the Communists the Government told the people of Germany that they had not been conquered by the armies of the Entente but had yielded only to the pressure of the blockade. Already in December 1918, the troops returning from the front had been received in Berlin as victors, had marched through the Brandenburg gate, flags flying, as had the victors of 1870, and Ebert had said to them "You return to your homes undefeated." The danger in such statements lay in the fact that they encouraged the conservative parties, the monarchists, only too eager to exploit the disorders of the day and the widespread fear of Communism for the purpose of preparing a restoration of the Empire. As a matter of fact the Communists were put down in Berlin and Munich and generally throughout the country, but it was a costly victory for the Republic as

certain reactionary elements in the population, particularly groups of former army officers and politicians connected with the fallen régime, were thus encouraged to plot more boldly against the Republic itself. The attempted Kapp-Lüttwitz *coup d'état* of March, 1920, was the consequence of this appeal to the army and to military sentiment as a protection against the revolutionary extremists.

Meanwhile the Peace Conference was in session in Paris and was slowly elaborating the treaties that were to be the basis of the new Europe. There is little doubt that the Germans expected that, because they had overthrown the Empire and proclaimed a democratic Republic, much would be forgiven them and that the demands upon them would be light. To be sure the Kaiser had said, on the eve of the great drive of March, 1918; "The prize of victory must not and will not fail us. No soft peace but one corresponding to Germany's interests." And the Secretary of the Treasury had said in April that "we do not yet know the amount of indemnity we shall win." And as late as July the demand had been general that Belgium should be retained. All this was forgotten and all the complicity of the German people in the war, when the Treaty of Versailles, with its demand for the cession of certain conquered territories and reparation for the colossal damage done, was submitted. The Germans were so indignant when they heard of the terms of peace, nationalist feelings ran so high, that Scheidemann and his colleagues, rather than sign the document, resigned. Thus disappeared the second ministry since the abdication of the Kaiser.

Gustav Bauer, a Social Democrat and trade-union leader, formed the new cabinet. The Assembly at Weimar approved the signing of the Treaty by a vote of 237 to 138. This majority was composed of the Social Democrats, the Independent Socialists, and most of the Center party. Feeling vaguely the danger represented by the reactionary parties, and vividly the danger represented by the Communists, this ministry, like its predecessor, was particularly concerned about the organization of the army as the sole means of preserving the present experiment. The former danger proved the real one as on March 13, 1920, General von Lüttwitz, commander of the army, conspiring with Dr. Kapp, a former Prussian official, attempted to seize power and overturn the Republic. The Government was forced to flee precipitately, first to Dresden, then to Stuttgart.

Seeing the Republic seriously in danger, all the Socialist parties, the Majority Socialists, the Independents, and even the

Communists, united for the first time since the Revolution and, joined by the liberal bourgeoisie, fought the Counter-Revolution by means of strikes and by means of arms. So effective was their resistance that at the end of a week the conspiracy collapsed, its leaders fleeing the country.

The first attempt at a *coup d'état* in the interest of reaction had failed but the parties which had prevented its success did not preserve their union after the crisis was over but flew apart again. The Bauer ministry, discredited by its flight, gave way to that of Hermann Müller, a Social Democrat. Under this ministry the elections to the Reichstag were conducted in accordance with the provisions of the new Constitution of Weimar. The elections favored the parties of the extreme right and the extreme left. The middle or moderate groups were greatly reduced in number. The continuing popular uncertainty and unrest reinforced the party of order. On the other hand, considerable numbers of the working classes swung from the Social Democratic party to that of the Independents, indignant with the Majority Socialists for their feeble attitude toward the reactionary parties, their frequent compromises with them, and their apparent indifference to all projects of socialization.

The elections, which on the whole showed a distinct growth of conservative feeling throughout the country, meant the downfall of Müller and the creation of a new ministry under Fehrenbach, one of the leaders of the Center party. This ministry distinguished itself from its predecessors in that it rested solely upon the bourgeois parties. The Social Democrats were now eliminated from power, as the Independent Socialists had been eliminated earlier. The conservative parties, either openly or tacitly, were favorable to the restoration of the monarchy. The conservatives were exultant that within two years of the Revolution they had been able to form a ministry of their own color, and to expel socialism in any of its shades from the Government; all the more exultant as they were able to do the same in Prussia as well. But their cheerfulness was of short duration. Involved in difficult discussions with the Entente Powers concerning the fulfilment of certain obligations of the Treaty of Versailles, this "Cabinet of Big Business," as it was often called, indisposed to accede to the demands finally made upon it for an immediate settlement of the questions of reparation and disarmament, finally resigned on May 4, 1921, and was succeeded several days later by the Wirth government, resting upon a combination of

the Center, Majority Socialist and Democratic parties whose foreign policy was more conciliatory.

This rapid recital of the governmental history of Germany during the first three years after the Revolution shows several things. One of these is the prevailing ministerial instability. As the Germans are divided into numerous political parties, no one of which represents a majority of the voters, each ministry must rest upon a coalition. Coalitions are proverbially fragile, prone to split asunder because of personal rivalries or divergencies of opinion on matters of policy. It is also evident that the currents of public opinion in Germany during this period were confused and contradictory. The German people, without serious training in the art of self-government, accustomed to exercise but a feeble influence upon the course of national policy, suddenly found itself invested with complete power which it did not know how to use, which it could use only clumsily and hesitantly. There had been no serious demands for a republic; no republican party had been evolved with definite programmes and recognized leaders and ready to assume control when the moment should arrive. Yet the Republic had come and, moreover, had come in the whirlwind, and it confronted on every hand the colossal wreckage of the war, enormous debts, a demoralized economic life, dislocation of social classes, loss of national prestige and cohesion, the lack of able or experienced leadership, the danger of national disintegration. With the loss of prestige had also vanished the legend, carefully nurtured for two generations, of German invincibility, and everywhere alarming cracks appeared in the political framework of the nation, that framework which was Bismarck's masterpiece, and which, created by blood and iron, seemed dependent for its very existence upon the continued efficacy of those agencies in the service of Prussia and Germany.

That efficacy having failed, there was on the morrow of defeat a marked recrudescence of that particularism, that states-rights feeling which the Iron Chancellor had been at such pains to combat and conquer. Everywhere separatist tendencies showed themselves throughout Germany, bitter criticism of the overlordship of Prussia which had proved so vexatious and so disastrous, jealousies of North Germany on the part of South Germany, talk, and even action, about the creation of a new state or of several states out of Prussian territory, along the Rhine particularly, the new states not to be entirely independent but to have a place of importance in a new federation based on approximate equality, and not, as the late one had been, on a

practical subserviency to Prussia. There was for several months after the armistice grave danger that German unity would be greatly undermined and might indeed disappear, and that too, not because of the intrigues of foreigners, not because of a desire of the conquerors, natural enough under the circumstances, but because of the passionate spirit of dissension which burst forth spontaneously among the Germans themselves as soon as the rigid compression of the war period was removed, a spirit of dissension which threatened to submerge the Bismarckian state beneath the violence of the flood. Was Bismarck's work, after all, artificial and illusory? Created by the sword was it destined to disappear by the sword? Had it failed to strike roots in the minds and hearts of the people during the half century when it had seemed so solid and imposing? Was it really only a fair-weather structure, unable to resist the stress and strain of times of trouble?

This tendency to a more vigorous assertion of local independence was reinforced by certain factors in the crisis which Germany was traversing. For instance, the fear of Bolshevism rendered those states which were naturally conservative desirous of restricting its field of action as narrowly as possible, and what could do this as effectively as the strengthening of the individual states? Conservatism should, it was widely believed, intrench itself behind state boundaries and thus the waves of revolution or radicalism might be broken, might at least be prevented from sweeping over the entire territory of the Republic. Another force that contributed to the strength of this particularistic movement was the general aspiration for "liberty," a large word, the fashion of the moment, and one which was susceptible of a multitude of practical applications.

THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION

To counteract and arrest this tendency toward separatism, out of the chaos of the hour to rescue the vital principle of German greatness, the principle of unity, and so to embody it in fundamental institutions that it would be even stronger than ever, was the dominant thought and aspiration of those who undertook to lead in the framing of the new constitution of the German Republic. A National Assembly had been elected on January 19, 1919, by the most democratic suffrage that had ever been invoked for such a purpose, perhaps the most democratic ever known. Every German, man or woman, over twenty years

of age had the right to vote, and every voter was eligible to election. The result was an assembly of 423 members, 39 of whom were women. Thirty million votes were cast, or 90 per cent. of the possible total. Of these the Social Democrats obtained 11,400,000; the Center or Catholic party, 6,000,000; the Democratic party, 5,600,000; the German National People's party, or Extreme Conservatives, 3,200,000; the German People's Party, less extreme Conservatives, 1,200,000; the Independent Socialists, 2,300,000. Of the members chosen to the Assembly, 163 were Social Democrats, 89 were Centrists, 74 were Democrats, and the others 42, 22, and 22 in the order given. Only 45 of the members had belonged to the Reichstag of 1914. The Assembly consisted, therefore, of new men.

It met on Feburary 6, 1919, in Weimar, a small and sleepy town, associated in German history with liberal and literary memories. Berlin was wisely avoided, as offering too many opportunities for the organizers of riots and insurrections. On February 10, the Assembly adopted a provisional constitution, which became immediately operative. It then proceeded to work out the definitive constitution which was finally adopted on July 31 and put into force, without popular ratification, on August 11, 1919. The man who may be considered the chief author of the constitution was Hugo Preuss, of Jewish origin, a professor of law, a man who had, by the independence of his ideas, incurred the disfavor of the late Imperial Government and had nearly been driven from his chair in 1917. Preuss was now Secretary of the Interior, a member of the Democratic party, and had been made the draftsman of the new constitution. Though the document in its final form discarded many of his views and suggestions, nevertheless, it was he who played a predominant part in the long and difficult discussions.

Preuss's fundamental idea was that the national unity of Germany must at all costs be saved, and even strengthened. He did not dare, nor was he inclined, to adopt Bismarck's formula of German unity achieved by Prussia, for the advantage of Prussia, and with Prussia securely seated in the saddle of united Germany. Prussia's leadership and dominance were, in his opinion, things to be destroyed, not restored. Preuss wished to organize a democratic state, a pacific state, in which the military power should be the docile servant of the civil power and not its lord and master. Germany had nothing to gain and everything to lose from the continuance of the commanding authority previously held by Prussia, a state now discredited by

the ruin it had brought about, a state traditionally hostile to those liberal ideas to which satisfaction must now be given. Preuss wished the future Germany to be so strong and centralized that any separatist tendencies would be easily snuffed out, but he wished, at the same time, to reduce the power of Prussia, whose yoke, he held, had before the war become odious to all the states of the Empire. He believed so strongly in national unity that he would have been glad to sweep aside all the federated states and have made Germany a unitary nation like France or Italy or England, subdivided only into administrative areas. Recognizing, however, that that was quite impossible, the local states-rights feeling being centuries old and having even been intensified by the Revolution, he sought to achieve his ends by other means. It was impossible to make Germany a unitary state. She must remain a federation. But the authority and the jurisdiction of the central government must be made as extensive as possible and the rights of the individual states, beginning with Prussia, must be as circumscribed as the situation would permit. " It is impossible," Preuss said, " from a legal, political, economic point of view, to maintain a republic of forty million people in the midst of another republic of seventy million." Preuss's centralizing ideas aroused great opposition, particularly on the part of all those who believed that without a strong Prussia there could be no strong Germany. But they had a measure of success, as we shall see.

The Constitution of Weimar is a composite document showing the influence of the past, the impress of the troubled moment in which it was drawn up, and also, in some of its provisions, seeming to foreshadow the spirit of the future. This complexity of origin must be constantly borne in mind in any attempt to pass judgment upon it. Inspired in part by other federalist constitutions, like those of the United States and Switzerland, it is particularly permeated with the ideas of the constitution which had been drawn up in 1849 by the Parliament of Frankfort, that first and ill-fated attempt to achieve German unity by liberal methods and for liberal ends.

Under the Constitution of Weimar the former name of the German national state, *Deutsches Reich*, is preserved, the name, that is, which had been the official designation from 1871 to 1918, but that state is declared a republic based upon the sovereignty of the people. The national flag is changed from the black-white-red tricolor of the Empire to the black-red-gold of the liberal students' clubs of 1815, colors which symbolized the

aspiration for political freedom and for national unity. But Germany is to have, at the same time, a commercial flag and this is to consist of the former imperial flag with the new national colors in the inner upper corner. It is provided that each state of Germany must also have a republican constitution, resting upon a democratic suffrage. The old states are preserved, so that Germany will constitute a Federal Republic, like that of the United States, not a unitary one, like that of France. The republic, then, is the form of government not only of the nation but of each component part, the fundamental framework of the new structure. In the words of Preuss "the restoration of the monarchy in a single one of the German states would bring with it the ruin of the new national unity." It is significant that a proposal earnestly urged in the Constituent Assembly to split up the large states like Prussia into a number of small ones and to unite a number of the petty states into larger units so that the average state might number about two or three million people and all states might be approximately equal, was rejected. The inveterate particularism which we encounter all through a thousand years of German history thus showed itself still vigorous. And in the new Germany, as in the old, Prussia is larger than all the other states combined and is likely, consequently, to exercise a preponderant and decisive influence. The strongest argument brought forth in this discussion was that as the dismemberment of Prussia would give the greatest pleasure to the enemies of Germany, and had, indeed, been one of their avowed war aims, Germans owed it to themselves to see that those enemies should not have this additional trophy of their victory.

Nevertheless, while this frontal attack upon the territorial integrity of the former German states failed, yet a way was provided in Article 18 of the constitution for possible future changes in state boundaries which might perhaps in time achieve the same end, namely, the approximate equality of the various members of the federation, their liberation from the undue influence of a single partner in the union. The constitution sanctions the principle of the mobility of state frontiers, for it provides that, by means of a national law, the territorial limits of the different states may be modified if the population of the area or areas concerned so desires. A simple national law will also suffice to transfer a province from one state to another, even if one of the states affected does not consent, provided a plebiscite has first been held and three-fifths of the votes recorded

are in favor of the change, if the three-fifths represent a majority of the total number of voters.

Under the operation of this provision of the constitution the map of Germany has already been somewhat retouched. Instead of the 25 states which made up the Empire in 1914 there are now only 17. The eight petty Thuringian duchies [1] have fused into a single state of Thuringia with 1,600,000 inhabitants, and the 75,000 inhabitants of Saxe-Coburg have united with Bavaria. Whether the internal map of Germany will undergo further alterations remains to be seen. Certain it is that many plans have been brought forward and discussed for the fusion of two or more states or for the detachment of individual provinces, dissatisfied with their present status.

In the new Germany, the central organ of the state is to be the Reichstag, not, as formerly, the Emperor and the Bundesrath. Under the Constitution of 1871 sovereignty belonged to the federated princes, Germany being governed by an association of monarchs, led by the most powerful of them, the King of Prussia. Such a system, naturally, could not survive the disappearance of the monarchs themselves. After the Revolution the democratic principle was destined to be applied on perhaps a larger scale than in any other country, *representative* democracy in the case of the highest organs of the state, the Reichstag and the President, and *direct* democracy, introduced alongside the other and expressing itself in the referendum, the initiative and the recall. The people are sovereign, and political supremacy has definitely passed to the Reichstag, that is, to the chamber elected directly by the people. The Chancellor and cabinet ministers are responsible to the Reichstag and must withdraw when no longer supported by the majority of that body. In other words, the parliamentary system has succeeded the system of personal government under which the monarch appointed and removed his ministers without asking the opinion of the peoples' representatives.

The Reichstag is chosen by universal and secret suffrage. The age qualification has been reduced from twenty-five under the constitution of the Empire to twenty-one, and women as well as men have the vote. The census of 1919 showed the population of Germany to be about 60,000,000. Of this number about 37,000,000 enjoy the franchise. All are eligible to the Reichstag,

[1] Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Gotha, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen and the two former principalities of Reuss.

women as well as men, at the age of twenty-five. Members are not chosen by single districts, but on a general ticket and by the proportional system. The election must be held on a Sunday or a holiday. The Reichstag is elected for four years. It may be dissolved by the President but only once for the same cause. The Reichstag is the lawmaking body. Legislation may be introduced into it by any member or, under certain circumstances, by the President or by the Reichsrath, but elaborate provisions are made for the use, under specified conditions, of the popular referendum and initiative in the enactment of legislation.

Under the Empire it was the Bundesrath rather than the Reichstag that was the real seat of the authority of the Government and of the Prussian leadership. It represented the princes of the several states and its powers and influence were much more extensive than were those of the Reichstag. Under the new constitution the Bundesrath is succeeded by the Reichsrath, or National Council, a body which, like the former, represents, not the people, but the Governments of the states, or Länder, as they are now called, the word state being formally abolished by the constitution. In the Reichsrath every state shall have at least one vote. In the case of the larger states one vote will be accorded to every million inhabitants, but no state shall have more than two-fifths of the entire membership. The object of this provision is to prevent Prussia from having a majority, as she would be entitled to, if representation according to population were rigorously adhered to. However, as a matter of fact, she has a larger representation than she enjoyed in the old Bundesrath. The new council, like the old, represents, not the people of the several states, but their Governments, but these respective Governments now depend, not upon princes, as they formerly did, but upon local legislatures elected by universal suffrage, a most important difference. The Reichsrath is, therefore, indirectly subject to public opinion.

Moreover, the powers of the Reichsrath are much inferior to those formerly enjoyed by the Bundesrath. It plays a certain part in legislation. The Government of the Reich brings its bills, in the first instance, before the Reichsrath. If the latter accepts them, then they go to the Reichstag. But if it rejects them, the Government may, nevertheless, lay them before the Reichstag, stating at the same time the dissentient views of the Reichsrath. The Reichsrath may veto a law passed by the Reichstag. In that case the law in question shall be sent back to the Reichstag. If the Reichstag reaffirms its vote by a two-

thirds majority, the bill becomes a law without the consent of the Reichsrath, unless the President within three months submits the matter to a popular referendum. On the other hand, if the Reichstag reaffirms its position by a mere majority vote the bill fails, unless the President orders a referendum. The veto possessed by the Reichsrath is, therefore, suspensory, not absolute. The real seat of legislation is the Reichstag. The Reichsrath is not a co-equal legislative chamber. Laws may be enacted without its consent, under the conditions stated.

The executive head of the state is to be a President chosen by the whole German people, women as well as men.[1] This strictly universal suffrage, indeed, is to prevail not only in national elections, but also in state elections. The President, who must be at least thirty-five years of age, is chosen for seven years, but may be re-elected, how often the constitution does not say, or may be deposed, before the expiration of his term, by a referendum. Should the referendum, however, result in his favor, it is to count as a new election. By a law, passed subsequent to the adoption of the constitution, on May 4, 1920, it is provided that the President must be elected, if elected on the first ballot, by an absolute majority, but that, if the first ballot shows no absolute majority, then a second ballot shall be held in which a plurality shall decide. The President has supreme command over all the military forces of the nation, but he is subject to the Reichstag in such matters as a declaration of war or a conclusion of peace. He may make alliances and other treaties with foreign powers, but certain of these require the approval of the Reichstag. He has the power to use the armed force of the nation to compel the individual states to fulfil their obligations under the constitution. Under him are the Chancellor and other ministers, who are declared responsible to the Reichstag. Any of the ministers may be compelled to resign by an explicit vote of that body.

Unlike the United States, the German Reich has no Vice-President, its framers not wishing, in the words of Preuss, a "Republican Crown Prince." The President does not possess the right of veto but he may nevertheless play an important part

[1] President Ebert was, however, elected by the Assembly of Weimar. He was really provisional president, it not being considered wise to proceed to a popular election until it was definitely known what the new boundaries of Germany would be, after the various plebiscites provided for by the Treaty of Versailles. In October, 1922, the Reichstag, by a vote of 314 to 76, decided to prolong his term until June 30, 1925. There will thus be no popular election of the president until that time.

in the legislative process. He may to a certain extent delay the actual putting into force of a law which has been passed; he may in certain cases order a popular referendum before promulgating laws; and he may, with the counter-signature of a single minister, dissolve the Reichstag, a provision which gives him a very considerable power.

May not the office of President serve as a loophole for the establishment of a dictatorship or the restoration of the monarchy? May it not be considered significant that a proposition to exclude from the presidency all members of the former ruling families of Germany was voted down by 198 votes to 141? It is further provided that the President may, in the case of civil disorder, act at once upon his own initiative, and, without the countersignature of the Chancellor or of the Minister of War, may summon "the help of the armed forces," and may, at the same time suspend a number of the articles of the constitution which guarantee the liberties of the citizen and freedom of speech, writing, and public meeting. While he must "without delay" inform the Reichstag of these exceptional measures and while the Reichstag may demand that they be abandoned, nevertheless it seems more than likely that a resolute, reactionary President, bent upon restoring monarchy and supported by the army, could easily go as far as did Louis Napoleon in France in 1851. The German Constitution wishes two things at the same time, things which may, perhaps, not harmonize with each other, namely the parliamentary system of government and a strong presidency.

The student should note the further fact that while a president of the republic succeeds the former emperor, no local presidents have been set up in the place of the deposed kings and dukes and princes of the former twenty-two sovereign states. The executive power of the various "lands" is vested in ministers. Thus the King of Prussia is not succeeded by a President of Prussia, but by a ministry selected by the president of the Prussian Chamber, acting in agreement with the leaders of those political parties which for the time being form the majority of the Chamber. It might be dangerous to confront the President of the Reich with a President of Prussia in the same city, Berlin, which is the capital of both. Friction of the most serious sort would probably result.

The subjects on which the central government may legislate henceforth are much more numerous than was the case under the former Empire. The fundamental rights and duties of German

citizens are set forth and important sections of the constitution concern the social life, the economic life, education and schools, religion and religious organizations. Private economic enterprises, for instance, may be "socialized," that is, transferred to public ownership, with compensation to the former owners. "All mineral treasures and all economically useful forces of nature are under the control of the nation," that is, private rights in mines, water privileges, and so on may be turned over to the nation through legislation. Workmen's and Economic Councils are recognized and are to be built up and their rights and duties defined. In this section of the constitution we plainly see the influence of Russian sovietism.

The constitution of the German Empire of April 16, 1871, is formally annulled.

Such are some of the features of the Constitution of Weimar. It was not submitted to the people for ratification, but was declared in force on the day of its publication.

This constitution really carries the unification of Germany considerably farther than Bismarck was able to carry it. The federal government becomes more important, that of the individual states less important. Indeed, it is significant that the expression "state" is entirely eliminated from the constitution and that the former German states are now called "territories" or "lands" (Länder). Under the former constitution Bavaria and Würtemberg possessed certain special powers in regard to military organization. These powers they now lose, the central government being given supreme control of all the German forces. Greater centralization than before will occur in the spheres of railroad ownership and control, and of financial administration and taxation, and there will be a complete unification of the postal systems. Bavaria loses her separate postage stamps. The stamp collector may consider that part of his task finished, as the last Bavarian stamp has been issued.

The constitution of the German Reich was born of circumstances and shows in many of its provisions the direct influence of the political and economic crisis which followed upon the military defeat. During the war, industry had been brought into close subjection to the state; employers and employees alike had found themselves regulated and directed and disciplined, and also guaranteed certain rights, by outside authorities, whose decisions were determined by patriotic and military, not economic considerations. Yet the operation of the blockade and the increasing difficulties of life had aroused some unrest among the

laboring classes which became more acute at the time of the final disaster and the Revolution. To meet this crisis, which might easily exceed all bounds, the manufacturers of Germany without delay sought to effect satisfactory working arrangements with the laboring classes. On November 15, 1918, the representatives of both groups signed an agreement which recognized that trade unions should have the right to take part in determining the laboring conditions which should prevail in factories. This pact between capital and labor must be worked out in detail in order to be effective.

The idea that working men should be represented in the conduct of the establishments in which they work was not new in 1914 but it became much more widespread as a result of the war. The old conception that a manufacturer was a "master in his own house," able to conduct his business as he saw fit, to determine above all the conditions of employment, was undermined by the war. For the workingmen of Germany the Revolution seemed to herald the beginning of a period of great social reform. The old authority of the state had disappeared, the former rulers were in exile or in hiding. The idea of liberty was abroad in the land and seemed to know no limits. What was more natural than that those who worked in the factories should control them? The constitution-makers of Weimar were confronted by a double necessity, firstly, that of regulating conditions of labor and of production in the factory itself, and secondly, that of modifying, more or less, the prevailing property system. They met the former by providing for the possible establishment of "factory councils," the latter by providing, under certain conditions, for the "socialization" of industry.

Article 165 of the constitution says: "Workers and employees are entitled to coöperate, in common with the employers and on a basis of equality, in regulating wage and work conditions and in furthering the general economic development of productive forces. The organizations of either side and their agreements shall be recognized." The article proceeds to announce the creation of an entire hierarchy of workingmen's councils, from the council in the individual factory to councils including a district or a province, the whole to be capped by a National Economic Council in which representatives of the workingmen shall sit together with representatives of the employers, to consider economic questions. Drafts of bills on social and economic questions which are of fundamental importance must be submitted by the Government of the Reich to the National Economic

Council before being introduced into the Reichstag, and the Council itself is entitled to initiate such bills.

One of the ideas at the bottom of this article is that of the need of a separate parliament for economic matters side by side with the ordinary parliament for political affairs. The functions of the state, it is held, have so enormously increased during the last generation or two that a single parliament is not able to discharge them all. A very large number of those functions are economic and ought to be discharged, not by ordinary politicians, who are overworked and moreover are generally quite ignorant of economic processes and problems. The machinery of the modern state is inadequate to its tasks. To fulfil the general economic functions which have devolved upon it new institutions are needed, a new economic constitution quite as important as the political constitution, probably more important.

The attempt to carry out the principles involved in this clause has met with great and systematic opposition. Article 165, which in the opinion of many contains much of the future, remains as yet largely a prophecy, if prophecy it be. The plan is still but a sketch. The individual factory councils have been created by a law passed in 1920. Established in factories employing twenty or more workmen, they represent the economic interests of the employees in their relations with the employer. These factory councils are elected by the workers themselves, male or female, of eighteen years of age or over. They have two main functions; a certain right of intervention in the hiring and dismissal of workmen, and the right to express opinion concerning questions of production, such as the purchase of raw materials, new machines and other equipment. But the councils are not given any rights of formal control, it being feared that they would become too powerful. After all they are hardly more than consultative bodies. But their creation recognizes, in a halting and restricted way, the demand of the laboring classes for a voice in the management of the factories in which they work. They are more important for the principle involved than for their actual achievement. Yet it is quite evident that the rights of labor have been extended by this legislation. "Where factory councils are in existence," says a recent writer, "arbitrary conduct on the part of the employer in regard to matters fundamentally affecting conditions of labor is rendered impossible, and the legal position of the worker in the industry is firmly established. Rights hitherto exercised by the employer without any restriction — such as, for instance, the right to issue factory

regulations, to fix penalties and to give notice of dismissal at will — have been limited. The worker's sense of his own personality has been raised. But, above all, the worker's sphere of influence has been extended to a province from which he was hitherto excluded. This province is the conduct of the business. It is true that the powers of the factory council in this sphere are not so far-reaching as in the sphere of the regulation of conditions of work. The actual right to a voice in business decisions has nowhere been conceded to the factory council. The employer, however, is obliged to answer questions put to him with regard to these matters; he must discuss them and must lay facts and figures before the council."

Article 165 provides not only for Factory Councils but also for District Councils and for a National Economic Council. In 1921 the District Councils were in process of preparation. The National Economic Council was established in June, 1920. Its rôle is an ungrateful one, that of presenting opinions to the Government or to the Reichstag. It has no power of action. It is a consultative, not a legislative body.

The Constitution of Weimar also makes another promise to the working classes, that of socialization (Article 156), namely, the transference to public ownership of "private businesses suitable for socialization." The movement for socialization reached its zenith during the period of the Revolution and succeeded in securing this recognition in the constitution, but its success has not gone beyond that. Attempts to translate the verbal promise into acts have failed, bitterly opposed, as they have been thus far, by manufacturers and business men. Moreover, Socialists themselves are more or less uncertain as to the practical application of socialization. The very meaning of the word has been endlessly discussed and analyzed. Kautsky, one of the leaders of the pure Marxians, has warned reformers against being in too much of a hurry. Socialist leaders understand that the revolution involved in the word socialization must necessarily be slow and must proceed step by step, that it cannot be consummated all at once. Nevertheless, the word itself is popular and has seized the imagination of the working classes. The Government has been forced to appoint committees to investigate the subject and to prepare plans. But nothing has thus far been accomplished. The question of socialization still remains in its theoretical stage, has not yet emerged into the realm of the practical. Discussion rages between capital and labor over the merits and the possibilities of the scheme, but thus

far no legislation undermining the existing system of private production has been passed. Big business is violently opposed to all projects of the sort and the power of big business has increased enormously in Germany since the Revolution of 1918. The advocates of socialization, blocked at every stage, are tending to concentrate their demand upon a few industries, and particularly upon one, that of coal-mining. The general instability of the political and economic situation of Germany is little conducive to fundamental and problematical changes.

CHANGES IN GERMANY

But the Germany of 1923 is not the same as the Germany of 1918, and is even less like that of 1914. Great changes have taken place, some of which are obvious and striking, while others are more or less obscure, complex, and difficult to characterize. The Old Régime has been abolished. Twenty-two princes have lost their crowns. The army has been reduced, it appears, to about a hundred thousand men, and the army officers do not at present play as conspicuous and important a rôle as they formerly did. The navy was surrendered at the end of the war, or rather was sunk by the Germans in order to prevent its surrender. The mercantile fleet is much smaller than it was although it is being rapidly rebuilt. While the office-holding class, the famous bureaucracy, has continued on the whole unaltered, and remains largely typical of the social groups it has hitherto represented, namely, the nobility and the more conservative members of the middle class, nevertheless democratic influences are filtering in and are gradually altering the tone and tendency of the administration. There has been no violent or sweeping change, yet new influences are beginning to show their effect. The revolution of 1918 was only a half-revolution. It did not even sweep aside the men and the parties that were responsible for the colossal calamities of the war. The judges of the courts, the diplomats, the professors of the universities for the most part remained in office and preserved the same ways of thinking as before, remained as always, adherents of the Empire, supporters of reaction. Disturbances, strikes, deeds of violence tend to become less frequent after several years of unrest. As no political party possesses a majority either in the Reichstag or in most of the local legislatures the government is carried on by coalitions whose constituent elements change from time to time. The various parties.

those of the right and those of the left, tend to neutralize each other, and the political education of the German people, so long delayed and so narrowly restricted, is now being bought at a heavy price and under difficult conditions. "The lack of political education contributed to the downfall of Germany," said a minister of foreign affairs recently.

Within the economic sphere the same opposition of interests, the same struggle of contradictory forces for supremacy, show themselves. Unlike what has happened in certain other countries, the German Revolution has not appreciably changed the organization of German agriculture. There has been no new distribution of agrarian property. Large estates have not been cut up into small. Naturally the large landowners have no desire to see their power reduced and they are aided in an unexpected quarter in their resistance to change. The Socialist trade-unionists agree with them in opposing a further extension of petty proprietorship, thinking that their ideal of the socialization of the land will be more easily attainable if the land remains under the control of big landowners and is not divided up among the peasants, who are most recalcitrant to all ideas of socialization, most obstinately attached to the idea of private property. But while there has been no agrarian revolution, German agriculture no longer yields the same returns as before the war, one reason being the high cost of fertilizers, another being the lack of labor. The 300,000 Poles, the 100,000 Ruthenians who, before 1914, used to come to harvest the German crops, no longer come. Germany has also lost the rich plains of Poland. The situation is serious, therefore, for a country which, even before the war, was very far from self-supporting.

In the industrial sphere we observe a remarkable development in two directions since the armistice, namely an extraordinary growth of colossal industrial combinations, and a rapid extension of trade unionism. The concentration of industry in Germany had proceeded far before the war, but since its close it has gone much farther. "Captains" of industry have become veritable generals and marshals of industry, so vast and swift and incredible has been their increase of power. At the very moment when the old feudal nobility was swept from its posts of influence, a new financial aristocracy leaped into its place, and is the dominating force in Germany to-day. The new trust magnates have carried their audacity and imagination and organizing ability to unheard-of limits. The so-called "vertical" trust has

supplanted, or rather has absorbed, the previous "horizontal" trust and is far more inclusive and wide-reaching.

This significant and mighty movement has thus far embodied itself in its most sensational and striking form in the person of Hugo Stinnes, a man who was born at Mülheim on the Ruhr in 1870 and who has won encomiums and denunciations in profusion by his astonishing activities since the close of the war. "Never have such power, capital, boldness and enterprise been concentrated in one German. To the Socialist he is a Satan who desires to 'Stinnesize' the whole nation; to the Pan-German he is a Messiah, sent to avenge and save Germany." Such is Maximilien Harden's characterization of the man. Others have called him the "Bismarck of the new régime," "Germany's new business Kaiser," "the man who grabs everything in sight," "the man who controls Germany's destiny." *Germania*, the organ of the Catholic Center party, has called him an ebon-bearded "Assyrian tyrant." He is the great exponent of that system of industrial organization known as the vertical trust. This is a kind of mammoth trust of trusts. The predecessor of this form was the "horizontal" trust, namely, the union of the plants and concerns engaged in the same kind of production, the purpose of the combination being the elimination of competition, the establishment of monopoly within a single field, such as the steel or the coal industry. The vertical trust, however, seeks to consolidate not only those industries which produce the raw materials such as coal or iron but all those industries which are based on these and which progressively transform them into the most varied finished products. All the stages of production from the extraction of the mineral from the soil to the delivery to the ultimate consumer of the completed article are controlled by the same comprehensive organization. Fuel is the basis of the system. Once that is assured all the other industries are built upon that foundation. Thus mining, smelting and metal industries, chemical and electrical industries, agriculture and all those agencies of transportation and sale, such as railroads, steamship lines, wharves, warehouses, hotels, all are brought within the same comprehensive ownership and management. Paper mills, pulp mills, printing firms are also included in the same combination since advertising is necessary and since newspapers are desirable in order that political pressure may be brought to bear upon legislative bodies, that public opinion favorable to the combination may be created, and that the trusts' views on labor questions may be presented to the public. A list of the concerns

included in the Stinnes trust is bewilderingly long and varied. The influence of this consortium is enormous with its seven or eight hundred thousand workmen, and its colossal capital. With the sixty or more papers which it is said to own it exercises a widespread political influence and that influence is used in favor of conservative classes and causes, monarchist claims and aspirations, high finance, big business, and against the masses and the workingmen. Stinnes is a dominating force in the German People's Party, whose concern for the people is limited to the exploitation of the name. He is a factor which must be reckoned with by the Government at every stage. He completes the cycle of his activities by being a member of the Reichstag and of the National Economic Council from which so much was hoped by liberals and from which so little has thus far come. As a member of the latter body he has been instrumental in defeating the socialization of German industries and mines.

"It is, perhaps," says a recent writer, "one of the greatest tragedies of the war that the masses of defeated Germany, after having freed themselves politically, should now have come under the economic control of a few men like Stinnes. Nor could a stranger paradox be conceived than this — one man emerging from a vanquished country as the world's greatest war-profiteer and thus named 'the man for whom the war has been fought.'" [1]

"It was early in the war that Stinnes entered the political field," says this same writer. "During the occupation of Belgium and Northern France, he was frequently called to the General Headquarters as an economic adviser. His advice was in support of the policy of stripping Belgium of her factories, machinery and raw material. Stinnes was responsible also for the deportation of Belgian workers to be used to increase the output of munitions in Germany. And it was the hand of Stinnes that demolished the factories and coal-mines of Northern France."

The Stinnes trust is not the only one. There are several other gigantic combinations which are in full process of development and prosperity and which employ hundreds of thousands of workingmen. The industrial concentration represented by them has reached an extraordinary pitch and is the most characteristic feature of the economic life of contemporary Germany. Walter Rathenau, himself a big industrial, declared that Germany was in process of being divided up into a dozen "industrial duchies over which a few sovereign potentates may exercise their

[1] *Atlantic Monthly.* April, 1922, p. 547.

tyranny." A few combinations, organized monarchically, dominate the economic life of Germany. And these few magnates, in whom the industry of contemporary Germany is incarnated, are not content with controlling merely the economic life of their country. They seek to control its political life as well and, at the same time, they seek to escape from the control of the state. And they are branching out into other countries, buying mines or factories or forests or newspapers in Austria, Italy, Czecho-Slovakia, Argentina, and casting their eyes on the immense supplies of raw materials of Russia. Thus they have become factors in the internal life of other countries and in international affairs.

Thus the power of capitalism has vastly expanded and increased in Germany at the very moment when for the first time the Socialists have seemed about to attain the goal toward which they had long been striving. And yet many Socialists, far from being discouraged by the emergence of this bitterly hostile opponent, seem to entertain the traditional belief of their party that this "super-capitalism" will render all the easier the overthrow of the system of private property, and that increasing industrial concentration will but hasten the advent of the Socialist state.

While the most important aspect of the economic life of Germany since the war is this mighty concentration of capital within the hands of a few uncrowned kings, the veritable successors in power of those who have lost their crowns, there is another aspect which should be mentioned and which has an opposite tendency. The war caused an immense development of the trade unions of Germany, and the crisis of uncertainty that succeeded has driven into them increasing numbers of workmen who have sought through them protection against the dangers that threatened from a capitalist class stronger than ever and subject to slight restraint, now that the state, which had hitherto given much thought to the welfare of the working classes, was weakened by the Revolution. Their membership has grown with surprising rapidity. They have become a political as well as an economic power, and constitute a well-organized element in the political situation. Rejecting, at least for the time being, all radical or extreme programmes, such as the expropriation of the capitalists, they have tried to assure the close co-operation of capital and labor, not the overthrow of the existing social order. Their policy has been one of moderate reform. Resisting the temptation to try revolutionary experiments, they have sought to extend their rights

and particularly to win for the laboring class a larger share in the control and profits of industry. They have become a political power, tending to eclipse that of the political parties. It was the trade unions, and not the Government, which was a fugitive, that brought the Kapp-Lüttwitz attempted *coup d'état* to a speedy and inglorious end by ordering a general strike and it was they who issued an ultimatum to the Government at that time, demanding the acceptance of eight "points" before they would terminate the strike, these points constituting a veritable programme aiming at the socialization of big industries, and the democratization of the army and the civil service. This programme is bitterly opposed by the conservative parties, but remains in the eyes of the trade unionists a statement of their minimum demands.

The trade unionists constitute one of the chief supports of the new régime in Germany as, speaking generally, the big business men are supporters of the old, potential supporters at least, even if not for the moment actively reactionary. They have rendered great services to the republic by collaborating with the Government in questions of domestic and even foreign politics. Some of their members have participated as experts in the various conferences to which Germany has been invited. They take an active part in the social legislation of the Reich. Many of their leaders have risen to high position in the state, Ebert to the presidency, Bauer and Müller to the chancellorship, Stegerwald to the premiership of Prussia.

The trade unions have stoutly resisted the attempts made by the Bolsheviks to win them over to the faith of Moscow. They have steadily rejected Communism, or "Asiatic" Socialism, as it has been called. Indeed the fear of Bolshevism has been one of the reasons for the rapid development of the unions.

The trade union movement has spread beyond the limits of the so-called laboring classes and has won a large following among the new proletariat produced by the war, namely, the employees and office holders who belong to the middle class, but who have felt the economic reactions of the war, the high cost of living and the insufficient salaries, even more keenly than have the manual laborers.

Whether the tendency represented by the trade unions or that represented by the trust-building capitalists will win control of Germany is one of the absorbing issues of to-day. And the fate of the republic will largely depend upon the outcome. If neither force should gain a clear predominance, if each should partially

neutralize the other, the uncertainty and instability which have characterized the recent past would continue in the future. At the moment these lines are being written there can be little doubt that capitalism is more powerful than labor, — yet not powerful enough to ignore it.

Germany's foreign relations are determined by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Some of the obligations imposed upon her by that treaty have been discharged; others have been the cause of contention and negotiation between her and the Allies, particularly those concerning reparations. A long series of conferences at Spa, Paris, London, Boulogne and other places has been held since the summer of 1919 to consider ways and means of carrying out the stipulations of the Treaty. There is a strong party in Germany which preaches resistance to the Treaty, denounces it as pitiless and preposterous in its demands, insists upon its complete revision, revision not only of its financial but of its territorial and military clauses. This party seizes every occasion offered by passing events to arouse and envenom popular opinion against the late Allies, particularly against France. It probably does not hope to be able to reopen the discussion by force of arms, knowing full well the comparative weakness of Germany for the time being. But there is a chance of discrediting the Republic, held responsible for the odious peace, and, by discrediting the Republic, the way for the restoration of the monarchy would be made easier, and, with the monarchy restored, other consequences of the defeat might be obliterated and the old prestige and power regained. The revision of the treaty has become the fixed demand of public opinion, so strong that even those who favor a policy of reconciliation with the conquerors, who favor frankly recognizing Germany's responsibilities and her duty to expiate her mistakes, are unable to go as far as they would like to for fear of being accused of lack of patriotism. In the hope of breaking the treaty, Germany has tried to get the support of this state or that, England, Italy, the United States, against the others, but thus far in vain. More and more she has been looking toward Russia as furnishing the most likely ally and as offering the most inviting openings for her commerce, her industries, her workmen, her engineers. The Russian Alliance looms larger and larger in the public mind. Merchants and manufacturers see markets and profits in it, whereas military and political reactionaries see the creation of a means of ultimately extinguishing Poland, odious to both classes alike.

The boundaries of the new Germany have gradually been determined by the plebiscites provided by the Treaty of Versailles for various doubtful areas. The carrying out of the treaty in the circles of Eupen and Malmédy has resulted in the transfer of those places to Belgium. The plebiscites in the two zones of Schleswig showed the northern zone as overwhelmingly in favor of incorporation in Denmark, the southern as equally in favor of remaining in Germany. The two consultations of the people of certain sections of East Prussia, the Allenstein and Marienwerder regions, have resulted in favor of Prussia. The disposition of Upper Silesia will be described in a later chapter. Suffice it to say here that that territory has been divided between Germany and Poland.

FOREIGN POLICY

In the domain of foreign policy one of the significant acts of the German Republic since the Conference of Paris was the signing on Easter Sunday, April 12, 1922, at Rapallo, near Genoa, of a separate treaty with Russia. The treaty provides not only for that legal recognition of the Soviet Government which the present Russian authorities have been eager to obtain from the nations which have been indisposed to accord it, but it provides also for the renunciation by both parties of all public and private claims against each other arising out of the war. Thus all indemnity claims, as well as pre-war debts, are reciprocally cancelled, and the German government and German nationals abandon all demands for the compensation or restoration of German property confiscated or "nationalized" by the Soviet Government, — this on condition that "the Soviet Government shall not satisfy similar claims made by any third state." Consular and diplomatic relations are to be immediately resumed and the economic needs of the two countries are to be treated "with reciprocal feelings of good will." Each Government agrees to give the other "most-favored-nation" privileges.

The announcement that the two most populous states in Europe, each of which was hostile to the arrangements laid down in the various treaties concluded at Paris, had come together in a formal agreement, inspired considerable apprehension and alarm among other nations, which were not allayed by the declaration of the authors of the Treaty of Rapallo that it was an economic agreement, and nothing more. What assurance was there that there were no secret clauses; what reason to believe

that this was not merely the first step in the building up of a Russo-German military alliance, "a hungry Russia," in Lloyd George's words, "equipped by an angry Germany," and both bent upon revenge?

It is hardly necessary to say that this action of Germany and Russia has not facilitated the work of those who have been striving for a general reconciliation of the nations of Europe. It has but confirmed the worst fears and suspicions of the French that to sup with these two powers they will need a long spoon, that the old Bismarckian methods still dominate the diplomacy of the German Reich. It is too early to say what the repercussions of this treaty will ultimately be, but it can be safely prophesied that the relations of Germany and Russia will be attentively watched for many years by a skeptical and disillusioned world.

Not only is the political situation in the new German Republic uncertain and precarious but the financial condition of the country is alarming. Her industries are active, there is little, if any, unemployment, and her captains of industry are heaping up great fortunes and acquiring unprecedented power. Her territory was not invaded during the war, her farms and mines and factories were not destroyed or devastated, as were those of France. As a French writer has said "not a German window-frame was shattered" by the enemy. Her people were taxed far less during the war than were the people of England, France, or Italy. Yet while there are abundant evidences of private prosperity, while the dividends of her stock companies are large and often astounding, the Government is poor and is unable to meet its current obligations, and a government of slender financial resources is a weak government, a ready prey of her enemies. Germany has paid but a slight fraction of what she owes her enemies on reparations and in August, 1922, she confessed that she was unable to pay any more and asked for a moratorium for several years. The root of her difficulty is not the burden laid upon her by the Treaty of Versailles but her own financial recklessness. She has followed a policy of wild inflation of her currency by enormous and rapidly increasing issues of paper money. At the time of the armistice, November, 1918, seventeen billion of paper marks irredeemable in coin were in circulation. By the end of 1919 this paper circulation had increased to 35 billion, by the end of 1920 to 68 billion, by the end of 1921 to 113 billion, and by July, 1922, to 169 billion. In 1914 a dollar would pur-

chase four German marks, in October, 1922, it would purchase between two and three thousand.

The responsibility for this policy must be shared by both the Imperial and the Republican régimes. While England and France imposed new and heavy taxes upon their citizens during the war, and raised enormous loans, to meet the war expenditure, Germany took a different course. Her Secretary of the Treasury declared that the Allies would ultimately be forced to pay all the war expenses of the Central Powers. Therefore why bother the German citizen with such unpleasant burdens. Only in the latter part of the war, when the outlook did not seem quite so rosy, did the German government introduce a system of taxation and loans, and then only on a very limited scale. Meanwhile it paid its war expenses with paper money. After the war England and France began to reduce their paper money circulation. Germany did the contrary, increasing hers, with some restraint at first, and then by leaps and bounds. Since 1910 the paper currency of France has been reduced 11 per cent.; that of Germany has been increased by over 170 per cent. (September, 1922). What the end will be, let him tell who can.[1] At least it can be said that such procedure is not conducive to economic health.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The Revolution of 1918 brought about a considerable change in the political parties of Germany, effecting the fusion of some, the disruption of others, and modifying to some extent their programmes and particularly prompting them to assume more popular names. Thus the former parties of the Right, the Conservatives and Free Conservatives, reappeared, after a brief eclipse, as the German National Party. This party consists of men whose policy had contributed greatly to the outbreak of the war, men who had done their part in pushing Germany toward the abyss. Ultra-annexationists during the war, they were sternly opposed to all talk of peace. Advocates of unrestricted submarine warfare, they had provoked the intervention of America. They have learned no useful lesson from the war and among their leaders is Helfferich who said that the Germans would "know how to make the conquered people drag for years and years the ball and chain of the billions of war indemnity" which they would exact. Another is Herght who had said that

[1] These facts are taken from an article by A. D. Noyes in Scribner's Monthly for September, 1922.

the United States could not land "three soldiers upon the soil of Europe."

The German National Party is the chief center of reaction in the German Reich. It is the representative of the old régime in the new Germany. It aims to restore the monarchy and the former military and political power of Germany. It is bitterly opposed to democracy, to socialism in any of its forms, to the republican régime, to the Jews. It denounces the French and the Treaty of Versailles unceasingly and is resolutely opposed to those Germans who recommend a conciliatory foreign policy, hurling at all such the abusive term of "the French party," that is, virtually traitors to the Fatherland. It has fought desperately against disarmament; it seeks in every way to prepare the military rehabilitation of Germany, to stimulate the determination to recover the lost provinces, particularly Upper Silesia and Alsace-Lorraine. This party has been increasingly successful in the elections. It includes the great landed proprietors, the officials of the old régime who have lost their positions, many prominent capitalists, the university world very largely, both faculties and students, and the peasants who are traditionally conservative and opposed to all collectivist theories. Marshal Hindenburg is the hero of this party. The Pan-German League is continuing in connection with this party the same propaganda it has been pushing for thirty years. The old German imperialism is not dead but is represented in a very lively form by the German Nationals. Should they ever become a majority party the peace of Europe would be menaced.

Another party is the German People's Party, or the Populists, as its members are sometimes called, — the successor, in the main, of the former National Liberals of the Empire. This is the party of "big business," of the upper bourgeoisie, of the great capitalists and captains of industry. It is the equal, perhaps the superior, in influence, of the German National party. Like the latter it is monarchical and nationalistic, is opposed to the republican constitution of Weimar, dwells willingly upon the merits of the Hohenzollerns and of Prussian militarism. But it differs from the German National party, not so much in principle as in practice. Its main interest is the economic restoration and expansion of Germany as that of the German Nationals is the military and political restoration of the old régime. Its leaders — and foremost among them is Stinnes — are men of great capacity and energy, men of limitless ambition, who have definite aims, but know how to compromise with situations and

with other parties, if something definite is thereby to be gained. While the German Nationals really desire revenge, the Populists would be content with wealth and economic power. The latter are not the stiff reactionaries that the former are, but are supple, adaptable, practical, hard-headed business men. They might become sincere republicans — if they could themselves control the republic.

These two parties are clearly parties of the Right as the Socialist parties are of the Left. Between the groups are two parties not as clearly defined, with points of contact with both Right and Left. One of these is the Democratic party, largely descendant from the old Progressive party, with some of the more advanced National Liberals. It is a party of the bourgeois, which is opposed to handing over the fate of Germany to the devotees of the old régime, or to the Socialists, alone. It is composed of dissimilar elements which find it difficult to agree upon a common programme, the more conservative wing not essentially differing from the People's party, the more advanced wing more radical than many of the Majority Socialists. The party has lost ground in the recent elections, probably because of this lack of definiteness in programme. It contains men who are convinced and thorough-going republicans, along with men who have rallied to the republic but who regret the fall of the Empire. It counts in its ranks such men as Siemens, the great industrialist, Bernstorff and Brockdorff-Rantzau, former diplomats, Dernburg and Hugo Preuss. Frederich Naumann and Walter Rathenau, now dead, were members of this party. Among its conspicuous journalists are Theodor Wolff and George Bernhard.

The other moderate party is the former Center party which as a result of the Revolution changed its name to that of the Christian People's party. The new label has not taken, however, and the old is the one in use. It is the Catholic party, and it contains the most diverse elements, noblemen, merchants, Bavarian and Rhenish peasants, Westphalian miners. Preserving essential unity in the defense of the interests of the Church, its attitude toward economic and social and many political questions is less clean-cut, more uncertain. It seeks to hold its conservative and its democratic elements together but the team is frequently restive, wishing to go in different directions. Representing very divergent social classes and points of view, it is, as it has always been, an opportunist party, tacking now in this direction, now in that. Commanding a large number of votes, its aid is sought by the parties of the Right and the parties of

the Left. It has in the main thus far supported the Republic, but should the people show a tendency to turn toward the conservative and reactionary parties, it would, it is quite safe to say, make a new adjustment. Among its prominent leaders in recent years was Erzberger, a strong and active democrat, bitterly hated by the Nationalists and assassinated by them in August, 1921. Joseph Wirth, who became Chancellor in May, 1921, belongs to the Center party.

Such then are the chief conservative and moderate parties of contemporary Germany. The parties of the Left are the Socialists, divided into the two main groups, the Majority and the Independant Socialists, and into two or three small ones. These have already been described. Sometimes working together, sometimes apart, the Socialists are the main support of the present régime, the only parties of whose devotion to the Republic one can speak with certitude. They have shown themselves from the beginning convinced republicans and adversaries of the militarist empire, while the bourgeois parties are impregnated with a monarchical spirit and with monarchical traditions.

As no party has a majority among the voters or in the Reichstag the ministry must always represent a coalition and a coalition is generally of weak vitality. The party system of present-day Germany rests in most unstable equilibrium. The Cuno ministry which succeeded the ministry of Wirth at the close of 1922 proved as short lived as had its predecessors, resigning on August 12, 1923, and being succeeded by a ministry under Stresemann, supported by the leading bourgeois and Socialist parties.

The Majority and Independent Socialists have latterly effected a kind of union, how durable time alone will show. They are now generally known as the United Socialists. The extreme Socialists or Communists stand apart.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE REPUBLIC OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

The close of the World War was signalized by events of the most sensational and far-reaching character. Those nations which had, with such incredible lightness of heart, appealed in 1914 to the arbitrament of arms as offering the surest and swiftest way to the realization of their ambitions were now compelled to recognize that they had woefully misread their horoscopes. The baseless fabric of their vision vanished into air, into thin air. In contrast to the hopes and purposes they had entertained the actual situation in the autumn of 1918 was a hideous, grinning mockery. The smiles of fortune now gave way to her frowns and the way of the transgressor was seen to be sometimes altogether hard.

It would require a volume adequately to appraise the consequences of the war, but in October and November, 1918, the handwriting on the wall was visible from afar and was legible enough for all concerned. It announced the doom of the great adventure and the arrival of the day of reckoning. For none was the reckoning as severe as for Austria, whose ultimatum to Serbia in 1914 had set the monstrous conflagration. For her allies, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Germany the issue of the conflict meant defeat; for the Dual Monarchy it meant annihilation. The Grand Turk was destined to lose a considerable part of his spacious domains; the petty prince who had pompously called himself the Tsar of All the Bulgars was to see his pretentions wither and his throne become untenable; Germany was to undergo a startling political revolution involving the disappearance of twenty-two sovereigns, big and little, and involving much else. But however heavily adversity, born of defeat, might weigh upon these states, at least their separate statehood was to continue. No so that of Austria-Hungary. The Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom of Bulgaria, the German Reich were still to appear, however altered, upon the map of Europe. But the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was to disappear utterly.

The reasons for the collapse of this great empire, the oldest and the proudest in Europe, were numerous. Many nations have

in the past experienced grievous defeat without, in consequence, completely disintegrating into their primitive elements, and the reason has been because those elements have in the course of time become fused and have gained the strength of fusion. This process had never taken place in the case of Austria-Hungary. Austria was not a nation, it was only a dynasty resting upon an aristocracy, a bureaucracy, an army, and a church. And that dynasty had adhered for centuries to a principle of government which was the very negation of sound statesmanship. It had sought to rule by playing off its motley peoples, with their racial and linguistic and historic differences, against each other, by encouraging the spirit of dissension to such an extent that the various rivalries would neutralize and nullify each other. Divide in order that you may rule, such was the dangerous motto of the House of Hapsburg. The Emperor Francis I, contemporary of Napoleon and Metternich, had expressed this jejune political philosophy succinctly when he said, observing how beautifully his different peoples detested one another; "From their antipathies springs order, and from their mutual hatred the general peace." For a long time this easy method worked to the satisfaction of its sponsors. But after all the surest way to disrupt an empire is to stimulate the disruptive forces within it. Then when the moment of strain and stress arrives those forces will show their power. It is the most serious charge that can be brought against the intelligence and the morality of the House of Hapsburg that, for generation after generation, its representatives, instead of acting as peacemakers among its discordant races, acted rather as disturbers of the peace, and deliberately and systematically fanned the flames, pitting nationality against nationality, race against race, in unholy indifference to the fundamental iniquity of such procedure and to its arrant unwisdom. With rare unreason all the elements of eventual disaster, all the dynamite that lies in hate, were heaped up about the existing régime, waiting only for the moment of explosion.

The Hapsburg princes might, by a policy of fair play, by assuring life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to their several nationalities, by introducing a real federal state organization with large spheres of local self-government reserved for the separate units, have evoked such a thing as a common patriotism, a common loyalty, based upon general contentment and well-being. But this was never their thought nor their endeavor. Systematic oppression of the Slavic and Latin peoples under

their sway, in the interest of two privileged races, the Germans and the Magyars, such had been their pleasure. The races that were opposed to this German-Magyar rule became naturally and inevitably the enemies of the Hapsburg monarchy. The memories of indignities and injustices endured were kept alive and vivid by repeated acts of arbitrary power.

To these peoples came, in August 1914, sudden war, a war manifestly designed among other things to crush the Slavs of Serbia and thus put an end to the troublesome aspirations of the Slavs within Austria-Hungary, thereby consolidating for an indefinite future the system in vogue since 1867. The war had effects quite contrary to those intended. Instead of consolidating the Dual Monarchy it rendered possible, and it hurried along, its internal decomposition, until, at the end of four years, the proud state lay in utter ruin. No common patriotism was evoked by the war because no common patriotism existed in the hearts of the dissimilar and discordant peoples which had historically been brought together under the Hapsburg scepter, because the Hapsburg policy had not been of a character to create it. Indeed, most of the Slavs of the empire were indignant at being compelled to fight in a cause of which they disapproved, to fight fellow-Slavs in the interest of Germans and Magyars. Austria was plunged into war without her peoples or their representatives being in any way consulted. The Austrian Reichsrat had been prorogued in March, 1914, and was not convened again until May 30, 1917. The Hungarian parliament, however, was in session at the outbreak of the war, and enthusiastically approved the policy of the Government but the Hungarian parliament represented only the dominant race of Hungary, the Magyars. The resentment of the Slavs, particularly of the Czechs, expressed itself during the war in wholesale desertions to the Russians and the Serbs. It has been estimated that over 30,000 Czechs deserted to the Serbs, that about 300,000 surrendered voluntarily to the Russians, perhaps 30,000 to the Italians. The Austrian government was naturally led by this alarming and dangerous disaffection to the adoption of vigorous methods of repression. A veritable reign of terror was introduced. Perhaps 20,000 Czech civilians were imprisoned as "political suspects" and nearly 5,000 were condemned to death by courts martial. A Polish Socialist leader declared in the Reichsrat in February, 1918, that there had been 30,000 executions in the province of Galicia alone. But imprisoning, shooting, hanging on an unprecedented scale only increased the

widespread disaffection, only loosened still further the cohesion of the state. The feeling, every day confirmed, that the victory of the Central Powers would mean the enthronement of the Germans and the doom of the Slavs, whom the Germans hated and despised as belonging to an inferior stock, as worthy only of serving "as mortar for a nobler race"; the feeling, too, that Austria would be bound hand and foot to Germany, should the Central Powers win, and that all real independence would disappear, all these considerations and still others confirmed the subject races of Austria-Hungary in their desire to escape once for all from bonds that had long been burdensome and that had now become intolerable. Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, Roumanians, Italians, Ruthenians were finally and completely estranged by the odious military régime which treated them as enemies and which completely eradicated any surviving instincts of solidarity, of common citizenship.

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed in October, 1918, as a result of military reverses and the long exhaustion of the war. In prosecuting the war to this victorious conclusion the Entente Allies contributed the blow that brought the "ramshackle" structure to the ground. But this had been no part of their intentions. They had wished to defeat Austria, not to destroy her. While the disaffected races had appealed for their help, they did not get it in any serious measure. President Wilson in his Fourteen Points, made public in January, 1918, had expressly disclaimed any thought of disrupting the Empire. He only demanded autonomy for the subject races, and autonomy is a word that lacks precision and is certainly far removed from independence. But events moved rapidly in 1918. By the middle of the year, the Allies recognized the claims of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs to unity and independence. The former they recognized as an independent state and an ally in arms. The Czecho-Slovaks, indeed, believing that the most impressive argument for their cause would be to furnish soldiers ready to give their lives for it, raised and organized considerable bodies of troops which fought side by side with the Allies in France and Italy and in Russia.

Seeing the storm that was blowing up from every quarter of the sky the Emperor Charles made a despairing attempt to prevent the threatened dissolution by proposing on October 16, 1918, the conversion of Austria — not of Hungary, be it noted — into a federal state composed of free nations, German, Czech, Jugo-Slav and Ukrainian, each with its own defined boundaries.

Galicia was to be free to unite with Poland. But it was too late. Dissolution was in fact already in full process and its speed was accelerating every day. The long pent up discontent of the Austrian nationalities finally exploded and the Dual Monarchy lay in fragments. Power passed from the old established authorities of the Empire to newly improvised national councils, representing the nationalities. There was no fighting, for nowhere did the revolution meet resistance. Neither the Emperor as a person or as a symbol, nor the dominant Germans and Magyars, could evoke any spirit of loyalty or chivalrous devotion in the hour of need, for their previous records had not been calculated to inspire such sentiments. The panoply of power which had long invested the ancient House of Hapsburg with wide authority over the thought and imagination of men now vanished overnight. None were now so poor as to do it even momentary reverence. Provisional governments sprang up where formerly there had been at least formal unity. The Czechs were solidifying a government they had been elaborating for some time in conclaves in Prague and Paris; Croatia was preparing to unite with Serbia; the Tyrol, Trieste, the country along the head of the Adriatic were being occupied by the Italians; Roumanians were invading Transylvania; the Poles of Galicia were negotiating with the new Poland which was arising from the hot ashes of the world's greatest war. All were staking out their claims and planning for a future more to their taste than the past had been. There was to be, if not a new heaven, at least a new earth. On November 12, the last of the Hapsburgs withdrew and the field was cleared for the new combinations and creations.

Such was the situation when the Peace Conference met in Paris. That conference has been subjected to much intelligent criticism and to much that has been unintelligent and fatuous. Unnecessarily feeble have been many of the comments concerning its decisions regarding Austria. It has been charged that the Conference "Balkanized" central Europe, that is to say that it wilfully split up a large political and economic unit into numerous fragments, jealous of each other, full of the spirit of unreason, incapable of living or letting live, self-assertive, aggressive, quarrelsome, intent upon the realization of their own petty ambitions, their own local advantages, indifferent to all considerations of the general good. It has been said that the Conference sacrificed the well-being of fifty million people by subordinating their economic interests to purely political considerations, by

destroying the vast and delicately organized economic system which bound the different parts of the Empire together into a union profitable to all, with its sources of supply, its markets, its modes of transportation available for all and contributing to the prosperity of all. In place of an economic organization slowly built up out of the needs of the people and responsive to those needs there was henceforth to be economic disorganization. The work of many decades was to be wantonly undone. The free and vital movement of industry and commerce was now to be arbitrarily interrupted because of this chopping up of a great empire into numerous small states which would have their tariffs and their tariff wars, with all their sorry progeny. Economic prosperity, the chief and fundamental good of life, was to be lightly tossed aside merely in order to satisfy excessive nationalistic and racial aspirations. Realities were to be exchanged for baubles.

To such criticism it is sufficient to reply that it was not the Conference of Paris that destroyed the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It merely registered the fact of dissolution. When the Conference opened Austria-Hungary was already a thing of the past, nor could the Conference have possibly restored it, even had it ardently so desired. All that the Conference had to do was to discharge a large amount of business left unfinished by the sudden demise, to make a multitude of adjustments between the eager and contentious heirs.

Furthermore, it should also be pointed out that most of the peoples of the world prefer such things as independence and liberty to economic prosperity, if they are compelled to make the choice. This has been proved so many times that it would seem to be unnecessary to call attention to a fact which is fundamental to any true interpretation of history. A purely economic interpretation is of all the least adequate and the most neglectful of essential factors. The various Austrian peoples well knew that the attainment of their aspirations would mean economic loss and hardship, at least for a considerable time. But this knowledge was no deterrent as they did not put their chief emphasis upon economic matters.

The states among which the former territories of Austria-Hungary were divided are called the " succession " states. This division had already been roughly achieved by the action of several of those states which had seized the territories which they considered theirs or which they were bent upon possessing. But such action was, from the nature of the case, provisional and

lacked finality. It was the duty of the Conference of Paris to make the necessary treaties of peace, to define and recognize the boundaries between the "succession" states, and to solve other problems arising out of the new situation.

The treaties of Saint-Germain with Austria and of Trianon with Hungary determined the future status of those two states, hitherto united, but now separate, and each much reduced in size and altered in internal organization. The treaty of Saint-Germain was signed on September 10, 1919, but months passed by before it was ratified by the Allied Governments. Indeed, it was not until July 16, 1920, that it actually entered into force. The Hungarian treaty was not signed until June 4, 1920, and was not ratified until much later.

On these and other accords concluded with Poland, Roumania, Italy, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, was to rest the new Central Europe, accords too numerous and too detailed to be described here. Suffice it to say that the Hapsburg inheritance was divided among those five states and among two additional ones, namely, what was left of Austria and what was left of Hungary. These were the successor-states. A difficult and highly contentious problem, only slowly worked out by the Conference of Paris, was that of drawing boundaries and assigning peoples in such a way as to satisfy the demands of approximate justice, to serve the cause of peace and security in Europe, to give promise of reasonable durability. It was natural that the allies or friends of the Entente, Czecho-Slovakia, Italy, Roumania, Poland, and Jugo-Slavia should fare better at the hands of the Conference than their enemies, the Germans of Austria, and the Magyars of Hungary.

In the following chapters we shall trace the recent history of the several states that either owe their very existence or their great enlargement to this sudden and complete disintegration of an ancient empire.

One of the most significant and promising is that of the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, and also one of the least known. Even its very name is new. Men had long known of the Kingdom of Bohemia, of its geographical situation, of its history. Why was not this historic and famous name retained when the time came to give this country once more the independence it had long possessed and which it had lost four centuries earlier? It was not retained because the new republic was to be no mere restoration of the former state of Bohemia but was to be something very different. Bohemia was to be not only the kernel

but a large part of the new construction, but it was not to be all of it. There was to be added to it Slovakia, a region in northern Hungary, which the Magyars had conquered and held since the tenth century, as the Hapsburgs had held Bohemia since 1526. The Czechs of Bohemia and the Slovaks of Hungary had not for a thousand years been united with each other, yet they were sister races, speaking practically the same language, although with variations. Each of these two closely related branches of the Slavic family saw in the World War the opportunity for independence, the one from the control of the Austrians, the other from the control of the Magyars. But each saw that, without the other, it would be numerically so weak and geographically so exposed to attack that it would be unable long to maintain its independence, even if acquired. The union of the two was essential to both. Self-interest of the most obvious sort prompted their union and will prove the strongest force in perpetuating it, capable of counteracting, in all probability, the friction that may arise between two peoples which, though related, have had different histories and been subjected to different formative influences.

In a way, then, the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia has a national tradition which runs back many centuries, yet it is one of the youngest of states. During the war France and Italy had accepted the aid of Czecho-Slovak legions on the French and Italian fronts, thereby virtually recognizing Czecho-Slovakia's claim. In August, 1918, Great Britain had recognized her as an Allied nation and in the following month the United States and Japan had virtually done the same. On October 18, 1918, the Czecho-Slovak Declaration of Independence was formally issued in Paris by three gifted and sagacious patriots, Professor Masaryk, Dr. Benes (pron. Benesh), and General Stefanik, men who had voluntarily gone into exile during the war and who, each in his own way, had worked day and night to present the cause of his country to other peoples who were profoundly ignorant of it and who were themselves occupied with problems of their own, harassing and exacting enough to absorb all their time and thought. The Declaration of Independence which these men drafted and issued to the world deliberately rejected the divine right of kings in favor of "the principles of Lincoln and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen." On October 27, the Austro-Hungarian Government recognized the rights of the Czecho-Slovaks.

Thus by the end of October, 1918, the Czechs had regained the

independence which they had lost nearly three hundred years before in the fatal battle of the White Mountain in the early days of the Thirty Years' War. Immense was the enthusiasm of the people at their liberation, an enthusiasm unaccompanied by violence. On November 16, there met in Prague the first body representative of the Czecho-Slovak people, the National Assembly. It decided unanimously in favor of a republic and it unanimously elected Masaryk, who was still abroad, its first president. Dr. Kramar (pron. Kramarsh), a man who had long been a leader of the Young Czechs, who had during the war been condemned to death for treason and had later been pardoned, the only man at the beginning of the new republic who enjoyed a reputation comparable to that of Masaryk, now become first prime minister and Benes became minister of foreign affairs. These two men were appointed the delegates of the republic at the Conference of Paris.

The problems confronting the new state were varied and formidable but were faced with serenity by a people exultant and electrified at being master of its own destinies once more after centuries of oppression. Prime Minister Kramar at the first session of the National Assembly expressed the national mood and determination when he said: "At home we feel sufficiently confident of being able to rely upon our own powers alone, and that without injustice to others. We shall count upon the devotion of all towards the State and we shall show that not only have we been able to achieve our liberty but that we know how to preserve it and to be really free — worthy of our great past, of our traditions and our sufferings."

The most important immediate problems demanding attention before the general work of reconstruction could be taken up were the determination of the boundaries of the new republic and the framing of a national constitution. The former was the work of the Conference of Paris, the latter of the National Assembly sitting in Prague. The former was an international concern, the latter a domestic affair.

The frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia were determined by the peace treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Trianon. The difficulties in drawing them were considerable. What should be chosen as the basis of the decision, history or ethnography? In that part of the new state which had formerly belonged to Austria, the former kingdom of Bohemia, the historic frontier and the linguistic did not agree. The central mass of the territory was peopled by Czechs, but around it, to the west and north, was a

zone peopled by Germans, and the relations of Czechs and Germans had for centuries been those of ceaseless and bitter strife, whose intensity had only deepened in recent decades. The contentions of these two peoples had grown so fierce that for years before the war the Provincial Diet had practically ceased to function, the vocal turbulence of the factions whenever it met showing the futility of attempting to continue its sessions. Wherever the two races naturally came together, in school or factory or church, there had been war, or at best an armed truce. The mutual repulsion was extreme. It was difficult to get them to work together in the same shop, nor would they consent to take the train from the same station. In many a village, whose population was certainly too small to justify any such luxury, were two railroad stations, one for the Germans, and one for the Czechs. Should peoples, filled with such a long-standing and comprehensive dislike of each other, be forced to live together in the new republic? The Peace Conference decided that they should, and, as it seems to the author, for good and sufficient reasons. States cannot live by ethnography alone. History is often mightier than ethnic purity, and must prevail. While in general the powers assembled in Paris considered that the political boundaries they had to draw ought, whenever possible, to conform to the linguistic boundaries, they recognized that there were exceptions to the operation of the rule, and here was one of the exceptions. Pare off this fringe of Germans whom you find around most of Bohemia and you mutilate a kingdom which had had a glorious history in the Middle Ages, succeeded by an unhappy one of several centuries under the Hapsburgs, but which had never relinquished its claims even in the darkest moments, which asserted that it had never ceased to exist and that it had a right to be restored in its entire extent by a conference whose high mission was, in part, to redress some of the injustices of the past. The Germans of Bohemia had never belonged to the modern German Empire. Ought the mere fact that there was within Bohemia a considerable minority of Germans to be considered a reason for dismembering an ancient state which was now miraculously on the point of restoration?

Other reasons for recognizing the historic boundaries of Bohemia, rather than the ethnographic, were that the former gave a territory which was a geographic unit, an economic unit, and which was, from a military point of view, defensible. Had the historic boundaries not been adopted, Prague, the capital of the new state, would have been only about thirty miles from the

German frontier and the passes through the mountains would all have been in German hands.

The Czechs argued for historic frontiers in determining the part of Austria that should go into the making of the new state. They argued against historic frontiers, in the case of Hungary, part of whose territory, namely Slovakia, they coveted. Here they appealed to the right of national self-determination. There was no doubt that Hungary's territorial unity was a thousand years old. On the other hand there was also no doubt that the Slovaks, long outrageously oppressed, would welcome the chance to get free of the hated Magyar rule. The claim to Slovakia was, therefore, made to rest upon the right of self-determination. But the drawing of the boundary line was very difficult owing to the fact that there is between Slovakia and Hungary no natural frontier, and that the process of Magyarization carried out for several decades had blurred the ethnological line.

The Czecho-Slovak Republic, as finally delimited by the treaties, has a population, according to the census of 1921, of nearly 14,000,000 and an area of about 55,000 square miles, about the size of the state of New York or of England and Wales. It is about six hundred miles long and at its maximum breadth about a hundred and eighty miles wide. Like the former Austria, to which it is one of the successors, it is a polyglot state. Of its fourteen million inhabitants, thirty-five per cent. are neither Czechs nor Slovaks. About three million are Germans, about 750,000 are Magyars (in Slovakia), and nearly half a million are Ruthenians or Little Russians. Thus the new state confronted from the outset one of the most contentious and difficult problems within the field of government, the problem, that is, of making peoples of different race and different speech, each with its history of wrongs inflicted or endured, co-operate together harmoniously in the building up of the commonwealth. Austria had failed to solve this problem and had gone to smash, in some measure because of that very failure. Would Czecho-Slovakia be wiser in its methods and happier in its achievements than had its predecessor, or would the issue be the same, bitter racial and nationalistic hatreds and rivalries culminating at the propitious moment in convulsions and collapse? The challenge to the leaders of the new state was peremptory and inevitable. Would they have the necessary stores of wisdom and good will to enable them to avoid in their treatment of German and Magyar minorities the evil courses which the Germans and Magyars had so long followed toward them? Would they repay injustice and

oppression by moderation and fair play? Or would the world witness the same old tragedy once more, only with the rôles reversed? Would the various languages be equalized and, therefore, cease to be badges of superiority or inferiority, or would the dominant race insist upon precedence and prestige for its idiom to the dark and rankling displeasure of the others? Even if themselves inclined to be reasonable and considerate would the fierce passions of the war and pre-war period so far subside as to render possible a policy of reconciliation and of progressive legislation?

A good start, at any rate, was made with the constitution. In process of drafting for a year or more, the constitution bears the date of February 29, 1920. It shows conspicuously the influence of French and American example. The American principle of the division of powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial, was largely applied. The organs of government are a president and a parliament consisting of two houses, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The constitution may be revised by a majority of two-thirds of the total membership in each of the two chambers.

The President of the Republic is chosen for seven years by the two chambers meeting together as a National Assembly. He may be re-elected for a second term, but he may not be chosen for a third until after an interval of at least seven years after the expiration of his second term. This restriction does not apply to the first President, Masaryk, for whom a special exception is made because of the high regard in which he is universally held. If the presidential office becomes vacant by the death of its occupant a new election must be held within two weeks; if the President is prevented by illness or for any other reason from discharging his functions, the executive power is exercised by the ministry; if this prevention, however, continues beyond six months, the National Assembly shall, if two-thirds of the ministers propose such action, elect a substitute. The president represents the Republic in its international relations, is the head of the army, possesses the pardoning power, and summons, prorogues, and dissolves the chambers, to which he may send messages or which he may address in person. He does not possess the veto power. He has the right to demand a new deliberation upon a law submitted for his signature but if the chambers, on roll-call, maintain their position, or if the Chamber of Deputies alone, by a two-thirds vote, declares itself for the second time in favor of the law, the President has no

further power of resistance but must promulgate the law forthwith. The President is not responsible at law for his acts, each one of which must be countersigned by a minister who thereby assumes responsibility. He may be impeached, however, by the Chamber of Deputies, but in one case only, treason. If found guilty his punishment is loss of office and disability ever again to hold it.

The Chamber of Deputies consists of 300 members elected for six years; the Senate of 150 members elected for eight years. Women may vote and may be chosen to either chamber under the same conditions as men. Universal suffrage exists, and voting is not only direct and secret but is also obligatory. To vote for Deputies one must be at least twenty-one years of age, for Senators at least twenty-six. To be eligible for the Chamber one must be twenty-six years old, for the Senate forty-five. In the first parliament chosen under this system, thirteen women were elected to the Chamber of Deputies; three were elected to the Senate. The proportional system of representation is established in the interest of minorities; in order that the election may represent the real thought of the voters, and not be vitiated by adventitious circumstances. It is forbidden to sell or offer any alcoholic drink either on election day or on the night before.

A measure passed by the Chamber of Deputies and rejected by the Senate may, nevertheless, become a law if the Chamber of Deputies passes it again by a vote of the majority of its entire membership. The two houses are, therefore, far from equal.

Parliament must hold at least two ordinary sessions a year, in the spring and in the autumn, and it may be summoned by the President of the Republic at other times, and must be summoned if a majority of the members, or in certain cases, two-fifths, demand it. There is, in addition, the striking provision that during the intervals between sessions, when Parliament is not sitting, a permanent commission, consisting of sixteen deputies and eight senators, elected by the respective chambers and on the system of proportional representation, shall have the right to pass urgent legislation and to exercise control over the Government. Such measures lapse unless confirmed within two months by the Parliament at its subsequent meeting. Cabinet ministers are appointed by the President of the Republic. They are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies. They need not themselves be members of either house.

A constitutional tribunal consisting of seven members is given the power to judge the constitutionality of laws.

Those civic rights which are customary in free countries are guaranteed, liberty of speech, of the press, of meeting, of conscience. All religious confessions are declared equal before the law. Minorities, whether religious or racial, are assured special rights. Every linguistic minority representing at least twenty per cent. of the population has the right to use its own language in all its relations with public officials, who must reply in the same language. Every "important" minority may have its language taught to its children in the public schools. Czechoslovak is the state language and may be used everywhere and on all occasions. While it is sometimes declared that there is no such language, but that Czech is one tongue and Slovak another, it appears that they are practically one, that, with the exception of about a thousand words, most of which, moreover, resemble each other, the vocabulary is the same, and that the essential difference lies only in the pronunciation.

Such are some of the provisions of the constitution, a document liberally democratic and one which seeks to satisfy the demands and needs of the various races and religions within the borders of the republic.

But a tree is judged by its fruits. It is too early yet to say whether the political institutions of Czecho-Slovakia are adapted to the solution of the problems of the national life. Those problems are both numerous and grave. The peoples at whose expense the new states of Europe have been created have been industrious in proclaiming that these states have not within them the strength of life, that, artificial results of a war which turned out one way and might easily have turned out another, they lack the leaders and the traditions and the experience necessary for success, and must, therefore, shortly disappear; that they are little fitted to withstand the rough usage of the world, to hold together upon the choppy sea of politics. Whether these interested and pessimistic prophecies, generally born of an evident desire that the thing prophesied shall happen, will come true, remains, of course, to be seen. But the five years of history that have rolled by since the war would seem amply to justify a reasonable optimism. The old ordering of Europe in too many cases left untapped rich sources of talent and intelligence and character and good will which the benign and fructifying spirit of independence naturally evokes. The senseless and criminal wasting of precious human capacities in the interest of certain dynasties and privileged classes and racial dominations has without question incalculably impoverished as well as poisoned

the public life of Europe. With the liberation of national and popular energies and aspirations, hitherto cruelly and cunningly repressed, with the achievement of independence rendering possible the realization of a greater dignity of life, a greater self-respect, a livelier sense of usefulness, opportunities will be opened up in various parts of Europe for the emergence and free expression of many a personality which, under the old system, would have been hounded into silence or conspiracy or fruitless opposition. We may confidently expect to see the new states, now in control, for weal or for woe, of their own destinies call forth and utilize the activity of men of originality and power. The school of adversity may have trained leaders who now will know how to guide their peoples safely through the dangers of freedom. What happened in America, in the Revolution and after, may well be repeated in many a European country. Groups of vigorous and able individuals may find careers of large usefulness and honor as citizens of independent nations which otherwise would not have been opened to them. New conditions may call forth new men, some of whom may find niches in their nation's or the world's hall of fame.

The pertinence of these remarks is excellently illustrated in the case of Czecho-Slovakia since 1914. The war that then broke out was intended by its authors permanently to blight, if not to annihilate at once and forever, the dream of the Slavs, and, among them, of the Czecho-Slovaks, for independence. Instead, it realized that dream and, incidentally, in so doing it revealed to the world some very admirable and impressive characters of which it was up to that time supremely ignorant. Foremost among these are Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, first president of the republic and Edward Benes, its first minister of foreign affairs.

Those who are inclined to think lightly or humorously of professors as unconscionable blunderers or dolts in politics, if they are so imprudent as to wander thus far afield, would do well to cast a passing glance at these two new figures on the world's great stage, to compare them with others who have had a different and supposedly more appropriate and promising origin, and possibly to distil a drop or two of wisdom from an examination of their exploits in the domain of public affairs.

It was quite in the tradition of the Czechs to find their leaders in the class of intellectuals. The great national hero is John Huss, priest, philosopher, professor, reformer, a man who was burned on the shores of Lake Constance because he would not

recant his religious beliefs when ordered to do so by the Council of Constance. Probably the next best known son of Bohemia is Comenius, one of the world's most famous educators. The Czech national revival of the nineteenth century, without which the Czechs could not conceivably have achieved their present fortunes, was largely the work of scholars, among whom were Dobrovsky and Jungman and Safarik and Kollar, philologians and archaeologists, and Palacky, " the greatest of Slav historians and the creator of the national consciousness of Bohemia," whose work, according to Gooch, " was not only an achievement in scholarship but a political event, a trumpet call to an oppressed nationality to raise its head and prove itself worthy of its past." Masaryk and Benes are worthy successors in this dynasty of scholars to whom the new nation owes so much.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was born in 1850 of parents so poor that the problem of his education was a very difficult one. After passing through the primary school, he was apprenticed to a blacksmith and worked for some time at that craft. But nothing could long hold him back, so ardent was his desire for knowledge and for the intellectual life. He went through a preparatory school and then entered the University of Vienna where he devoted himself particularly to the study of the classics and the natural sciences; then to the University of Leipsic for work in philosophy. At the age of thirty-two he was appointed to the chair of philosophy at the University of Prague. From this coign of vantage his influence radiated not only throughout Bohemia but throughout the Slavic world in general. Not only the youth of his own country but thousands of young Serbs and Croatians, Bulgarians and Russians, received the instruction and stimulus of this very clear-sighted and very honest scholar and thinker. Masaryk's lecture room was a fruitful nursery of sound and critical thinking, and a powerful generator of fresh moral purpose and energy.

Bohemian philosophy had long felt the influence of German thought. It was now to be given a different turn, as Masaryk, reacting against German speculation, emphasized particularly English philosophy as expressed by Hume and Spencer and Mill, as expressed also in the positivism of Comte. Realistic, scientific in method, insisting that nothing be accepted which has not first been rigorously tested and proved, Masaryk exercised a profound and healthy influence upon a multitude of students. He taught them that the truth must be sought for diligently, must be always held in reverence, that it is the truth that makes

men free. An intense patriotism and a deep love of humanity were not found contradictory or mutually exclusive by this practical philosopher, as they have often been by extreme nationalists and by extreme internationalists.

The problem of the small nations began to interest him and he began to preach that the first duty of a people like the Czechs was the slow and laborious one of developing their culture to the highest point, intellectually, morally and materially. Only thus could they hope to maintain their individuality in the face of an adversary as strong in numbers and in resources as was Germany. Masaryk denounced the old method of nationalist agitation which consisted in extravagantly praising everything Czech, in forever harping upon the glories of the past as in some way ensuring the future. He hated false patriotism and all its manifestations and he was not afraid to tell the truth even when it was disagreeable to his fellow-countrymen. Thus, some time after his arrival in Prague, he challenged the authenticity of certain manuscripts which were generally considered as ancient and glorious national relics, and as proving that the nation had attained a high degree of culture as early as the tenth century, and quite without the aid of foreign influences. In collaboration with some of his colleagues, he was able to prove, by an appeal to philology and to sociological criticism and historical analysis, that the manuscripts were false, and he took occasion to drive home the lesson that the culture and the policy of a nation can never be based upon forgeries. Whereupon, for a time, he became vastly unpopular and his name a term of opprobrium, synonymous with that of traitor, the last of insults which men hurl at each other in their anger. But in the end, this reputation for truth-telling, for downright honesty, served Masaryk well, as it had served Washington before him, and became the source of that vast moral influence which he was destined to exert upon all classes of the Czech population.

In the field of politics, as in that of scholarship, Masaryk waged unrelenting war upon all humbugs, illusions, and meaningless rhetoric. He founded a party which he called the Realist Party and whose motto was "to have no illusions on the real state of things," to look the facts of social and political life straight in the face, to see things as they really were, and not to deal in mere catchwords or phrases. The application of this principle to the study of the national problems and conditions gave great vigor and freshness to his discussion of public matters, whether in his university lectures or in his numerous

books or in his speeches in parliament. He expounded his programme in the Austrian Reichsrat and in a newspaper which he edited. His fame began to spread to other countries when, in the first decade of the new century, he denounced the tortuous and dishonest methods of Austrian policy in regard to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the shady transactions of Austrian diplomacy in its relations with the Serbs.

When the war broke out in 1914 Masaryk, considering its purpose to be the secure and final enthronement of Germanism in Central Europe, the definitive extinction of all the hopes of the Slavic peoples, left Bohemia on a self-imposed mission for his country. He was to return in triumph exactly four years later, acclaimed unanimously as president of his liberated country. Those four years he spent in France, Italy, Switzerland, England, Russia and the United States, arguing for the independence of his native land, establishing personal contacts with important statesmen in the Allied countries, organizing the Czecho-Slovak legions in Russia, whose marvelous efforts in Siberia rivalled the Odyssey and made their new name known the world over, and founding and directing the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris, which served as the spokesman of a people completely surrounded on all sides by its enemies, completely cut off from its friends, and muzzled as thoroughly as any people in Europe.

Such was the man who, by universal acclaim, became President of Czecho-Slovakia when Czecho-Slovakia became independent, a man exceptionally equipped for the position to which he was called. For Masaryk was a man of the widest cultivation, knowing England and Germany from long periods of residence in them and from deep study, thoroughly familiar with the history of French thought and with current French ideas, the author of an important book on *The Spirit of Russia*, a study of the history and philosophy and religion and politics of a country for which he had always felt the liveliest interest, thoroughly conversant with Austro-Hungarian and Balkan problems, and well acquainted with the New World through his marriage to an American lady. Masaryk, as another has said, was, when the crisis of his life came, "better prepared than perhaps any statesman of his time to grapple with the great European problems which the war had raised." [1] Respected for his absolute honesty and sincerity, personifying the highest qualities and ideals of his race, a man of Spartan tastes, indif-

[1] R. W. Seton-Watson, in Temperley, *A History of The Peace Conference of Paris*. Vol. IV, page 353.

ferent, as we have seen, to popularity, he had this additional title to the regard of his countrymen that in 1916 he had been condemned to death *in contumaciam* and that as a method of intimidating him, he being safe abroad, his daughter, Dr. Alice Masaryk, had been imprisoned, and had remained without trial in solitary confinement for nearly a year, only released finally as a consequence of the indignant protests of certain women's societies of America. It is no occasion for surprise that since Czecho-Slovakia has achieved her independence she has named her loftiest mountain peak, and also her university at Brunn, after her first President.

Around this Father of his Country, as Masaryk was considered, had gathered a group of followers and disciples, one of the ablest of whom was the son of a peasant, Edward Benes, formerly a student of Masaryk and subsequently his colleague at the University of Prague. Benes had spent many years studying at the universities of Prague, Paris, Berlin, and London. In 1914 he was a lecturer at his own university and was favorably known in university circles for his knowledge of law and economics and philosophy and sociology. He was thirty years of age, with no reputation in politics, with no ambition, indeed, save that of carrying on the work of Masaryk, within the field of education and letters. But the war launched him upon a very different career. He became Masaryk's right-hand man, collaborating closely with him at every stage. Escaping with difficulty from Bohemia during the war, he settled finally in Paris and became the center of multitudinous activities, the purpose of which was to win over the public opinion and the public men of the Allied countries to the idea of Czecho-Slovak independence and to the conception of a new central Europe free from Germanic control. The war and the subsequent years of peace-making revealed him as a magnetic personality and as the possessor of diplomatic talents of a high order, which talents were shown at the Conference of Paris and in the Council of the League of Nations. In 1918 Benes became the foreign secretary of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and was shortly recognized as one of the straightest thinkers and most constructive minds in the diplomacy of contemporary Europe.

The only other Czech who at the beginning of the republic enjoyed a reputation comparable to that of Masaryk was Dr. Karel Kramar, prime minister of the first cabinet, long recognized as one of the most intelligent and liberal of party leaders, a man hated by the Austrian Government, arrested and im-

prisoned on the charge of treason in 1915, and condemned to death in 1916, a sentence which the government did not dare to execute but which it commuted to fifteen years of penal servitude. Released in 1917 by the operation of the amnesty proclaimed by the new Emperor Charles, Kramar was destined to play an important part at the inception of the new state, although his ministry was to have only a brief existence.

The new republic had need of all the talents it possessed, for the problems confronting it were varied and formidable. Both in foreign policy and in domestic, questions of the most complex character must be answered. Under the leadership of Masaryk and Benes and the men they have gathered around them, these questions have been taken up and solved or carried some distance toward solution. Of primary interest has been the development of the foreign policy of the state. Czecho-Slovakia, with its fourteen million inhabitants, is a rich and well-ordered country, but with potential enemies within and without. Surrounded on three sides by a cordon of German states and with about four million Germans upon her territory and those four million largely concentrated toward the German frontier, her situation is full of danger. A landlocked state, she possesses no seaport and her only way of reaching the sea is over railroads owned by other nations. To be sure, definite rights of access to Hamburg and Stettin and Trieste are assured her by the treaties, but will these rights be sufficient to the needs of her commerce or will the assurance be permanently respected? During the war the Germans had considered a grandiose plan for the organization of Central Europe, and that plan had rested on the control of the Slavs for the advantage of the Germans. But the outcome of the war was very different from that contemplated by the theorists of this high-flying conception. Instead of establishing a wider overlordship over the Slavs of Central Europe, Germany lost even those Slavs who had long formed a part of her Empire. The destinies of Central Europe were henceforth to be in the hands of a restored Poland, a Czecho-Slovakia and a Jugo-Slavia, all Slavic states, and in the hands of their friends, the Western Allies, whose military successes and diplomatic decisions had destroyed the German dream and substituted another for it, namely, the dream of the Slavs themselves. Naturally the Germans of Germany and Austria, and the Magyars of Hungary, close partners in the plan now so unexpectedly and unceremoniously set aside, hated the new

arrangement and would be ready to tear it up at the propitious moment.

The consolidation of the new European order, born of the war and defined by the treaties that ended it, naturally, inevitably, became the basic principle of the foreign policy of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. A child of the Allied victory, the new state could only continue to live if the victors should permanently remain in command of the field. Let the treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain and Trianon be upset and her title deeds and guarantees would disappear and her hold on life would become precarious. Even with all the aid she could get, her situation would be none too comfortable. Blocking for the Germans the alluring pathway to the East, occupying a territory essential to the Central Europe which the Germans had marked out for themselves, Czecho-Slovakia is alike a challenge and a defiance. As the rearrangement of central Europe is the keystone of the new European order, and as Czecho-Slovakia is geographically the very center of the center, it follows that the international relationships of the new republic must present two aspects, one general, the other limited. Within the sphere of general continental politics the closest accord with the great Western Allies, France and England, the strict observance of the treaties, are the objects aimed at by those in charge of the Czecho-Slovak foreign office. Within the more limited sphere of central European politics the preservation of the status quo, that is, of the arrangements sanctioned in that part of the world by the treaties, is the basic purpose. This thought has achieved its most conspicuous expression in the creation of the so-called "Little Entente." By a series of treaties, concluded in 1920 and 1921 under the direction of Benes, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and Roumania have united in an alliance to preserve the peace in central Europe, to secure the maintenance of normal economic conditions and to block all attempts at reaction that may be made of a character to threaten the existence of the new states. Particularly does the Little Entente aim to prevent a restoration of the House of Hapsburg to power. This purpose concerns, particularly, Hungary, as there is little likelihood, owing to conditions, of such a restoration being attempted in Austria, the other part of the former Dual Monarchy. The efficacy of this alliance was proved in the part it played in April, 1921, and in October, 1921, in helping to prevent Charles of Hapsburg from recovering the throne of Hungary.

In forming the Little Entente, the three powers were not only

prompted by the most obvious self-interest, as a restored royal house would inevitably be driven to attempt to recover its lost territories and its lost prestige, but they were acting in conformity with the view expressed by the Paris Conference when it declared on February 2, 1920, that "it is not within the intention nor can it be regarded as the duty of the principal Allied Powers to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungary or to dictate to the Hungarian people what form of government or of constitution they shall adopt; nevertheless, the Powers cannot allow the restoration of the Hapsburg dynasty to be regarded as a question concerning the Hungarian nation alone. They declare, therefore, that a restoration of this nature would be in conflict with the very basis of the peace settlement and would neither be recognized nor tolerated." The Little Entente has indicated that it will regard the restoration of the Hapsburgs to their former thrones as a *casus belli.*

On another point of foreign policy Czecho-Slovakia is equally emphatic. She is absolutely opposed to the union of Austria with Germany. Should this incorporation occur, she, a nation of fourteen million, would find herself nearly surrounded by a nation of sixty-five or seventy million, and would exist on sufferance merely. Moreover, a Germany thus augmented, with Vienna as its second city, and resting on the Danube, would exert a great pressure for the annexation of the three or four millions of Germans in Czecho-Slovakia and, having re-established a direct connection with Hungary, would encourage that state to try to recover its former Slovak territories. Those who are inclined to believe that Germany and Hungary have accepted their defeat and will not seek to tear up the treaties should at least not expect the Czechs, threatened as they are, even now, by the very situation in which they find themselves, to cherish any illusions in regard to peoples whose nature and quality they have had abundant occasions to observe during many painful centuries.

Still another feature in the foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia which the observer, interested in seeing the contemporary world as it is, should not lose sight of, is her opposition to the foundation of a Danubian confederation. Looking with intense suspicion upon all such plans as merely the beginning of a contemplated restoration of the former hated empire and the former oppressor, the House of Hapsburg, she has been and will be found to be steadfast in her opposition to any combination that might, under any name or form, restore the old Austria-Hungary.

Such are certain of the fixed points in the outlook of the Czecho-Slovaks over the international horizon. But while refusing bluntly to consent to any rehabilitation of the odious régime to whose overthrow they have so greatly contributed, while refusing to compromise in any way the independence of their country, which they have achieved at such costs and which they are resolved to maintain, they have frankly recognized the economic interdependence of the "Succession States" and have sought to create a system of agreements with them covering various aspects of economic life such as transportation, ports, telegraphs, exchange of goods, finance and banking, thus hoping gradually to bring about peaceful, normal, regular economic conditions conducive to the stability of the new European order and consequently to the security and prosperity of the republic. But in the conclusion to this end of numerous treaties with their neighbors and with the Allies, the Czecho-Slovaks have made it plain that nothing is to be done which shall restrict or impair the economic and political sovereignty of their state.

Within the sphere of domestic politics much has been achieved since 1918 and much is in course of being achieved. The statesmen of Czecho-Slovakia are engaged in making a modern democratic nation. To accomplish the end they have in mind, they have many problems to solve, the adjustment of racial differences, regional differences, social differences. Czecho-Slovakia, like the former Austro-Hungarian Empire is, as has already been said, a polyglot state. Of the 14,000,000 inhabitants, thirty-five per cent. are of different races and speak different languages than the Czechs and Slovaks. There are about three million Germans in Bohemia and Moravia, about 750,000 Magyars in Slovakia, and about 460,000 Ruthenians or Little Russians in the eastern tip of the country, under the Carpathians. Whether these racial and linguistic minorities will co-operate harmoniously with the Czechs and Slovaks in the development of the country or whether they will be centers of irredentism, sources of obstruction, advocates of secession; whether they will inflame and poison the political and social life of the commonwealth, or whether these hardy and traditional passions will gradually subside remains, of course, the secret of the future. It is well not to be unduly optimistic. In Europe the fusion of races that have countless bitter memories, and countless grudges to repay, presents no such easy problem as Americans, who have happily been spared much of the misery of history, are apt to think. Certain it is that the German deputies to the Czecho-Slovak parliament on one occasion in 1920

struck up the *Watch on the Rhine* and *Deutschland über Alles* and then quit the hall, as an expression of their discontent. The Germans and the Magyars of Czecho-Slovakia will have the support, at least moral, of their brothers in Germany and Hungary.

However, there are forces of a better augury active in the state. Economic interests tend to hold the Germans and the Czechs of Bohemia together, and while the world ought to know by this time that economic motives are not the most powerful in determining men's conduct, that men will often willingly sacrifice obvious economic advantages in order to realize such ideals as liberty and independence, still in normal times the cohesive effects of material needs require no proof. Also just treatment of minorities by majorities may tend in the same direction and the future may see, what the past has seen only too infrequently, the fading of racial animosities.

There are not only differences of race to be adjusted in this new republic, but there are also marked regional differences which may or may not become sources of misunderstanding, irritation, and friction. The different sections are unevenly developed both from the point of view of education and of material prosperity. In Bohemia and Moravia the standard of education is high and there are very few illiterates. This devotion to education is entirely in the traditions of the former kingdom of Bohemia, with its great heroes, Huss and Comenius, leaders of the highest intellectual and moral distinction. On the other hand in Slovakia the situation is deplorable. Of the subject nationalities of Hungary none were more grossly or systematically misruled than the Slovaks. It was the intention and the policy of the ruling Magyars to keep them undeveloped in order to keep them weak and powerless, and the process of Magyarization was carried out among them with relentlessness. For forty years before the independence of Czecho-Slovakia, there had not been in Slovakia a single secondary school using the Slovak language. The Magyars would allow Magyar schools which might carry on the work of Magyarization but not schools conducted in the language of the people. They followed a deliberate and heinous policy of stunting two and a half million human beings in their development. Not only were the Slovaks given no secondary schools by the state, they were even forbidden to found private schools of their own.[1] The number even of their primary schools

[1] For further information on the Magyar methods in Slovakia see R. W. Seton-Watson, *Racial Problems in Hungary* (1908) and Ernest Denis, *Les Slovaques* (1917).

was reduced from 1921 in 1869 to 429 in 1909. The natural result of such oppression was a backward and ignorant population, high illiteracy, poverty so great and an outlook so hopeless that thousands and tens of thousands of Slovaks were driven to emigrate to the United States. The Ruthenian provinces, to the east of Slovakia, and constituting the extreme tip of the republic, were still worse off, being on a level with Russia in backwardness, illiteracy there rising as high as seventy-five per cent.

How, out of a country of such various cultural levels, to make a nation that shall feel and think along similar and harmonious lines is one of the problems challenging Czecho-Slovak statesmanship. A promising beginning has been made. Between 1918 and 1921 the Government established some 2,000 additional primary schools and forty or more high schools, so that it is only a question of time before a great improvement will be achieved in this domain.

Another question, raised into high relief by the revolution of 1918, was that of land reform, a reform long recognized as desirable both from a social and economic point of view. It was now seen to be a possible reform. Immense landed estates belonged to an infinitesimal proportion of the population, perhaps to a tenth of one per cent., while large numbers of people did not own a single acre of their native land. "The great majority of the landlords," says President Masaryk "were nobles of foreign origin who acquired their estates at the hands of the Hapsburg conqueror from 1621 onwards, when, after the battle of the White Mountain, the lands of the Czech nobles and yeomen were confiscated, the owners being executed or, as adherent of the Moravian Brotherhood and other Protestant churches, preferring to pass into exile rather than surrender their faith. The demand for the nationalization of the great landed estates was thus not only supported as a social and economic necessity, in order to provide the landless population, notably the legionaries, with land, but was, deep in the minds of the people, regarded as a legal rectification of the wrongs suffered through the confiscations which followed the defeat of the White Mountain."

That the demand for agrarian reform was widespread and emphatic is shown by the fact that a law sequestering the great estates was passed unanimously by the National Assembly on April 16, 1919. This law gives the state the right to seize and distribute estates larger than 370 acres in the case of noble land or 600 acres in the case of other land. This land is not confis-

cated but is paid for by the state, according to certain standards laid down by the law. For the work of buying and selling the land, a State Land Office has been established. The land is in general to be divided into small farms of about 37 acres, an amount considered suitable for cultivation by a single family. This land is to be paid for by the new proprietor, though means of gradual payment have been instituted so liberal that persons with very slight means can practically acquire holdings, paying only a tenth of the value down and being given credit for the remainder. The object of the law is the division of land among peasant proprietors. The process was to begin with the acquisition by the state of the very large estates containing 12,350 acres or more.

Much other legislation of a social and economic nature has been passed since the revolution of 1918, laws establishing the eight hour day for those engaged in industry and agriculture (with certain exceptions), laws enlarging the scope of the accident and sickness insurance system and increasing the payments to the insured, sickness insurance being made to include maternity insurance, laws securing pensions to the widows and orphans of the insured, laws concerning the housing problem and also encouraging building operations by means of state aid, laws concerning unemployment, employment of ex-soldiers, the regulation of "sweating" industries, and finally laws for the construction of necessary highways, railroads and canals.

Of all the states that have inherited all or part of their territory from the late Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Czecho-Slovakia is from the economic point of view the richest and most progressive. Her activity, about equally divided between industry and agriculture, had made her the most prosperous of the Austrian lands. This prosperity rests upon two factors, important natural resources and a population which is hard-working and intelligent. Prague and Pilsen rank among the great industrial cities of Europe. In certain branches of industry Czecho-Slovakia stands high, as, for instance, in the production of sugar and glass. She is the second largest beet sugar producer in the world and the only state in Europe which can export sugar. Her glass has been famous since the fifteenth century. Paper and porcelain, leather goods and chemicals, beers and wines are among her characteristic products and the metal and textile trades have been extensively developed. Czecho-Slovakia possesses coal and iron, though not enough for her needs. Her foreign trade is increasing with the natural though slow

movement back toward normal conditions of labor and industry and with the conclusion of commercial treaties with other powers. As a land-locked country she can only reach the markets of the world by sending her commodities over railways and rivers which belong to other nations. But under the peace treaties she possesses the right of transit and she has secured docks and warehouses of her own in Hamburg. How smoothly such arrangements will work or how many impediments may be thrown in the way of their free development remains to be seen.

The geographical position of Czecho-Slovakia, the very center of Europe, is favorable to her serving as intermediary between the East and the West of the continent. The character of her economic system makes it certain that she will be a great exporter. Her business relations will probably be closest with her immediate neighbors, Germany on the one hand, and Hungary, Bulgaria, Jugo-Slavia, and perhaps ultimately Russia, on the other.

Czecho-Slovakia is a country which has a distinguished background in the history of letters and the arts, and in moral and religious movements, some of which have reached far beyond its borders. In the course of the centuries, the country has been embellished with the creations of architecture and painting and sculpture. Prague is from this point of view one of the most interesting capitals of Europe. Music may properly be called a national art, an old tradition among both Czechs and Slovaks, a popular art in the literal sense of the word, expressing a people's soul and a people's aspirations. It was noticed during the World War that the population flocked not only to the theater but to the concert halls as to temples where their patriotic fervor, their hope of a future freed from foreign oppression, would receive inspiration and exaltation. The names of Smetana and Dvorak, the composers, of Kubelik, the executant, are widely known abroad. It is reasonable to expect a richer efflorescence of the arts now that national liberty has been achieved.

In other domains this new country has its traditions in the past of those peoples which are now its constituent elements. In education it has a long record of devotion, as has been already indicated, a record which gives every assurance of continuing with the founding by the Republic of two new universities, the Masaryk University at Brunn, and the Comenius University at Bratislava, the new baptismal appellation of what was formerly known to students of history as Pressburg.

In religion there is great diversity of allegiance. Before the Thirty Years War about 90 per cent. of the Bohemians were

Protestants. As a result of that war and the loss of independence and of the Counter-Reformation the situation was reversed and about 90 per cent. of the population became Catholic. A great deal of the spirit of John Huss, however, has always been present in the Bohemian people for whom he has ever remained the national hero despite the fact that he was burned at Constance as a heretic. Even before the revolution of 1918, there had been in Bohemia a certain movement of revolt summarized in the cry "Away from Rome," a movement which resulted in some increase of the ranks of free-thinkers and Protestants. According to President Masaryk about 1,000,000 persons left the Roman Catholic Church between 1918 and 1921. Many of these became free-thinkers but a considerable number proceeded to found what they called a national Czecho-Slovak Church. Many priests demanded changes in the church, such as abolition of celibacy, the use of the vernacular in church services, and a more democratic administration of church affairs. Upon the Pope's refusal to meet these demands, the dissatisfied elements seceded and in January, 1920, founded the Czecho-Slovak Church, which has about 120 churches and over half a million members.

There are in Czecho-Slovakia, beside the Catholics who are in the overwhelming majority, about a million Protestants, and half a million adherents of the Greek Church. The Jews number about 350,000, too few to create a problem such as that which exists in other countries of Eastern Europe.

CHAPTER XL

THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

The reappearance of Poland at the Conference of Paris as a sovereign state was one of the most impressive and spirit-stirring events of our age or, for that matter, of any age. A nation which had had a great and memorable history and which had then undergone vivisection at the hands of its neighbors came to life again and found once more a local habitation and a name. The partitions of Poland had long been considered the classic adventure in international crime of the eighteenth century, ranking with the seizure of Silesia in the coolness of its villainy and greatly eclipsing it in the magnitude of the operation. The second or third largest state in Europe was completely effaced from the map and where one sought its name, one found only the names of Prussia, Russia, and Austria. Whatever consecration time can give to successful wrong was bestowed upon this famous rape, and those who had performed it went their prosperous way, rejoicing, quite free from any weak qualms of conscience, and not seriously disturbed by the reappearance from time to time of the ghost of murdered Poland. The soul of Poland might still exist but it was tightly imprisoned on all sides.

The declaration of war in August, 1914, opened up for the Poles a gloomy and agonizing prospect. After a century and more of grievous oppression, they saw themselves herded together in the ranks of the German, Austrian, and Russian armies, about to be hurled against each other in fratricidal strife, brother pitted against brother, and both against their mother country. There followed four years of varied horror; the state of siege with all its vexations and cruelties toward those suspected of not being loyal to their oppressors, and who should not be so suspected? four years of invasion and counter-invasion, of armies moving back and forth and systematically ravaging or robbing as they moved; four years of terrible isolation from all friends, of ignorance of what was going on in the world, an ignorance only diversified by the lying or embroidered accounts of Austrian or German news agencies, relieved very infrequently by a little

precise information from some person who had miraculously managed to get out of the country and then back again, and who was able to report things not to the liking of the Austrian and German general staffs.

What hope was there for the Poles in such a war? In whatever direction they might turn, what could they see but continued subjection to others? If the Central Powers should win, Russia might be compelled to give up her Poles, but who would get them, if not the Austrians and Germans? If Austria and Germany should lose, would not the outcome be merely the reverse, subjection to Russia instead of to Austria and Germany? To be sure, throughout the war, the one side or the other tried, as its fortunes waned or waxed for the moment, to lure the Poles to hearty co-operation against its enemies by promising them a restored and united Poland in the end, but the promises were always specious, always qualified by some ambiguity or reservation that rendered them null, or nearly so, in the eyes of the Poles, whose experience in the past with the triple band of oppressors did not lead them to repose an unlimited confidence in them now. The burnt child fears the fire and fearfully keeps at a safe distance from its dangerous and deceptive warmth.

The only hope for the Poles in the war was that both sides, Russia on the one hand, and Germany and Austria on the other, should come out of it defeated. And such a hope could not reasonably be entertained, so preposterous it seemed. Nevertheless, the preposterous happened. Russia was defeated by the Central Powers and compelled to sign the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Central Powers were defeated by the Allies and compelled to sign the Versailles and other treaties. The ground was cleared for a new structure, and one more substantial and more comfortable for its occupants than that whose uncertain and shadowy plans had, during the war, been dangled before them by their oppressors.

Long before the opening of the Conference of Paris the problem of Poland had been envisaged from a very different angle than that of the partitioning powers. As early as May, 1917, the attitude of the Poles themselves was defined by the Polish members of the Austrian Parliament who declared that "the desire of the Polish nation was to have restored an independent and united Poland with access to the sea." More important, because having more force behind it, was the opinion of the Entente Powers, whose education in this matter, as in others, had been backward but was now beginning to catch up with the

possibilities and requirements of the situation. On January 5, 1918, Lloyd George, stating that he was speaking "for the nation and the Empire as a whole" declared that "an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe." This was putting the project on high and permanent grounds. An independent Polish nation was declared necessary not only because the Poles themselves might desire it but because it was essential to the stability of Western Europe, that is, because it would be of direct benefit to England and France and Italy and other states, as well as to the Poles. Three days later, on January 8, 1918, President Wilson expressed practically the same thought when, in the thirteenth of his fourteen points which must be secured in order that this world "be made fit and safe to live in," he said: "An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant."

Thus, before the Conference of Paris met, the existence of a restored Poland was recognized by the victors who gave to Poland two votes in the Conference itself, as they gave two to Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Greece, and others.

But the Polish problem was not solved by these and other similar pronouncements; it was merely stated as a problem which ought to be solved in conformity with certain fundamental principles. It was the business of the Conference to apply those principles in detail to the actual facts of the situation, to determine just what was an "indisputably Polish population," what precise territories included it, and what exactly would constitute "a free and secure access to the sea." If Poland was to be restored, and all the Allies were agreed that she was to be, what was Poland anyway? She was already recognized as an independent state in the Conference of Paris, casting two votes on occasion, but she was a state without boundaries; evidently no seemly or safe condition for any state, young or old, to be in. This was a matter that must be attended to at once.

A most perplexing matter it was and one that was to drag distressingly and to be settled to no one's satisfaction; one, indeed, that was settled only piece by piece. A beginning was made in the Treaty of Versailles, which defined the boundary on the side of Germany; which, in other words, decided what terri-

tories Germany should give up to the new state. This was the most important aspect of the whole subject, although it was only one aspect. Into the details of the long argument and the complicated, involved decision we cannot enter here. Suffice it to say that Poland received the larger part of Posen and a part of the province of West Prussia. Most of East Prussia was to remain German but in two sections plebiscites were to be held in order to determine the wishes of the people, in the Marienwerder and the Allenstein districts. The access to the sea was provided for by the famous "corridor," a comparatively narrow strip of territory indisputably Polish in population. This arrangement has been denounced by the critics of the Treaty of Versailles on the ground that this corridor cuts off Germany from the province of East Prussia, largely left to her, and that this is something the Germans can never be expected permanently to endure. The wisdom and justice of the decision have been succinctly and convincingly presented by an authority on Polish history, as follows: "Certainly it would be an undesirable arrangement if there were any just way of avoiding it. But it may be remarked, in the first place, that this is the only solution of the problem that corresponds to the ethnographic situation, to the unhappy way in which Germans and Poles have come to be distributed here as the result of centuries of conflict. This solution merely restores the territorial situation that existed for three hundred years down to the time of the First Partition. Moreover, the continuity of German territory cannot be maintained without denying Poland access to the sea. Either East Prussia will have to trade with Germany across Polish territory or Poland will have to trade with the outside world across German territory. It is a question of balancing the respective interests at stake. And who will argue that the right of the million and a half Germans in East Prussia to have a land connection with Germany (they will always have an easy communication by sea) outweighs the right of over twenty million Poles in the hinterland to a secure access to the Baltic? Clearly the Polish interest involved is incomparably the greater and ought to take precedence. Every effort has been made in the Peace Treaty to assure untrammeled railway and trade communications between Germany and East Prussia across the intervening Polish territory. Further than that it seems unnecessary to go to secure the interests of the rather small, detached German colony around Königsberg."[1]

[1] Lord, in Haskins and Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, pages 179–180.

But the control of the corridor to the sea would be of slight advantage without control of its natural terminus, the port of Danzig. Danzig is the end of the corridor, the port of entry, the port of exit, for the Vistula, the great river of Poland. Danzig had belonged to the former Polish republic and had greatly prospered as all the ocean commerce of the country had passed through its harbor. Prussia acquired it in 1793 in the Second Partition. Very prosperous and contented under Polish rule, Danzig largely lost its prosperity under the Germans. The Poles, because they regarded the city as rightfully theirs and also because it was their only possible outlet to the sea, expected that it would be included in the new state. That it was not was owing to the opposition of Lloyd George, with whom President Wilson was persuaded to agree, Clemenceau acquiescing, though unwillingly. The reason given for not doing the obvious thing was that Danzig and the region round about, with a population of about 300,000, was overwhelmingly German in stock and speech and sympathy, that it was undesirable to incorporate in Poland so large a body of persons who would necessarily be a discontented and therefore a weakening element in the state. The reason is not impressive coming from men who lapsed easily from the principle here involved in their settlement of other questions that came before them. Three hundred thousand Germans of the Austrian Tyrol were handed over to Italy on strategic grounds and three million to Czecho-Slovakia on historic grounds. The same arguments might have been applied to Danzig with greater force from the point of view of Polish national defense and with equal force from that of historic right.

The Conference of Paris, instead, saw fit to make a most complicated and artificial arrangement. It took Danzig from Germany but did not give it to Poland. It provided that it should be made a Free City or State under the protection of the League of Nations and with close connections with Poland. It promised that the Allied Powers should negotiate a treaty between the Free City and the Republic of Poland whereby the latter should include the former within its customs barriers, whereby a part of the port should be constituted a "free zone," and whereby also Poland should have the free and unrestricted use of the docks and quays necessary for the free movement of exports and imports. Poland is to have charge of the foreign affairs of the Free City as well as of the protection of its citizens abroad. Poland is assured the control of the railways, post

offices, telegraph and telephone systems that connect her with Danzig. The executive of the Free City is a High Commissioner appointed by the League of Nations. A diplomatic representative of the Polish Government stationed at Danzig acts as intermediary between the Republic and the Free City.

Thus the three hundred thousand people in this zone of 1800 square kilometers are subject to three governments, to their own in some respects, to the Polish in certain others, and in still others, to the League of Nations, representing some fifty states. It would not be easy to organize a system that would expose more surfaces to friction, and it need occasion no surprise that serious friction has already occurred. The High Commissioners thus far appointed by the League of Nations have been Englishmen. In 1920, when the Russians invaded Poland and came within twelve miles of Warsaw, the precariousness of Poland's famous "access to the sea" and the dangers to her national safety that lay in these complicated arrangements were abundantly established, the fragility of paper guarantees in the practical exigencies of life again amply demonstrated. The course of that campaign, so critical for the Poles, brought into harsh light the importance of the "question of Danzig." The Poles, could they or could they not use the port which the Treaty of Versailles had placed at their disposal? For six critical weeks in July and August, 1920, they could not. The dockers of the port refused to unload an English boat carrying munitions for Poland. The Poles replied by cutting off food supplies which were on their way to Danzig. The fear of famine generated troubles. A mob of 20,000 persons went to the palace of the High Commissioner and began to smash in its doors when the Prussian police arrived and re-established order with machine guns. There were several kill and wounded. German workmen, armed with clubs and knives, started a mad hunt for Poles. Some time later the Danzig laborers permitted British soldiers to unload the munitions, which reached their destination, not, to be sure, when the need was greatest, but in the fulness of time.

This was hardly the unrestricted enjoyment, the free use of a port. All through the year, in fact, there was almost constant wrangling between the German and Polish elements in the Free City, much contention between the Free City and Poland, and frequent appeals were taken by one or both from the decisions of the High Commissioner to the supreme authority, the Council of the League of Nations.

Whether the relations between the various elements of this

complex construction will with the lapse of time become smooth and normal; whether economic advantage will make its influence felt in reconciling the Danzigers with the Poles, since the fact is that if Danzig is necessary to Poland, Poland is likewise necessary to Danzig; whether the magic touch of mutual and reciprocal self-interest will suffice to make an artificial and involved arrangement work practically in a reasonably orderly and beneficent way remains to be seen. It can only be said that the experiment thus far has not been of a character to inspire excessive optimism.

In another section of former Prussia, it was provided by the Treaty of Versailles that the new boundary line should be drawn only after a consultation of the people concerned, namely, in Upper Silesia. That the majority of population there was Polish-speaking was indisputable. The proportion of Poles to Germans was 65% to 35% for the region as a whole. But did speech indicate preference? And even if it did was that the only thing to be taken into account?

So strong was the claim of Poland that the Peace Conference originally decided to grant Upper Silesia to her outright, but toward the end of its sessions, under the influence of the vigorous German protests and the criticism of the British Labor Party, Lloyd George succeeded in reopening the matter and in effecting a different arrangement. Upper Silesia was a most important mining and industrial section of Germany. It had produced, before the war, a fourth of Germany's coal, more than 42,000,000 tons a year. It was rich in lead and zinc. The prospect of losing so valuable a territory aroused the Germans to bitter protest, and it was finally decided that the people of Upper Silesia should express their wishes and that after they had done so, the principal Allied and Associated Powers should draw the boundary line, taking into account not only the showing of the plebiscite but the geographical and economic conditions of the region as well.

By this decision the Conference precipitated a long and stormy struggle which lasted over two years, which inflamed the passions of Poles and Germans to fever heat, which led to warlike acts within the fated area itself, and which incidentally strained the relations of the Allied Powers among themselves almost to the snapping-point. Into the multitudinous and most exciting details of this chapter of contemporary history, it is quite impossible to enter here. On several occasions it seemed as if war might again break out over the application of this supposed pacific method of adjusting differences. The plebiscite, when it

was finally held on March 20, 1921, resulted in a total of 717,000 votes for Germany to 483,000 for Poland. In 664 districts there was a German majority, in 597 a Polish. It was for the Allies to draw the line in view of all the relevant facts, but the Allies could not agree. Indeed, the relations of France and England, the former favoring the Poles, the latter the Germans, became so tense as to threaten a rupture. Unable to come to a decision themselves, the Allied Powers finally referred the matter to the Council of the League of Nations, agreeing to accept its decision. In October, 1921, the Council rendered its decision, which was to divide the industrial region between Germany and Poland, and it drew the frontier accordingly. But, the Council declared that, "owing to the geographical distribution of the population and the mixture of the racial elements, any division of this destrict must inevitably result in leaving relatively large minorities on both sides of the line and in separating important interests." As this industrial region had long been a unit it would be desirable to provide for the continuance of its normal economic life for a period of years. Thus an abrupt cutting of economic connections could be avoided and the necessary readjustments could be made gradually. The Council, therefore, recommended that a general convention be concluded to this end between Germany and Poland, covering such matters as railways, water and electric power, postal service, coal and mine products, employees' and workers' federations, social insurance, and freedom of movement between the respective zones, and the protection of racial minorities. During the provisional period, which was to last fifteen years, Upper Silesia should be under a special régime. To superintend the execution of these provisional arrangements, a Mixed Commission was to be set up, composed of an equal number of Germans and Poles with a president of some other nationality, to be designated by the Council of the League of Nations. These recommendations have since been incorporated in an elaborate agreement worked out between Germany and Poland.

The region whose status has thus been determined, after much discussion and contention, covers about 4000 square miles and had a population in 1919 of a little over 2,000,000. Its importance is due, as has been said, to its rich coal and zinc mines and to its highly developed iron and steel industries. The decision of the Council of the League of Nations, which was formally ratified by the Allies, gives to Poland about 1,300 square miles, less than a third of the total area, but this zone includes 47 per

cent. of the population, three-fourths of the coal production, all of the zinc mines and works, practically all of the iron mines, and half of the capacity of the steel industries.

Before the war the mines in Upper Silesia, which are now allotted to Poland, produced about 32,000,000 tons of coal, those now allotted to Germany about 10,000,000 tons. Germany produced in 1913, leaving out of account Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar Basin, 174,000,000 tons, of which the area now assigned to Poland produced about 19 per cent. As the pre-war production in the territory of Poland, outside of Upper Silesia, was about 9,000,000 tons, the production of Poland will be increased between three and four times. As her pre-war consumption was about 18,000,000, it is evident that Poland may, for some time, be a coal-exporting country, until at least her own industrial life is much more developed than it is at present.

The decision, then, allots to Poland decidedly more of the mineral wealth and manufacturing industries of Upper Silesia than it allots to Germany. Germany, however, retains more than two-thirds of the territory and much the larger amount of agricultural and forest land.

The Upper Silesian plebiscite was the last of those ordered by the conference of Paris for the purpose of aiding in the determination of the boundaries of the future Germany. Meanwhile, the plebiscites required in the districts of Marienwerder on the Vistula and of Allenstein or Mazuria had resulted in favor of Germany. The population in those districts, while Polish in speech, was Protestant in religion and had never felt the spell of the Polish nationalist movement.

By the series of decisions which have thus been described, the western boundary of the new Republic of Poland was defined, the boundary, that is, between Poland and Germany. But this was only a part of the problem. The southern and eastern boundaries also presented problems of some difficulty and required much time for settlement.

Upper Silesia had not, for six or seven centuries, been a part of Poland, but south of the Carpathian Mountains there was a large Austrian province, Galicia, which had belonged to the Polish kingdom and which had constituted Austria's part of the booty of the three partitions. The collapse of Austria, in 1918, resulted in setting this district adrift. But what its future status should be was not entirely obvious or simple. The western part of the province was overwhelmingly Polish in race but the eastern part presented a mixture of peoples, Poles, Ruthenians and Jews. Here

the Poles represent only 27% of the population but they have always been the dominant class. Their rule has latterly been resented, but ineffectually, by the Ruthenians, who constitute 59% of the total population. The Ruthenians are of the same race as the Little Russians or, to use a term that has become current during recent years, the Ukrainians. For many centuries the Poles and Ruthenians lived peaceably together but the development of the sense of nationalism in the nineteenth century ultimately touched this corner of the world as it touched and transformed so many others. The ground was not very favorable for the new seed, since the Ruthenians were nearly all poor and ignorant peasants, with only a small educated class of professional men, too small to furnish adequate leadership. Nevertheless, the anti-Polish feeling of the Ruthenians grew, greatly favored by the Austrian government, true to its traditional policy of stirring up the races under its rule against each other so that the one might neutralize the other and none be strong enough to prevail. The Germans, too, stimulated by devious processes the growth of the Ukrainian movement as a way of annoying and possibly menacing both Russia and Austria.

This Ruthenian nationalism, partly natural, partly artificial in origin, had not developed sufficient coherence or sufficient clearness of aim to be in a position to act effectively at that moment of unusual liquidation and rearrangement which was furnished by the end of the war. Although the Ruthenians only numbered about three and a half million, they were divided into two parties, one wishing the creation of an independent Ukrainian nation, the other some kind of a union with Russia, though not until after Russia had purged herself of Bolshevism.

For some time after 1918 a confused and sanguinary struggle unrolled itself in Eastern Galicia, a region that had been fought over during four years by Russians and Austrians, and terribly devastated. There now followed more fighting and more devastation, this time at the hands of Poles and Ukrainians. The Peace Conference intervened only to show its powerlessness. The Poles had no intention of losing so large a province and insisted upon its complete incorporation within the Republic of Poland. In the end, after much pulling and hauling with the Allies, they practically achieved their purpose. Galicia will form an integral part of the Polish state.

We have not yet exhausted the difficulties encountered by resurrected Poland in the initial and necessary work of getting her boundaries defined. We have discussed the problems

presented in the west and south. In the east, also, there were complications. Where should the boundary line between Poland and Russia be fixed? After the revolution of March, 1917, resulting in the overthrow of Nicholas II, the Provisional Government of Russia under Prince Lvov recognized the principle of "an independent Polish state including all regions with an indisputable Polish ethnic majority." But the distressing fact is that here as in many other parts of Europe ethnography speaks with a dubious voice, in most uncertain tones. There are large debatable zones in which there are no "indisputable" ethnic majorities and yet such regions must be placed somewhere, either on the one side or on the other of the projected frontier.

The eastern boundary of Poland was still more difficult to draw because Russia was not a member of the Conference of Paris, because the Allies were not at war with her, and because they had no right and no desire to dispose of her territory without her consent. Moreover, they had no diplomatic relations with her and, therefore, negotiations were impracticable. Yet the question was one which did not admit of indefinite postponement. Consequently the Conference in December, 1919, drew a provisional eastern boundary for Poland. This, the so-called "Curzon line" the Poles refused to accept, as sacrificing too much, and by later direct negotiations with the Soviet Government they were able to secure a line much farther east and consequently giving them a much larger territory (Treaty of Riga, signed March 18, 1921).

Thus it was not until nearly three years after the independence of Poland had been solemnly proclaimed, on November 9, 1918, that her boundaries were definitely defined, nor were they even then entirely defined, for the line between Poland and the new state of Lithuania was still uncertain. Here contention centered particularly about the city of Vilna, and gave rise in time to an ineffectual attempt at mediation by the League of Nations. In April, 1923, the Council of Allied Ambassadors finally recognized the *fait accompli* and definitely assigned Vilna to Poland. Thus ended the long and difficult process of establishing the frontiers of the resurrected republic.

This decision concerning Vilna prompted the Lithuanians to an act of imitation. They seized by force the important port of Memel, placed by the Treaty of Versailles at the disposition of the Allies. As year after year had gone by with no determination by the latter as to its future status the Lithuanians resolved to precipitate a decision. Their action in settling the question by

force ultimately received the sanction of the Council of Ambassadors, a sanction enveloped in phrases designed to save the face of the latter body, whose power and pretentions had been so nonchalantly flouted.

The new Poland, one of the notable by-products of the World War, has within it the potentiality of becoming, under favoring conditions, almost a Great Power. In area it is the sixth state of contemporary Europe and covers about 150,000 square miles. Only Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Spain are larger in territory. Poland's population, as shown by the first census (1921) taken since independence was achieved, exceeds 27,000,000, placing her fifth among the states of the Continent, outranking Spain. Her natural resources are rich and varied. Her forests are extensive and her soil naturally fertile. Important deposits of coal and oil, of zinc and lead, of salt and potash render possible a large industrial development, which, indeed, had successfully begun under Russian and Prussian rule. Warsaw in 1921 had a population of over 900,000 and Lodz, the chief manufacturing center, of nearly half a million. Animated by the stirring and poignant memories of a great and tragic past, stubborn and unshaken in devotion to the national ideals, Poland has awakened from the long period of subjection and, elate with the newly acquired freedom and independence, presses forward with eagerness and hopefulness to her new destinies, whatever they may be. A self-reliant, hardy, energetic people, long tempered in the hot furnace of adversity and misfortune, tough in fiber and resolute in purpose, the Poles are well aware that not all the perils have been avoided, and are conscious of the opportunity that has come to them, after incredible vicissitudes of fortune, to attain a healthier national life than they have ever known, if only they themselves reveal sufficient intelligence and character, a sufficiently true and accurate sense of measure and reality.

But more will be needed for the preservation and development of restored Poland than the mind and soul of her own people can furnish, for the difficulties and dangers, within and without, that menace the future, are numerous and grave. Called into renewed existence by the victory of the Allies, that existence will be threatened by anything that may undermine the harmony of the Allies in their determination to preserve the new European order which their victory has brought forth and which is embodied in the various treaties. Created at the expense of Germany and Russia and Austria, out of territories long ruled by them, Poland

has, in those three powers, the possible and even probable enemies of the future. The enmity of Austria may be disregarded because of the utter collapse and impotence of that state. But a reorganized and ambitious Russia would constitute a formidable danger toward the east, and Germany, it may be affirmed with practical certitude, is and will remain the sworn enemy of Poland, hating her very existence, and resolved, when conditions favor, to end it. Should either neighbor attack her, or more serious still, should both combine to repeat in the twentieth century the notorious achievement of the eighteenth and to effect a new partition, Poland's independence could only be safeguarded by her sponsors of Versailles, chiefly France and England, or by other factors in an international situation which she would herself not be in a position to control. The viability of Poland, like that of the other states of central Europe which have issued fresh or greatly remodeled from the peace deliberations of Paris and its suburbs, will long be more or less precarious, dependent upon circumstances, not all of which can be foreseen. Something more than the vigilance and wisdom of her rulers will be required if she is successfully to surmount the dangers that environ her from her geographical position and the animosities which have thus far dogged her footsteps and which inhere in her very situation.

There are complications, also, of an internal nature, which throw many a shadow before her. One of these is the difficulty of welding together into a firm and homogeneous unity three very dissimilar sections, each of which has had a different history and been long subjected to different formative influences, each of which had left a distinct trace behind. Before the war there had been three Polands, Russian Poland, the largest, with Warsaw as its center, Austrian Poland, or Galicia, with its capital at Cracow, and Prussian Poland, revolving about the city of Posen. Each section had lived under a different régime for well over a hundred years and the impress of so long a period could not fail to be profound. The laws, the institutions, the economic conditions, the policies of each of the three partitioning powers had differed, and the three groups of the same family had lived a different life. The result was a more or less different mentality and outlook and competence characterizing each group. Uniting the three branches of this distracted and unhappy family was the powerful, unconquerable sense of nationality which transcended frontiers, the ever-present consciousness of a glorious past and of a hateful present, the spell of a history that could not

be forgotten, the intangible, indestructible cement of a common patriotism. But, nevertheless, the three sections were unlike socially, politically, economically. German Poland was the most prosperous and progressive. The Poles of Austria had enjoyed a greater measure of political power, and had, therefore, had a greater opportunity for a certain education in the arts of government and administration. The Poles of Russia represented on the whole a lower stage of development, having been associated with a less intelligent, a more backward society.

The leaders of the new Poland, therefore, were confronted with the preliminary and formidable task of fusing into a single body of citizens three great aggregations of people whose bondage to three masters had made three peoples standing on different planes of development, more or less lacking in comprehension of each other, unaccustomed, necessarily, to team-work since that was the fundamental consequence of their having been imprisoned into three compartments as nearly hermetically sealed against each other as the fear and the ingenuity of the three oppressors could contrive. The three Polands lived side by side but were more or less strangers to each other. Such was the essential meaning of their fate, of their having been divided into three troops of captives subject to other wills than their own, of their hard, involuntary servitude. An incidental and important consequence of this state of affairs was that the natural leaders of the three fragments of this disrupted family knew each other imperfectly, had had no training in co-operation and no responsibility in the conduct of affairs. Only in Galicia had the Poles possessed a certain automony, only there had they had a certain political training. The education which the Poles had not been able to secure in bondage they must secure in freedom, at a moment of unparalleled difficulty, a moment filled with imperative and distracting problems of every kind, all clamoring for immediate solution. The Poles must, from the nature of the case, learn the baffling art of statesmanship in the hard school of experience, at the very moment when they were engaged in the most exacting of all enterprises, the creation of a state. But they came to their task with the exhilaration of men freed at last from degrading servitude and for whom the doors of opportunity had finally been flung wide open.

Everything had to be created quickly. The state itself, the army, the educational system, systems of taxation, of law, of administration, measures of relief for a people that had suffered desperately from the war, all must be improvised, and improvisa-

tion means haste and waste. The vast work of reconstruction must be begun forthwith by a people that was utterly impoverished, whose fields had been ravaged, whose industries had been destroyed, whose tools and machines had been stolen or wrecked, whose factories had in many cases been burned or blown up by the Germans, whose railroads and highways had gone, for long stretches, to wrack and ruin. How to build a habitable home for the new nation when most of the means were lacking, how to restore the agencies of an ordered and efficient economic and social life in a land whose people were very poor and very hungry, that was the problem. Making bricks without straw is easy by comparison.

But the Poles went at it undismayed. The clearing away of the colossal wreckage, the building up of the new social fabric would require years and years, but the labor was begun on the morrow of the armistice.

Poland's independence was proclaimed on November 9, 1918, the day when the thrones of Germany were falling " in cascades." Five days later General Joseph Pilsudski, freed from the Magdeburg prison where he had been confined for more than fifteen months, assumed, in response to the practically unanimous voice of the Polish nation, the leadership in the state and immediately convoked a Constituent Assembly which confirmed him in his office. Though quite unknown outside of Poland, Pilsudski was known to every Pole and was regarded as the natural and predestined chief, the first President of the Republic of Poland. This was not the first time, as, for instance, was shown by the history of America, when a trusted military leader became the chief political factor in the state.

Pilsudski was a Pole, born in 1867 on the family estate near Vilna, in that Lithuania which had long formed a willing part of historic Poland and which had furnished many distinguished figures to Polish history, among them Kosciusko and Mickiewicz. As a student of medicine at the University of Kharkov, he had incurred the disfavor of the Russian government and had, in 1888, been banished for five years to Siberia. Returning to Poland he managed for eight years to elude the Russian police. Caught at last, in 1900, he feigned insanity, devising new forms of madness. After about a year in a lunatic asylum, he escaped to London, at that time one of the chief centers of the Polish Socialist Party. In 1902 he was back in Russia again.

" He can hardly be described as a Socialist in the usual meaning of the term," says a well-informed writer in *The New*

Europe. "He is a nationalist with foresight and a Socialist without faith. Imbued with the traditions of the old Polish fighters for liberty, of the Legionaries who had followed Napoleon, and of the Polish Democrats who had started the insurrections of 1830 and 1863, he is a spiritual descendant of the Europe of Garibaldi and Mazzini. He and his associates from the Right Wing of the Polish Socialist Party adhered to socialism because they recognized in it the only powerful revolutionary and democratic force of our time — and their supreme aim was by revolutionary means to win Polish independence."

Not primarily interested in the labor problem and yet with considerable knowledge and understanding of it, Pilsudski's chief preoccupation was political in nature, the recovery, by whatever method circumstances might favor, of Polish independence. His was a life, therefore, of secret preparation and intrigue, to which for many years he was dedicated. Forced to manoeuvre incessantly, to burrow secretly underground, in order to avoid the authorities who were always on the watch for him, his activity was mainly directed toward the creation of at least the nucleus of a Polish army, which might, at some critical juncture, emerge from secrecy, equipped with leaders, well-trained, ready, and capable of expansion.

All this preparation aimed at armed revolution against Tsarist Russia, and when the war came Pilsudski and his men fought for a while on the anti-Russian side. But in 1915 he stopped recruiting for the army which he had himself created. He was determined not to develop a force which could be used by Austria and Germany, for their own advantage, not for that of the Poles. He desired a Poland independent not only of Russia but of the Central Powers as well. His attitude brought him into conflict with the military authorities of Austria and Germany and landed him ultimately in the prison of Magdeburg. But his preliminary work had been so well done that it continued to develop in secrecy even after he had himself been seized and deported to Germany.

Pilsudski had proved himself the most determined anti-German as well as anti-Russian leader in Poland. This fact was also attested by Prince Max of Baden, the momentary chancellor of the tumbling German Empire. On November 2, 1918, the Prince wired to Warsaw that he would release Pilsudski only "provided he abandon his hostile attitude with regard to the Occupying Powers, which has led to his removal from Poland." A few days later the revolution in Germany liberated the stubborn prisoner

and caused the transient occupant of Bismarck's chair to vanish incontinently from the scene.

Such had been the career of the first President of the Republic of Poland. He had given evidence of the possession of exceptional abilities as a soldier, as an organizer. Whether there was in him the making of a statesman remained to be seen. The moment was one that called loudly for an able steersman and strategist upon the dangerous field of politics, national and international. A people threatened with starvation, hungry for land, divided into parties reactionary and radical, and environed by enemies, had sore need of a moderating influence, and of sagacity as well as of courage in high places.

One of Pilsudski's early acts was the appointment as prime minister of the man who was in the opinion of the world Poland's most widely known and most distinguished citizen, Ignace Paderewski. Paderewski, an intense patriot, was also a citizen of the world. As a great musician his name had long been familiar not only to the people of every country of Europe, but to Americans, to Australians, to all the tribes of men. What had not been generally known before, this master pianist of the age, now prime minister by one of the romantic twists of an epoch rich in surprises, showed that he was an accomplished diplomat, a student of history and economics, a storehouse of political information, an engaging personality, with influential friends in every land. His rare intellectual equipment and his wide personal contacts had from the beginning of the war been placed at the service of his country, to its great advantage. In Switzerland at the outbreak of the conflict, Paderewski organized a Polish Relief association which soon had branches in other lands. Coming to America in 1915 he exercised a great influence upon the millions of Poles of this country. He, himself, raised perhaps $150,000 by concerts and addresses for the aid of his countrymen in distress and was the agent of raising many times that amount. When America entered the war he earnestly urged the American Poles to go to the front, and during the war perhaps two hundred thousand of them fought under the American flag. He also offered France a Polish Legion, which was accepted and which fought at Château-Thierry. He founded a Polish National Committee in Paris to work for the interests of his country, to plead its cause, to secure friends for the hour of opportunity which might come.

This man, who knew Europe so well and was so well known, became Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in

January, 1919. In the following month, a general election was held for a Constituent Assembly. The election resulted in the return of about 400 members favorable to the ministry, about 80 Socialists and 15 Jews. Paderewski's tenure of office was to prove brief, lasting only from January to December, 1919, but it filled a critical year and its achievements were of the first importance. By his position it was his duty to control the work of the Polish delegation at the Conference of Paris and to lay the treaties of peace concluded there before the Polish Parliament. This he did, securing the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles on August 1, 1919, by 285 votes to 41. But, despite this victory, his prestige was diminished and his position shaken, because, while the Poles gained much at Paris, they did not gain all that they desired. The arrangements concerning Danzig and Upper Silesia gave great offense, the Poles regarding both of these territories as rightly theirs and as necessary to their prosperity and their security. When, later in the year, Paderewski was obliged to appear before the Parliament as the supporter or apologist of other unpopular measures of the Allies, one concerning the rights of minorities, which offended the *amour-propre* of the Poles and seemed an infringement upon their sovereignty, and another concerning the disposition of Eastern Galicia, his explanations and appeals failed to carry conviction and he was forced to resign. These measures were little more satisfactory to him than to his critics, but he had the wisdom, which is essential to the statesman if he would be successful, and not a futile doctrinaire, to be content with what one can get out of a highly competitive world in which there are other minds and other interests than one's own, confiding in the hope that a more sympathetic future may consent to favorable rectifications and adjustments.

We have seen that the boundaries of Poland were difficult to draw and that the process of drawing them was not complete in 1919 and that their permanence, once drawn, was exposed to many dangers. The new republic, born of the war, was not destined to know of relief from war for long months after the cessation of the great conflict upon the main theaters of operation. Owing to the dilatoriness, the mistaken judgments, and the multiple distractions of the Conference of Paris, many contentious matters were long left dangling in various parts of Europe, where a prompt decision might possibly have averted conflicts. Thus in 1919 the Poles and Czecho-Slovaks came to the verge of war over the possession of the valuable coal lands of the former

Austrian duchy of Teschen, an inauspicious beginning of relations between the two newly-liberated neighbors. A highly industrialized and populous though not extensive area, Teschen was a valuable prize, lying temptingly on the border of the two countries and with a mixed Czech and Polish population. The Prime Minister of Great Britain later admitted in the House of Commons that he "had never heard" of Teschen but that that unknown spot had "very nearly produced an angry conflict between two Allied States, and we had to interrupt the proceedings and try and settle the affairs at Teschen." This unwelcome intruder upon the deliberations of the great seriously annoyed the Conference of Paris, impeding its progress, and constituting a dangerous point of tension and unrest, likely at any moment to affect injuriously the interests of Europe and its peace. It was not until the middle of the following year (July, 1920) that the five Great Powers (America included), divided the little duchy between the two republics in such a way as to secure to Poland the town of Teschen while to Czecho-Slovakia were given the coal mines and an important stretch of railway. Thus tardily was one of the minor difficulties in the rearrangement of Europe settled without further recourse to arms.

Throughout 1919 the Poles were at war with the Bolsheviks, encouraged in this by the Allies, whose policy, though vacillating, was to regard the Poles as defenders of the first line against those would-be revolutionizers of the world. In the autumn of that year the Bolsheviks were prepared to make peace on Poland's terms, but the Poles were advised by the Allies to continue fighting and in the following year the conflict widened out and passed through several swift and dramatic phases. To the southeast the Poles invaded the Ukraine, partly because that was one way of weakening the Bolsheviks, partly also because of a desire to expand their territories in a region which had once been theirs. Advancing rapidly and seizing great quantities of war material, on May 8, 1920 they entered Kiev, capital of the supposed state of Ukraine. But their stay was destined to be brief, for the Russians opened a counter-offensive farther to the north which speedily developed into an alarming menace to the very existence of the new republic. Advancing continuously they were by August 12 within twelve miles of Warsaw, nearer to the capital of Poland than the Germans had ever been during the Great War to the capital of France. They cut the main line of railroad that connected Warsaw with Danzig, the only place whence help from the Allies might come. The world held its breath as the

meaning of the possible collapse of Poland dawned upon it. Was Bolshevism to conquer this state, which had thus far served as the center of resistance to its spread, was it then to come into direct contact with Germany with its restless, disturbed and radical elements, was its march to the Rhine to find, after all, an unimpeded way? The procrastinating Allies now woke up. They had had two ends in mind when at the close of the Great War they had re-established the Polish state, firstly the accomplishment of an act of historic justice, and secondly "the desire to create a strong state which should act as a protection to civilized Europe against Bolshevik Russia and should serve to separate Russia from Germany and thus to prevent the dangerously active Communist Party in Germany receiving support from Soviet Russia." During 1920 Poland did, in fact, as we have seen, serve as a bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism.

In the latter part of July, 1920, the Allies sent a mission to Warsaw to help the Poles. Its most important member was General Weygand, one of Marshal Foch's ablest aids. Weygand, who was to act as military adviser, was to be assisted by several hundred French officers. The Allies were also prepared to send munitions to the hard-pressed Poles, but not soldiers. Trotsky, Russian Minister of War, took occasion to announce that Poland would shortly cease to be a defensive buffer for Western Europe and would become instead a bridge by means of which the social revolution could pass from Russia to Western Europe.

The Allied mission, which was principally a French mission, was an encouragement to the Poles but at the same time the dangerous defect in the treatment of the Danzig problem by the Conference of Paris was conspicuously shown. A cargo of 150,000 rifles, sent by the Allies for the Polish army, was held up by the German dockers of Danzig who refused to unload them. It was only after long delay that the arms so sorely needed reached their destination. It was quite evident that the Poles did not possess the much advertised and repeatedly promised free access to the sea. The actions of the British High Commissioner were, in the opinion of the Poles, equivocal and unfriendly. The faults, the involved artificiality of this Versailles' creation, were rendered sufficiently clear at the first test.

The Poles faced the critical situation with high spirit and accustomed valor. Peasants and workingmen, the people as a whole rallied *en masse* around the flag, resolved to preserve their newly acquired freedom or to die in the attempt. For them it was a life and death struggle, a tense and tragic moment, decis-

ive of their destinies. In London and in Paris, the situation was likened to that critical one six years earlier when the Germans had seemed about to seize their intended prey. The two situations offered another point of similarity. As the Germans under von Klück had invaded France too rapidly, imperilling their communications by the swiftness of their advance, so now it was shortly to be proved that the Russians had done the same or worse. In August the Poles began a counter-offensive. The Russians, taken by surprise, were unable to meet the unexpected attack. Disorganized, and compelled to beat a retreat more rapid than their advance had been, they ran a great risk of being completely cut off. During the second half of August they lost nearly 100,000 men in prisoners alone. Having planned a peace that would mean the real subjection of the Poles to Soviet Russia and the revolutionizing of Poland along Soviet lines, they were now compelled to accept terms of a very different nature. The Treaty of Riga, signed on March 18, 1921, a treaty very favorable to Poland, ended this strangely chequered campaign. For Poland 1920 had been a most eventful year. Her eastern boundary was now defined, as already stated, and lay far to the east of the so-called "Curzon line" which the Allies at Paris had tried to impose upon her. While this boundary might in the future be questioned by the Russians and might become a cause of a new conflict, for the time being, at least, the Poles had won a respite from the storm and stress of war, and a greatly needed opportunity for the establishment and consolidation of fundamental institutions and for the study and solution of pressing domestic problems.

For Poland was, after two years of independence, still living under institutions which were avowedly provisional. A Constituent Assembly had been elected in January, 1919, under a system of universal suffrage, women voting as well as men, and of proportional representation. Between five and six million persons had taken part in the election.

The constitution as finally adopted, after long discussion, on March 17, 1921, declares that Poland is a republic, that both sexes shall enjoy the franchise, the voting age being twenty-one, that the legislative power shall consist of two houses, a Diet and a Senate, both chosen by universal suffrage, that to vote for members of the Diet one must be twenty-one years of age, for members of the Senate thirty, that to be eligible to the former one must be over twenty-five, to the latter forty or over.

The executive power is exercised by a president and a council

of ministers responsible to parliament. The president is elected, not by popular vote, as many desired, but by the two chambers meeting together. He must be over forty years of age and his term of office is seven years. Should he die in office his duties are to be discharged by a council of three, consisting of the speaker of the Diet, the Prime Minister and the head of the Supreme Court. The president is the supreme commander of the army, except in time of actual war, when the Minister of War is responsible for all military affairs.

Many members of the Constituent Assembly desired a legislature consisting of a single house, but the bicameral system was adopted. But the Senate is given powers inferior to those of the other chamber. Its veto, for instance, may be over-ridden by a three-fifths vote in the Diet.

All citizens are equal in the eyes of the law, all have the right to protection of life and liberty and property. Freedom of conscience is guaranteed and freedom of religion. There is no established church. All denominations enjoy equal rights, although the constitution declares Roman Catholicism to be the dominant religion.

The constitution provides that economic bodies, including a Supreme Economic Chamber, may be established by law to watch over and provide for economic interests. This system has not yet been worked out in practice. Insurance for unemployment, for illness and for accident is guaranteed.

Such is the formal constitution of the republic, quite firm and rigid. It provides, to be sure, for its own revision, from time to time, in the light of experience. But the political life of a nation, though it may express itself through the forms and channels furnished by its fundamental statute, is not wholly, and sometimes not largely, determined by them, and institutions which resemble each other on paper often present dissimilar aspects in actual operation. The constitution of Poland adopts the parliamentary system of government, that of a ministry responsible to parliament. In England, where this device was invented, the ministry consists of men who are members of parliament, who, generally and normally, belong to a single party, and who have therefore a certain unity of thought, a certain common body of principles and purposes. But the political life of Poland, as it has developed during the past four years, shows a considerable divergence from the standard, classic model created by the Mother of Parliaments. Parties in Poland are not two or three but many, very many — and consequently mostly very small.

To create, out of this medley of unstable fragments, a unified body of ministers, capable of following a definite and coherent policy, is most difficult. Endless compromises or adjustments or bargains must precede the painful formation of the ministry and can only furnish an insecure basis for it, when formed. A multiplicity of shifting party groups renders difficult the normal functioning of the parliamentary system, and there has already appeared in Poland, as in Czecho-Slovakia and other countries where the same conditions prevail, a tendency to construct ministries, not out of members of parliament, but from outsiders, "technicians," "experts," administrators pure and simple, not administrators who are at the same time politicians. Such men consider themselves clerks of the popular chamber, merely in the cabinet to carry out its will, not leaders responsible for its policy as well as for the execution of it. What the permanent effect of this innovation in procedure, should it persist, will be upon parliamentary institutions it is too early to say.

Many and insistent are the problems confronting Poland at the outset of her new career. One of these, here as elsewhere in eastern Europe, is the problem of the land. Poland is primarily an agricultural country, a nation of peasants. These peasants are poor and ignorant, particularly those who were formerly subjects of Russia. The agricultural population, denser in numbers than anywhere else in Europe, save in Italy, Belgium and Holland, without technical instruction, with few highways and railroads, lives in houses or huts which lack windows and chimneys and which shelter alike parents, children and animals. How to develop safe and sane political and social ideas out of such an environment? And yet this class, materially and morally indigent, constitutes four-fifths of the population and now possesses the vote. Poland must necessarily be a democratic country. In order to be an intelligent democracy, the mentality of the peasant must be enriched and changed.

Another aspect of the matter is this. A large part of the land, 40 per cent., has been held by only 18,000 proprietors, and much of this has been left uncultivated. This means that the rest is overcrowded, is insufficient for the population. A better, a more even division of the land is imperative and, as a consequence, in the effort to improve the conditions of the masses and to conjure away the agrarian crisis, the Polish Diet, in July, 1920, passed certain rather drastic laws. A general land office is established and is authorized to take over land formerly held by the Prussian Colonization Commission or by the government

or by large proprietors and to sell it, in small parcels, to those who will actually cultivate it, preference being given to soldiers wounded in the war. Such farms may range in size from 150 to 600 acres, according to location. Lands so taken from private owners are not to be confiscated outright but are to be paid for.

What the social effect of this radical legislation will be can hardly be foreseen. It may not necessarily mean increased production since many of the large proprietors were able to apply to farming more intelligence and of course more capital, in the form of machinery, fertilizers and improved methods, than the poor and ignorant peasant can apply. For this reason there is likely to be a certain loss that can only be slowly overcome by the general raising of the peasant class to a higher level of intelligence and well-being, a long and complicated process. That the general contentment of the peasants will be increased by the operation of the new land laws seems probable.

But the agrarian problem is after all only one of the many problems that clamor for study and solution. And there is this fact, also, which the reader ought never to forget in his survey of the difficulties which the newly created or resuscitated states of Europe are experiencing, namely, that they are forced to solve quickly and summarily problems which England or France or Germany has been able to solve with deliberation, tentatively and progressively. But neither Poland nor Czecho-Slovakia, to take only two examples, has time for preliminary study, for experiment. Rapid creation, not slow and cautious evolution, must be the order of the day, in these and other countries. Inevitably, therefore, will there be much misdirected effort, many mistakes and disappointments, much heart-burning along the way. Even though compelled to by circumstances you cannot create a nation in a day. If you try, your work will be more or less feverish and certainly incomplete.

The vast enterprise of industrial reconstruction has been attacked with resolution by the Poles, but the problem is bewildering in its complexity, and what the achievements have been, thus far, it is quite impossible to state with any precision or sense of certitude. It is the problem of restoring factories which have been systematically destroyed or rifled of machinery by the Germans, of securing raw materials, of winning back the old trade connections and markets or creating new ones, of settling troublesome relations of employer and employee, rendered more difficult than ever by widespread unrest and misery, the unhappy products of the war. Moreover, where are the Poles to find the

means for this resumption and development of industry, the one absolutely essential prerequisite, capital? They cannot buy machinery and set it going, they cannot exploit mines, they cannot purchase raw materials or pay their laborers without capital. But the war destroyed the capital of the world on an enormous scale, it inflated currency in most countries by vast issues of paper money, thus reducing its value and violently affecting exchange and rendering trade and commerce a wild risk and gamble, if not bringing them completely to a standstill. In this regard, Poland is among the chief sufferers, although many of her sisters are in a similar plight. Virtually bankrupt, with an enormous and an expanding budget which will not and does not pretend to balance, with the state compelled to pay in paper money because it has little else with which to pay, with a currency constantly depreciating and prices mounting dizzily as a result, Poland is not, it must be admitted, in a brilliant position to carry out the imperative work of reconstruction. She, as well as many other states similarly conditioned, faces a long and troubled future which can only slowly clear up. She has already made many a beginning but they are only beginnings. It remains to be seen how even such a measure as the agrarian reform described above can be carried out without capital, something which cannot be improvised and which is so hard to find. But measures designed to improve the material conditions of workingmen have been passed, such as the eight-hour day, the regulation of the labor of women and children, cheap housing, the reduction of the number of holidays, excessive in this Catholic country which has many saints upon its calendar and a serious economic hindrance to a country needing, above everything else, a speeding up of activity along every line, an increase of productivity for its reconstruction.

One of the most important questions confronting Poland is that of the Jews, a problem that has many aspects, racial, moral, social, economic. There are more Jews in Poland than in any country in the world, except Russia. They constitute, indeed, one-seventh of the population. For many centuries both the people and the government of Poland were very tolerant, furnishing a refuge for the Jews who were persecuted in other countries and who came from Germany, from Spain, from Bohemia. Among such Jewish immigrants the German element predominated, and succeeded in imposing its language, for the Jews of Poland spoke a badly corrupted form of German, Yiddish. From the end of the eighteenth century, the Poles sought to

assimilate the Jewish population, removing various restrictions, only in the end to find their efforts frustrated by the Russian government, interested in encouraging dissension as a convenient method of ruling.

Public opinion in Poland remained indulgent toward the Jews down to about 1895. Then the government of St. Petersburg thought of another method of crippling Polish nationalism by thrusting upon the Poles troublesome problems that would divide them and weaken their efforts for the recovery of their independence, by driving Russian Jews into Poland. The new-comers were entire strangers to Poland and they were to render vain all attempts at assimilation. They asserted and developed in their schools and newspapers nationalistic ideas of their own, and sought to increase the diffusion of Yiddish rather than to adopt the language of the people among whom they were living. As the use of their own language was the only weapon the Poles possessed at a time when the Romanoffs were engaged in a violent campaign of Russification, the Jews, standing aloof and indifferent, if not hostile, came to be detested as unpatriotic, as traitors, as national enemies scarcely disguised. The Jewish press of Poland openly combatted Polish autonomy. This defiance by the Jews of the cause which had been dearest to every Polish heart since the partitions of the eighteenth century is the fundamental reason of Polish anti-Semitism. Economic factors entered in to irritate and exacerbate relations. The Poles, seeing almost all their trade and a part of their industry in the hands of those who were indifferent and often hostile to the national cause, became apprehensive. The economic boycott of the Jews by the Poles of Posen before the war was essentially an attempt to free the commerce of Poland from Jewish domination, regarded as a domination of those whose patriotism was suspect.

This lack of national feeling among the Jews, this absorption of theirs in furthering their own racial rights and aspirations, this cold indifference or positive hostility toward Polish national aims, both angered and alarmed the Poles, as they would have angered and alarmed any other people similarly situated. The situation was still further envenomed by the war and by the events which followed it. During her occupation of Poland from 1915 to 1918, Germany found among the Jews precious allies quite ready to co-operate in the odious work of espionage and delation. The prominence of Jews in the Bolshevist movement, a movement which is in theory the very negation of nationalism,

served but to accentuate the hostility of the Poles, to whom patriotism was the breath of life, was a religion. Moreover, no sooner had the German danger been removed than the Bolshevist danger appeared, threatening, as we have seen, the very existence of the republic. And, although they defeated it in 1920, the Poles have a lively fear that it may reappear. Again, the action of the Conference of Paris, in imposing upon them the Minorities Treaty, has been hotly resented by the Poles. Regarded as largely the work of the Zionists and of powerful international Jewish influences, they see in it not only an infringement of their sovereignty, such as no one of the nations imposing it would for a moment consent to in its own case, but as a distinct encouragement to the perpetuation and expansion of separatist tendencies directly subversive of that national unity and independence which had been the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night which the Poles had followed during so many heart-breaking decades. By that treaty not only shall Jew and Gentile enjoy the same civil and political rights but the Jews shall have the right, in towns or districts where their numbers are considerable, to publicly-supported schools in which the instruction shall be given in their own language, not in Polish. And in such regions they shall be assured "an equitable share in the enjoyment of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the state, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes," and "educational committees appointed locally by the Jewish communities of Poland," shall, "subject to the general control of the State, provide for the distribution of the proportional share allocated to Jewish schools" and for the organization and management of these schools. Other clauses assure not only racial minorities of Poland unrestricted use of their languages in private intercourse, in the press and in public meetings but "adequate facilities" for their use in courts of law. It is also provided that the Jews may not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath, nor shall they be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to perform any legal business on their Sabbath." No elections, general or local, may be held on a Saturday.

These clauses and others are placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. "Any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations may be brought before the Council of the League which may take such action as it deems proper."

To many Poles, these provisions seem likely to make the Jews not an equal but a privileged class, seem to favor those who, in their opinion, have shown themselves more friendly toward German domination than toward Polish independence, who live, and wish to live, separate from the rest of the nation, who have no intention of being assimilated and who have secured guarantees which will render assimilation extraordinarily difficult, if not utterly impossible, and who can, through the influence of powerful Jewish elements in other countries, interject, through the League of Nations, a greater or less international control of what are considered in all the great nations of the world purely domestic questions.

The judgment of an American scholar concerning these minorities treaties of which the Polish is but one and those imposed upon Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Czecho-Slovakia are the others, may profitably be quoted:

"Equality of treatment to the degree specified in the treaties places restrictions upon the action of a people in making laws or modifying their constitution that may prove unendurable. Such restrictions are really a limitation of national sovereignty respecting internal affairs. They are justifiable only if the League of Nations will see that the minorities do not become a privileged class and do not carry on ceaseless and unjustifiable agitation. In the United States, there is solidarity, in part through a common language. In central Europe the languages of the minorities are retained, and the state is compelled to countenance and even to develop them. Linguistic differences will be perpetuated and even increased. Irredentism will continue. Many of the wisest men of Europe and America deprecate these treaties; they regard them as a standing invitation to quarrel." [1]

The first national elections under the new Polish constitution were held toward the close of 1922. Marshal Pilsudski, refusing to be a candidate for the presidency, was succeeded in the headship of the state by Gabriel Narutowicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was assassinated a few days later by a person who was insane. On December 20, 1922, Stanislaw Wojciechowski was chosen president by the National Assembly.

[1] Bowman: *The New World,* 287.

CHAPTER XLI

ROUMANIA

One of the countries that suffered greatly and profited greatly from the war was Roumania. As one of the "Succession States," she has entered into the possession of a considerable part of the patrimony of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. A nation of eight million inhabitants in 1914, she has become one of sixteen or seventeen million. Larger in area than Italy or England she covers as much territory as New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania combined. She has grown great quickly and her people now see opened up before them possibilities of which they formerly hardly dreamed.

This country, which has thus conspicuously benefited from the victory of the Western Allies, had been for thirty years revolving in the German orbit. Her royal house was German, a branch of the imposing and flourishing family of Hohenzollern. The king, Charles I, had come to Roumania from Germany, the land of his birth, forty-eight years before and for forty-eight years had labored zealously to introduce German methods into the army, the government, the schools, the industries and commerce of his principality. The Queen, Elizabeth, better known as "Carmen Sylva," was a German princess who by her devotion and her tact, by her interest in things Roumanian, had increased the favor in which this German family was held. The connections between Germany and Roumania were more than personal, for in 1883 Roumania attached herself to the group of powers which had recently founded the Triple Alliance. The agreement effecting this was never submitted to the Roumanian parliament, probably because its ratification might have been difficult to procure. Nevertheless it was constantly renewed and was the underlying fact in the nation's foreign policy. For thirty years Roumania considered herself and was considered a part of the German system of alliances which dominated Europe. The practical results of this secret and yet well-known connection were that Austro-German finance and commerce were able to secure a control in Roumania which was sometimes very irksome to the latter.

In one respect this union with Austria and Germany was unnatural, and prejudicial to the attainment of what were regarded as the national aims, namely the liberation and incorporation in Roumania of several million Roumanians who lived outside Roumania, namely in Hungary, where, moreover, they were the victims of oppression. Roumania, being an ally of the oppressor was estopped from any attempt to emancipate and annex her unhappy relatives.

The outbreak of the war in 1914 obliged the rulers of Roumania to take an account of stock. The King, a German by birth and proud of the fact, wishing to be loyal to his allies and convinced, moreover, that they would win, was anxious to enter the war forthwith upon the German side. But the political leaders of the various parties whom he consulted gave contradictory advice, most of them recommending neutrality, some of them enlistment on the German side, while others urged the precise contrary, intervention against the Germanic Powers as offering the obvious and providential way of liberating the Roumanians of Transylvania, a part of Hungary contiguous to the kingdom of Roumania.

The policy of neutrality, of watchful waiting, won the day. Though King Charles died in October 1914 and was succeeded by his nephew Ferdinand, whose wife was an English princess, Marie of Edinburgh, the policy remained unchanged. For two years the Roumanian government steered an uneasy course between the two camps of combatants, not knowing which would win, a pardonable ignorance shared by most of the world, and not wishing to imperil destiny by betting on the wrong horse. At last after two years of coquetting with both sides, enthusiasm waxing and waning as successes and reverses succeeded each other, Roumania accepted the terms of those who could, and were inclined to, offer the most advantageous territorial reward for her co-operation. On August 17, 1916, she agreed to enter the war on the side of the Entente, assured of the realization of her historic and racial aspirations, if the Entente should finally prove successful, and promised " the same rights as her Allies " in the negotiations and discussions of the Peace Congress which would be held at the end of the war. Article V of this secret treaty of alliance pledged all the contracting parties to make no separate or general peace except jointly and simultaneously.

Great was the exultation in the Allied countries over this acquisition of a new recruit; great also in Roumania, whose masses were thrilled with the prospect of finally uniting into a

single nation all the members of their race, those on the one side of the Carpathians with those on the other. The declaration of war was immensely popular.

The exultation, however, was premature, and was followed by a speedy and a rude awakening. The Austro-Germans, under Mackensen and Falkenhayn, somewhat assisted by the Bulgarians, eager to repay the grudge that had arisen out of the Balkan war of 1913, easily defeated the Roumanian armies, which failed to receive the expected aid of their allies, and entered Bucharest. The Roumanian Government and Parliament fled to the north and installed themselves in Jassy, in Moldavia. For two years the Germans ruled most of Roumania with an iron and a grasping hand. The country was combed quite clean, cattle, horses, food stuffs, metals and rolling stock being seized by the victors and carried off. Typhus broke out, exacting a heavy toll from the unhappy victims.

But the Roumanians did not sue for peace. Setting themselves doggedly to work, their resolution stiffening under adversity, they proceeded to reorganize their army and increase its efficiency under French instruction, and their government adopted a programme of much-needed reform, proclaiming a policy of universal suffrage and of division of the big landed estates. Parliament enacted legislation along these lines. But soon came another disaster, the accession to power of the Bolsheviks, the consequent withdrawal of Russia from the war, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Roumania's position was very serious, cut off as she was from all Allied support, and now threatened with war with the Bolsheviki. The reorganized Roumanian army which, in July and August 1917, had inflicted severe defeats upon the German invaders, was, it was felt, quite unable to meet the new situation. Most reluctantly, under the stern pressure of necessity, the Roumanian government decided to make peace with the Germanic Powers. The Treaty of Bucharest of May 7, 1918, sealed, it was thought, her doom once and for all. Its terms were crushing. She must give up the Dobrudja, and, what was far worse, all the Carpathian passes and valleys that led into her defenseless plains. Her economic subjection to the Central Allies was complete and was ingeniously and ruthlessly organized. She was as prostrate as a nation could possibly be.

In this case, however, pride, the pride of insolent power, was only a few steps before its fall. In September, 1918, Bulgaria sued for peace. On November 3 came the armistice with Austria-Hungary. On November 9 Roumania re-entered the war and

when, two days later, the armistice with Germany was signed, her army was in Transylvania and in Bukovina.

Roumania's experience at the Conference of Paris was not a happy one. So far from having "the same rights as her Allies" in the negotiations and discussions of that body she found that the Great Powers, which controlled both procedure and decision, regarded this promise, whose sweep the Roumanians had probably exaggerated as elevating them to the rank of a Great Power, as having lapsed, the Treaty of 1916 as no longer binding, owing to the fact that Roumania had made a separate peace with Austria and Germany, despite the formal undertaking of that treaty. Extenuating circumstances were not given their due weight by the Great Powers. Moreover Roumania found that she was allowed only two delegates at the Conference whereas Belgium and Serbia were allotted three, although they were smaller than she. The relations of the big states and the little at Paris were characterized by much the same friction and resentment as at Vienna, a century earlier. The former, conscious that the main burden of the late conflict had been theirs and that theirs would be the main burden of guaranteeing the new arrangements of the future, which arrangements were, moreover, of such great and obvious advantage to the smaller states themselves, were impatient at the stiff opposition which some of their proposals and decisions encountered on the part of those who, they felt, ought to show gratitude to their benefactors rather than the unpleasing spirit of criticism. Anxious to get things done, to set the world in order as speedily as possible, and not seeing how that could be accomplished if discussion was to be dragged out indefinitely, as it would be if every voice were heard as long as it would like to be heard, and impatient of the contentions of the small states among themselves, the leaders of the Conference of Paris compressed negotiations and adopted decisions which seemed to those most intimately affected by them as lacking in tact as well as in an accurate or sufficient comprehension of, or sympathy with, the needs or the desires of the peoples concerned. The Great Powers were prone to consider the small as too ambitious and too grasping, as too little inclined to ignore the large and permanent aspects of the difficult problem of establishing a peace which might be general and reasonably enduring. The latter, on their side, considered the former as too domineering, as suffering from the illusion of superior wisdom and virtue. Personal factors, also, entered in to affect the issue, as they always do in any aggregation of individuals momentarily engaged

in dealings with each other. Mr. Bratiano, the leading Roumanian delegate, did not produce a favorable impression upon M. Clemenceau or Mr. Wilson. For that matter neither did they produce a favorable impression upon him.

Out of this sorry clash of interests and personalities arose one of the lesser crises of the eventful life of the Conference of Paris. Roumania refused to sign the treaties with Austria and Hungary, which were the ones that directly concerned her. She also refused to sign the treaty concerning minorities, submitted at the same time. Her refusal continued for several months and was only brought to an end by the sharp and peremptory pressure of the Supreme Council, threatening an immediate breach of diplomatic relations if she should persist longer in her recalcitrant attitude. Fearful of the consequences of complete isolation Roumania finally yielded, but, naturally enough, with a lively sense of grievance against her former allies.

Roumania's specific objections to the treaties she was compelled to sign were mainly two. Although her boundaries were liberally drawn and included most of the territories she desired they did not include quite all. She claimed all of the Banat, a region in the south of former Hungary which was inhabited by a mixed population of Roumanians and Serbs. While she was given the larger part, the Conference properly assigned to the Serbs that part which was peopled predominantly by Serbs and which, moreover, by reason of its geographical location, was essential for the adequate defense of Belgrade, the capital of Serbia.

The other and more serious objection was leveled at the minorities' treaty and the reasons were much the same as those expressed by the Poles against the largely similar document forced upon them. The right assumed by the Great Powers of imposing upon the smaller states certain obligations which the former would not consent to impose upon themselves was resented. Here we have again the same old difficult problem of the relations of the big and the little. The smaller states claimed full equality with the greater. They were willing to accept provisions that should apply equally to all but they were not willing to concede an interference by foreign governments which was limited only to certain states. The crux of the problem was, in the case of Roumania, as in the case of Poland, the guarantees provided for the Jews.

Moreover, the motives, the arguments, the forces behind the making of the minorities' treaties were enveloped in some obscu-

rity, and are still so enveloped. The proceedings of the Committee that framed them had not then and have not yet been published, and this fact gave rise to rumors and innuendoes, impossible to prove or to disprove, of doubtful influences at work. The disaffection of the smaller states exploded at the plenary session of the Conference on May 29, a session which was carried over to the 31st. As the press were excluded and the proceedings were regarded as confidential, our information regarding what was said in them is not as full or certain as we would like it to be. Suffice it to say that the Great Powers insisted that, as it was they who had largely won the war, it was their duty to make the peace, and that as they were consenting to the resurrection or great enlargement of Poland, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and were transferring to them large numbers of people of different races, languages and religions from those of the majority, they had the right and were in duty bound to see that states which they were so conspicuously aiding should not be in a position, by unjust or tyrannical treatment of such minorities, to imperil the peace of the world. As the permanence of the treaties could only be guaranteed by the Great Powers, the latter were under the heaviest obligations to see that nothing that could be avoided should be allowed to bring them into question. "Take the rights of minorities," said President Wilson. "Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities. And, therefore, if the Great Powers are to guarantee the peace of the world in any sense, is it unjust that they should be satisfied that the proper and necessary guarantees had been given?"

So also with boundary questions. "The chief guarantors are entitled to be satisfied that the territorial settlements are of a character to be permanent, and that the guarantees given are of a character to insure the peace of the world. . . . How can a power like the United States, for example — for I can speak for no other — after signing this treaty, if it contains elements which they do not believe will be permanent, go three thousand miles away across the sea and report to its people that it has made a settlement of the peace of the world? It cannot do so. And yet there underlies all of these transactions the expectation, on the part, for example, of Roumania, and of Czecho-Slovakia, and of Serbia, that if any covenants of the settlement are not observed, the United States will send her armies and her navies to see that they are observed." "In those circumstances," he

asked, "is it unreasonable that the United States should insist upon being satisfied that the settlements are correct?"[1]

Whether the President was by inference unduly committing his country to a possible future of incalculable intervention in the affairs of Europe, whether he was by suggestion arousing or confirming an expectation on the part of European powers which might not be realized, are questions that were later hotly discussed in the United States. But at any rate the air was now cleared as far as the Conference was concerned. The Great Powers had defined their attitude with precision. They were resolved to carry through their policy in regard to the protection of minorities and, one by one, the states to which they intended to apply it were forced to yield. Roumania held out for many months. Her delegation withdrew from Paris and her government sought in every way, by evasion and delay and political manoeuvre, to avoid submission, but in the end, as already stated, it saw itself compelled to accept the unpopular treaties.

Roumania's relations with the Great Powers were rendered still more complicated and aggravated at this time by a sharp and prolonged controversy between her and the Conference of Paris over Hungarian affairs. In March 1919 a Communist revolution had broken out in Hungary and the régime of Béla Kun, which was shortly to make itself notorious, was established. A Soviet dictatorship was set up which announced an alliance with the Soviet Government of Moscow and a determination to war upon all *bourgeois* countries in the approved Bolshevist manner. These Hungarian Communists first attacked Czecho-Slovakia, intending to break through and establish a connection with Russia. Then the march of Bolshevism westward toward the Rhine might begin. But the Czecho-Slovaks were not so easily swept aside and the Red army decided to attack the Roumanians. The Roumanians, on their side, counter-attacked successfully and were about to march on Budapest, when the Allies in Paris ordered them to stop. The Roumanians, however, ignored the order, not sharing the hopes entertained in Paris of a possible peaceful arrangement with Béla Kun but believing it desirable to end the Communist régime in Hungary, and that the only way to do it was to occupy the capital. They therefore

[1] Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris,* vol. V, pp. 130–131. The words quoted are from the President's own version of his speech issued from the White House, October 11, 1919, being the short-hand notes of his stenographer.

continued their advance, entered Budapest on August 8, 1919, and occupied it and a large part of Hungary for several months, only withdrawing as the result of a practical ultimatum from the Supreme Council. Those months were filled with bitter contentions between Roumania and the Allies, with frequent and somewhat contradictory orders from the latter, and procrastination and disobedience from the former. That the Roumanians had a juster view of the nature and requirements of the situation, and that they rendered a distinct service to Europe in suppressing the Bolshevist régime in Hungary, seems quite evident.

But there is another side to the story. The Roumanians during their occupation of Hungary seized all kinds of things, food products, railroad cars and engines, munitions, cattle, and shipped them off to Roumania. Charged with inhuman conduct and with defying the principle adopted by the Conference of Paris, that reparations for damages in the war should be regarded as a collective undertaking, not as a policy to be enforced by any single country, however provoked and aggrieved, the Roumanians point out that the armistices of November 1918 with Germany and Austria had secured for the Allies vast quantities of material sorely needed by them, coal, rolling stock and so forth, that they themselves, on the other hand, had after nine months of waiting received no compensation in kind for their material losses, that their services in the war merited consideration from the Allies, that over 300,000 of their soldiers had been killed and that a larger number of civilians were dead as a result of Roumania's participation in the war, that as the Hungarians had been most conspicuous in the recent systematic pillaging of Roumania they were justified in recovering the things which had been carried away from their devastated land, or their equivalents. If the Allies would not help them, had they not the right to help themselves?

At any rate the visit of the Central Powers to Budapest in 1916 was now returned with interest by that of the Roumanians to Budapest in 1918. Memories of injuries suffered are not generally short, nor, on the other hand, are they conducive to the speedy resumption of friendly relations and the abatement of the desire for retaliation. They constitute, rather, strong links in the vicious and very human circle of measure for measure, tit for tat.

The Conference of Paris condemned these actions of the Roumanians and demanded their cessation, and reimbursement

to the victims. This was one of the reasons, though not the sole one, for the peremptory summons from Paris for the evacuation of Hungary by the Roumanians and their withdrawal behind the boundaries assigned them. The Roumanian occupation left a bitter legacy of hate among the Hungarians. The importance of this fact need not, however, be unduly exaggerated. The Magyars had always hated the Roumanians and had long grossly oppressed those of that race resident in Hungary. Their hatred was not likely to be diminished by the outcome of the war, with its feature of abasement of mountains and exaltation of valleys. Those who recommend to the offending parties speedily to forget the passions which their history had unhappily evoked should ask themselves, in all sincerity, whether they would do so themselves under similar circumstances. The effacement of hateful souvenirs will only be brought about by the alchemy of patience and slow time.

Roumania issued from the war and the subsequent peace treaties more than doubled in size. The fundamental principle of the Conference of Paris, that of nationality, a principle widely though not universally applied, operated greatly in her favor. She acquired Transylvania and part of the Banat from Hungary, nearly all of Bukovina from Austria, and Bessarabia from Russia. But in acquiring these extensive territories she acquired about 3,750,000 non-Roumanians, namely, about 1,500,000 Magyars and 400,000 Germans or Swabians from Hungary, about a million Ukrainians or Russians in Bessarabia, and about 750,000 Jews, numerous in Bukovina and considerable in other sections. These non-Roumanian populations were, in general, ethnic islands surrounded by Roumanians and it was for geographical reasons impossible to separate them from the encircling majority. Thus at the very moment she was realizing her national aspirations, the union of all Roumanians under one flag, Roumania was acquiring a difficult and perplexing problem, that raised by the incorporation within the kingdom of racial elements which would prefer a different allegiance. Roumania Irredenta had become Roumania Redeemed but, in the process, new irredentisms had been created, inferior in numbers to the old, but, like the old, disruptive in their tendency. Whether she would be able or inclined to rule these reluctant peoples with such wisdom and such tact that their regret at being separated from their brothers would cease to be a danger to the unity of the state and would gradually be transformed into frank and loyal allegiance, only the future could show. Doubt on this

point was the chief motive for the adoption of the minorities' treaties by the Great Powers, which sought to reduce racial discrimination and consequent racial discontent to a minimum, thus eliminating as far as possible a source of friction which had hitherto been a prolific cause of war.

Another problem confronted Greater Roumania, which, as we have seen, confronted Poland. The peoples now brought together had long formed parts of several different states, had had different histories, had lived under different laws and institutions, stood upon somewhat different planes of development, intellectual, social, economic. Could elements so dissimilar be fused into a single folk, be rendered sufficiently homogeneous so that their comprehension of each other, their sympathy with each other, would more than counter-balance the effects of their long separation, and so that their diversities of character and aptitude and outlook would duly enrich the common life and not disorganize or disrupt it? In other words could essential unity of mind and heart be evolved out of the obvious and prevalent diversity? Could the nation be made one and indivisible, not by compulsion, which defeats its own end, but by the evocation and the stimulation of the spirit of concord and mutual confidence?

One thing is evident from the start. Greater Roumania will not be a mere continuation or enlargement of the former kingdom. It will be something different. The peoples and regions which have been added to the original provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia are so considerable in numbers and in size that they are bound to affect profoundly the course of Roumanian history. They will have a large and, perhaps, a predominant share in the new legislation which must be enacted covering all phases of the national life. They will introduce a new note, which may become, indeed, a keynote. The newly annexed provinces, which formerly were parts of Austria, Hungary and Russia, have already begun to show their power in the new All-Roumanian Parliament. The old political parties are in full process of rearrangement and readjustment to a very altered situation and new parties have appeared upon the scene with new leaders and representing new interests. Political life, it is quite safe to say, will cease to be a preserve for a small minority of professional politicians and cliques, disputing the possession of power with each other and exercising the mechanism of the state primarily for their own advantage. The masses have entered the political arena and already a new political orienta-

tion is apparent, though it cannot yet be defined or described with certitude.

The Old Roumania was oligarchic in political and social structure. The New Roumania is democratic. Universal suffrage has been proclaimed and this means, among other things, that the dominant political power will henceforth be in the hands of the peasants — if they develop the necessary leadership and organization. Bessarabia and Transylvania have already sent large peasant delegations to the parliament in Bucharest, and the old-line parties are coquetting for their support and old-line politicians are beginning to discover virtues in the new electors which had previously escaped their notice. The peasant is commanding an amount of attention in high places which he has never known before. A new ferment is abroad in the land.

See how it works. Before its union with Roumania, and influenced by the local conditions and by events in contiguous Russia, Bessarabia, which had proclaimed its independence, had solved its land problem along Bolshevist lines, by confiscating the estates of the great landowners and distributing them among the peasants, without the payment of compensation. Roumania herself had already adopted a policy of agrarian reform as a part of that national regeneration which followed her defeat by Germany in 1916, just as the regeneration of Prussia a century before had followed the defeats of Jena and Auerstädt. Great estates were to be seized and divided among the peasants. But the owners were to be compensated and the maximum size of farms was to be 500 hectares, whereas Bessarabia had voted that no holding should exceed 100 hectares. Obviously it was undesirable if not impossible to have two standards side by side in the same country, particularly when one was more popular than the other. The two must be brought into line. The Bessarabians were persuaded to accept the principle of compensation and the Roumanians reduced the size of the normal holding.

The execution of this agrarian reform is gradually being effected. According to a statement made by the Minister of Agriculture in September 1920 the government had expropriated 5,500,000 acres, of which 4,000,000 were already in the hands of the new peasant owners, the remainder being in the hands of the communes, or awaiting distribution.

Let no one suppose that agrarian reform is something new in Roumanian history. Repeatedly have great estates been

divided into small to appease the discontent of the masses. Prince Couza in 1864 carried through a sweeping and very creditable reform, which, however, did not go far enough. Over 4,000,000 acres were distributed at that time among 400,000 peasants. But, the farms still proving too small for the support of the peasant families, the state divided up the national domains, which constituted about a third of the national territory. This relief, in turn, proved only temporary and the condition of the peasants subsequently became so hard that they rose in revolt in 1907, a revolt put down with difficulty. Eleven thousand peasants paid for their desperation with their lives. Again more land was parcelled out. This process, recurrent in Roumanian history, is apparently now approaching its completion as the result of the war. Roumania is to-day overwhelmingly a land of peasant proprietors. Satisfactory statistics are lacking but as long ago as 1912 there were more than a million peasant holdings of less than twenty-five acres each, compared with four thousand large estates, of two hundred and fifty acres or more. It may prove, after the present reform, that the holdings are too small for the support of a population whose birth rate is high and, after a few years, discontent may reappear. But at least it may be noted, in passing, that so many people now have a stake in the soil that Bolshevism has thus far found comparatively few recruits in Roumania.

The agrarian problem, here as elsewhere in eastern Europe, will not be solved, if it is ever solved, until a far-reaching change has been brought about in the agricultural population itself. The great ignorance of the peasantry must be dispelled, their primitive methods must yield to more enlightened ones, they must receive not only an elementary general education but a definitely agricultural education as well, if the soil is to be intelligently cultivated. This is a more fundamental reform than that of land-division, one that will require much more time and thought but one which Roumania must undertake, a reform already sadly belated. The peasants are very ignorant. Perhaps 70% of them are illiterate. They are also very superstitious. Innumerable religious holidays, on which the peasant will not for the world consent to work, greatly reduce his output. A mental revolution must succeed the material revolution, and the raising of the intellectual level of masses of men is a process that seems unconscionably slow to reformers eager to re-create the world forthwith. Yet it must be undertaken, and under what conditions! — in a country prostrated by war, ravaged by

the enemy, burdened with an enormous debt, and with an enormously depreciated currency. As the chief exports of Roumania are necessarily agricultural, and as her normal foreign markets are restricted or cut off by the unfavorable state of exchange, it is very difficult for her to buy the manufactured articles which are so necessary even for agriculture itself.

For Roumania herself manufactures very little. The industrial development of the country is recent in origin and has not proceeded far. Her potential wealth is very great. She has large deposits of petroleum, and coal, iron, copper, and lead are to be found in her mountains. The vast resources of her forests have hardly been touched. But her industries are only just beginning and probably do not employ more than 300,000 workers. Industrial legislation lags behind the standards of most western countries. Trade unions are few and feeble. Lack of native capital and of trained organizers, managers, and technical experts is one of the reasons why there is so little industry in the country. There are as yet not enough capable and experienced natives properly to exploit the resources of the country, to build up big industries, yet the Roumanians are very reluctant to let foreign capital and foreign experts invade too freely the field which they themselves cannot adequately cultivate, fearful, above all else, of foreign pressure or even foreign domination. This Roumania is stoutly resolved to avoid, even, if necessary, at the cost of her material prosperity. What is true of her is true of many of the other countries which we are passing in review. Intensely nationalistic, all of them, they are suspicious of the intrusion of foreign influences, sometimes occult and sometimes only too apparent, into their political and economic life. The history of the exploitation of backward countries is very vivid in their minds.

Anyone who has visited these countries since the war is impressed with the prevalent optimism and energy of their populations. They bear the hard conditions of life without repining because they have gained something which they have more at heart than even economic well-being, namely liberty, independence, unity, the opportunity to make or mar their own destiny, things more precious than riches in the opinion of all vigorous and self-respecting peoples.

The rejuvenated peoples of Europe are facing their grave and multitudinous problems with courage and with equanimity. Attacking first one and then another they have made considerable progress within a brief period of time. The consolidation of

their newly-won position has been their first preoccupation. And in this field the recent history of Roumania is significant and instructive. Adjoining powerful neighbors, resentful of her possession of territories which once were theirs, she has sought to look ahead and to prepare for contingencies before they actually arise. Her first aim has been to establish friendly and close relations with the Succession States and this she has accomplished, thanks particularly to the wise statesmanship of Take Jonescu (d. 1922), one of her most brilliant lawyers and a man of wide knowledge of other European countries, a knowledge based upon long residence in several of them and upon the maintenance of intimate personal relations with their leaders. A liberal in domestic affairs, Take Jonescu's absorbing interest was in international politics, for which, having had as a young man an international education and commanding several languages besides his own, he was eminently well fitted. As Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1920–21 his record of political achievement was remarkable. The aim of his international policy was the creation of a Balkan *bloc*, "the Balkans for the Balkans." Meeting in Venizelos of Greece and Pashitch of Serbia and Benes of Czecho-Slovakia not only personal friends, but sympathetic collaborators in an undertaking of mutual utility he was able with them to contribute greatly to the speedy improvement of relations between the Balkan states and to the establishment of serious guarantees for the future.

Roumania and Czecho-Slovakia concluded in 1921 a treaty of defense against Hungary, the state which had been compelled to cede to each important territories and which might at any time try to recover them. Article I of this treaty provides that in case of unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary upon either of them "the other Party binds itself to contribute to the defense of the Party attacked." Roumania had signed a similar treaty with Jugo-Slavia. Czecho-Slovakia had signed one of the same nature with Jugo-Slavia the year preceding. By this series of bilateral engagements was constituted the "Little Entente" which, as we have seen, owed its inception to the statesmanship of Benes of Czecho-Slovakia and which was formed primarily for defense against Hungary and a Hapsburg restoration, and of the treaties of Trianon and Neuilly.

Take Jonescu sought also to bring Roumania and Poland closer together, — hoping to draw the latter country ultimately within the circle of the Little Entente. It was found impossible to do this directly but as the two countries have similar interests in

regard to Russia they signed on March 2, 1921 a treaty binding each to help the other in case either is attacked without provocation on its present eastern frontier and to follow an identical foreign policy toward their eastern neighbors. This treaty is to last five years. After two years either country may give six months' notice of withdrawal.

Good relations also exist between Roumania and Greece, sealed and symbolized in 1921 by the marriage of Crown Prince Charles and Princess Helen of Greece and of Princess Elizabeth of Roumania to Prince George of Greece. In the following year another royal marriage, that of King Alexander of Jugo-Slavia and Princess Marie of Roumania, strengthened the friendship of two countries which, amid all the chaos of Balkan history, have never made war upon each other. These family alliances may contribute to the spread and consolidation of a common foreign policy in the center and southeast of Europe, a region profoundly altered as a result of the late war.

CHAPTER XLII

JUGO-SLAVIA

Another astonishing result of this epochal war was the creation in the Balkans of a great state composed of most of the Southern Slavs, "the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," for such is the awkward but official title of this new member of the family of nations. The name by which the busy world, with less accuracy but with more speed, calls this new community is Jugo-Slavia, land of the Southern Slavs, Jugo meaning southern. Northern Slavs are those who live in Russia, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia. Southern are those who live in the Balkans and in the southern sections of former Austria and Hungary.

Here again we witness the triumph of that ubiquitous and emancipating spirit of nationality which has continued so wondrously to transform the world during the past century and a half and which imposed itself peremptorily upon the Conference of Paris as the basic principle of its decisions, to be ignored only at the peril of the permanence of its handiwork. The Northern Slavs, as we have seen, are no longer to be ruled from Berlin and Vienna but from Warsaw and Prague; the Southern no longer from Vienna and Budapest but mainly from Belgrade. One branch of the Southern Slavs, the Bulgarians, is, for various and sufficient reasons, still living outside the fold. The family is divided and will remain divided as long as historical memories continue to exercise their present spell over the minds of its various members, unhappily but effectively estranged by many melancholy deeds of omission and commission in the past, by a tale that has been already told.

The story of the attainment of independence and unity by the Poles and by the Czecho-Slovaks, complicated enough, is simple in comparison with that of the Jugo-Slavs. Here we have confusion worse confounded, wheels within wheels, most admired disorder, a riot of forces working at cross purposes. The Southern Slavs had never lived together, had never constituted a state but had been split and shivered into many frag-

ments, by natural processes and by artificial, and had been treated very variously, and generally very badly, in the rough and tumble of existence. Their lot had usually been one of servitude and yet the servitude of one branch differed from the servitude of another. They lacked even that primitive unity which is represented by a common oppression.

Yet this fortuitous concourse of racial atoms has in our own day and with incredible rapidity become crystallized into a single mass, which may or may not prove brittle, but which at present is a fact.

Into this jungle of South Slav history let us now penetrate, seeking to discover the reasons for a change which at first glance seems quite past comprehension. The labyrinth must be considerably thinned out, the story must be much simplified if we are to find our way at all, and a simplified story is after all a distorted story. However, only at this risk can we hope to gain even an approximate understanding of a most interesting and significant event.

To anyone aspiring to make a nation out of this material the prospect even ten years ago was most uninviting. In 1914 the Southern Slavs were distributed in the following manner. Some of them had succeeded in establishing the independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, whose rise and history we have already traced. The others were in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy but their relations to that strange, composite state varied from section to section. Some constituted the triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, a kingdom you would have some difficulty in accurately describing, it being partly fiction and partly reality. In this inner combination there was the inevitable diversity which the student soon comes to recognize as normal and characteristic of the Dual Monarchy. For Croatia-Slavonia belonged to Hungary, though enjoying, and having for centuries enjoyed, a measure of autonomy, possessing its own legislature, as well as representation in the legislature of Hungary. Dalmatia on the other hand, though a part of the Triune Kingdom, was one of the seventeen provinces of the Austrian Empire and had its local Diet at Zara, as the other sixteen provinces had theirs in various places. Some of the Southern Slavs were in the Banat, an integral part of Hungary. Slovenia, which, despite the temptation, is not to be confused with Slavonia, consisted of parts of Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, and Istria, provinces of Austria, each with its local legislature, and was peopled with Southern Slavs, who also formed the population of

Bosnia and Herzegovina. But Bosnia and Herzegovina had a special position in that perplexing medley which men called the Dual Monarchy. They belonged neither to the Austrian Empire nor to the Hungarian Kingdom but to both combined and were ruled, by a special device, by both. From 1878 to 1918, just forty years, Bosnia and Herzegovina were under this joint administration. As if the cup of confusion were not already full there was Fiume, which from 1887 to 1918 was under Hungary but possessed a certain autonomy of its own. The reader who has a mathematical turn of mind might try to reckon up the number of governments, national and provincial, under which the Southern Slavs were living at the outbreak of the war which was to prove, for most of them, their war of independence. Before they could achieve their independence and their unity two historic empires had to be destroyed, the Turkish and the Austro-Hungarian. The former had been disrupted, piecemeal, during the course of the nineteenth century. The latter collapsed suddenly in October, 1918.

There were even more obstacles to the unity of the Southern Slavs than there were to the achievement of their independence. For they were divided among themselves by some very serious differences. The Serbs belonged to the Orthodox Greek Church, the Slovenes and Croatians to the Roman Catholic, and there were, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, hundreds of thousands of Moslems, for the Turkish conquest, centuries before, had made many converts, by suasion or by interest, just as the two other churches had done in their day and way.

Then there were also differences of language between the Southern Slavs, or at least differences of dialect. While these were not so formidable as to render the various branches of the race unintelligible to each other, still they exercised a certain estranging influence. And, as if this were not enough, those who spoke virtually the same idiom, like the Serbs and the Croatians, used different characters when they wrote it, which made the single language look like two. The former used the Cyrillic alphabet, which looks like Greek, and is Greek, with a few additions of which the Greeks never dreamed. The other used the Latin characters, which we likewise use.

The inquisitive student, wishing to be thorough, will be rewarded for any pains he may take in the search for other differences among the various groups of Southern Slavs, for he will find still more; for instance, the divergent psychological and social effects produced by the various conquests which this

region of Europe has known in its changeful history, Roman, Byzantine, Turkish, German, Magyar. Ethnology, geography, folklore, each has revelations of its own, quite worth while and essential to a larger understanding. But for our purposes this summary analysis will and must suffice.

The builders of a united Jugo-Slavia obviously had work enough cut out for them. But as they were many, and as they operated through a long space of time, they succeeded. For it must never be supposed that theirs was a work of improvisation, carried through in a dizzy rush between the years 1918 and 1920. Those years were merely years of culmination and their crowded history merely the final, or at any rate, the latest chapter in a long story.

The Jugo-Slav movement is not a recent one, however it may appear to the vulgar, generally absorbed in their own routine of life and only aroused to cast a glance beyond their customary horizon by something spectacular and sensational. Just as the unification of Italy and Germany had had its heralds in certain poets and thinkers of the eighteenth century, isolated voices crying in the wilderness and heard only by a few ears similarly attuned, just as the noise of the French Revolution had awakened responsive chords in Italy and Germany, in Poland and in Greece, so was the unification of Jugo-Slavia, consummated yesterday, prepared by seers and actors of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of its own and other lands. And Napoleon, too, had passed that way as he had passed nearly everywhere, and had left a certain and a distinct impression. After Wagram, having defeated Austria, Napoleon had resolved to cut her off from the sea, a thing which has been repeated in our day, and he had taken her Slovene and Croatian and Dalmatian provinces and had made them into a separate Illyrian Kingdom, which he had incorporated in the French Empire and which, though its history proved brief, exercised long after an influence upon the imagination of many Jugo-Slavs, just as the brief history of his kingdom of Italy exercised a potent spell over that of many Italians long after that kingdom had vanished from the scene.

Napoleon soon passed to Saint Helena and Illyria reverted to Austria. But the spirit of Jugo-Slav nationalism did not melt away but continued to express itself and with increasing frequency, as the Jugo-Slavs themselves became more conscious of their essential identity and as the investigations of their scholars and the inspiration of their poets added to their knowledge of

their past and suggested the possibilities of the future. This was a long, slow evolution, filling the nineteenth century. The contagious influence of the kindling French philosophy, borne over Europe by the Revolutionary and Imperial armies, was followed by the romantic movement in literature and art, with its cult of popular memories, its respect for national traditions. The different groups of Southern Slavs, aroused also by the stirring efforts which the Northern Slavs, the Poles and Czecho-Slovaks, were making to preserve or realize their individuality, were shaken out of their torpor and came to feel their essential oneness. What were Slovenes and Croats and Serbs but three names for a single folk? Did they not all speak the same language, whatever variations existing between them being only of minor significance? Were not their popular legends, imparted to each new generation, the same? Were not their social conceptions and their institutions similar?

Such ideas were at first restricted to narrow circles, but gradually these circles widened until the more active and intelligent elements of the different sections came to have a lively sense of their common origin, their common destiny, their duty to achieve and to maintain their essential unity in spite of all obstacles.

For a long time these national aspirations possessed no political character, and, had the House of Hapsburg possessed a moderate amount of wisdom, it could have used them for its own advantage. But that House was quite as incapable of understanding its own interests as of respecting the most elementary rights of its subjects. Instead of appearing to them as a protector, its customary and congenial rôle was that of oppressor. Sowing the wind for a century or so, it in the end inevitably reaped the whirlwind and was swept incontinently away. It long found willing helpers in its maltreatment of its Slavic peoples in the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary. As a result of this maltreatment the non-political nationalist or racial sentiment of the Southern Slavs became political, and in the end became, what it had at no time needed to become, disruptive.

This long and complicated chapter of history can not be narrated here. A leading feature of it was the alienation of the Croats from the Magyars. For centuries these peoples had been close allies in the wars against the Turks. But after 1848 their relations began to change. Hungary began to enact legislation prejudicial to the interests and increasingly injurious to the

rights of the Croatians. After the *Ausgleich* of 1867, which established the Dual Monarchy, the situation grew rapidly worse. Fundamentally the *Ausgleich* was a bargain between the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary designed to assure the supremacy in the state to those two races, and to no more. It represented the very negation of what should have been the basis of a polyglot empire, the equal and equitable treatment of all its races. The Compromise of 1867 established dualism at the expense of the lesser nationalities. It closed the door to Slavic aspirations. It handed over the Slavs of Hungary, bound hand and foot, to their enemies, the Magyars. As the consuming ambition and resolute intention of the Magyars was to Magyarize the other races within the kingdom and as they were prepared to stop at nothing to achieve their end, the Slavic revival which we have described now encountered in them its most dangerous foes. After 1868 the history of Croatia was one long succession of illegal and arbitrary acts designed to stamp out her individuality and succeeding in gravely undermining her historic rights. It was a carnival of injustice, chicanery, dishonesty and violence on the part of the oligarchy of Budapest, diversified by fraud and forgery, and by a jesuitical Machiavelism which pervaded and poisoned all the relations of public life. Croatia was subjected to what at times amounted to a régime of terror. Into the details of this deliberate and continuous maltreatment of Croatia by Hungary we cannot enter, but the reader, if he is interested, may be referred to the various books of Mr. Seton-Watson, an authority upon the subject.

Austria ruled her Southern Slavs with less of violence but with the same indifference to their wishes and well-being, and with a ready resort to despotic processes when the moment seemed to call for them in order to maintain the system definitely established in 1867 by the famous and, to the Slavs, infamous Compromise.

The results were not what were expected. A régime of intimidation and of injustice generally ends in provoking resistance, in tempering the steel of the victim, in developing leaders and programmes of action among the oppressed minority. And this was what happened in this case. In the stern school of unhappy experience the founders of Jugo-Slavia were being formed and equipped for a future which they themselves could not clearly foresee but which they felt was approaching and would prove decisive. Ideas were ripened rapidly in this heat, differences of opinion and of policy melted away and the

several branches of the Southern Slavs, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, were fused together in a common patriotism. Seeing that they would never have fair play from the powers that were or a decent chance for the intellectual or political or economic development to which they felt entitled, they stiffened, and waited for events. The things that divided them, as, for instance, religion, dropped into a very secondary position. The Catholic Slovenes and Croats and the Orthodox Serbs, being equally the victims of oppression, had an equal interest in escaping from it.

The air of the Dual Monarchy in what proved to be its last days was charged with electricity. "We shall liberate ourselves," said a great Slav scholar, "not by stupid quarrels but by serious acts, and, as it were, by means of a new history. Our task is to render the people capable of the destinies which await it." The younger generation of Southern Slavs felt, in increasing measure, the gravity of the situation and their duty toward it. Many of them went to the University of Prague, a shining center of Slavic intellectual effort, where they followed the courses of Professor Masaryk, profiting from his large and liberal teaching and returning to their own country with a livelier hatred of oppression, with a larger tolerance of feeling toward each other and with a determination to break once for all with outworn methods and wretched prejudices which had served hitherto to divide them against themselves. As the Magyar despotism deepened the influence of this spirit deepened too.

The national revival in Croatia which has just been sketched furnishes us the key to this tangled chapter of history. Croatia was inhabited by two branches of the Slavic people, the Croats and the Serbs. Unless those two should come to feel their essential unity, it was quite useless to consider a still wider unity, one comprehending all the Southern Slavs. But this nucleus was formed in the way just indicated, through a growing enlightenment and through common suffering. The march toward the independence and unity of October, 1918, was marked by several historic steps. Thirteen years earlier, in October, 1905, the deputies in the Hungarian Parliament from Croatia, Dalmatia, and Istria took occasion to draw up the so-called "Resolution of Fiume" in which were set forth the reforms necessary for the establishment of a solid friendship between Croats and Magyars. Leaders in this movement were two Dalmatians; Dr. Trumbic (pron. Trumbitch), a lawyer and politician, and Dr. Supilo, editor of a newspaper in Fiume, —

men who henceforth were in the forefront of the campaign. It is interesting to note that the Resolution of Fiume announced explicitly the doctrine of self-determination, a doctrine destined to exercise its potent witchery upon a later day and upon a world-wide stage. "Every nation," said the Resolution, "has the right to decide freely and independently concerning its existence and its fate." No one of all those who later bandied this phrase about ever added anything to its lapidary perfection.

A month or so after this announcement from Fiume the Croat and the Serb parties in the Diet of Dalmatia asserted publicly that "the Serbs and Croats are one nation," a statement from which there was no wavering henceforth. The political creed of the Southern Slavs had reached the stage of crystallization in fitting formulas.

But political, like religious, creeds usually need interpretation. What did this one mean? Did those who framed it intend or hope to apply it to all of Jugo-Slavia or only to that part which was subject to the House of Hapsburg? The situation was this; eight million of the Southern Slavs lived in Austria-Hungary; four million lived in the independent Kingdom of Serbia. Was it the ambition of those within the former to unite with those of the latter in forming a single state? Or was it their ambition merely to secure their own union and a more favorable status within the Dual Monarchy? If they were agitating for the former were they not working for an end that was treasonable, the disruption of Austria-Hungary for the advantage of the Kingdom of Serbia? If for the latter, were they not simply demanding a reorganization within the Dual Monarchy, a reform, therefore, purely domestic in character, and quite legitimate?

Needless to say they themselves declared that the latter was their aim and that their loyalty to the House of Hapsburg was not to be impugned. They were only demanding better treatment and a recognition of the obvious fact that they, the Southern Slavs, were a separate people; that they were merely appealing from a monarch badly advised to one who ought to be advised more wisely. And it is quite safe to say that had their monarch agreed with them, had he made them comfortable and contented within their own home, they would have cast no glances beyond; that Jugo-Slavia, in short, would have been permanently divided into two sections, the larger under the House of Hapsburg, the smaller under the House of Karageorge. It is interesting to note that at the opening of the twentieth

century the best informed observers thought that the union of the Southern Slavs would be accomplished by Austria and under her direction. As late as 1911 Mr. Seton-Watson, one of the profoundest students of the problem and a pronounced friend of the Jugo-Slavs, held that a Pan-Serb ideal was beyond the range of realization and ought not to be realized, that it, moreover, would be fatal to the development of civilization in the Balkans. "The union of Croats and Serbs must and will be brought about," he said, and it can only be by Austria.

But the House of Hapsburg missed one more golden opportunity as it had missed so many in its variegated past. Francis Joseph refused to be better advised. Only the exceptional incapacity of the governing classes in Vienna and, very particularly, in Budapest, which set themselves like adamant against the proposals that came from the Southern Slavs, could have given the Kingdom of Serbia the chance which was about to come to it of acting as the deliverer and unifier of the Jugo-Slavs, of playing, in the Balkans, somewhat the rôle that, half a century earlier, Piedmont had played in Italy. The governing classes in Austria and Hungary preferred to denounce the Jugo-Slavs of the Dual Monarchy as traitors in disguise, and tried to unmask them in great state trials, the Agram Treason Trial of 1909, the Friedjung Trial a little later, only to fail utterly and disgracefully, the documents which Professor Friedjung, a well-known Austrian historian, brought forward to establish the treasonable connections between the Croat and Serb leaders of Austria-Hungary and the government of Belgrade being proved to be impudent and clumsy forgeries fabricated with the connivance of most "respectable" and highly-placed Austrian officials, who lost nothing by being exposed as vulgar criminals but were rewarded with additional and more attractive appointments by the authorities whose disreputable servants they were.

Such was the situation in 1914. The resentment of the Croats and Serbs of the Dual Monarchy had reached the boiling point when their constitution was abolished in 1912. But the war which began two years later and which, in the intention of Vienna and Budapest, was to settle the Jugo-Slav question once for all, settled it, in fact, but in a very different way from that which was in the mind of its authors. Intended to seal the doom of the Kingdom of Serbia as a really independent center of Slavic life, to destroy it as a focus for the national aspirations of those Serbs who lived outside; intended also to clear the way

for Pan-Germanic eastern programmes, over the prostrate forms of the Jugo-Slavs, it issued, after resounding reverberations around the world, in a most astonishing backward kick.

What was the effect of that war upon the Jugo-Slav movement which we have been attempting to portray? One effect was that it completed the alienation of the Southern Slavs from their former masters, and another was that it opened a path of hope, a path which was long enveloped in obscurity, and which was rough and tortuous and thick-set with difficulties and which seemed at times to end in a blind alley, a street without a thoroughfare.

The Great War began with shots fired by Austrian guns across the Danube at Belgrade. Twice in 1914 the Austrians crossed into Serbia expecting an easy victory. Twice they were thrown back, suffering, at the hands of a people they despised, the first humiliations of the many they were destined to experience. Then in the fall of 1915 back they came again, this time supported by the Germans and Bulgarians. The combination overran the country, and held it henceforth as in a vice until the autumn of 1918. Serbia as an independent nation seemed to be forever extinguished, awaiting only the position that would be assigned to it in the comprehensive and ambitious scheme of a Middle Europe under German auspices. All that was left of the little state, the so-called Piedmont of the Balkans, was the Government that had taken refuge in the island of Corfu and the Serbian regiments which that Government had managed to re-form, after the defeat, and to send to the Allied camp of Salonica.

The war was designed by those who precipitated it not only to end the independence of the Kingdom of Serbia. It was designed also to end the Jugo-Slav movement wherever it might be found. And no sooner had it begun than the civil and military authorities of Austria-Hungary entered upon a policy of severe repression of the Jugo-Slavs within the Dual Monarchy. They treated the population of Croatia and Bosnia and Dalmatia as hostile, just as they did the people of Serbia. Many thousands of Jugo-Slavs were arrested, thrown into prison, or into internment camps where a large proportion of them died. The properties of the victims or of their relatives were confiscated. Treason trials became the order of the day and death sentences were frequent. This was the way Austria and Hungary ruled their southern provinces during the four years of war. Such procedure could only lead to one of two results, either the

complete crushing of the spirit of the victims or their complete estrangement from the monarchy.

While this régime of repression was being carried out in their home land a certain number of Jugo-Slav leaders, who had managed to escape to foreign countries, formed a Jugo-Slav Committee with headquarters in London and Paris and with a programme of a united and free Jugo-Slavia. Among them were Trumbic and Supilo, who, as we have seen, had helped to frame the Resolution of Fiume. The Committee membership consisted not only of European Jugo-Slavs but also of representatives of the Jugo-Slav colonies in North and South America. Its purpose was to interest the Entente Powers in its cause, but it met at first with an indifferent response. Jugo-Slavia was far away and its affairs excited but little curiosity. Moreover England and France at that time were not greatly aroused against Austria-Hungary, which their leaders were inclined to consider as necessary to the European state system, as holding in some kind of useful balance the unstable elements of various nationalities. Their wrath was directed primarily against Germany. The difficulties confronting the Jugo-Slav Committee were therefore enormous, — general indifference, wide-spread ignorance on the part of the Allies, and feeble resources on their own. But it kept stoutly at work, conducting its propaganda as best it could. One of the things it did, which caught the attention of the Allies, was the organization of Jugo-Slav legions from among the Jugo-Slav prisoners in Russia. These troops fought for the Allied cause in the Roumanian campaign. They were later transferred, via Murmansk, England and France, to the Salonica front. One brigade, cut off, could only be gotten out through Siberia. The Jugo-Slavs did, on a lesser scale, what the Czecho-Slovaks, more favorably circumstanced, did on a larger.

Not only did the Jugo-Slavs receive slight attention or encouragement from the Allies during the early years of the war, but, on the contrary, they experienced a heavy blow in the entry of Italy into the war in May, 1915, for Italy had only decided to throw in her lot with the Allies on terms that were very prejudicial to the cause of the Jugo-Slavs. By the Treaty of London of April 27, 1915, the Entente Powers guaranteed to Italy, in the case of a successful outcome of the war, an extensive area around the head of the Adriatic and down its eastern shore, in Gorizia, Carniola, Istria, and Dalmatia and including many of the Adriatic islands. More than 700,000 Southern Slavs

lived within this area. Thus not only were Austria and Germany sworn enemies of Jugo-Slavia, but within the Entente too there was a dangerous rival, powerfully supported, and a rival may easily become an enemy. The Treaty of London was a secret agreement but the Jugo-Slavs soon learned of its provisions with substantial accuracy. Depressing to them, the treaty was of service to Austria-Hungary in her efforts to rally the Slovenes and Croats in defense of the national territory. The Entente Powers were represented as ready to betray their natural allies.

But even this serious setback did not cause the Southern Slavs to deflect from the course upon which they had entered, and to which events, as well as general considerations of ultimate advantage, forced them to adhere. The brilliant deeds of the Serbian army stirred their blood and the subsequent conquest of Serbia by the Austro-German-Bulgarian combination evoked their lively sympathy. The Jugo-Slavs saw more and more clearly that they must hang together or they would hang separately. There was nothing to hope for from the Central Powers, whereas a victory of the Entente might bring great advantages, though not all that they might wish. Desertions of Jugo-Slav soldiers from the Austrian armies in which they had been necessarily enrolled to the armies of the Entente persisted and increased.

The national idea continued to develop among the Jugo-Slavs, favored by certain events. The death of the Emperor Francis Joseph on November 21, 1916, and the accession of the young Emperor Charles introduced a somewhat milder régime into the Austrian Empire. A number of prominent Slavs, imprisoned for political offenses, were released. Particularly did the summoning of the Austrian Parliament, which had not been allowed to meet since 1914, offer an opportunity for the dissatisfied to express publicly their grievances and desires. The Jugo-Slavs at once put forward their demands in the following words: "The union of all the Jugo-Slav territories of the Monarchy in an independent state organism, free from the rule of any foreign nation, and resting on a democratic basis, under the scepter of the Hapsburg-Lorraine Dynasty." The reference to the dynasty was considered by many people as indicating persistent loyalty to the Austrian connection. It, however, was apparently dictated merely by prudence. Without some such phrase discussion would be immediately suppressed, and persons advocating secession from the state would be treated as traitors. As it was,

the supporters of this resolution were generally so regarded and denounced.

It was left for the Southern Slavs residing outside the Dual Monarchy, not for those within, to repudiate the Hapsburgs, to demand complete separation from Austria-Hungary, and to announce a very definite programme for the future independent state. The Prime Minister of Serbia, Pashitch, and the president of the Jugo-Slav Committee in London, Dr. Trumbic, after long negotiations and discussions, issued on July 20, 1917, the Manifesto of Corfu, a document of capital importance and which has been called the birth certificate of the future Jugo-Slavia. After declaring that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes constitute a single nation, and after appealing to the doctrine of self-determination, the Manifesto lays down the principles that the future state shall be called "The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes"; that it will be "a constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy under the Karageorgevitch Dynasty"; that the united state shall have a flag of its own and that the three constituent members shall all have their own flags as well, which shall "rank equally and may be freely hoisted on all occasions"; that the two alphabets, the Cyrillic and the Latin, shall also rank equally, as shall also the three religions, the Orthodox, the Roman Catholic, and the Mohammedan. The Manifesto also announced that the future constitution would be framed by a special constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage, that all citizens would be equal in the eyes of the law and that the suffrage would be universal, equal, direct, and secret. It also proclaimed the freedom of the Adriatic to all nations.

The publication of this manifesto marked a decisive step forward in the Jugo-Slav movement. It furnished a banner for the nationalists in all Southern Slav lands, and laid down the chief lines of future development. None of the Entente Governments officially expressed approval of it but it was well received by the peoples of the Entente countries, and seemed to clarify and crystallize public opinion both at home and abroad. But statesmen lagged behind. Mr. Lloyd George said on January 5, 1918, that "the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims" and that, if genuine self-government on democratic principles were given to the nationalities, "Austria-Hungary would become a Power whose strength would conduce to the permanent peace and freedom of Europe." Three days later in his famous Fourteen Point Speech President Wilson expressed practically the same view; "The peoples of Austria-Hungary,

whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

But this issue, like so many others that were pending, was not to be determined, though it might be helped or retarded, by statesmen, foreign or domestic, but was to be decided by the fortunes of war, by the generals and soldiers in the field. Events moved with great rapidity in the year 1918. In September Bulgaria sued for peace after a final campaign in which the Serbian troops took a leading part. In October Austria-Hungary collapsed and dissolved into its constituent elements. In various parts of Jugo-Slavia local national councils sprang up to take over provisionally the direction of affairs. A swift and bloodless revolution was accomplished. Jealousies of Serbs and Croats and Slovenes, projects entertained by some of a separate Croatia along with a Greater Serbia as the desirable arrangement for the future, two states instead of one, were all swept aside in the general Jugo-Slav enthusiasm. The Italian danger, for the Italian troops had advanced to occupy those Jugo-Slav lands which the Treaty of London had assigned to Italy, also acted as an accelerator of opinion and of action. On December 1, 1918, the union was effected of the Jugo-Slav territories which were under the control of the National Council at Zagreb, and the old Kingdom of Serbia. The new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was proclaimed.

Meanwhile a revolution had occurred in the Kingdom of Montenegro. A so-called National Assembly had met on November 26, had declared King Nicholas and his dynasty deposed, and had voted the union of Montenegro with Serbia. Whether this assembly represented the real opinion of the kingdom or whether it was merely a packed, irregular body, usurping a power to which it had no right, are questions that have since been much discussed, though apparently the discussion is decreasing. In any case there is at present a dissentient party in Montenegro which regards the action of the Assembly as illegal, and which would like to see it undone.

Thus a new state had come into existence, a state of Southern Slavs. But what would its boundaries be? Would they be spacious enough to include all the Southern Slavs? We have already seen that the Italians had long had their eye not only upon those Austrian territories where there were unredeemed Italians but also upon those where there were Jugo-Slavs and

which the Jugo-Slavs themselves wished and intended to redeem. Hitherto Austria had been the chief obstacle to the unity of the Southern Slavs. Was Italy now to slip into her place? What would the Great Powers have to say? They had not yet recognized the new arrangement. Would they do so, and, if so, on what terms? These were matters that must be settled and consequently the new nation looked forward, in hope and in fear, to the convening of the Conference of Paris. Pashitch, a Serbian, Trumbic, a Dalmatian Croat, and Zolger, a Slovene, were sent to represent her there.

They ran forthwith right into the teeth of a fierce and wracking storm, and one that was to be unconscionably long in subsiding. Into the details of this tumultuous chapter in diplomacy we cannot enter here and yet the details alone can do it justice and can give an idea of the fury of the blast. The claims of Jugo-Slavia and of Italy clashed violently. Italy took her stand upon the Treaty of London which gave her not only Trieste, a predominatingly Italian city, but wide districts in Istria, Gorizia, and Dalmatia, territories which, with the exception of the western part of Istria, were overwhelmingly Jugo-Slav in population. Dalmatia, for instance, had a population of over 600,000, of whom less than 20,000 were Italians. Yet the Treaty of London gave the larger part of it to Italy. Italy took her stand upon treaty rights, Jugo-Slavia took hers upon ethnology, each using other arguments whenever it seemed desirable. Italy claimed Fiume, too, though not included in the Treaty. Jugo-Slavia also claimed it by ethnical right as well as by an imperative economic necessity, it being the only good port in sight, if Italy was to have Trieste and Pola. Was the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to be deprived of access to the sea as the kingdom of Serbia had been in 1913 after the Balkan Wars?

The boundary between Italy and Jugo-Slavia was not drawn by the Conference of Paris, although it was one of the topics that most occupied and disturbed that body. Great Britain and France supported Italy on the ground of treaty obligation. President Wilson supported Jugo-Slavia, refusing to recognize the Treaty of London as binding, because it was the offspring of secret diplomacy and because, in his view, it was expressly abrogated by the Allies themselves when they accepted his Fourteen Points and other formulae as the basis of the armistice.

The Adriatic crisis continued all through the life of the Conference of Paris and remained unsolved when that Conference adjourned. Nor was it ever settled by the Great Powers,

although they made several more or less contradictory efforts to settle it. A solution was finally reached by direct negotiation between Italy and Jugo-Slavia, culminating in the Treaty of Rapallo (November 12, 1920). Italy had a certain advantage in these negotiations owing to the eclipse of President Wilson. By the Treaty of Rapallo, Italy secured a frontier considerably farther east than the so-called Wilson line. She secured most of Istria and a strip of territory connecting it with Fiume, but not that city itself. But neither did Jugo-Slavia acquire Fiume, which was henceforth to be a free port under the League of Nations. But Italy gave up all claims to Dalmatia, with the exception of the single town of Zara, which became a free city under Italian sovereignty. She also gave up most of the islands along the Eastern Adriatic which she had claimed and which were finally secured by Jugo-Slavia. By this treaty Italy acquired about 500,000 Jugo-Slavs. The Jugo-Slavs acquired a few thousand Italians along the Dalmatian coast. Yet they were compelled to guarantee special linguistic and other rights to their few Italians, whereas Italy signed no corresponding guarantees for the half-million Slovenes and Croats now within her boundaries.

Thus the prolonged diplomatic controversy ended. As long as it continued the new state of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was prevented from undertaking the work of national consolidation which was so imperative. Her boundaries finally defined, she now turned to pressing domestic questions. Elections for a national assembly to draft a constitution were held on November 28, 1920. One of the chief subjects of discussion in the assembly was whether the new state should be federal or unitary. There were other lines of cleavage also. The peasant and Catholic parties of Croatia wished to set up a republic but the majority voted for a constitutional monarchy. There was dispute about the name of the new state, the Croats and Slovenes wishing to call it Jugo-Slavia, but the Serbs vigorously objecting, not willing to have their name, which had long been the name of a state, eliminated entirely from the appellation. And so the awkward title of Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was written into the fundamental law.

The constitution as finally drawn up is a long and elaborate document. It is fundamentally the old constitution of Serbia writ large — with of course many variations in detail. It provides for a legislature consisting of a single chamber, the Skupshtina. The suffrage is universal, the proportional system

of representation is established, as is parliamentary government. "The official language of the kingdom is Serbo-Croatian-Slovene," declares Article 3, an article which appears to settle from on high a much mooted philological question by declaring all three one and the same language.

The new constitution went into effect on June 28, 1921. The state thus created consists of two former independent kingdoms, Serbia and Montenegro, and of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, three or four small sections of western Bulgaria, acquired on the ground of necessary frontier rectification, and a part of the Banat of Temesvar, a region of former Hungary, now divided, as has been already said, with Roumania. The new state has a population of about 12,000,000, whereas Serbia at the outbreak of the war had one of about 4,000,000. Jugo-Slavia does not include all the Southern Slavs, though it does include the large majority. Five or six hundred thousand Slavs are now subject to the House of Savoy, and about 5,000,000 form the independent state of Bulgaria. Nor does Jugo-Slavia include only Southern Slavs. Within the new state are perhaps 450,000 Germans, about the same number of Magyars, 150,000 Roumanians, and 250,000 Albanians. These racial minorities, though not relatively large, may give trouble in the future, as may also the small Bulgarian districts on the eastern border, taken for strategic reasons.

Whether the unity of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is as strong and deep as the leaders of the Jugo-Slav movement have assured the world, whether it can stand the strain of the acute party and local conflicts which have hitherto been customary in the Balkans and to which it will inevitably be exposed, whether the fusion of the constituent elements is increasing in completeness and will continue to increase, are questions as difficult to answer as they are vital in character. Certain it is that there is a lively demand in Croatia and Slovenia for a larger measure of autonomy than that provided by the constitution. This demand may prove strong enough to force a revision of the constitution in the direction of a looser federalism; it may conceivably lead to civil dissension and even to the disruption of the state; or the disaffection may prove but temporary and may be assuaged by some less extreme adjustment. All that can be done here is to indicate the cloud upon the horizon, without attempting to say whether it will expand or disappear.

The foreign policy of Jugo-Slavia is that represented by the Little Entente, one of whose members she is. She has also signed

with Italy an agreement for common action in case any attempt should be made to restore the Hapsburgs to the throne of Austria or of Hungary.

Jugo-Slavia is largely an agricultural country and in most sections the land is held in small properties by the peasants. In her forests and her mines she has immense resources, as yet largely undeveloped. She is poorly provided with railroads. Illiteracy is very high. That the work of economic exploitation may proceed capital is necessary and capital is very difficult for a small, partially devastated, and newly-founded country, to secure. Jugo-Slavia confronts many and serious difficulties. But she has in the past confronted difficulties even more serious and has conquered them.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

The nations which we have been describing in the last few chapters are called the Succession States, successors and self-appointed legatees of the oldest and proudest royal family of Europe, the House of Hapsburg. They are the states which have succeeded the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which collapsed in the month of October, 1918, with a suddenness and a completeness that can be matched with difficulty in the history of the world. The necrology of empires records few, if any, instances of death as dramatic or impressive as that of this illustrious and historic realm. It vanished from the scene ingloriously amid the lightnings and the thunders of a world war which, for those who had begun it, was at last drawing to a catastrophic close.

But Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia are not the only succession states. When those countries had divided Francis Joseph's coat of many colors, to their approximate satisfaction, there was something still left over, namely Austria and Hungary, both brought low, indeed, from their former high estate, greatly changed in form and feature, and sadly shrunken in their fortunes and their prospects. These, too, the present Republic of Austria and the kingless Kingdom of Hungary, are succession states also, the lesser heirs of a great inheritance. Let us examine their recent history.

The Republic of Austria was proclaimed on November 12, 1918, by the German-speaking deputies of the former Reichsrath who since October 21 had been constituted as a Provisional National Assembly. At the same moment that these men declared German Austria a republic they also declared that it would form an integral part of the German *Reich*. The Emperor Charles renounced all share in affairs of state. A provisional constitution had been already adopted, extremely democratic in character. The transition from the old system to the new was bloodless, the natural representatives of the former régime yielding without a struggle. But the new republic

was of revolutionary origin. It was not evolved by any legal process out of the old constitution. There was a break in historical continuity. The present Republic of Austria is a new state. It is not simply old Austria rebaptized.

It was confronted at the outset with redoubtable problems, both foreign and domestic. It was a republic which did not know what its boundaries would be and which was forced to await the pleasure or convenience of its enemies, who would settle this fundamental matter. Its government might argue about the matter and argue it did with ability and finesse. But the decision lay, not in Vienna but in Paris, and the Austrian delegation was not in Paris and was not expected until summoned to receive the draft of the treaty which would so profoundly affect the future of the republic. Austria's argument was that, as she accepted President Wilson's Fourteen Points unreservedly, she had a right to have them honestly applied. She renounced all claim to keep Czechs or Slavs or Italians within her territory if they did not wish to remain. But the doctrine of nationality, of self-determination, must be extended to the German element of the former monarchy, as to the other racial groups. If it were, then the Germans of Bohemia and the Germans of Western Hungary would be joined with the Germans of Vienna and the neighboring provinces and a state of some ten million people would result. In case of doubt Austria asked only a fair plebiscite, to be conducted preferably by an Allied commission.

Logically this position was very strong. If there was anything incongruous in the German Austrians appearing in this unaccustomed rôle of zealous defenders of the sacred rights of races, they who, with the Magyars, had up to then held those rights in slight esteem, the incongruity did not affect the correctness of their present attitude. The mere fact that they and their Magyar colleagues had been famous oppressors of other nationalities might cast some suspicion upon the nature of their sudden conversion to the doctrine of the hour. But it did not alter the fact that self-determination, being announced as the corner stone of the new order, ought to be applied systematically, and not merely when its probable operations would prove pleasing to its sponsors.

But when the Austrian delegation was summoned to Paris to receive the draft of the treaty which they were expected to sign, they found, probably not to their amazement, but certainly to their great chagrin, that Northern Tyrol with its 300,000 intensely loyal German Austrians was to go to Italy, and that

the 3,000,000 Germans of Bohemia, who hated the Czechs like poison, were to be included in Czecho-Slovakia, that the new Austrian Republic was to be a nation not of ten million, but of six million and a half, that it was to be a truncated nationality, that while there was to be an Italy Redeemed there was to be an Austria Irredenta, which might never be redeemed, because to those who have is given while from those who have not is taken away even that which they have. Strategic arguments were assigned as justifying the transfer of Northern Tyrol, birthplace of Andreas Hofer and many other Austrian heroes, and historical and economic arguments to justify the incorporation of the Germans of Bohemia and Moravia, despite their desires, into the new Czech state. And yet strategic and historical and economic arguments were not allowed the Austrians when they would operate to their advantage, only when to their disadvantage. Naturally the Austrians regard the Fourteen Points as a fraud and the doctrine of self-determination as a delusion and a snare, a fabric of organized hypocrisy and insincerity. It should be said, however, that it was this doctrine that won them a small strip of Western Hungary. This, however, they regarded as rather a mockery than as a consolation.

The argument of the Austrians would have been unassailable if the Allies had ever promised to consider ethnology and nothing but ethnology in reconstructing the map of Europe. But it certainly would have been absurd to have judged and decided every boundary question from that single standard. Life is more complex than that and many factors inevitably enter into the creation of states. History is one of the most powerful of these elements and cannot wisely or safely be ignored. It cannot be maintained that the Conference of Paris applied principles consistently everywhere, but in the case of Czecho-Slovakia they did the only thing that was consonant with the success, the security, the durability of the state they were helping on its way in a world of danger, of a people which had conspicuously aided the Allies in their time of stress. The Austrians were too prone to forget that the Allies owed much to the Czechs, whereas Austrian contributions to the well-being and triumph of the Allies had not been notable. It would have been neither just nor reasonable to let bygones be bygones thus nonchalantly and to treat victim and offender as if there were no difference between them. One can quite well appreciate the Austrian feeling in this matter without conceding that it alone should be considered, to the exclusion of all other considerations.

In another matter also the Austrians were destined to disappointment. They desired, as we have seen, to become a part of the German *Reich*. Article II of their Fundamental Law of November 12, 1918, declared that "German Austria is a constituent portion of the German Republic." The principle of self-determination was again invoked. If Austria wished to be a part of the German Republic and that Republic wished to have her, who had the right to forbid the banns? She would be united with a people of the same stock, speaking the same language, and the union with that large political and economic body would enable her to live, which she could not do if reduced to the status of a petty nation, without resources, and surrounded by states that were inflamed against her.

The Conference of Paris forbade the banns peremptorily and explicitly, inserting provisions into the treaty with Germany and the treaty with Austria which required both countries to renounce their plan. Was Germany to be permitted to come out of the war larger than ever, and more preponderant in Europe? Was she to maintain and even increase her crushing numerical superiority over each of the other great Occidental powers? She might lose Alsace-Lorraine and her Danish and Polish provinces, but if she could annex Austria she would be more populous than ever and would sit astride central Europe from Hamburg and Bremen nearly to the Adriatic, and would be master of the Danube as well as of the rivers flowing north. An exchange of Strasbourg and Posen for the imperial city of Vienna would be willingly accepted as a piece of incredible good luck. And, having gained a prize which was beyond even Bismarck's dreams, Germany would be in a position to try again the realization of her ambitions under better auspices than before, to attack her neighbors and rewrite the odious treaties, this time according to her heart's desire. And who could doubt that she would attempt precisely that, if she should consider the moment ripe? Was the war to be permitted to end in a triumph of Pan-Germanism?

Obviously France could not for a moment consent to any such an outcome of the Allied victory, to any such issue of a conflict in which her very life had been at stake and had been so nearly taken. The most elementary considerations of future security forbade her acquiescence in such a plan. France, with her population of at most 40,000,000, would be exposed to danger enough from her mere proximity to a people of at least 60,000,000, and a people, moreover, almost inevitably bent upon revenge.

And not only France but Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia would be directly threatened by this union of their enemies of yesterday and their likely enemies of tomorrow, by this augmentation of Germany's strength and this more favorable delineation of her boundaries. Czecho-Slovakia, for instance, would be surrounded on three sides by Germany and its existence might be easily ended at the proper moment. And with Germany a neighbor of Hungary, through her annexation of Austria, the Magyars would be quickly brought within the German orbit, and the Magyars had grievances enough against the Czecho-Slovaks, the Roumanians, the Jugo-Slavs for having parcelled up "their" territories. The last end of these new states would be worse than their first. Were the Allies anxious to help on that process of building up a Germanic Middle Europe which they had just blocked at such fearful cost?

The interests at stake were not only those of France and the newly created or newly enlarged states of central and eastern Europe. All Europe, the entire system of European reconstruction, the durability of the whole set of treaties which were being drafted, the very basis of the new European order would be gravely threatened by such a consummation. This was no mere harmless detail in the complicated work of readjustment. It was a pivotal point. The peace of the world was involved. It was not for the Allies to labor in the interest of those who would be only too glad to undo all their work and fashion a very different Europe, to the advantage of those who have never accepted their defeat. The decision of the Conference was that Austria should not be allowed to join Germany except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations whose decision must be unanimous; including, therefore, necessarily the vote of France, always to be a member of the Council.

The solution of the difficulties which confronted the new republic was not therefore to be found in uniting it with the German *Reich*, which would mean an important change in the European equilibrium and might constitute a menace for the peace of the world by augmenting the power of the German *bloc* in the heart of Europe. There is one thing more sacred than the right to self-determination of a single people, and that is the right to life of all the other peoples, their right to live free from the constant apprehension of a reopening of the bloody conflict. The constitution of a formidable German *bloc* would mean the political and economic subjection of the neighboring states. That would be the immediate or the early result of

the union of Austria with Germany. Then, once its first dreams of aggrandizement were realized, Pan-Germanism would not be slow in revealing its remote ambitions.

This union is therefore not likely to be permitted until at least it is reasonably evident that Germany has undergone so profound a change in mind and outlook, has become so truly pacific that she does not constitute a danger to her neighbors, and that she had no intention of tearing up at the first convenient opportunity the treaties upon which the new Europe rests.

It has often been said that it is absolutely useless to forbid this union since Austria cannot live as an independent state. This argument is one that cannot be refuted, not because it has been proved by experience but precisely because the experiment has never been made. It is also said that Europe has no right to interpose its veto against the realization of the wishes of both the peoples directly concerned. It is pertinent to recall, however, that the Great Powers nearly a century ago decided, in the interest of the European equilibrium, that the French-speaking Belgians should not be united with France, and that Belgium has been able to live an independent life and that no Frenchman today dreams of claiming annexation. What has happened in the case of Belgium may happen in the case of Austria.

One thing at least in regard to Austria should never be forgotten, namely that it was not the Allies which divided up the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was the peoples of that Empire themselves.

The proclamation of the Republic of Austria on November 12, 1918, meant the end of the old order and the beginning of a new. The dynasty of Hapsburg-Lorraine was set aside and its members were banished from the country unless they would give guarantees that they would accept without reservation the laws of the republic. A large part of the Hapsburg family domains was confiscated and the nobility was abolished. The Emperor did not abdicate, but withdrew, first to a castle on the Danube, and, in March, 1919, to Switzerland.

The government of Austria after October, 1918, was entirely in the hands of new men. They faced an appalling situation, threatened starvation, manifold misery, anarchical disorganization everywhere, the woeful legacy of war. The collapse of the Empire severed the Austrian provinces, and particularly the great city of Vienna, from the customary sources of food-supply, as those sources were now largely included in, and jealousy guarded by, the new states arising from that collapse. And

not only the food-supply but the coal necessary, also, for the support of life, the maintenance of transport and of industry. Czecho-Slovakia which now possessed the coal mines would not send the precious fuel to Vienna. Hungary, the granary of the former monarchy, kept her produce for herself. The setting up of the new political barriers was followed by the erection of economic barriers as well and Vienna was for a while almost hermetically closed. And not only did the new succession states harden their hearts against this reminder of former oppression, but the agricultural provinces of the Republic itself refused to help the capital in its dire distress, or helped only by exacting exorbitant prices for their produce. Unemployment on a large and increasing scale aggravated the difficulties of the situation. Compelled to seek abroad for many of the barest necessities, the republic could acquire only with great difficulty a modicum of what it needed. Starvation was at the doors. To prevent its conquest of Vienna the government was forced to buy, if it could, at high prices and sell at low, which was storing up new troubles for the future in a sadly disordered budget. At the beginning of 1921 the annual deficit of Austria was estimated at over fifty billion kronen. To meet this the government had to contract what loans it could abroad, which were neither numerous nor large. For the rest it was driven to rely upon the printing press, a method that was sure to end in financial catastrophe, yet the only method that remained.

This critical condition of the new Austria called forth to a certain extent the sympathy and attention of former neutral and even enemy states which did what they could to prevent the worst from happening, particularly to save Vienna from starving. The Allied Food Commission under the direction of Mr. Hoover organized the shipment and distribution of supplies on a large scale. But the chief preoccupation of the Austrian Government during two years after the armistice was the procuring of at least the necessary minimum of food. The problem remained and still remains a serious one, Austria herself producing only about half the food she needs.

The economic condition of Austria began to improve somewhat in the course of 1921 and it seemed that the corner had been turned. Methods of rehabilitating the country and putting it upon a sound basis have been carefully studied by several international bodies, but have as yet yielded slight results. The financial situation, bad all over the world, was particularly bad here, and would not easily yield to treatment. Moreover it was

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none too clear what the treatment should be or how it should be administered. Only slowly was a certain relief to be worked out by the agency of the League of Nations.

Meanwhile the commercial hostility of the states surrounding Austria, which was so marked on the morrow of the war, is showing some tendency to abate, and commercial treaties, mutually advantageous, are gradually being concluded between her and her neighbors, and this ought to contribute to the creation of a better condition of affairs. The new states are coming to see that the hope of all of them lies in a certain measure of cooperation and that a continuation of harsh and illiberal policies is the surest way to retard their own economic development. This process is one that cannot be hurried but the pressure of circumstances is steadily urging it on.

The boundaries of the Republic of Austria are laid down in the Treaty of Saint-Germain. The state is divided into eight provinces, Vienna, now set apart as a separate province, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Tyrol, the latter three much reduced from what they were before the war. By the terms of the treaty Austria has shrunk from 116,000 square miles to 32,000 square miles. She is a land-locked state, having no access to the sea. In this she resembles Switzerland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary, with which she is contiguous. But she has been granted certain rights of transit to the sea over the territory of intervening countries. Of her six million people, a disproportionate number, nearly two million, live in Vienna, a city whose future is problematical. It has been generally thought that this metropolis, the former capital of a powerful empire, the seat of a brilliant court, of a vast administrative system, employing thousands and thousands of officials, a business, banking, and commercial center with ramifications all over the country, a city rich in museums and galleries and educational institutions known throughout the world, one of the most attractive and gayest residence towns of Europe to which the rich were wont to repair to spend their money, must suffer irretrievably from its new position as the huge head of a small agricultural state, that it must inevitably lose its importance and prestige and sink into a mere melancholy reminder of faded glories and departed splendor. Something of this may, indeed, prove to be its ultimate fate, yet it seems to begin to appear that the economic predominance of Vienna reposes upon a much more solid basis than was at first supposed, after the collapse of the empire whose heart it had been for so

many centuries and from which it had drawn its wealth and its lustre.

The political structure of the Austrian republic is laid down in the new constitution which went into force on October 1, 1920, and which is one of the longest and most detailed constitutions to be found anywhere. This document establishes a federal, not a centralized, republic, the provinces having considerable powers. It establishes universal suffrage, women as well as men having the vote, the voting age being twenty-one. It provides for a parliament of two houses, an Assembly (Nationalrat) elected by popular vote for four years, and in accordance with the principle of proportional representation, and a Federal Council (Bundesrat) chosen by the Provincial Diets in proportion to their population, the smallest province or state having at least three representatives, the largest not more than twelve. Virtually, however, the parliament consists of a single chamber as the powers of the Federal Council are merely advisory. Its veto can be overridden by a mere majority in the popular house. The two houses combined elect the president of the republic whose term is for four years and may be once renewed. The president must be at least thirty-five years of age. Members of reigning or formerly reigning houses are not eligible to the presidency. The cabinet is elected by the Assembly or popular house. The constitution sets up an elaborate system of courts and it is interesting to note the creation of a so-called Constitutional Court which has the power to decide whether laws, either Federal or Provincial, are or are not constitutional. This court has the right to quash an illegal decree or an unconstitutional law.

The first president elected under this constitution was Dr. Michel Hainisch, chosen on December 9, 1920. Born in 1858 Dr. Hainisch, by profession a lawyer, had held various offices under the old Empire and was the author of many books on sociology and politics. Once a Radical Socialist, he has in his later years become a Conservative Agrarian.

The first parliament under the constitution was elected in October, 1920, and resulted in the return of three principal parties, the Christian Socialists (82), a peasant and clerical party whose strength is in the provinces, the Social Democrats (66), whose strength is in the cities, particularly in Vienna, and a German Nationalist party (20), whose name indicates its programme. The opposition here shown is that between peasants and town-workers. The reactionary or conservative parties of

the old empire have largely disappeared from the scene. While some legislation demanded by the working classes has been passed and certain measures have been enacted of a socialistic tendency, the generally disorganized and distressing conditions prevailing throughout the country since the close of the war have militated seriously against the success of any attempts to set up a new economic order. The country has been living from hand to mouth and has had no time to provide for other than the most pressing needs. Social legislation on a considerable or practical scale will have to await a calmer time and a riper concensus of opinion.

Since December, 1920, Austria has belonged to the League of Nations, and the League has latterly been empowered to attempt the financial and economic rehabilitation of the country, an attempt which appears to be in a fair way to succeed. An agreement was concluded in September, 1922, at Geneva and under the auspices of the League, by which Great Britain, France, Italy, and Czecho-Slovakia were to loan Austria about $130,000,000 for the purpose of rehabilitating her finances and stabilizing her currency. This loan was to be secured by the control of the Austrian customs receipts, the state tobacco monopoly and other assets. The League of Nations was authorized to direct and supervise the execution of this plan, which amounted to a practical receivership, or financial dictatorship, of the debtor state.

CHAPTER XLIV

HUNGARY SINCE THE WAR

Not only did one of the two members of the Dual Monarchy, Austria, suddenly dissolve into its constituent elements in October, 1918, but the other, also, Hungary, crumpled up and collapsed under the staggering blows of military defeat and disaster. The day of judgment had come simultaneously for two states which had long defied all the weather signals of the time and had sailed cheerfully forth upon the uncertain sea of war and international adventure with a very combustible cargo aboard. The more one studies the history of Austria and Hungary during the last half-century, the more profoundly is one impressed with the essential frivolity and ineptitude of their ruling classes. Hardly a trace of statesmanship, hardly a breath of liberalism, hardly an indication that those in power knew that they were living in a most dynamic century and that it behooved them, above all else, accurately to appraise the nature of the forces which were at work and to seek to canalise and direct them rather than merely to block them and forbid their movement. In an age when the restless and aggressive spirit of nationality was abroad in the world as never before, when the desire for national independence among subject peoples was greatly stimulated by the resounding successes of Germany and Italy and other states, when the doctrine that a people with a distinct national self-consciousness, born of history, of a common language, and of a culture peculiar to it, has the right to live its own life, had become a gospel, the House of Hapsburg and the governing oligarchies of Austria and Hungary were as blind to the signs of the times, blazing as those signs were, as ever the privileged classes of France in the eighteenth century. And yet that House and those oligarchies had an unrivalled opportunity to study and to measure this phenomenon for, from one end of the Dual Monarchy to the other, the ferment of nationalism was the main feature of the situation, and showed no signs of abating, but was on the contrary striking out farther and farther and deeper and deeper every day.

Instead of showing statesmanship or ordinary common sense and prudence, the governing classes of Austria and Hungary resorted to all the ruses and chicaneries of petty politics, uniting a lamentable narrowness of vision with a misplaced audacity in the service of the state. Revealing no creative ability, and devoid of imagination and of sympathy, these hand-to-mouth politicians with their musty policies of class and racial domination were engaged in sapping and mining, during half a century, the very ground on which they stood. Finally the ground gave way in October, 1918, and their rickety and fantastic structures ignominiously collapsed.

There was less excuse for the fate which their folly invited in the case of the Hungarians than in the case of the Austrians. For the lords of Hungary, the Magyars, had themselves long served in bondage, had seen their rights trampled upon, their aspirations flouted, had themselves felt the compelling attraction of freedom, and had struggled bravely and heroically to attain it — and, having attained it, had proceeded forthwith to refuse it to those who lived with them within the confines of Hungary and whose ancestors, many of them, had lived there longer than had theirs. This was the great refusal. For fifty years the Magyars, a minority of the population of the kingdom, had followed a ruthless and sometimes ingenious policy of Magyarization, despite the stubborn opposition of the Roumanian, the Serb, the Slovak within their gates. Naturally the passions thus developed were bound to explode with damaging effect when the shell that contained them should be worn too thin longer to do its work. The shell was in that condition at the end of an unexpectedly long and exhausting war and it shattered into fragments at the final touch. The Magyar state, the object of so much laudation and idealization by its admiring architects, had proved for half its inmates a suffocating prison, "a pestilential charnel-house," to quote a famous phrase which Louis Kossuth had hurled at Austria in the great days of 1848, and the prisoners seized the occasion to escape, exultantly and with no trace of regret. A government that so completely alienates half its citizens has no just ground for complaint, or even of surprise, if the tables are some day entirely turned against it.

"The Magyar State," says a recent writer, "rested on the two pillars of a restricted suffrage and a unified Kingdom. Either universal suffrage or a federalized State would have enabled the different nationalities to realize their aspirations and

to overthrow the Magyar hegemony. Both proposals were, therefore, anathema. The Magyars claimed to be a 'national State' but their idea of such a State was the oppression of three or four nationalities for the benefit of a fifth." [1]

In short Hungary had nowhere laid up friendships for a possible hour of adversity. That hour had now arrived. On October 16, 1918, the Emperor Charles issued a proclamation favoring the federalizing of Austria. This death-bed repentance had no effect in Austria as it came much too late. To Hungary, however, it came as a "bombshell," as one of her leaders, Andrassy, said. For federalism might save Austria but it would only mean the doom of Hungary, a state which, the Magyar oligarchy declared, had been a "unitary" state for a thousand years and must continue such. To federalize Hungary would be to transfer power to the majority, who were non-Magyars; would mean, in other words, the dethronement of the dominant race.

But dethronement it was to be, at least for the moment. The ground was prepared. The disasters now raining down upon the Central Powers threw into deep discredit those who had up to this time been conducting the Hungarian state and had now landed it on the very edge of a precipice. Moreover there was widespread discontent because the extension of the suffrage, often promised, had never been granted. The Social Democrats, whose numbers had greatly increased in recent years, had been prevented, by the artful processes in vogue in Hungarian elections, from securing any representation in parliament and were consequently discontented. Confidence in the King and the Government was shattered; authority was undermined.

On October 31, 1918, a revolution broke out in Hungary whose object was the establishment of a republic and separation from Austria. Count Tisza, the masterful embodiment of the hated régime, was assassinated. Count Karolyi, a representative of an important Magyar family, a great aristocrat but a radical in politics, became the man of the hour, head of the ministry. The King, called upon to abdicate, did not reply directly to the demand, but on November 13 issued a proclamation announcing his withdrawal from all affairs of state. On November 16 Hungary was proclaimed a People's Republic and Karolyi was later elected provisional president.

The Karolyi Government lasted until March 22, 1919, when it gave way to a Communist régime. Count Michael Karolyi

[1] H. W. V. Temperley in *A History of the Peace Conference*, vol. IV, 486.

was born in 1875. By birth and by fortune he belonged to the great Magyar aristocracy but he was regarded as a traitor to his class and was consequently bitterly hated by it, for he, a great landowner, a born aristocrat, and a Magyar, had for years advocated the emancipation of the peasants, the division of the big estates, and universal suffrage, things utterly odious to the reigning oligarchy. He now added to his enormities, in their eyes, by proposing the recognition of the non-Magyar nationalities and the transformation of Hungary into some sort of a federation. Accused by the nobles of being an incorrigible demagogue and popularity-hunter, a man without honor or principles, a Cataline, willing to sacrifice his country for personal advantage, as anxious to fish in troubled waters and as surrounded by a scurvy crew, he appears to the outsider as merely a man of generous ideas, ideas which ought in large part to have been adopted long before for the well-being of Hungary. But he was not a man of sufficient force to dominate a crisis, not a man of action, able to direct and control the wild forces of a revolution, not a man of constructive talent, capable of laying the foundations of a new society in a time of turmoil, of snatching order from disorder. Accomplishing little and disappointing many who had looked to him as to a guiding star, he soon disappeared from the scene.

He was succeeded by Béla Kun and his cohorts of "Reds," or Communists. A Soviet system, in the Russian style, was soon set up and although it lasted only from the end of March to the first of August, 1919, it wrote a sorry and an ugly chapter of Hungarian history. Born in 1886 of a Jewish family named Cohen, Kun had, after a somewhat shady past, finally become a journalist. Enrolled in the Hungarian army during the war, he had been taken prisoner by the Russians. While in Russia he became indoctrinated with Bolshevistic theories. After the collapse of the Central Powers he was sent back to Hungary by Lenin to work for Bolshevism in that country. Events, and his own audacity, favored him and he leaped into the light as the result of an insurrection which he organized. He did not become the official head of the state — a stone mason named Alexander Garbai (born 1879) was made President of the Republic — but Kun took control of the Foreign Office and was the real director of the government. He was in close relations with Lenin and was ready to go to any length to achieve his ends, "the destruction of capitalistic production and society and the creation of communistic production and society by securing the dominion

of the workers over the exploiters by means of a dictatorship of the proletariat," to quote a central phrase from the so-called Soviet constitution. This dictatorship was to be exercised through soviets or councils for which only workingmen, soldiers, and peasants could vote. All others were denied the suffrage.

Communists were put into all the important positions and invested with extensive, if not dictatorial, powers. The existing judicial system was abolished, the judges being removed from their positions. The courts were done away with and "revolutionary tribunals" composed only of Communists were put in their place. The Communists, numbering only a few thousand, perhaps fifteen, in the entire country, were compelled, naturally, to resort to terror as the only means of maintaining so petty a minority in power. Large numbers of persons were imprisoned and there were many murders. The press was thoroughly gagged, all newspapers being suppressed except three Communist journals. The right of public meeting did not exist, except for Communists. Measures were taken to destroy the capitalistic system and to set up a socialistic one. All private property was declared to be the property of the state. Stores and business houses were closed and their goods sold for the benefit of the state. Trade became a state monopoly. Even education felt the vivifying touch of Bolshevist thought. In the secondary schools the pupils elected Pupils' Councils whose duty it was to supervise and control the activities of the teachers!

As a social and economic experiment this Communist régime was a fiasco. All that it accomplished was the disorganization of industrial life, with consequent widespread suffering. As all classes, save the small group of Communists, were being ruined by these policies, all were ready to turn against these new oppressors and end their tyranny, at the first opportune moment. The trade unions, which the Communists tried to destroy, because they represented the principle of democracy, a principle which Communism rejects, became hostile, as did of course the terrorized middle classes, and the peasants, also. Offered nothing but a worthless paper money for their products, the latter refused to part with them, and the cities, and particularly Budapest, were threatened with famine. Many peasants were killed by the "terror troops" under Szamuelly, one of the most repulsive figures thrown up by this convulsion. An additional unhappy feature of the situation was the rapid development of anti-Semitic feeling which was, in part, due to the fact that most of the leaders of the Hungarian Soviet were Jews, Béla

Kun, Szamuelly and others. A counter-revolutionary army was being recruited and drilled by Admiral Horthy, a man who had had an excellent record in the Austrian navy during the war.

Kun, with dangers thickening about him, struck out wildly, and the whole fantastic fabric tumbled quickly to earth. Prompted either by the need of food or by the desire to get into connection with the Bolshevists of Russia, he struck at the Roumanian army, which was occupying a part of Hungary. The result was that the Soviet troops were beaten and that the Roumanians entered Budapest on August 8, 1919. Kun had not awaited their arrival but had a week earlier fled to Vienna. In July 1920 he escaped to Russia, where his talents and his services were appreciated by the Soviet Government. Szamuelly committed suicide.

The Roumanians were at first regarded by many Hungarians as deliverers from a horrid nightmare. But this feeling soon changed into one of bitter hatred. The Roumanian occupation lasted from early August until November 11. Constantly at variance with the Supreme Council in Paris, which had forbidden their entering Budapest and which repeatedly demanded their withdrawal, the Roumanians remained three months and more. The friction, which had developed at Paris between them and the Great Powers, continued and became more pronounced. Nor was the fault mainly on the side of the Roumanians. The relations of the Powers with Béla Kun had been characterized neither by firmness nor an intelligent understanding of the situation. The Roumanians considered that they had rendered a distinct service to European peace by stamping out Bolshevism in Hungary. This feeling was shared by their neighbors in central and southeastern Europe. In this matter those most directly threatened showed a truer understanding of the exigency than did the Great Powers far away.

But there was, however, another side to the medal. The Roumanians, now in Hungary and in Budapest, as the Hungarians and Austrians and Germans had for two years been in Roumania and in Bucharest, proceeded to see that the return visit was in harmony with the style already set. This meant the exacting of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. In other words the Roumanians seized vast quantities of supplies of all kinds and shipped them off to their own country. They were resolved to remain in Hungary until they had recouped themselves for the losses they had experienced in the invasion and spoliation of their own country. The feeling was natural enough

but it was only pouring oil on the fire, intensifying the ugly hatreds of the war and militating against the chances of a restoration of peace to a harried continent. The conduct of the Roumanians was severely condemned by the Supreme Council.

How extensive the reprisals were it is quite impossible to say, as the matter is highly controversial. But that they went to the extreme limit seems certain. A recent Hungarian writer, who probably does not err on the side of leniency, states that the Roumanians took grain, fodder, cattle, 1151 locomotives, 40,950 railway carriages, 4,000 telephone installations from the Budapest central exchange, the telephones and typewriting machines from the government offices and schools, beds and bed-linen from hotels and prisons, and scientific apparatus from the schools.

Whether this catalogue is correct or not and whether or not there was a measure of justification for the severe retaliation, one thing is indisputable, namely that the hatred of Roumania is universal and frenzied among all classes of Hungarians and that this is one of the factors of the present situation in that part of the world. It should, however, also be remembered that the Magyars had always despised the Roumanians and that, of all their subject nationalities, they had treated their Roumanian subjects with the greatest injustice and severity, probably because they feared them most, knowing that they were looking to their fellows in the Kingdom of Roumania as their destined deliverers. This fact may, perhaps, somewhat reduce the force of their frantic denunciations of a people whom they would have denounced anyway. It may also caution us against reposing full faith in what are possibly considerable exaggerations. At any rate Hungarian hatred of Roumanians did not begin with the occupation of 1919, — nor will it soon end. That much, at least, is certain.

The reaction of these events, particularly that of the Bolshevist tyranny, was quick and decisive. The former governing oligarchy of Hungary, anxious to recover its power, was now aided by the general determination of many classes of society that a repetition of such experiments should be rendered henceforth impossible. The evil of unbridled radicalism is that it is apt to generate an excessive movement in the other direction. Socialism, compromised by its unholy alliance with Communism, had lost the support of many who might have continued to favor it, had it not appeared in so destructive and hateful a form. Law and order, threatened for a moment with complete destruc-

tion, now reasserted themselves and with increased rigidity. The Red Terror was succeeded by the White Terror.

The different ministries which followed the overthrow and flight of Béla Kun sought to restore authority and in order to do it several times resorted to martial law. In January and February 1920 elections were held for a National Assembly, the old parliament with its Table of Magnates and its Table of Deputies having been abolished when the republic was proclaimed. For the first time in Hungarian history elections were held on the basis of universal and secret suffrage. Intimidation, which had long been a conspicuous feature of elections in Hungary, was, however, not entirely lacking in these. The result was an overwhelming victory of the conservative parties, the Christian Nationalists securing 68 seats, the Small Landholders 71, the Socialists none at all, and the Democrats a bare half dozen. With such an assembly reaction began at once. On March 1, 1920, the Assembly elected Admiral Horthy (b. 1868) as regent, styling him officially "Protector of the Magyar Republic." On March 23 it was declared by a mere Government Order that Hungary was a Monarchy and should be so described in all official documents. Thus ended the Hungarian Republic. The monarch, Charles IV, to be sure, was living in exile in Switzerland. But he had not abdicated. He had merely renounced the exercise of power until a more convenient season, and the Assembly, a thoroughly monarchical body, in electing Horthy regent, had shown that it considered Charles still the crowned and lawful sovereign. Horthy was to serve only during the pleasure of the Assembly.

The reason why Charles did not take up his residence in the massive royal palace which crowns the hill of Buda and why a Regent sat there instead was, not that the Hungarians did not wish him back, but that the Great Powers and the powers which were shortly to form the Little Entente refused to let a Hapsburg, be it he or any other member of the family, mount the throne. The Powers in Paris took occasion on February 2, 1920, to repeat their declaration of the preceding August that "they cannot admit that the restoration of the Hapsburg Dynasty can be considered merely as a matter interesting the Hungarian Nation, and hereby declare that such a restoration would be at variance with the whole basis of the Peace Settlement, and would neither be recognized nor tolerated by them." On August 14, 1920, Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia made an agreement, which Roumania later joined, an agreement con-

stituting what is generally known as the "Little Entente." While this document nowhere states explicitly that the restoration of the House of Hapsburg to the throne of Hungary would be regarded as a *casus belli*, while it merely declares that "in case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary against one of the contracting parties the other party pledges itself to come to the assistance of the party attacked," the real meaning of the agreement was, as Dr. Benes, the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Secretary, bluntly stated on February 5, 1921, that "the resolve not to permit the return of the Hapsburg was the basis and groundwork of the Little Entente."

The seriousness of these declared intentions of the Great Powers and the "successor states" was shortly to be tested. On Easter Sunday (March 27, 1921) Charles, having escaped in disguise from Switzerland, and aided and abetted by the landed aristocracy and the higher clergy of Hungary, appeared before Regent Horthy in the royal palace at Budapest and demanded back his throne. The attitude of the Hungarian Government was correct. Horthy refused to surrender supreme power until ordered to do so by the National Assembly which had invested him with it, and requested Charles to leave, which he did, withdrawing to Steinamanger, a small town in western Hungary. On April 1, the Powers in Paris renewed their previous declaration. On April 2 the Hungarian National Assembly passed a resolution refusing restoration and expressing the opinion that Charles' presence in Hungary was a national danger and urging him immediately to leave the country. The Little Entente was more emphatic, began military preparations, and delivered an ultimatum demanding Charles' expulsion before April 7. On April 5 Charles recrossed the frontier and regained Switzerland.

Six months later Charles made a second attempt to regain his throne, the more serious of the two and the more dangerous. Escaping by airplane from Switzerland, and accompanied by his wife, the Empress Zita, he reached Hungary, where he was joined by a small force of armed royalists, at whose head he marched upon Budapest. The Allied Powers and the Little Entente immediately made it evident once more that they would not tolerate his restoration. Again the Hungarian Government, thoroughly monarchical in feeling though it was, followed a correct policy. It sent troops against the King, who was badly defeated about twelve miles from Budapest and was taken prisoner. He and the Empress were arrested, and, practically on orders from the Powers, Charles was deposed by the National

Assembly and compelled to renounce all claims to the throne. He was handed over to the Allies for internment on the island of Madeira, where, on April 1, 1922, he died of pneumonia, at the age of thirty-five, leaving as his heir and claimant an eight-year-old boy, Prince Otto.

Meanwhile, in 1920, Hungary had been compelled to make peace with its enemies in the Great War. The Treaty of the Trianon was signed on June 4, 1920, eighteen months and more after the armistice. The long delay was largely due to the Allies. This treaty, which the Hungarian National Assembly ratified on November 13, 1920, is anathema throughout the length and breadth of Hungary. Few Hungarians consider themselves morally bound by it. Its terms have been already indicated in connection with our discussion of the boundaries of Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia and Austria, to all of which countries Hungary was forced to yield important territories. Through the loss of these territories the Kingdom of Hungary has become one of the smallest states in central Europe. Instead of an area of 125,000 square miles, which it had before the war, it now has one of 35,000 square miles; instead of a population of about 21,000,000, it now has one of less than 8,000,000. Like Austria, Hungary is a small state with a great city of over a million inhabitants as its capital. It has lost far the larger part of its coal and iron mines, its forests and the raw materials for its industries. The old kingdom was predominantly an agricultural country; the new will necessarily be more exclusively agricultural and will have to rely upon the export of its surplus agricultural products to pay for the necessary manufactured articles which must, in great measure, be secured abroad.

But Hungary's most serious loss is in her pride. Resenting bitterly the humiliation of her present position, the sight of her former vassals, victorious and elated, who have risen as she has fallen, intensely conscious of departed glories, of a history of a thousand years of independence always practically with the same spacious boundaries, now torn and shattered, Hungary has bent to the storm which has passed over her, but is only biding her time. Surrounded by states which have rapidly grown great at her expense she refuses to accept her fate, is overwhelmingly monarchical in sentiment, and is, it may quite safely be said, resolved to reopen the case and quash the judgment, whenever a favorable opportunity arises. She is one of the danger spots of Europe.

All the more dangerous because there has apparently been no revolution in the national mind, the national outlook and aspiration. The old governing forces are back in power. The White Terror of reaction has exacted a heavier toll of lives than did the Red Terror of the Communists. Though the excesses of that terror have apparently passed, still martial law remained in force as late as 1921 and freedom of speech, freedom of the press, are held precariously by those who dissent from the official will and the official purpose. The Government of Admiral Horthy finds its great support in the military class, the officers and ex-officers of the army, in the official classes, in the big landed proprietors. The big landlords have apparently thus far largely blocked the strong demand for a thorough-going agrarian reform, although, under pressure, certain steps, which may prove fictitious, have been taken, despite them, in that direction. A bill has been passed designed to enable agricultural laborers to acquire small holdings of perhaps eighteen or twenty acres.

Certain anti-Jewish legislation has been passed with but few dissenting votes. Jews are now forbidden to own or lease landed property or to own more than one house. Foreign Jews, who have entered Hungary in large numbers since 1914, are, according to this legislation, to be expelled and other foreign Jews are not to be permitted to enter. Jews are "forbidden to hold positions in any school or university, or to act as managers of any theatrical enterprise, editors or managers of newspapers, or to hold any office, civil or military," and they are not to be allowed to hold a government contract or to have Gentile servants. As the Communist leaders were chiefly young Jewish "intellectuals," and in order to prevent the growth of a Jewish educated proletariat, it is provided that Jews shall be admitted to the universities only in the proportion that the total number of Jews bears to that of the population of the country, which is estimated at five per cent.

In September, 1922, Hungary was admitted to the League of Nations.

CHAPTER XLV

BULGARIA AND THE TREATY OF NEUILLY

Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in October 1915. The reasons which induced her to take this step were the promises she received of territorial gain, and the opportunity to take her revenge upon Serbia, Roumania and Greece for the treaty of Bucharest of 1913. She was to receive all that she had lost in the Second Balkan war, a war which she had perfidiously begun and which had led within forty days to her great discomfiture and her bitter humiliation, and she was to receive much more. Her king, Ferdinand, a German prince, possessed virtually the entire control of foreign affairs and, convinced that Germany would win the war, he considered the opportunity for aggrandizement too good to lose. Regarded as a very astute monarch, and so regarding himself, Ferdinand was a man of soaring ambition, bent upon retrieving the woeful lack of judgment which he had shown two years before and upon exalting himself to the first place in the Balkans. Surrounded only by servile and venal politicians he saw no obstacle in his way and he plunged his adopted country into an adventure of which he thought he saw the speedy and complete success. "The European War," he said at the time in a proclamation to his people, "is drawing to a close. The victorious armies of the Central Empires are in Serbia and are rapidly advancing." If ever a man thought he could read the future and could get rich quickly, in power and prestige, by taking advantage of an alluring prospect offering no element of risk, that man was Ferdinand of Coburg, who in 1908 had shaken off the last remnant of Turkish authority and had assumed the pretentious title of Tsar of All the Bulgars.

Before Ferdinand took the step which was to prove so fatal to his inordinate hopes and so costly for his people, he was obliged to listen for a few moments to a man who was unafraid and who drew a very different horoscope. Alexander Stambulisky (b. 1870), a peasant by birth, the able leader of the Agrarian or peasant party, told the King to his face that the

people were still suffering from the catastrophe of 1913 which he had caused, that they had lost all confidence in him, and that, should he repeat his criminal act of plunging them into war, he would lose his throne, if not his head. For this freedom of utterance Stambulisky was immediately sentenced to imprisonment for life and was kept in close and painful confinement for three years, only finally to be released by events which he had foreseen with such perspicacious vision. The honors in prophecy ultimately went to the bold, blunt peasant rather than to the self-complacent and vain-glorious king.

The advantage to the Central Powers, the disadvantage to the Western Allies of Bulgaria's entrance into the war did not arise from the military importance of the Bulgarian army, which, however, was an excellent fighting force and a desirable addition to the strength of the side on which it ranged itself. The value to Germany of the Bulgarian alliance and the corresponding damage to the Allies arose out of Bulgaria's geographical position. Standing between the Germanic Powers and their ally, Turkey, Bulgaria possessed an importance altogether out of all proportion to her population, which in 1914 was only about five million and a half. Had she remained neutral the conduct of the war would have been more difficult and less efficacious for the Central Powers, the problem for the Western Allies simpler and more hopeful. Her throwing in her lot with Germany rendered easy the crushing of Serbia, which was one of her most congenial war-aims, and the crushing of Serbia opened a clear road to Constantinople. The connection thus established between Berlin, Vienna and Constantinople possessed an importance difficult to exaggerate. It enabled the Central Powers to ship easily arms and men and munitions to Constantinople and the Straits, without the aid of which the Turks would have been compelled to abandon those strategic positions. It counted greatly in frustrating the Allied attack upon the Dardanelles and in causing the Gallipoli campaign to go amiss. The grip of the Central Powers upon Constantinople and the Straits prevented the Allies from sending war materials to Russia, which badly needed them, and also prevented them from securing the food supplies which were accumulated in great quantity in the Russian ports on the Black Sea and which the Allies could ill do without. This isolation of Russia from her companions in arms brought with it disaster on the field of battle and economic paralysis, potent causes of the Russian Revolution of 1917. This grip on Constantinople also rendered possible the use by the Central Powers

of the Berlin-Bagdad railroad, largely completed, thus enabling them to carry the war into Syria and Egypt, to threaten the Suez Canal, and to maintain contacts with the Mohammedan world. Bulgaria's intervention also forced the Western Allies to establish another theater of war, that of Salonica, and this meant a dispersion of their forces over three fronts, the Western, the Eastern, and the South-Eastern. Bearing these facts in mind and reflecting upon their significance, the reader will hardly need to be persuaded that, owing to her strategic position, the action of Bulgaria in lining up with Germany, Austria, and Turkey prolonged the war, — how much it would be impossible to say. The Allies quite appropriately, quite justly, as well as quite inevitably, were bound to give that fact considerable attention in the day of final accounting, if that should ever come.

Bulgaria's chief part in the war consisted in attacking her old enemy Serbia from the rear while Germany and Austria attacked her from the front. The combination easily achieved complete success, ending in the memorable and tragic retreat of the remnants of the Serbian army and of large numbers of harassed civilians across the Albanian mountains to the Adriatic sea. Bulgarian troops also fought Roumania and Greece. Their hatred of the former was manifested in every way and, in general, during the war, they indulged in unrestrained pillaging and in wanton destruction. Bulgaria declared that Serbia no longer existed and, had there later not been a decisive turn of fortune, she would have annexed as much of that country as would satisfy her people and as would have been permitted by her Germanic allies. The Bulgarian people enthusiastically supported their government and hailed each victory and every prospect of aggrandizement with enthusiasm. They had not caused Bulgarian intervention in the war — that had been the work of the King — but they associated themselves with practical unanimity with the activities and ambitions of the Government, revealing the same instinct for dominance over their neighbors, the same determination to become the "Prussia of the Balkans" which their rivals had long accused them of trying to become. The Bulgarian people cannot escape a large measure of responsibility for the sinister conduct of their civil and military leaders. They were whole-hearted accomplices in this war of aggression and revenge, good haters of their neighbors, more than willing to make the necessary sacrifices for the coveted national expansion.

When the turn of the tide in the great world conflict occurred in the autumn of 1918 Bulgaria was the first of the Central

Powers to sue for peace. Her King, who had played for high stakes, having lost them, abdicated and left Sofia amid the complete indifference of his people, who expressed neither joy nor sorrow. The ministers fled. Stambulisky was released from his prison, and Bulgaria awaited the decision of her victors as to the terms of peace to which she would be forced to subscribe. Those terms are contained in the treaty signed at Neuilly, on November 27, 1919, Stambulisky, who had become prime minister, signing for Bulgaria. Bulgaria was compelled to cede Southern Dobrudja to Roumania, although that territory was inhabited largely by Bulgarians and Turks. She was also compelled to cede certain regions on her western border to Serbia, Tsaribrod, Boseligrad, and Strumitza, although they too were peopled largely by Bulgarians. Serbia insisted upon these acquisitions for strategic reasons whose necessity, she maintained, had been shown by the advantage they had been to Bulgaria in the war. The Serbians in justification of their claim, which was in opposition to the ethnic principle, the principle of self-determination along the lines of nationality, urged various considerations in regard to the Bulgarian conduct in Serbia such as the fact that Bulgaria had entered the war in 1915 because she had been promised a part of Serbia, that Bulgarian authorities had at one moment declared that Serbia no longer existed and that it had become Bulgarian, that they had subsequently closed Serbian schools and churches and had burned them to the ground, that they had attempted even to stamp out the Serbian language, that they had devastated and ravaged the country, that they had committed nameless outrages upon Serbian prisoners and the civil population. In the opinion of the Serbs they were justified in demanding a better defensive frontier than they had previously possessed against a neighbor which had shown its character in the war and which would henceforth inevitably be animated with the spirit of revenge, born of defeat and frustrated ambition. The Western Powers were affected by the Serbian arguments and granted some, but not all, of the Serbian demands. They drew a boundary between the two countries which, in their opinion, placed each in a strong position for defense and in a weak one for aggression.

Another territorial cession that Bulgaria was compelled to make was the part of Thrace which she had acquired in the Balkan wars and which gave her an outlet on the Ægean. Most of Thrace was, by a later decision of the Allies, to go to Greece. This renunciation is the one most bitterly resented by

the Bulgarians of all they were compelled to make by the Treaty of Neuilly, because it meant that henceforth they were to have no territorial access to the Mediterranean. For this reason that treaty is odious to them. The ethnical principle was not violated in this instance as there was no Bulgarian majority in Western Thrace, a region of about eighty miles in length and about thirty in depth, but the national sentiment was mortally offended. It was no satisfaction to the Bulgarians to be assured, as they were by the Treaty, of the right of transit across that strip to the Ægean seaports. The loss of their Ægean littoral was galling in the extreme and made them the bitter enemies of the settlement imposed upon them, without preliminary consultation, by the Great Powers assembled in Paris.

Other terms in the treaty concerned the reparations which Bulgaria must pay for her disastrous adventure. She must atone for the damage she had done. She must pay two and a quarter billion of gold francs (about $450,000,000) in semi-annual installments running through 37 years; also the cost of the armies of occupation and of various commissions; also she must furnish Greece, Roumania, and Serbia 70,000 head of live-stock by way of restitution for animals taken by her during the war; and she must supply 50,000 tons of coal annually for five years to Jugo-Slavia as compensation for the destruction of Serbian mines.

The military clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly were stringent and severe; an army which should not exceed 33,000, a volunteer and not a conscripted army, the soldiers enlisting for a period of twelve years, the officers for a period of twenty; only one military training school; only one munition factory and that to be controlled by the state; no tanks, no armored cars, no poison gas, no aëroplanes. Bulgaria has, as a matter of fact, since signing this treaty, been unable to raise even the number of troops permitted her, because her peasants will not enlist for so long a term of service, as this means that they must leave their homes and occupations for twelve years, must, in fact, become professional soldiers. Some modifications in these clauses of the treaty have since been allowed by the Great Powers in view of the manifest inability of Bulgaria to raise a force sufficient even for the preservation of internal order.

Such was the penalty imposed upon Bulgaria for her ill-advised and unlucky participation in the war.

One thing stands out conspicuously from the survey we have given of the recent history of South-Eastern Europe.

The war and the various treaties which followed it have radically altered the balance of power in the Balkans. The order in which those states stood, according to area and size of population was in 1914 as follows: Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia. Now Bulgaria stands fourth, and is reduced not only relatively but absolutely in extent of territory and in number of inhabitants. The following table shows the situation in 1921.[1] It indicates a vital and far-reaching change.

	1914		1921	
	Square Miles	Population	Square Miles	Population
Bulgaria	47,750	5,550,000	45,000	5,200,000
Roumania	53,454	7,700,000	113,221	17,400,000 (estimated)
Serbia (or Jugo-Slavia)	33,900	4,600,000	101,250	12,162,900
Greece	42,000	4,800,000	60,000	7,500,000

The defeat of Bulgaria in the war brought with it the overthrow of the old régime, now utterly discredited, and the beginning of a new era. The abdication of Ferdinand was followed shortly by the accession of his son, Boris III, a youth of nineteen who saw immediately that he could only hold his throne by abandoning all thought of personal rule and by conforming his conduct to the wishes of his people, by being in short a democratic sovereign, a king of peasants. For the overwhelming mass of Bulgarians were owners and tillers of the soil. Agriculture is the chief occupation of the people. Bulgaria is a land of farms, most of which are small. There are few industries and no large manufacturing towns. There is no aristocracy and no considerable body of rich people.

This sober and hard working peasant population ceased now to be merely hewers of wood and drawers of water and became, for the time being, the real directing force of the state, having found an able spokesman and leader in Stambulisky, a man of their own class, who had long opposed all that Ferdinand had stood for, a man of forty, huge in size, or as people said, "as big as a bull." This man had studied agriculture at the University of Halle, had been a schoolmaster, an editor, a politician, and was now the leader of the Agrarian or Peasant's party. The elections of 1920 placed that party in power.

[1] This tabulation is only approximate as far as Greece is concerned, the definite boundaries of that kingdom not having been drawn in 1921.

A new and significant direction was given to public policy by the advent of this party to power. Bulgaria became the typical peasant government of Europe. Its prime minister was a peasant by birth and the other ministers also were peasants, and the program of reconstruction and national development which was adopted and which was forthwith carried out revolved around the peasant and his problems. The interests of the peasants, in contradistinction to the interests of the bourgeoisie, were to have the right of way under this new dispensation. The men in power called themselves Socialists and they aspired to make Bulgaria a model state by socialistic methods. But contemporary socialism is a coat of many colors, and of a different cut according as it is English or German or Russian or Bulgarian. These Bulgarian socialists are bitterly opposed to communism and the abolition of private property, most of them being property owners and having the peasants' intense attachment to his possessions. Neither are they Marxian socialists. Marxian socialism, whose teachings and tenets have mainly grown out of a study of the conditions of modern industrial organization, and which rivets its attention mainly upon the improvement of the fortunes of the industrial proletariat, has slight points of contact with the facts of Bulgarian life, since Bulgaria has few industries but is a land of petty proprietors. The adherents of the new Agrarian Government of Bulgaria were often called "Green" Socialists in contradistinction to the "Red" Socialists of Russia and other countries. They insisted upon labor as the fundamental means of securing the reconstruction of the nation and they insisted, also, that those who would not labor must be forced to do so. The people must be compelled to work. The natural resources of the country must be developed to the highest pitch by private initiative and by state aid. Roads must be built, transportation by water and by rail developed, irrigation systems installed, waste lands reclaimed, all in the interest primarily of agriculture, the great national industry, the chief source of national wealth. And the national wealth must be developed in order, not that a small and favored class may enjoy the privileges of civilization, the arts and sciences, the culture and the amenities of social life, but that those benefits may become the possession of the great masses, in widest commonalty spread. The raising of the masses materially, intellectually, spiritually must be the central, pervasive, ever-present consideration in the mind of the democracy. There must be a reform in taxation to ease the burden which had for centuries

weighed heavily upon this hitherto dumb, driven class of humanity, the peasantry. Private property which is the product of private labor must be respected, but no one must, for instance, possess more land than he is capable of working. Education must be made really, and not merely theoretically, accessible to the masses, for only through education can they achieve complete emancipation. The peasants, seeing that their conditions have not improved but have remained essentially the same for countless generations, that their fate has always been that of an exploited class, must take control of public affairs themselves, must themselves organize society, and must no longer allow the bourgeois parties to direct the state, "a handful of lawyers and capitalists, assisted by journalists without faith, patriotism, morality or pity for the masses," a "tiny group of oppressors" who, by their superior intelligence and organization, "have up to the present fooled the rural population of millions and exploited them at their pleasure, that is to say in the way most suitable to their own private interests."

This peasant movement aims at the elevation of the agricultural masses who, in many countries, form four fifths of the population and who, even in industrial states, form a considerable fraction of it. It is a democratic movement, as it affirms that its programme must be carried through by peaceful means, by the ballot and the machinery of parliaments. It is not opposed to industries or professions as it needs their products and services. But industries and professions should be developed, their functions regulated, with a view to the interests of the agricultural classes, the immense majority. These Bulgarians regard the conduct of the Russian Bolsheviks as not only stupid and criminal in their destruction of the very things of which humanity has need, but as determined by the supposed interests of a small class, the industrial proletariat, whereas the real proletariat in Russia, and in most of eastern and central Europe, is the agricultural. The emphasis of the Socialists, beginning even with Karl Marx, had been put upon the wrong problem, industry, not upon agriculture. The principal task of the government should be to assure the prosperity of agriculture, as it will never cease to employ the largest number of workers.

Stambulisky and his followers, whose views have thus been summarized, were, it will be readily seen, launched upon a most formidable and difficult task, but one of undeniable interest. Moreover they did not consider their movement merely local,

limited to Bulgaria, but they aspired to make it international, as the interests of the peasants everywhere are fundamentally the same. This idea of an International Union of Peasants was definitely expressed for the first time at a Congress of the Bulgarian Peasant Union held in February, 1921, which adopted resolutions from which the following extracts are taken:

"The Congress of the Bulgarian Peasant Union invites the peasants of all nations to organize in the name of their common interests and to take political power into their hands when they are in a majority. Peasants thus organized have need of a powerful International Peasant Union. And this Union will play a great rôle in the rebuilding of humanity. The Union will have to struggle for the complete emancipation of the peasants against the menacing wave of reaction, against the anarchic power of the Communists, which would destroy all that the war spared, and fill the world with new wars of which the result will not be social equality but the most abject misery. . . . We send our fraternal and enthusiastic greetings to all peasant associations. Let us soon begin the building of the splendid edifice of the new era. . . . The International Union of the peasant masses of all countries will be founded, and listen to the peasant word which has too long kept silence. This Union is a great event of the new era and the importance of understanding and relationship between peasants will have a vast significance in international relations. We wait for this with joyful heart, and nurse the hope that the Union will much improve the hard fate of the peasants of the world." [1]

Such was the ideal of the party then in control in Bulgaria, obviously an ideal difficult of attainment and of somewhat hazy outlines. Whether "Green" Socialism, "Green" Internationalism were merely ephemeral catch words or whether they represented germinal ideas of social justice and radical changes destined to shape the future of Bulgaria and of other countries in which similar economic conditions prevail, was not clear. It was evident that for their realization leadership of a high order, great executive and technical ability, and an exceptional intelligence on the part of the community would be required.

Passing from theory to practice it was certain that a striking change had come over Bulgaria since the war. Although the large majority of Bulgarians were small proprietors, and the agrarian problem was not acute as in other countries, still

[1] Quoted in L. Haden Guest, *The Struggle for Power in Europe,* pp. 262–264.

measures will be taken for the expropriation of Crown and Church lands and of all farms of over seventy-five acres and for their allotment to landless peasants. Bulgaria undertook seriously the duty of punishing its war criminals, those responsible for her entrance into the war and for acts contrary to the laws of war, and long terms of imprisonment and heavy fines were imposed, acts which hit particularly the bourgeoisie and which the latter regarded as arbitrary and oppressive. Advanced labor legislation was passed and the municipal ownership or operation of public utilities was furthered. Particular attention was paid to education, for which the Bulgarians had long been eager, ranking first among the Balkan peoples in the number of those who could read and write. The new Agrarian Government aimed to give a more practical and less literary tone to public instruction and to this end sought to create larger facilities for training in agriculture, arts and crafts, and practical science.

In these two directions socialization was attempted. Foreign trade was put under government control, the Government operating through the agency of consortiums. A consortium was created for the export of cereals and another for the import of medical supplies. The other measure of possibly far-reaching importance was the establishment of compulsory labor. A law was drafted in May 1920 providing for one year's service for all males of 21 years of age or older and of six months for all females on the completion of their sixteenth year. Bulgaria's neighbors suspected that a scheme of providing indirectly for the obligatory military service which was forbidden by the Treaty of Neuilly lurked in the clauses of this bill and their protests prompted the Great Powers to disallow this legislation. But compulsory labor was decreed for a period of ten days each year, for women as well as for men, for children as well as for adults. No one might gain exemption by the payment of money. The chief arguments for this obligatory service were the accumulation of work that had to be done, the inability of the state to pay for it, and the shortage of labor, all consequences of the war.

It was impossible to say beforehand how this principle would work in actual practice. Early results seemed reasonably satisfactory. In March and April 1921 over 600,000 school children devoted a week to manual labor. Armed with brooms and shovels and forks and buckets they cleaned streets, scrubbed floors, made walks and gardens, built fences, planted trees. Had it not been for this compulsion the work done by these children and by their

elders would have remained undone. The principle at the basis of this reform was that society might legitimately be called upon to give a certain amount of its time and strength for purposes that are social, that is, for the benefit of the community in general.

But this experiment in peasant statecraft and social ordering was destined to a sudden end. At three o'clock in the morning of June 9, 1923, the Bulgarian Government was overthrown by a *coup d'état*. All the ministers, with the exception of the premier, who was absent from the capital, were arrested by army officers and a new set of ministers were installed in their places. Professor H. Zankoff, of the University of Sofia, became prime minister and was surrounded and supported by a coalition of all the parties except the agrarian and the communist. Stambulisky, head of the late government, was killed on June 14, as an incident of a fight between some of his adherents and the troops of the new government. This is the official statement, but it is by no means certain that he was not simply assassinated. Thus the peasantry of Bulgaria lost the ablest leader they had ever had. Power passed from the hands of those who had dominated the country since the war into the hands of those who were their bitter enemies, who had been and were apparently to continue to be their chief victims, the bourgeois. For the Stambulisky régime had ignored the bourgeois, except as tax-payers. If the latter, who had now seized control by the dark and desperate device of a *coup d'état*, should show a similar narrowness and intolerance, they might find that, after all, authority so gained is ephemeral. For a government, to be stable, must recognize that a nation is composed of many and various elements, a fact which victorious parties, the world over, are too little inclined to remember, often to their own ultimate undoing.

CHAPTER XLVI

SOVIET RUSSIA

The Bolshevists or Communists of Russia, having seized control of the state by violence in November 1917 and having by violence turned the Constituent Assembly, popularly elected, out of doors on its first day of meeting because they did not like its complexion, were obliged by the requirements of the situation and by the promptings of their creed forthwith to give the world their measure as architects and builders of a new and perfected political and social fabric, in which mankind, cruelly and shamefully maltreated by the past, should find not only a greater contentment than it had ever known before but should also see opening up before it wide and inviting avenues of fruitful progress, of full self-expression untrammeled by the confining, deforming, and deadening institutions of long ages of blindness and of barbarism. Humanity was at last to throw off its strait-jacket, escape from prison, and become free, free in body and in soul. For Bolshevism was to issue the edict of emancipation of the world, was to strike off not only political and economic fetters, but intellectual and spiritual shackles as well.

Let us see how the Bolshevists have met the challenge of their opportunity, how they have actually applied the new evangel, what sort of architects and builders they have proved to be in practice, how large the measure of emancipation which they have achieved. And first let us see what they have accomplished in the well-worn field of politics and government, a fundamental matter, for, in the Bolshevist philosophy, politics and industry and culture are interwoven in a manner and with a closeness eclipsing, quite, all previous efforts in the direction of general integration.

As the constitution of a country provides the necessary framework within which the national life moves and has its being, it is proper to examine at the outset the governmental conceptions and political technique of the self-appointed rulers of New Russia. The constitution of July, 1918, more or less amended and amplified in subsequent years, is their handiwork, the mirror of their

ideas of statecraft. A very long document, and one not always easy to understand, it proclaims the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, the official title of the new government. Adopted hurriedly and with but little debate by an assembly of about a thousand members, from which all troublesome opponents had been expelled, an assembly called the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates, it instituted what, according to Lenin, is "an immeasurably higher form of democracy" than the world ever yet had seen. If this is true the world must radically revise its definition of democracy. Article 7 in Chapter IV announces the basis of the republic by saying "that now, at the decisive moment in the struggle between the workers and their exploiters, there can be no place for the latter on any governing body" and other articles render the thought more precise: "The following persons have neither the right to vote nor to be elected: — (*a*) those who employ others for the sake of profit, (*b*) those who live on income not arising from their own works." In other words, all aristocrats and all the middle class, the much talked-of bourgeoisie, manufacturers, business men, professional men, merchants, bankers, as well as those peasants who employ other peasants on their farms, are excluded from the franchise or from holding any position in the government. Only those who gain their livelihood by "productive" labor possess the right to vote. With these restrictions, which are quite formidable, the franchise is given to all men and women who are over eighteen years of age.

But does this "democracy" operate fairly and without favor for those who are declared within the fold? By no means. In electing representatives to a Soviet Congress the industrial workers are given a representative for every 25,000 voters, whereas it takes 125,000 peasants to secure the same privilege. In other words the electoral power of a man who works a machine is five times as great as that of one who works the soil. The same ratio applies to local or provincial bodies as to the national. There is thus no attempt to secure democratic equality. Nor do these unequal democrats vote directly for representatives to a national assembly, as do the voters of France or England or the United States. They vote for delegates to Urban or Provincial or County Soviets which, in turn, elect the delegates to the All-Russian Congress. This elaborate and intricate machinery facilitates the elimination by wire-pulling or, if necessary, by violence, of those who are considered undesirable by those conducting the election.

The highest authority in the state is declared by the constitution to be the All Russian Congress of Soviets, a body consisting of a thousand members or more. This Congress elects a Central Executive Committee of three hundred members, which constitutes the supreme legislative and administrative body in the state and which chooses a Council of People's Commissaries, or Cabinet, consisting of 18 members. In practice it is this latter body which wields the real authority. Even this body is led by an inner group.

This system combines the appearance of democracy with the reality of a narrow dictatorship of at most a half a dozen men, of whom the leaders have thus far been Lenin and Trotsky.

But the real political life of Russia is not to be found in the constitution. It is to be found in the Communist Party which, through its organization, its clubs, its committees of supervision, its manipulation of elections, is able to terrorize the country, to capture the offices of state, and, in short, to establish a monopoly of power. This party, which, on its own showing, has never numbered more than 600,000 members, only a fraction of whom are active, has since 1917 maintained a dictatorship over more than 130,000,000 people. Having seized power by a military *coup d'état*, it has gradually developed agencies of self-protection, a highly centralized administrative system with an immense number of officials under its control, a Red Army, also controlled by it, and a secret police and espionage system, carried out by a body known as the Extraordinary Commission, or Che-ka, a sort of revolutionary tribunal with indefinite powers of inquisition, with its agents everywhere, its torture chambers and its prisons, its summary processes. Established "to combat counter-revolution" the Che-ka counts its victims by the tens of thousands. The Secret Police under the rule of the Tsars was not so sinister or so irresponsible a body.

Using such instruments a small minority has been able to establish a tyranny which has never been surpassed in thoroughness or in scope in the history of the world. Having seized power by force that minority has used its power ruthlessly in order to preserve its acquired position. Organized terror has been its method, frankly admitted by the authors of this bloody and inhuman policy, though often denied by their foreign sympathizers. "No dictatorship of the proletariat is to be thought of without terror and violence," is one of Lenin's illuminating utterances, and another is, "we are firmly for the Red Terror against the capitalist class" — and the capitalist

class included anyone who believed in private property, any peasant, for instance, who would not give up his grain at the demand of a Bolshevist official, anyone, in short, who was either hostile or lukewarm to the ideas and policies of the self-imposed dictators. Terror has been used to crush, not only the bourgeoisie, but the peasantry, and even the other Socialist parties than the one to which the Bolshevists belong. It has been impartially applied to all whom the Bolshevists have, for whatever reason, considered dangerous to their retention of power or to the spread of their dogmas. The success of the Bolshevists in maintaining themselves in power has not been owing to the superiority of their theories but to the superiority of their organization, and to the régime of blood and iron.

The triumph of the Bolshevists has been gained not only by the violent suppression of the bourgeoisie but by the sweeping aside of all other Socialists than those who belong to their own group, particularly the Social Revolutionaries, and by treating them as suspect. Karl Kautsky, leader of the pure Marxians of Germany, states the situation as follows in his book on the *Dictatorship of the Proletariat:* — "The Socialist party which governs Russia to-day gained power in fighting against other Socialist parties, and exercises its authority while excluding other Socialist parties from the executive. The antagonism of the two Socialist movements is not based on small personal jealousies; it is the clashing of two fundamentally distinct methods, that of democracy and that of dictatorship. For us, therefore, Socialism without democracy is unthinkable."

And Kautsky adds: "How can a dictatorship remain at the helm against the will of a majority of the people? Can a Socialist system of production be built up on this foundation? This means the organization of production by society, and requires economic self-government throughout the whole mass of the people. State organization of production by a bureaucracy, or by the dictatorship of a single section of the people, does not mean Socialism. Socialism presupposes that broad masses of the people have been accustomed to organization, that numerous economic and political organizations exist, and can develop in perfect freedom. The Socialist organization of Labor is not an affair of barracks."

Lenin and Trotsky, outraged by this trenchant criticism, proceeded to excommunicate Kautsky from the fold, as they have excommunicated many other Socialist leaders. But this interchange of courtesies indicated the fundamental difference between

the two schools of Socialists. The Social Democrats of Germany, whom the Social Revolutionaries of Russia resembled, believed that Socialism would come into existence slowly, gradually, with the growth of capitalism to such a pitch of concentration that society would at the ripe moment merely take control of a perfected mechanism. They also believed in democratic processes, democratic training for the masses, in factories and political parties, since only a mature and instructed democracy could operate a socialistic system of production and distribution. They did not believe that progress could be made by violence, but only by the slow methods of education and moral suasion. The Bolshevists, on the other hand, impatient of any such leisurely process, believed that the new social system could be hastened enormously by revolutionary action; that, to bring it to pass, democratic methods, with all their delays and hesitations, must be discarded; and that power must be concentrated in the hands of a few leaders who know exactly what they want and who have the energy and audacity necessary for a direct and immediate attack upon the existing system. As the majority of people do not yet believe in communism the work must be done by the enlightened minority. Salvation lies not in democracy, but in the dictatorship of the few for the sake of the proletariat. This dictatorship must be used, first to crush all opponents and clear the ground, then to lay the foundations of the new order. The Bolshevists rejected parliamentary institutions, political democracy as middle-class superstitions, instruments of the exploiting bourgeoisie. It was just this exploiting bourgeoisie which was the enemy and which must be swept aside, with all its works.

This has been done effectively, by taking away their property, by reducing them to starvation or to exile, by denying them any share in the state, by depriving them not only of the right to vote, but of all positive political or civil rights, and by numberless acts of great or petty tyranny. Announcing in the first article of the constitution that all private property in land was abolished without compensation, that the entire land of Russia was national property, that " all forests, treasures of the earth, and waters of general public utility, all implements whether animate or inanimate " belonged to the nation, the new government indicated sufficiently its programme of " socialization," that is, the seizure of all private property and the vesting of it all henceforth in the nation, not only landed property, but factories, mills, mines, railways, banks, as well. Such was the ideal, the

goal to be reached as quickly as possible. The "parasitic strata" of society must be eliminated. Only thus could "the liberation of the toiling masses from the yoke of capital" be achieved.

The work of "liberation" had already begun. The estates of the great landowners had been seized by the peasants on the morrow of the overthrow of the Tsar, long before the constitution had been framed, and had been divided up among themselves, not in any orderly or systematic way, but by the very practical method of each peasant or group of peasants arming against every other, grabbing what he could and holding it if he had the power. But whatever the method, the result was the transfer to a new set of people of probably 135,000,000 acres of land. The landed aristocracy and the gentry were ruined. The state might declare and did declare the land the property of the nation. Should it, however, attempt to enforce this conception it would find that the hundred million peasants considered the land theirs, not the state's. The peasants had a very lively respect for right of private property, not always for the property of others, but always for their own. They did not at all share the belief of the Bolshevists that private property was the root of all evil. But they were willing to profit by the transfer of the possessions of others to themselves.

The nationalization of industries was a more complicated matter. At first the workers in each factory were urged to take over the factory, ignoring the owner, to conduct it, to determine the conditions of labor, to sell or distribute the products. Managers, directors, owners were either driven out or were reduced to receiving orders from their former employees, not giving them. The results were, however, not satisfactory. The workers had not the requisite ability or training to administer such enterprises; moreover the opportunities and incentives to loafing or slacking on their jobs were too good to be missed. They everywhere increased their wages enormously and worked as much as they liked. The result was that chaos reigned in the industrial field, and that production fell off, thus creating a grave situation for a people that needed more rather than less after the long and exhausting war. Moreover the workers, like the peasants, showed a tendency to regard the factories as their own and to hold cloudy or lax views in regard to nationalization.

While this procedure was not a success in increasing the national production, it contributed greatly toward the primary end which the Bolshevists had in view, the ruin of the bourgeoisie.

The next step in industrial experimentation was taken when it was decided on June 28, 1918, to nationalize all factories, that is, to confiscate them. The reason given was the Bolshevists' desire "to put an end to the economic disorganization, to the disorder in the distribution of supplies, and to simplify the dictatorship of the workers and the paupers." By the end of 1919 four thousand concerns with all their property were declared to belong to the nation. It was officially stated that this was "all Russian industry." This was not quite accurate, for the State took over only those factories which were large and well-equipped, leaving the smaller undertakings in the hands of their owners. All industry was to be controlled through the Supreme Economic Council, which had about fifty industrial departments, and a large number of local organs. State ownership and control of the principal means of production, distribution and exchange, such was the economic system set up by the Soviet government. But how would the system work? To work at all some general scheme must be evolved co-ordinating the various kinds of industries, furnishing them the necessary raw materials and the necessary supply of labor and providing also for the proper distribution of the finished products. Such a scheme could not be improvised. Moreover it would require an army of trained administrators, something always difficult to find in Russia, and now particularly so, since whatever training there was was the possession of the hated bourgeoisie, the "crushing" of whom was the primary object of Bolshevik statesmanship. Such a scheme was never forthcoming, though often loudly announced. The "nationalization" of industry was shortly to prove a dismal failure. Production fell off alarmingly and, in some lines, practically ceased. To secure the creation and distribution of even the reduced supply of commodities, the State was compelled to apply the principle of compulsion and of terror to considerable groups of people from whom the incentive of private gain had been removed.

A Communist state, if it is to monopolize all sources of wealth, all means of production, is at least bound to see that its citizens do not starve or die in larger numbers than they do under the capitalistic régime, the régime of private property and private enterprise. Otherwise the new system will seem inferior to the old and the sympathy and devotion even of those who have hailed the dawn with enthusiasm may turn into indifference or even into execration. The condition of the food problem is a test of the efficiency and validity of any social system.

At the very outset of their career as rulers the Bolsheviks had, as we have seen, issued decrees proclaiming the abolition of private property and the nationalization of the land. In practice, however, they had encouraged the peasants to seize the estates of the large landowners and divide them up. The peasants thought that the additions they thus made to their holdings were theirs in full ownership. They did not for a moment think that these new parcels any more than the old belonged to the nation. They belonged to themselves. The peasants were a hundred million strong and they believed intensely in the right of private property. They and their present rulers were poles apart in their economic conceptions. The Bolsheviks, recognizing in the peasants the greatest obstacle to the realization of their schemes proceeded rather softly at first and with discretion. They did not seek to drive into the peasant mind at all costs the blunt fact that what he thought was his own was not his at all. They rather glossed the matter over for the time being by distinguishing between the *ownership* which, it was declared, inhered in the nation, and the actual *possession* of the land which the peasants had enjoyed and intended to enjoy. As long as the peasants were not molested in their occupation of their farms they would not bother their brains much about the new, strange theories of the politicians.

But friction could not long be avoided. The Bolsheviks with their theory of national ownership of the land regarded the peasants as tenants at will of the Soviet Republic, required to render whatever services were necessary for the benefit of society as a whole. Consequently, in order to secure food for the army and the civil servants and for the workers of the cities, the Soviet authorities began to make requisitions upon the peasants. Encountering opposition, they at first tried to divide the peasants among themselves, by stirring up the poor and lazy against the thrifty and industrious. The latter were denounced as bourgeois, as "tight fists," as men who had all the cruel selfishness of the bourgeoisie, who would not give up their grain for the benefit of the workmen of the cities. Committees of the Poor Peasants, or Pauper Committees, were formed in each village, consisting sometimes of the unfortunate, often of loafers and even criminals, to spy upon their fellow peasants and denounce them to the government. Outbreaks occurred between the peasants who possessed something and these Pauper Committees. The government sent troops to support the latter and punish the former. But one result of this policy was that as early as the fall of

1918 the industrious peasants began to reduce the area of their fall sowing. What was the object of raising a surplus, if those who did no work could come and take it away?

This introduction of civil dissension into every village, this policy of inciting the poor peasants against the well-to-do, this discovery that even among the peasants there was a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, and this determination that the former, the "tight fists," must be strangled and crushed, as the better known bourgeois were being crushed, did not result in making communism attractive to the peasants, and naturally did not increase the agricultural production of the country, which was the essential thing. But the government's measures grew harsher, its exactions heavier, and it finally decreed that the entire agricultural produce should be confiscated by the state with the exception of the quantity necessary for the support of the peasants. The latter must hand over to the state all that they raised above the minimum allowed them.

Whereupon the peasants decided not to raise any more than was necessary to feed themselves and their families. At a time when agricultural production should have been increased, it was as a matter of fact decreased, the area under cultivation grew less, because the farmers had no incentive to labor harder, knowing that not they but others would enjoy the fruits of their labor. The only reply on the part of the rulers of Russia to this passive resistance of the peasantry was terrorism in its various forms. This terrorism cost the peasants heavily, and increased the general disorder and distress, but did not increase the area under cultivation or the food supply. On the contrary both grew less from year to year, and the natural and inevitable result was famine, which came in 1921 and which was the ghastly consequence of Bolshevist economics and statesmanship. A hundred million peasants could not be whipped by the dictators of Moscow into creating wealth which those dictators would forthwith seize for purposes of their own. The peasants preferred to hide their grain rather than sow it, preferred to slaughter their livestock for food rather than to see it seized by the Bolshevik authorities.

In 1921, with famine at the door, the governing authorities began to see a light and adopted a different policy, one no longer of confiscation, but of a tax in kind which should be paid by the peasants and which should be much lower than the previous requisition had been. And the peasants were assured the right to sell any surplus which they might raise in the open market, a privilege which they had not previously enjoyed under the Soviet

rule. Whether this return to a system which the Communists had done their best to destroy came too late remained to be seen.

In the field of industry the result of the Bolshevist experiment has also ended in disaster and approximate collapse. Russian industries were badly shaken by the war and the blockade. Under the guidance of the dictators of the proletariat they have been nearly ruined.

The first innovation of the new régime within the industrial field was the decree of November 14, 1917, issued only a week after the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, establishing the system of Workers' Control. The workmen of a given factory were, as we have seen, authorized and encouraged to take over the factory and administer it through a committee elected by themselves, and controlling the multiple operations of production, of sale and of financial management. The capital of the former owner was thus used by the men who had formerly been his employees, and used as they saw fit. The former owner was either entirely eliminated or made to work in some inferior capacity, subject to orders. As the workers had neither the necessary business training nor experience, and as under their own direction they increased their wages enormously and decreased their hours of labor, and as there was no co-ordination among different factories, production fell off rapidly and industrial chaos resulted.

The Bolsheviks, in view of the obvious failure of this method of conducting the manufactures of the country, and in order to put an end to this anarchy, proceeded to set up, in place of workers' control, a system of industrial nationalization. The factories, declared national property, were to be administered henceforth, not by haphazard and unrelated committees of workmen, but by a central and all-embracing bureaucracy with representatives everywhere, a body capable of comprehensive plans and action. But as a matter of fact bureaucratic nationalization of industry proved no more of a panacea than workers' control. The insistent national need was increased production. Instead, production continued to decrease in every line, and most alarmingly. The Bolshevik authorities, in the endeavor to counteract this disastrous tendency, were driven to adopt measures more and more arbitrary and more and more severe, culminating in the adoption of the principle of compulsory labor. That principle had from the beginning been applied to the hated "bourgeois," who had been forced to perform hard and repulsive labor, street cleaning, street paving, removal of offal, unloading of coal, draining marshes. But now, the principle of

compulsory labor was to be applied to the proletariat itself, in spasmodic and partial fashion, it is true, since nothing general and systematic could be carried through in Russia. In the name of state necessity labor must be mobilized and sent wherever needed. "The masses," said Trotsky to his fellow-Communists at a party congress, "should be in a position to be moved about, sent and ordered from place to place in exactly the same way as soldiers. . . . Without this we cannot speak seriously of any organization of industry on a new basis in the present-day conditions of disorganization and starvation."

In harmony with this thought a decree was issued in the spring of 1920 incorporating the whole population in special labor armies. Mobilization was forthwith begun, and continued through the year, though in a random and fragmentary fashion. Extremely severe punishments were threatened for those guilty of the evasion of labor conscription, fines, imprisonment, even trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal. To such a pass had things come in Russia that the industrial proletariat of the cities, the very class whose liberation from age-long exploitation had been the announced purpose and justification of the Bolshevist revolution, found itself the victim and the dupe of its so-called emancipation, threatened with a coercion far more stringent than they had ever known under the odious old régime.

Trotsky's attempted militarization of industry, however, had but very poor results. The industrial proletariat resisted, passively or actively, just as the peasants resisted, the tyranny of the state. Only, being a much less numerous body, it was seriously injured in the contest. Many of the workers left the towns and hid in the country in order to escape conscription. Those who could not escape went on strike, and for this they were punished ruthlessly. Having ground the faces of the former rich or well-to-do, the Bolshevik dictatorship was now grinding the faces of the poor. Moreover the labor of those who were actually compelled to work under this régime was much below normal in efficiency, owing to reduced physical and moral strength. Petrograd workers adopted in September 1920 a resolution to this effect: "We feel as if we were hard labor convicts where everything but our feeding has been made subject to iron rules. We have become lost as human beings, and have been turned into slaves."

Industrial nationalization, therefore, proved no more successful than agricultural nationalization. The nationalization of commerce also was a failure. In April, 1918, all foreign trade

had been nationalized, and in October of that year, all domestic trade. The commercial fleet was declared national property. All stores, big and little, were closed, and their contents confiscated by the state. The state was henceforth to be the sole agent of distribution of commodities. Private trading was made punishable with heavy fines and imprisonment, and in this domain, as in the domain of agriculture and industry, terror was the order of the day.

Industrial, agricultural, commercial nationalization led Russia straight to disaster. The economic life of the country was utterly demoralized and distress became general and intense. The dictatorship of the proletariat was in fact the dictatorship of a petty and unscrupulous minority, and for that minority the clouds were thickening. Its enemies were becoming more numerous as its incompetence and unabashed tyranny were more and more sharply defined against the murky background of a society in rapid process of disintegration. The theories of Bolshevism were discredited by its works.

These artists in destruction finally saw that in order to maintain themselves in power they must alter their course of action, must execute what they called an "economic retreat." Their aim had been to destroy capitalism and to bring about the world revolution. The world revolution, that is to say, universal communism, had failed to appear and the chances of its coming had been steadily growing less. Meanwhile the breakdown of agriculture, industry and transportation had brought unutterable woe upon Russia, and not that new and happier era which the Communists had promised. Throwing the blame for their failure upon the "rapacious" and "parasitic" classes of "capitalistic" countries and upon the stubborn, unintelligent Russian peasants, the Soviet authorities began to compromise with capitalism. In a speech delivered on March 15, 1921, Lenin announced that they must satisfy the peasants "economically," must consent to their having the right to buy and sell in open market as under the old régime, or "it will be impossible to maintain the power of the proletariat in Russia, in view of the slowing down of the international revolution." And he added certain observations which might, without undue intellectual strain, have been made much earlier: "In Russia the industrial workers are in the minority and the small farmers overwhelmingly in the majority"; "the transformation of the entire psychology of the petty peasants is a labor which will require generations"; "it is time to admit frankly that the peasants manifestly refuse to accept pro-

letarian dictatorship any longer. . . . We must grant freer economic relations between the workers and the peasants. . . . Freedom of economic relations means free trade, and free trade signifies a return to capitalism. Those who believe that in this Russia of peasants socialism can be reached, simply believe in Utopia."

These utterances sound like a complete renunciation of the whole Communistic experiment. Such was, however, not at all what Lenin had in mind. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Concessions must be made to the long-established habits and prejudices of men, and the wise person is he who, in such circumstances, makes concessions enough to enable him to gain time. Lenin's proposals, soon embodied in decrees, were that henceforth the peasant's crops should not be seized by the state but should belong to the peasant, that he should pay a tax in kind, and that he might freely sell any surplus he might possess, and might buy any manufactured article in open market. In other words, shops might open again and might engage in private commerce. But such individual enterprise was to be encouraged only in the case of petty merchants. A certain freedom was to exist, henceforth, for small capitalists, but big enterprises, big capitalism, considered so dangerous, were to be still under the control of the state.

But how could merchants secure the manufactured articles which the peasants needed and which they were now to be permitted to buy, — provided they should have any agricultural surplus with which to pay for them? The industries of Russia, shot all to pieces, could themselves neither secure the raw materials nor produce the desired commodities in sufficient quantities to meet the needs. The authorities now invited practical manufacturers, experts, to come back and start up the factories once more and resume their accustomed role of leadership and direction. But factories cannot be run without capital and the dictators of Moscow had for three years done their best to destroy capital and capitalists, and had been eminently successful. Russian capital was pretty nearly, if not quite, extinct. As it could not be called miraculously into existence by a mere decree or by many decrees something else had to be done, something on a large scale, too, for in 1921 the food situation was such that widespread famine could be easily foreseen and hunger and misery often make men desperate and lead them into dangerous courses.

"The year 1921," says Professor Miliukov, "will be remem-

bered as the first year of the great Russian Famine. None similar to it can be found in Russian history. It is as unparalleled and unprecedented as the events which caused it." Miliukov adds that the famine began "as early as 1919 and 1920 with the shrinking of the planted area to three-fourths and two-fifths of its normal size." In 1921 the area under cultivation fell to half that planted before the war. Even had the crops been excellent within that restricted area there would have been a dreadful shortage of food. And the crops were poor! "The worst of it is," says this author, "that this situation is bound to last as long as the causes that brought it about last. Famine has become endemic in Russia."

What could the Government do to conjure or to mitigate the crisis? Half measures would surely not suffice. The ruin of industry, the decline in the productivity of labor, the diminution of the area under cultivation, the demoralization of the railroads, the fantastic depreciation of the currency, how could these and still other evils be remedied?

By an appeal to capital. Such was the only answer that this Government, founded on the negation of the right of capital to exist, could give. For four years the Soviet Government had been living on the reserves of the capitalistic era which had preceded its advent to power. The gold it had found in the Imperial Treasury and which had largely kept it going was, however, approaching exhaustion. There still remained at its disposition early in 1921 about £50,000,000, a paltry amount, considering the situation. When these were spent, what then? There could be no appeal to free Russian capital because none such existed. There could be no recourse to private Russian banks, for one of the first measures of the Communist Dictatorship had been to abolish all private banks and to confiscate their assets.

There was nothing left to do except to appeal to foreign capital, to appeal for help to those countries which had refused to accept the economic illumination that had shone for four years from the towers of the Kremlin, and which had continued along in the old and narrow ruts worn by ages of economic ignorance. The Soviet Government now set out to tap this inviting source of supply. All through 1921 and 1922 it made repeated and varied efforts to get "credits" from abroad; i.e., to get the aid of English, French, American capitalists, capitalists, in short, of any stripe. It asked for loans from foreign governments and, largely at the desire of Lloyd George,

it was given the opportunity to present its arguments at two international conferences, held in 1922, at Genoa and the Hague. Lloyd George was of the opinion that trade with Russia was necessary not only for Russian reconstruction but for European reconstruction; that nothing could be considered stable in Europe as long as so large a part of the continent stood outside the ordinary international relations and activities; that, if trade could be renewed between Russia and the other nations, not only would the grave problem of unemployment in the latter be put in the way of solution, but that Russia, by the renewed and daily association with those countries, would come to abandon her peculiar economic theories and would slip back into the old familiar grooves of private industry and individual enterprise. With an optimism which was far from being warranted by the facts the British Premier believed that the leopard had already changed many of his spots and would be only too glad to change the others if given a little encouragement.

The Russians on their side saw their opportunity in this manifest desire of other nations to resume trade with them. Wishing to emerge from the isolation in which they had stood for several years, desiring foreign recognition of their government, and particularly anxious for foreign capital, now that Russian capital had been destroyed, the dictators of Moscow proceeded to whet the foreign appetite by dangling before the world of speculators roseate pictures of great wealth to be easily acquired if only they would co-operate in a reasonable spirit with the Soviet authorities. These authorities, desperately needing money, developed an elaborate scheme of putting up the vast resources of Russia to the highest bidder — on conditions and for a consideration. Those resources, mines, forests, fisheries, should be put into the market. Foreigners who might be willing to invest their money in them should of course be guaranteed that they could retain their concessions long enough to enable them to make handsome profits. They must be assured that there would be, in their cases, no nationalization, no confiscation, no requisitions, things for which contemporary Russia was unpleasantly famous. They must also be assured of the right to hire and direct Russian labor so as to be able to carry on their enterprises.

In other words Russia was to be offered up to the tender mercies of foreign exploitation. That this would mean economic subjection, a condition similar to that of Turkey or China, a régime of capitulations and extra-territoriality, and special rights that native Russians could not enjoy, made no difference

to the Soviet Government as long as thereby it might hope to remain in power. No compunctions as to the probable fate of Russian labor under such a régime deterred it in its desire to carry through its scheme. Would these foreign capitalists be given rights of compulsion over their Russian workmen or would the Russian authorities use compulsion in order to supply them with laborers and to keep the latter up to the mark? It must be admitted that this champion of the poor and the oppressed, this enemy of all exploitation of the masses by "rapacious" capitalists, showed no weak and silly sentimentality in this crisis nor any morbid passion for consistency. But what is to be said, on the other hand, of the spectacle offered by the other nations, several of which had been Russia's late allies and friends and who owed much to Russia's indispensable and great assistance during the years of the war? They were showing, some of them, a repulsive keenness to profit by the weakness of the Russian state.

Thirty-five nations, including Russia and Germany, attended the Genoa Conference (April–May 1922). The premier of Great Britain was the center, round whom buzzed all the intrigues, all the greed, all the appetites of Europe. France attended the conference out of deference to the wishes of Lloyd George, but with no faith in the desirability or the possibility of any agreement with a nation which repudiated its debts and which denied the right of private property. The United States, urged to attend, declined, but sent a word of cooling wisdom which was not at all to the taste of the sponsors of the conference. "It is idle," wrote Secretary Hughes, "to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition, by firm guarantees, of private property, the sanctity of contract, and the rights of free labor." Until these things existed in Russia no co-operation would be possible.

The great illusion of Genoa, namely that it was possible to pacify and unite Europe and launch it upon a prosperous career, by an agreement with Russia, was soon dispelled. Another illusion, entertained by many, that Bolshevism was a thing of the past, that its famous "economic retreat" indicated a complete reversion of Russia to the type prevalent in the rest of the world, also soon went into the discard. Russia, by dint of being told that Europe could not exist without her, felt her position very strong. Having ruined Russia the dictators of Moscow appealed to Europe for immediate help but they did not abandon their

fundamental tenets. It was proved at the Conference of Genoa, to the satisfaction even of those who would fain be blind, that the basic principles of Bolshevism, the destruction of capitalism, and the annihilation of the capitalist class throughout the world, had not been abandoned but were as firmly held as ever by those who controlled the Russian state. Two antipodal systems of thought cannot be harmonized by any verbal ingenuity, however consummate it may be. Before the governments of Europe would loan money to Russia they must know whether that country recognized the obligation to pay them what they had already loaned her in the past, a debt which she had formally repudiated. But the Soviet representatives declined to give the necessary assurance that those debts would be paid. Before the governments could urge their private citizens to invest their money in Russian enterprises they must have assurance that those who had invested in such enterprises in the past would get their factories back, they having been promptly confiscated by the Bolsheviks upon their arrival in power. Such assurances were not forthcoming. It was merely stated that, if the powers would recognize the Soviet authority as a legal government in full and regular standing in the family of civilized nations, and would make Russia a large loan, then these other matters might be discussed in later negotiations.

Mr. Lloyd George had urged the calling of the Genoa Conference, and the participation in it of Russia and Germany, as a means of uniting Europe, as a means of founding the general peace and prosperity of a distracted world by a general spirit of co-operation and amity. But at the very outset of the conference Russia and Germany concluded a treaty of alliance, at Rapallo, on Easter Sunday, 1922, which showed that at least Russia was aiming not at a united but at a divided Europe. This action was immediately damaging in its effects upon the conference and it opened up an alarming future. Were Germany and Russia, both of which, for different reasons, were bitter enemies of the Treaty of Versailles, preparing to attack and destroy that settlement and erect one of their own in its place? The Treaty of Rapallo, which proved to be the sole positive achievement of Genoa, was a sharp warning to the former Allies that they would better remain united if they cared anything about preserving the fruits of their victory.

"The Genoa Conference," says an American diplomatist, "was a market for the purchase and sale of stolen property." It broke up because those who believed in private property and

those who believed in its destruction could find no common meeting ground. The Hague Conference which met a month later to continue the derisory discussion was shortly wrecked on the same jagged rock.

Meanwhile Russia had concluded an agreement with Germany, a state which like herself was willing to fish in troubled waters, whereby she received the official recognition she had demanded, was given back the Russian embassy in Berlin, and secured at least, it appeared, one good customer. It remained to be seen whether, unable to get general recognition, Russia could get piecemeal recognition, first from one nation and then another. More important still, it remained to be seen whether, if capitalistic governments who would not co-operate in loaning money to the Soviet autocracy and in encouraging their citizens to invest in Russian "securities," there were still private capitalists in those countries adventurous enough to do so in the face of the warning that, if the waters proved too deep, their governments would not aid in pulling them out.

The Supreme Council in calling the Genoa Conference said, in disclaiming any thought of intervening in the domestic concerns of Russia: "It is the right of each country to choose for itself the system it prefers." But this is precisely what the Russian people has not been permitted by the Bolshevik dictators to do. The Bolshevik government, founded on a military *coup d'état*, drove out of doors a constituent assembly which had been popularly elected, and has confiscated, not only property, but the rights of man, free elections, free speech, freedom of the press and of public meeting, civil and political freedom, in short, democracy. Lenin frankly declares that "liberty is a bourgeois superstition."

We have thus far concerned ourselves with the political and economic history of the Bolshevist experiment; an experiment that has been going on since 1917. We have seen its rise, its development, and its present-day tendencies, which indicate a limited and somewhat superficial reversal of policy though not of ultimate aim. Russia, which declares itself a Federated Soviet Republic, is none of these things, unless the dictatorship of a petty minority is a republic. Whatever federation exists is very slight and largely fictitious, and the soviets, that is, popular and democratic organizations of workmen and peasants vested with supreme political power, no longer exist. They also have been confiscated by this highly confiscatory government. They have been purged of all elements of opposition, have been brought

under the control of the government, have been made a mere instrument of the Communist Party. The men now in power in Russia are not generally workmen and never have been workmen but belong in large measure to the so-called intellectual class, a few lawyers, many journalists and professional revolutionaries. As for the peasants they enjoyed a larger direct representation in the first Duma under Nicholas II than they have ever enjoyed in the controlling councils of the Soviet Republic. One of the charges that may be justly brought against the Bolsheviks is that by their resort to traditional and exaggerated methods of arbitrary rule they cut short that promising democratic movement which began after the first revolution in 1905, and which began again after the overthrow of the Empire in March, 1917.

Not only is Russia exhausted, impoverished and disorganized economically, but she is much reduced in size. The advent of the Bolsheviks to power was the signal for the disruption of the state. Everywhere the border peoples broke away from the central government and declared their independence. Finland and Poland seized the occasion to throw off a yoke they had long hated. The Baltic provinces, Courland, Esthonia and Livonia, eager to be free alike of their German baron overlords and their Russian autocrats, broke loose and later appeared as two small, democratic, peasant republics, Esthonia and Latvia. Lithuania also reappeared upon the map. The Ukraine, a vast region of South Russia, tried to do the same and succeeded momentarily. In the southeast, in the region of the Caucasus, arose the republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Erivan, Armenia, and the long stretches of Siberia broke up into fragments. We have seen how far the Bolsheviks were willing to go in recognizing this national disruption in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Germany was required by the Treaty of Versailles to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which the western Allies had never recognized. During the next two years, 1919 and 1920, the Soviet Government, which had been ready to make peace at any price with Germany and Austria, was almost continually at war with the non-Bolshevist elements in former Russia, led by Denikin, Yudenitch, Kolchak, Wrangel, and with the Lithuanians, Letts, Esthonians and Poles. These were in large measure civil wars. The Moscow government was able in the end, by developing a large and well-disciplined Red Army, to put down its internal enemies who questioned its right to rule and who tried

to overthrow it. It also overran the Ukraine and terminated its brief dream, putting in its place the fiction of an independent allied Soviet régime, — a fiction and nothing more. Later it did practically the same with the shadowy republics of the Caucasus. In the course of two or three years the militaristic energy of the Bolsheviks had won back much of what they provisionally lost, and these arch-internationalists had revealed a strong sense of nationalism. This sense had been reinforced and utilized by the conflicts which had gone on at the same time with foreign troops, with the English in the Archangel and Murmansk regions, with the Czechs, Japanese, and Americans in Siberia, with the Roumanians and the French in southern Russia, with the Esthonians, the Letts, and the Poles toward the west.

The total result of this complicated series of insurrections and wars was the re-establishment over a large part of former Russia of the power of the Russian state. Sometimes that re-establishment, as already hinted, was more or less disguised by an illusory recognition of semi-independence or half-alliance as " Associated Republics," as in the case of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and the Far East. In reality, however, no one was deceived by such circumlocutions.

But, despite the vigor and general success of the Bolshevik authorities, they nevertheless do not rule over as much of the earth's surface as did Nicholas II. Finland, the Baltic provinces now known as Esthonia and Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are gone and the Russia of today is a reduced Russia. Counting these losses and including also the losses of the Great War, 1,700,000 killed and probably several times as many dying as a result of its indirect effects, and including also the losses of the civil wars, of the emigration of two or three million of the former privileged and bourgeois classes, and the mortality occasioned by the economic exhaustion, the under-nourishment and starvation of immense numbers, and we have a notable diminution of the population of Russia. About 180,000,000 in 1914, that population has probably shrunk to something like 130,000,000 today. The abnormal increase in the death rate which has characterized the last few years will not quickly disappear and will continue to exact a heavy toll, owing to the epidemics and the unsanitary conditions of life, which cannot, even under the most favorable circumstances, be immediately stopped or remedied.

No country has in modern times experienced so violent or so complete a break with its past as has contemporary Russia.

The Romanoffs are gone, the nobility is ruined and killed or scattered. The elements of a monarchical reaction are few and apparently impotent. The land has been divided quite beyond recall, it is reasonably safe to say. The bourgeoisie has been crushed and perhaps half of its number are eating the bitter bread of exile. This colossal emigration of the bourgeoisie is a very serious matter as robbing the country of the ability, the training, the technical equipment, the enterprise of an educated class, never very large in Russia, a class which will be sorely needed in the work of future national restoration. The class of industrialists, which had sprung up only during the last two or three decades of the Empire has been swept away by the destruction of industry. The industrial working classes have lost the gains they so painfully acquired in the Factory Acts of the closing nineteenth and opening twentieth centuries, and have been frightfully worn down by the present misgovernment. The men of the liberal professions have been decimated, the intellectual, literary and scientific world has been bereft of many, if not of most, of its men of achievement and promise. Russia, which will need leaders in the future as never before, will have increased difficulty in finding them.

Meanwhile the peasantry, the overwhelming mass of the people, have benefited from the revolution, in one respect. They have more land. Russia will long be a peasant state, and all theories of communism will break themselves in vain against that granite block. Whatever hope there is for the future seems to lie in that sorely harassed, illiterate, ignorant, but hardy and vigorous class.

The old régime in Russia has disappeared forever. What the new régime will be is wrapped in obscurity. That it will be a peasant democracy seems as likely a prophecy as any. But when? At this point even the prophet may well refrain from attempting to exercise his art. Divination is a venturesome and presumptuous business.

At the present moment the government of Russia is the very negation of democracy and of all that democracy implies.

CHAPTER XLVII

FRANCE SINCE THE WAR

The close of the war left the French Republic in a position of pre-eminence on the continent of Europe. Her government, long considered by many as the embodiment of the weakness of democracy, had proved itself rather the embodiment of its strength. For half a century overshadowed in the mind of the world by the power and prestige of the German Empire, France had been regarded not only as an inferior state, but as one whose inferiority to her neighbor was constantly increasing and was destined inevitably to continue to increase. The reasons for this gloomy outlook were commonly considered to lie in the nature of her government and in the character of her people. But the war had abundantly proved the fatuous superficiality of such critics. Both government and people had given a memorable account of themselves, and the Cassandras of decadence were estopped, at least temporarily, from their doleful incantations. France had been, from the beginning to the end, the heart of the Entente. Her valor, abundantly attested upon the battlefields of Europe from the time of Julius Caesar to that of Napoleon Bonaparte, had suffered no diminution and was universally recognized. The genius of her commanders was unsurpassed. The will of her people was made of iron. The pluck, the vigor, the bull-dog tenacity, the mastery of self, shown by the French democracy during the interminable struggle had brilliantly demonstrated the essential soundness of the national life. The men of Verdun were not the products of chance but of long training and a rich inheritance, both of mind and character.

If there was any fitness in things, it was inevitable that the Peace Conference, which was to sign and seal the verdict of the war, should be held in Paris, if it were not to be held in Berlin, and should be under the presidency of the veteran Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, whose indomitable courage and prodigious energy had been a tower of strength, a bulwark and a blazing beacon in the most desperate crisis of the war, whose driving force and swift intelligence had inspired his people with renewed

confidence and resolution. Long known as "The Tiger" in the animated and often venomous party struggles of the time, Clemenceau was now universally acclaimed as the Father of Victory and parliament took the earliest occasion to declare that he had "deserved well of the country," the highest official praise that can come to any Frenchman. It was this man who was to preside over the assembly of diplomats who were soon seen converging from all the corners of the globe upon the city which for four years had daily heard the thunders of the world's greatest war.

Had Clemenceau died at the Psalmist's appointed age, he would have been known only to those curious of the details of parliamentary politics. But he had lived long enough to have an opportunity to render a unique and mighty service to his country and, consequently, to the world. And now as head of the French delegation to the Peace Conference, and as the president of the Conference, he was to be one of the makers of the treaty with Germany. Fortified with a striking vote of confidence of the Chamber of Deputies (398 to 93), the man who had done so much to forge the victory now proceeded to try his hand in a very different and unaccustomed line of work.

The deliberations and decisions of the Conference of Paris have already been described. Important for all the world, for no country were they more important than for France. The provisions of the treaty, its merits and defects, were destined quite inevitably to dominate the political life of France for many years to come, furnishing the public, the press, the politicians with abundant material for debate. French domestic policy was henceforth to be determined by the necessities or possibilities of her foreign policy, or rather foreign and domestic policies were to be hopelessly intertangled, each reacting upon the other, sometimes in surprising ways.

Clemenceau's relations with his parliament during the Conference of Paris aroused considerable dissatisfaction and apprehension. He refused to consult it with regard to the terms of peace or to communicate to it those terms until the treaty was completed and had been signed by himself and his colleagues. The Chamber of Deputies indicated its dislike of this method, its sense that it ought not to be confronted with a *fait accompli*, which it might be forced to accept against its judgment, the bad along with the good. The Senate issued an unofficial manifesto, signed by every member present, reminding the Prime Minister of what France wished to have put into the treaty.

All this to no avail, for Clemenceau adhered to his policy of making the treaty without the intervention of the legislature.

The text of the Peace Treaty, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, was on June 30 laid before the Chamber of Deputies, along with the Franco-British and Franco-American Conventions accompanying it and considered by the French as virtually parts of it, as essential elements of the general compromise of conflicting and divergent interests worked out by the Conference. The attitude of Parliament toward the treaty was lukewarm. To many of its members the provisions for ensuring the security of France along the Rhine seemed unsatisfactory, insufficient. As the one dominant thought of France throughout the war and the dominant thought during the peace negotiations was, and the dominant thought today is, how to prevent another invasion from Germany, which had invaded France four times within a hundred years and would, in the practically unanimous opinion of the French people, try to invade her again, in order to wipe out the humiliation of the present war and realize her long cherished aims, the question of security was fundamental. Being a country of sixty million people while France was one of only forty million Germany was a terrible menace, how terrible any one who had lived through the Great War must recognize. Many members of the French parliament felt that the French delegation at the Conference had not secured the necessary guarantees in this vital matter.

There was much criticism in this connection of the Covenant of the League of Nations, even on the part of those who had long been advocates of peaceful methods of settling international disputes and who were sympathetic with the purpose of the League. The French representatives on the commission which had framed the articles concerning the League had tried to make those articles stronger, not weaker. They wished the League to possess sufficient force, physical force, to be able actually to maintain the peace of the world, the avowed purpose of its creation. The treaty provided for the disarmament of Germany, or rather the reduction of the German army to a moderate size. It provided also that the Allies should maintain an army in Germany for a possible fifteen years to enforce these stipulations. But after that period who could know whether Germany was living up to her treaty agreements? Her word alone France did not regard as sufficient. The French delegates, therefore, urged that a commission be established with powers of inspection to see whether she was keeping her promises or

not. M. Léon Bourgeois proposed an amendment to the Covenant to this effect. It was defeated, probably largely because of the opposition of the American and English delegations.

On a more serious matter the French had met the same opposition and had seen their views rejected. They desired the creation of an international military force strong enough to enforce the decisions of the League, in other words to prevent immediately the attack of one nation upon another. As the purpose of the League was the preservation of peace, it should be given the power to preserve it. The articles of the Covenant seemed to the French delegation quite inadequate in this regard. Those articles provided that disputes between members of the League should be submitted to certain processes of arbitration or conciliation and that no disputant should go to war until after a certain time and then only under certain conditions. Article XVI provided that violation of these provisions would be considered an act of war against all the other members of the League, which would immediately sever all trade and financial relations with the offending state, — the famous economic blockade, — and that the Council of the League should " recommend " to the several governments what military, naval, or air forces they should severally contribute for the protection of the covenants of the League.

The word " recommend " did not seem to the French a sufficient guarantee of action. They were thinking of a very real and very concrete possibility, of a thing that had occurred to them twice within fifty years and might occur again. The Council might " recommend," but the nations were to decide what quotas they would send, if any. While they were discussing, or while they were raising and equipping their contingents, the damage might be done. France knew what it had meant to wait two years for England to get really ready for the late war, and three years for America. She did not care for a repetition of any such desperate and doubtful a period of waiting, of sickening tension.

Her representatives accordingly urged the Conference to give the League an international army, with a professional staff, ready to act, whenever peace should be threatened. It did not seem to them either sensible or safe to discuss the establishment and equipment of a fire department among forty or fifty nations after the blaze has broken out.

The French motion for such a military force was voted down, for reasons which are none too clear, since the debates of the com-

mission have not been published. But the insistent French apprehension had the effect of leading England and America to sign nearly identical agreements promising France aid, under certain conditions, if wantonly attacked. But England was not to be bound unless America ratified the Franco-American treaty, nor was America to be bound unless England ratified the Franco-British treaty.

Such had been some of the criticisms of the proposed League made by the French delegation at the Conference. They had desired to endow the League with some elements of force. They had wished to give it bones and sinews. But they had been voted down.

Now that the Treaty of Versailles, with the Covenant, was before the Parliament, it was quite natural that the same arguments should be heard there, and should also be given expression by the press. The French considered the method set up in the Covenant for the preservation of peace as too vague, too uncertain, too poorly organized. They did not consider that the first twenty-six articles of the Treaty of Versailles gave them any guarantee of real security. Objection was also made to the treaty as a whole on the ground that it did not provide clear or adequate means for its own execution but left too much to future adjustment among the Allies, which adjustment might lead to friction and even to serious crises, a premonition which was destined to prove only too well justified. As a matter of fact the treaty, thus critically received at the outset in France, became increasingly unpopular in succeeding years. The ablest and most luminous defense of it in Parliament was made by Tardieu, Clemenceau's right hand man in the negotiations. His argument was later elaborated and powerfully presented in a book entitled "The Peace."

But Parliament, however lukewarm its admiration might be, knew that there was nothing else to do than ratify the document which had been worked out with such difficulty and which necessarily represented a compromise. The treaty was ratified by the Chamber on October 2, 1919, by the strong majority of 372 to 53. Seventy-three members refrained from voting. Nine days later it was ratified unanimously by the Senate.

Now that the treaty was out of the way, it was possible to turn to other matters. The election of a new Parliament was long overdue, the present one having prolonged its life beyond its legal term, owing to the war. The election of 1919 was Clemenceau's last triumph. He himself sounded the keynote

when, speaking in Strasbourg early in November, he appealed to his countrymen to realize that the supreme duty of every Frenchman was to work, to work, to work; that only by unremitting and accelerated labor could they restore the ravages of war and enjoy the benefits of their victory; that internal peace was the primal duty of the hour. He emphasized the necessity of a stable government. The electors ought to return a large and solid majority of moderate men whose loyalty to republican institutions would be unquestioned. He pointed out the enemy, namely Bolshevism, which had made considerable progress in the land. The contest was between the National *Bloc*, comprising the moderate and conservative classes, and the Socialists, already partially affected by the ideas of Moscow and becoming more and more revolutionary. The result of the French election of 1919 showed an entirely different tendency from that revealed by the general election held at about the same time in Italy and that indicated by bye-elections in England. The moderate parties were returned in larger numbers than before and the conservative parties increased considerably. On the other hand the radical parties suffered great losses and the Socialists sank from a membership in the Chamber of over a hundred to one of 68, and several of their most conspicuous leaders had failed to be returned.

The nation thus emphatically repudiated Socialism, for out of 610 members in the new chamber over 500 belonged to the *Bloc*. Nevertheless, this does not tell the whole story, for, while fewer Socialists were elected to the Chamber the total popular vote for Socialist candidates was not far from 2,000,000, practically the same as in the elections of 1914.

After the elections to the Chamber in November came those to the Senate in January, 1920. They did not greatly alter the party complexion of that body. Among the new senators chosen was Raymond Poincaré, the President of the Republic, whose term of office was to expire on February 18.

Normally the election of the president of the French Republic takes place one month before the expiration of the presidential term. The newly chosen Parliament, therefore, proceeded on January 17, 1920, to the election of the man who should succeed Poincaré. To the surprise of the world, though not at all to the surprise of Frenchmen, that man did not prove to be Clemenceau, the "Father of Victory," whose popularity throughout the country was immense. In the party caucus held before the formal election by the National Assembly, Clemenceau

received fewer votes than did Paul Deschanel (b. 1856), at that time president of the Chamber of Deputies. Clemenceau immediately withdrew his candidacy and Deschanel was chosen President of the Republic by 734 votes out of 888 cast. The reasons why the highest honor within the gift of France was not bestowed upon the man who had done so much to save France from a German victory were various. The election was not by the people directly, who probably would have voted for Clemenceau, but by the Parliament, sitting as a National Assembly, and Parliament was filled with the enemies whom Clemenceau had made during a long political career, men whom he had opposed or driven from office or lashed with his particularly bitter tongue. The opportunity for the settlement of old scores was too good to miss. Again, all the Socialists, defeatists, all those Bolshevistically inclined, men whom Clemenceau had ruthlessly and successfully hounded and pounded during the war were naturally against him. Then there were many who, fully recognizing that he had been the right man in the right place as the great war minister, did not believe that he possessed the qualities needed in the presidency, the tact, the temperament, the social amenities which the occupant of that largely ceremonial office ought to possess. And there were many who thought it highly unwise to choose as president in a time so grave a man who was seventy-nine years of age.

Clemenceau now retired to private life, subsequently making long trips to Egypt, and to Japan, and proving that, if he was too old for the presidency, he was still young enough to hunt big game in the jungles of India.

Paul Deschanel, the ninth President of France, was admirably qualified for the office. Coming of an old republican family — his father, Emile Deschanel, a distinguished professor of literature at the Collège de France, had bitterly opposed Napoleon III and had been exiled by the latter — he had been introduced into politics by Gambetta, and had long been a member of the Chamber of Deputies and several times its president. Occupying that position during the World War he had played a great part as the national orator. "There were, indeed," says a recent writer, "few occasions of sorrow or thanksgiving which his eloquence did not either lighten or intensify. He delivered orations more frequently than he made speeches. Whether it was to hold German infamy up to execration, to sing the splendors of the dead of France, to pay a glowing tribute to an ally's achievements, or to console the widow and the orphan

and spur on the living fighter, he always had at his command the delicate, if somewhat artificial, style of speech of the great Latins, which combined both the structure of the artist and the feeling of a man."

The new president was installed in office on February 18, 1920. His administration opened brilliantly, but it was destined to end shortly and tragically. In May, while travelling by night on an official journey, he fell from the window of his state-room while the train was proceeding at good speed. Several hours elapsed before anyone on the train noticed the accident. Meanwhile the President, who, strangely enough, had not been seriously injured by his fall, was able to walk to the nearest signalman's box. But the shock, coupled probably with the fact that he had long been working at too high a pitch, brought about a nervous breakdown of so serious a nature as to compel him to resign the presidency (Sept. 16, 1920). Though he later appeared to be recovering and was even elected to the Senate early in 1921, his work was over, for the following year he died (April 28, 1922).

He was succeeded in the presidency by Alexandre Millerand (b. 1859), at the time of his election Prime Minister. Millerand was one of the leaders of the French Bar, had served in several cabinets, and had been called to head the War Department immediately after the beginning of hostilities in 1914, at a time when the deficiencies of the military machine as revealed by the battle of the Marne had to be made good and that, too, speedily. In the discharge of this heavy task, he had shown energy and doggedness. After the war he had been sent as Commissioner-General to the newly recovered provinces of Alsace-Lorraine where he was confronted with a tangle of delicate and difficult problems, in the solution of which he displayed great tact, intelligence and courage. Cutting official red tape with cheerful alacrity, not afraid to assume responsibility, going directly at the object, intent upon securing results, he laid securely the bases of the new organization of the provinces, inaugurated carefully matured policies for the future, started a governmental tradition, and, incidentally, won great personal popularity among the Alsatians. Called to Paris to form a ministry upon the resignation of Clemenceau, his prestige continued to increase, and when M. Deschanel was compelled to give up his office, Millerand was chosen by 695 votes out of 892 to succeed him (September 23, 1920.).

Since the conclusion of the war two great and insistent

problems have been of commanding, almost exclusive, importance in the political life of France, the one the problem of national reconstruction, the other that concerned with the practical application of the Treaty of Versailles, largely the problem of reparations. The two problems were most closely connected and each presented a multitude of aspects. The one was primarily a domestic question, the other primarily a foreign question, but the interlocking of the two in this case went far toward justifying the dictum that in reality the only politics that count are foreign politics, so powerful, so pervasive, so determinative is the repercussion upon the internal life of a nation of its foreign relations. While this dictum does not contain the whole truth, since history cannot be compressed into a single formula, yet it is one which democracies have been particularly prone to neglect and which they have a particular reason to remember. Contemporary history ought to be sufficient to prove even to the most provincially-minded that foreign events have a profound and often a painfully palpable influence upon the individual life of every citizen in other countries.

The history of the application of the Treaty of Versailles, and especially the relations between France and England, the two chief agents in its enforcement, is a complicated, difficult and unfinished chapter. It has taken the form of numerous international conferences, Boulogne, Spa, Hythe, San Remo, Cannes, Genoa, the Hague, most of which have had to wrestle with the problem of reparations, reparations being the contribution which Germany must make toward the reconstruction of the countries she saw fit, in her great adventure, to invade and injure.

The injuries she had done to France were appalling. It would require many volumes to recount them. A summary statement cannot be made vivid enough or adequate enough to enable the reader even remotely to realize the sweeping extent of the destruction or the formidable nature of the problem of restoration.

There was, first, the loss in man-power, 1,364,000 killed, 740,000 mutilated. Besides these, 3,000,000 men had been wounded, and this number represented a grave diminution in the labor resources of the country. Nearly 500,000 had been taken prisoners and nearly all of these returned from Germany ill or weakened in health. The most serious aspect of the matter was that fifty-seven per cent of the soldiers between the ages of eighteen and thirty-two had been killed, that is to say more than half of the young generation, a loss that would be felt

for many decades. "In order to grasp the full significance of these figures," says M. Tardieu, "apply them to the population of the United States. Had American losses been on the French scale, it would have meant the raising by Americans of about twenty-six and a half million soldiers, of whom four millions would have died."

"The decline in man-power went hand in hand with a decline in financial power," says the same author, who estimates that the net cost of the war, deducting all that Germany had to reimburse, was 150 billions of francs, and this enormous burden was accompanied with an enormous decrease in the nation's capital, owing to the destruction of the war.

For more than four years and three months France had been the principal theater of war. Enormous destruction was a natural and inevitable result. But much was destroyed, not as an unavoidable consequence of the clash of hostile forces moving back and forth over the country, but wantonly, intentionally; not because of military necessity, not because serving legitimate military purposes, but because of a deliberate purpose on the part of the invaders to weaken France so thoroughly that, long after the peace, she would not be able to compete in the markets of the world. Over 4000 towns or villages were either occupied by the Germans or necessarily evacuated by the French, and in these nearly 300,000 dwellings had been utterly destroyed and over 400,000 badly injured. Over 6,000 public buildings, churches, town halls, schools, had been destroyed and more than 10,000 seriously damaged, and many of these were among the architectural or historical glories of France. "With the destruction of towns, dwellings, and public buildings went also the destruction of shops, mills, factories, mines, and industrial establishments of every kind. The number of industrial establishments partially or totally destroyed was about twenty thousand. . . . The destruction of buildings was only a part, and often only the smaller part, of the industrial loss, the remainder including machinery, tools, equipment, and appliances of every kind, most of which were either entirely destroyed or else rendered useless by the destruction of essential parts. With the loss of machinery went also, in most cases, heavy losses of raw materials, stocks, and finished products."[1]

[1] These facts, as well as those which follow, are taken from William MacDonald's *Reconstruction in France* (1922), an admirably comprehensive, thorough, and precise description, which everyone should read, of the remarkable courage, activity, and achievements of the French in the work of rebuilding their country since the close of the war.

Railways were either wrecked as the enemy withdrew or had been so worn down by the enormous amount of traffic they had had to sustain as to be almost worthless. Over 2400 kilometers of railway on the main lines and about as many on the small local lines in the devastated area needed restoration, partial or complete, as did over 2000 stations, tunnels, and bridges. Over 50,000 kilometers of highway, with bridges and culverts, needed reconstruction, as did a thousand kilometers of canals.

"To this destruction or serious impairment of houses, public buildings, factories, mines, and transport equipment is added unprecedented injury to the soil itself. An enormous mass of defensive works and military equipment cumbered the surface of the devastated zone from one end to the other." Barbed wire, trenches, gun emplacements, huts, shell holes, were everywhere and unexploded shells and bombs that might explode if hit by plow or spade rendered cultivation dangerous if not impossible. There were considerable regions where the surface soil had been blown away. "Poisonous gases intended to kill men also killed vegetation, and the soil was impregnated with chemicals the nature or duration of whose effects upon the various soil products was unknown." Many forests had been ruined or damaged. The war had completely destroyed nearly 30,000 wells and over 90,000 other wells needed repair. "Nowhere in the region could water safely be used for drinking or culinary purposes until wells had been disinfected and the water analyzed." Over 1,350,000 oxen, cows, sheep, goats, horses, and mules had, it is estimated, been carried away by the Germans down to November 11, 1918.[1]

The picture is far from complete but it may suffice to suggest the vastness of the destruction accomplished, the stupendous character of the problem of reconstruction. The French buckled down to the huge and heavy task with their accustomed pluck and resolution. What they achieved in the various lines during the three years after the armistice cannot be told here. The reader should go for exact and comprehensive information to the sober and impressive account given, and buttressed at every point by definite statistical data, by Dr. MacDonald who summarizes his investigation in these words: "Never in history have a people and their government accomplished so great a task in so short a time."

The railways and water-ways have practically been restored. Substantial, though not as extensive, progress has been made

[1] MacDonald, *Ibid.* Chapter II.

with the highways. The record in industrial reconstruction has varied according to the industry and the region but has in any case been creditable. Thousands of industries have been re-established and in re-establishing them, as in rebuilding the railroads, the French have not been satisfied with merely the replacement of what had been destroyed. They have sought to plan for the future. French industry will be more scientifically and more effectively organized than it has been in the past. Less progress has been made in the restoration of the mines. Competent authorities estimate that the coal-mining industry achieved about one-fourth its former productivity by the end of May, 1921, and that the output was increasing. The revival of agriculture, involving the replenishment of live stock, the providing of implements and seeds, and the erection of farm buildings, after the preliminary work of clearing the land, has been less marked than the revival of industry, but has, nevertheless, gone far. Very little has been done toward restoring the forests and still less the public buildings, churches, and monuments.

The problem of reconstruction in last analysis is a problem of finance. Germany's obligation to repair a part of the damage she had done was explicitly stated in the Treaty of Versailles. The French, therefore, expected that the cost of putting their industries and agriculture back upon their feet would be borne by the German reparations. But until these should be actually paid, the French must themselves find the money, or else postpone the reconstruction of their country, a thing that was unthinkable. Since the armistice France has spent, it is said, about ninety billion francs for reconstruction. That amount has been borrowed from the people, by state or municipal loans, or by loans contracted by railroads, manufacturers, and mine owners. The effort has been tremendous. The limit has probably been reached. Meanwhile, as Lloyd George stated in 1922 in the House of Commons, not one penny of German money has gone to the restoration of the country which she ravaged and ruined on an absolutely unparalleled scale. Germany has made good a part of the live-stock which she had seized and has made considerable deliveries of coal and limited payments of money, which have gone to the support of the armies of occupation, but beyond that she has not gone. What the Germans do not pay the French themselves must pay. Whatever part of the burden is removed from the shoulders of the aggressor must be placed upon those of the victim. The advances that

France has made have been supposed to be to the account of Germany, to be repaid in the course of time. Whether they ever will be, remains to be seen. If not, the revival of France will be extremely slow and even doubtful.

The problem of German reparations has given rise to constant discussion and difficult negotiation between the former Allies themselves and between them and Germany, occasioning a long series of conferences whose decisions have not thus far proved final, the question still continuing to dominate the international situation. According to the Treaty of Versailles the Reparation Commission was to determine the total debt of Germany by May 1, 1921. This it did on that date, fixing the amount at 132 billions of gold marks, there being added to that sum the amounts loaned to Belgium by the Allies during the war. The payments were to be made in forty-two annual installments. The French share of the money to be paid by Germany was fixed at 52 per cent. This would constitute only a part of the charges France must incur for the reconstruction of the devastated regions. Should she in the end not recover even this, she would be compelled in all probability either to stop the work of further reconstruction or, in order to continue it, to resort to financial methods that would mean a return to inflation, arrested during the past two years, to a corresponding depreciation of the currency, to an increase in the cost of living, and to acute labor troubles which would draw in their train various and ominous social disorders. Unless relieved by German indemnities or by some sort of international co-operation, such as the much-discussed international loan, France might be forced into bankruptcy. Such is "the exact situation of France," said a careful French publicist in 1922,[1] "and it may be said without exaggeration that it is a very tragic one. The French are, I think, the people in the world who most hate a deficit and who have a horror of bankruptcy. Rather than face that extremity they will be ready to enforce upon Germany the penalties which, according to the Treaty of Versailles, they are perfectly entitled to enforce. They will use the rights which they derived from the treaty which was signed not only by their allies, England and America, but by the Germans themselves. The treaty gives France the right to seize German property in case the German Government does not fulfil its obligations. That will be, of course, a bad solution of the question of reparations, not a single sane

[1] Raymond Recouly at the Institute of Politics in Williamstown, Massachusetts, August 10, 1922.

Frenchman doubts it, but we will certainly try that solution before letting ourselves go into bankruptcy."

The problem of public finance, inextricably involved in that of reparations, which, in turn, is decisive for that of reconstruction, will long remain central and pivotal in the future history of France. It will require for its solution exceptional wisdom and courage. At best the charges upon the people will be so heavy and so multifarious as to affect every class of citizens, every walk of life, restricting appreciably the powers of self-development of the individual by reducing the resources available for his needs and tastes.

If it were not for this encompassing cloud of debt the outlook would be promising. The restoration to France of Alsace and Lorraine free of all financial obligations is an economic boon of the first order, to say nothing of its moral and political significance. It gives her the richest iron-ore beds of Europe, enabling her to become a great producer of iron and steel. It was these deposits which furnished Germany three-fourths of the iron mined within the former Empire. Alsace has oil wells and potash deposits of great value.

France has acquired full rights of ownership in the coal mines of the Saar. Should that basin return ultimately to Germany, the mines would not become German unless bought and paid for. France also gains from the altered status of Luxemburg. This neutralized duchy, for nearly eighty years a member of German Zollverein, was occupied at the beginning of the war by the Germans, who exploited its valuable iron mines to the full in munition-making. At the close of the war the Grand Duchess, a strong German sympathizer, was forced by her Francophile subjects to abdicate, and, by a popular vote held in September, 1919, this petty state of a thousand square miles and 260,000 people, too weak to stand alone economically, voted by a large majority to join the French customs union. But France refused, in favor of Belgium, this economic union and by an agreement subsequently reached between Belgium and Luxemburg, and coming into force on April 1, 1922, the customs barrier between these two countries was abolished for fifty years and the use of Belgian money in the Grand Duchy provided for. The economic union of Belgium and Luxemburg was thereby accomplished.

France has gained an enlargement of her colonial empire out of the general liquidation of the colonial possessions of Germany, about four-fifths of Cameroon and Togoland, and that part of

the Congo ceded to Germany in 1911. All German claims in Morocco are quashed and that source of friction is finally removed. France has also been given a mandate over Syria in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus she is in a position to proceed unhampered with the development of that vast stretch of northwestern Africa which contains her most profitable colonies, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco. The situation of these possessions, close to France, renders them enormously valuable, how valuable was clearly seen during the war. Colonial troops, colonial laborers, colonial produce were forthcoming in abundance and emphatically contributed to the final success of the Republic. The present colonial empire of France, including the countries for which she has a mandate, covers a total area of over 10,000,000 square kilometers, an area twenty times larger than France herself, with a population of 55,000,000. The general trade of her empire amounted in 1913 to three and a quarter billion francs, in 1918 to about five, and in 1919 to over seven billion. Its natural resources are extensive and varied.

From an economic and political point of view one of the most serious problems confronting contemporary France is her low birth rate. Germany has a population of over 60,000,000, France one of less than 40,000,000. Germany before the war increased by nearly a million annually. France remained stationary. In 1918, indeed, the number of deaths exceeded the number of births. If this disparity is to continue, it is only a question of time when France will be entirely outclassed by a neighbor which may desire to reopen, under such improved auspices, the age-long quarrel. To study this problem and to suggest practical measures for overcoming the grave menace contained in these figures a special national bureau was created in 1920. If economic expansion leads to an increase in population, as some economists think, then the greater present resources of France and the greater initiative of French business men, aroused by the experiences of war-time production, and likely to be still further augmented by the conscious study and imitation of German methods and organization, may lead to a higher birth rate and an increasing population. A recent writer has pointed out that it was the coal and iron districts of Germany that showed the greatest increase in population after 1871. France's resources in iron are now vastly greater than they were in 1914, and somewhat greater in coal.

The international influence of the Republic is stronger and more commanding than it has been in a long while. The power

and prestige of her eastern neighbor no longer overshadow her. The most authoritative voices in the councils of Europe are those of France and England. France is the most active and powerful defender of the treaties upon which the new order of the world rests, and as such she is the natural ally of the states of central and eastern Europe who find their title deeds in those very treaties. One of the members of the Great Entente, her connections with the Little Entente are close and are likely to become still closer. French diplomacy has a wider field than ever for constructive achievement. German models and methods are destined to enjoy a lesser vogue, and a renewed radiation of French influence has begun. A close military alliance with Belgium has been concluded and diplomatic relations with the Vatican have been renewed (May, 1921), after an interruption of seventeen years, an interruption occasioned by the famous separation of church and state in 1904–5. This renewal of relations has not produced any change in the laws adopted at the time of rupture. It simply means that France is to be represented at the Papal Court, which is an active center of international politics as of religion, and that the Pope is to have an official representative in France. Practical utilitarianism has in the main prompted this settlement, the desire to have a possible aid in the solution of various questions in Alsace-Lorraine and Syria in which France is interested.

CHAPTER XLVIII

GREAT BRITAIN AND HER EMPIRE

France and Great Britain had fought side by side, shoulder to shoulder, for four long years and more, and had been the two chief European architects of victory. This intimate and sustained union of two peoples who had been so often estranged in the past, was the dominant fact of the Great War, the tower of strength, the heart of oak of the Allied cause. It was a surprising experience for the two nations, rare though not absolutely unique. Their normal attitude toward each other had been one of hostility, tempered, during intervals of peace, by mutual distrust. Their interminable contentions during the Middle Ages had been carried over into the modern period with slight abatement. For a century and a quarter, from 1688 to 1815, they had fought repeatedly against each other, in Europe, in Asia, in America, running up a score of sixty years of war. Approximately one year out of every two had witnessed this primitive expression of mutual animus. The nineteenth century saw them less belligerent, saw them even co-operating transiently, as in the Greek war of independence and the Crimean war. But their harmony was most fragile and precarious and their colonial aspirations led to many clashes and kept their dislike of each other constantly fresh and green. If there was a law of nature in the world of international relations, it seemed to be that England and France must be forever pitted the one against the other. Any lull in the age-long controversy seemed only a breathing spell designed to enable the wearied combatants to get their second wind. If history had anything to say in this matter, it was that France and England must always be disputing with each other. Any deviation from this rule must be regarded as an abnormality.

But a fortunate and interesting feature of history is that it has its turning-points, and one of the most decisive of these came when the German Empire, in the full flush of prosperity and power, challenged both these countries at one and the same moment. At that instant a new era opened for the world, of quite incalculable significance. Old passions and pretensions

immediately subsided and in their place arose a sentiment of unity and comradeship that weathered the ordeal by fire and the ordeal by water and the ordeal by the sword. The Entente Cordiale or Cordial Understanding that had grown up in the years before the war, because the two nations had seen the same portent in the sky, became a formal alliance and a dynamic force upon a hundred battle-fields. Whether this fruitful spirit could withstand the shock of peace as it withstood the shock of war, no living man could tell. But sufficient unto the day was the good thereof. The student ought never to forget that but for the union of the French army and the British fleet Germany would have won the war. Not that it alone could have gained the victory but that it was sufficient to hold the enemy until such time as Britain and other countries could throw great armies into the field and organize fabulous expenditures for their support.

But peace hath her difficulties no less than war. And England, which had spent her man-power and her wealth most lavishly during the murderous struggle, was soon to see that the times which tried men's souls were not yet over, that the critical days were not ended when the armistice was signed in Marshal Foch's dining car in the forest of Compiègne. For all about, within the Kingdom and within the Empire, clouds were gathering, and alarming situations were developing, which were likely to disturb the well-earned right to peace.

For the moment, however, England, on the announcement of the signing of the armistice of November 11, gave herself up to rejoicing. Indescribable was the enthusiasm that found expression on the streets, in public meetings, in Parliament, everywhere. Day after day the jubilee continued. Popular emotion, long severely repressed, broke all bounds. The priceless services of England's soldiers and sailors were gratefully and exuberantly recognized, and when, in accordance with the terms of the armistice, the German submarines surrendered off Harwich and the German High Fleet, with its battleships of every type, steamed into the Firth of Forth and surrendered to Admiral Beatty, the primacy of England's sea-power was fittingly attested. Britannia still ruled the waves. A little later came the returning troops, and Field-Marshal Haig and Marshal Foch, and M. Clemenceau, and President Wilson on his way to Paris, their progress through the streets of London the signal for renewed and impressive outbursts of enthusiasm, for ovations without end.

In the midst of these exciting spectacles, of this exaltation of

the public mood, occurred the elections of the new parliament. The elections were long overdue. The existing House of Commons had been chosen in November, 1910 and should have ended in December, 1915, but, owing to the war, its life had been prolonged by successive acts until it had lasted nearly eight years. Meanwhile an electoral Reform Bill had been passed in 1918 enormously extending the suffrage, by giving the vote for the first time to women, some six millions of whom could meet the necessary qualifications, and to about two million men who, under the old system, were without a vote. An electorate so enlarged and so different from the old must obviously be consulted at the earliest possible moment. Moreover, with the Peace Conference impending, the Ministry must know whether it had the support of Parliament or not. The Ministry consisted of a coalition of Liberals and Conservatives under the leadership of Lloyd George. Did England wish to continue in times of peace the Coalition which had seemed to her so necessary in the time of war or did she now desire to resume her accustomed practice of entrusting the administration to a single party. One of the maxims of English politics is that England hates a coalition.

In this case, at least, she did not express any such proverbial dislike. On the contrary the Coalition won 478 seats in the new House and thus had a majority of 249 over all non-Coalition parties. A significant feature of the elections (held on December 14, 1918) was that the Labor party obtained 63 seats, whereas the Independent Liberal party under the leadership of Mr. Asquith obtained only 28. The Labor party thereby became the veritable Opposition. Another significant feature was the result in Ireland. Only 25 Unionists and 7 Nationalists were chosen, compared with 73 Sinn Feiners who, unlike the two former groups, demanded complete separation from Great Britain, and who, indeed, had already declared Ireland an independent republic, a claim which England, of course, had not recognized. None of the Sinn Feiners took their seats in Parliament. Their election had been intended as a demonstration of Irish opinion.

The electoral campaign had been conducted in a war-atmosphere. Popular cries of "Hang the Kaiser" and "Make the Germans pay" had been so strong that Lloyd George had promised that the trial of William II, the punishment of war criminals, and full war costs from Germany should be included in the Coalition programme at the Peace Conference, to which he and the British delegation soon repaired.

Meanwhile the rumblings of widespread social discontent were heard in the land and soon became louder and more insistent. This was the reverse side of the picture of national triumph and jubilation. During 1919 and 1920 and 1921 England was to pass through a period of economic tension and distress and of popular unrest similar to that which had, a century earlier, followed upon the dazzling success of Waterloo and the overthrow of an emperor more imposing than William II.

Within a few days of the armistice troubles began. Workingmen from various industries, particularly from the munition plants, appeared before the Prime Minister and demanded a living wage; railway men demanded an eight-hour day, which was speedily granted; workers in the shipyards, dock workers and engineers demanded consideration of their grievances; the employees of the London subway went on strike and stayed out until they secured an eight-hour day. Increased wages to meet the increased cost of living, and shorter hours were demanded in one industry after another. Unemployment began immediately upon the cessation of the war and increased rapidly as the army was demobilized and soldiers came home in large numbers, seeking their old positions or new ones. A tendency to work less rather than more, explicable by the tension of four years of war, was soon apparent. Moreover, revolutionary ideas were fermenting among certain sections of the working classes and the Russian revolution also was a disturbing influence. The coal miners insisted not only upon a 30% increase in wages and a six-hour day but upon national ownership of the mines. Some of their demands were granted but not nationalization of the mines, Lloyd George declaring that so grave a step toward socialism could only be taken with the consent of the nation as a whole, and not with that of a mere fraction of the nation. The Trade Unions favored using the weapon of the strike for purely political purposes, that is, "direct action" instead of constitutional methods, and decided at their Congress at Glasgow in September, 1919, that if the conscription acts were not repealed, and if the British troops were not immediately withdrawn from Russia, they would hold another congress "to decide what action shall be taken." Almost immediately thereafter and without warning, a great railroad strike was declared which speedily reproduced some of the aspects of life during the war. The government restricted the use of light and fuel. Hyde Park was used as a milk depot for London. The government appealed for volunteers to run trains and large

numbers responded. Army motor trucks were used on a great scale to bring food supplies to the capital. The strike ended after ten days, the strikers gaining certain concessions but not all that they desired.

While this recurrent disturbance of the economic life of the country was going on all through the year of 1919 a considerable amount of social legislation was being enacted. Bills were passed aiming at the solution of a pressing housing problem, at the securing of land for the veterans of the war, at the securing for women of certain rights which seemed logically to flow from the grant to them of the suffrage. A bill was passed providing that "no person should be disqualified by sex from the exercise of any public function, or from being appointed to any civil or judicial office or post, or from entering any profession or vocation." Women were made eligible as jurors. In November, 1919, Lady Astor, an American by birth, a daughter of Virginia, was elected to the House of Commons and was the first woman to take a seat in that body. The Lords, however, refused to consider that women, peeresses in their own right, could sit or vote in the Upper House.

The budget of 1919 was particularly important in that it established at last the principle which had long been urged upon the government of imperial preference as a means of binding more closely together the different parts of the British Empire. The duties levied on such imports as coffee, tea, sugar, tobacco, and motor spirits were to be reduced by a sixth, those on clocks, watches, motor-cars, motor-cycles, and movie-films by a third if these imports came from other parts of the Empire and not from other nations. The act applied to all the British dominions outside Great Britain, to all British protectorates, and to British India and to the native Indian states, and might, by an easy process, be made to apply to any further protectorates that might be brought under the British crown or to any territory for which Great Britain might procure a mandate from the League of Nations. The purpose of this legislation was to increase trade within the Empire, to reduce British dependence upon foreign states and to further the development of imperial resources. It was a form of protection, slightly disguised, and was expected to make the Empire more of an economic unit than it ever had been and consequently more of a political unit, to render it more self-sufficient, more secure. There was a certain opposition on the part of the Independent Liberals and some members of the Labor party, in the name of Free Trade, to this

system of preferential duties, but it was too weak to prevent its adoption. The economic, political, and social consequences of this departure from the policy hitherto followed will be watched with interest by other nations, as all will be affected by it.

The labor unrest continued to trouble subsequent years, although becoming less acute. It was particularly pronounced in the coal-mining industry. The demand for nationalization was still pressed but the government refused to consider it. Questions of wages and prices were not settled in a way satisfactory to the miners who accordingly struck in 1920, securing a part of what they desired. Another coal strike occurred in 1921, the most serious of all, lasting three months and settled only when the miners abandoned their demand for what amounted to an indirect form of nationalization. The damage to other industries was great as they were dependent upon coal, but the damage to the trade unions was also considerable as their funds were depleted and as many of them ran into debt. The influence of the new Russian economic theories gradually diminished as more came to be known about the effects they were having upon the Russian working-classes themselves.

But the problem of unemployment continued all through these years and was not solved. The life-blood of England lay in her commerce and her commerce was hampered at every turn by the disturbed and difficult economic conditions prevailing everywhere, owing to the enormous impoverishment of the war, the high taxes, the new national frontiers with their strange new tariffs, the depreciating currencies, and the generally unstable structure of society. The abnormal disorganization of the markets and the trade currents of the world had a more immediate and more profound reaction upon England's industries, since her commerce was world-commerce. Large numbers of her factories were compelled to shut down or to reduce the number of their employees. A grave social as well as financial question was thus presented and, as the economic revival of the world was slow and uncertain, it tended to persist. In January, 1921, the number of unemployed was 1,039,000; in April, 1,615,000 (not including the miners then on strike); in June, 2,185,000, and in addition there were at the last date 1,144,000 persons who were working only part time. From April to November, 1920, the foreign trade of Great Britain had amounted to 2,066,000,000 pounds sterling; whereas from April to November, 1921, it amounted to only 1,019,000,000 pounds.

Naturally the manufacturers and merchants of England, as

well as the laborers, clamored for relief and, as they generally asserted that their unhappy state was not caused by the war but by the treaties that closed it and by the unwise and mistaken policies of the governments subsequent to the war, they and their representatives in parliament and the press brought an increasing pressure to bear upon the Prime Minister to change the course of his diplomacy. The shiftings and turnings of Lloyd George in the numerous international conferences that have been held since the middle of 1919 found their motive and their explanation in this domestic situation. A considerable and influential body of English opinion held the Treaty of Versailles responsible for this state of affairs and demanded a revision of the treaty. Though Englishmen, it was generally believed in other countries, had had more to do than any other people with making that treaty what it was, and though in it they had safeguarded their own interests with the greatest care, they were now the ones most inclined to upset that charter of new Europe, particularly its reparation clauses. As British trade and British finance are always very formidable forces in British diplomacy, this altered British attitude became a more or less decisive factor in international politics. As the reparations provided for in the Treaty of Versailles were designed to furnish the means for a partial restoration of the countries devastated by the invader, and particularly of France, any British deviations from the line deliberately set down in the treaty instantly affected other countries, and most notably England's chief ally in the war, France. A dispute was thus opened, mainly between England and France, the two chief sponsors of the treaty, which has complicated and embittered their relations and which seems as far from solution as ever.

For England the basic problem of reconstruction is the reconstruction of commerce, for France the reconstruction of the devastated regions. The controversy, which has wide ramifications, and unexpected and surprising aspects, and in which all sorts of prejudices and aspirations, intrigues and jealousies, play their several and more or less hidden parts, bids fair long to absorb the attention, and perhaps baffle the ingenuity, of those who are responsible for the governance, not only of the two chief parties to the dispute, but of all other nations as well, since all are concerned in the issue. The revision of so comprehensive and vital a document as the Treaty of Versailles, or such an interpretation of it as may amount to an indirect revision, are things not to be undertaken except under the most

imperative and obvious necessity, since the consequences of such action are quite incalculable, since the last end of the matter may be worse than the first.

The post-war period was one of unrest not only throughout the British Isles but also throughout the British Empire. Several remarkable changes in the constitutional framework of the Empire were the ultimate outcome. The political status of various of its members was rapidly and radically altered. In the eastern and the western hemispheres, in the northern and the southern, wherever the subjects of the British Crown were to be found, there was a sense that the war was a turning-point in imperial history, that the time was ripe for a new departure, for innovations long desired and now possible. Local dissatisfaction with the existing system, ranging all the way from a desire for a greater participation in the councils of the Empire to a demand for complete and utter independence, showed itself everywhere. Four great empires, Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Russia, had broken down and disintegrated under the impact of the tremendous events of the day. What was to be the effect of that impact upon the fifth? Was it also to be disintegration or might it be transformation? The principle of self-determination, a new-fangled name for the old principle of nationality to which the Allies had given such vociferous allegiance during the war, and which had served their cause so conspicuously, was still reverberating round the world and the rulers of Britain were now to have their turn in noting its effects, its pulverizing tendencies. What is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander. Was the gander to show greater suppleness than the geese had shown, in dealing with this pervasive and infectious force, to display superior powers of judgment and precision, or was there to be only another exhibition of melancholy incompetence in high places in a time of crisis. The answer to this query is to be found in the very recent history of Ireland and India, of Egypt and South Africa.

England, having paid a fearful price for her salvation, 800,000 men killed and more than £6,000,000,000 of additional debt, had also drawn some very palpable profits from her costly participation in the war. Her colonial possessions were greatly augmented either directly, or in a roundabout way through the new mechanism of mandates. Forty-two per cent. of the population of the German colonies in Africa were assigned to her under the Treaty of Versailles while thirty-three per cent. went to France and twenty-five to Belgium. German Southwest Africa,

German East Africa, now called Tanganyika Colony, a part of Togoland, a part of Cameroon, now came under the British flag, as did also Kaiser Wilhelm's Land and the Bismarck Archipelago and other scattered islands. Great Britain also received mandates for the rich valley of Mesopotamia and for Palestine. Egypt, which had lived under the fiction of Turkish suzerainty, had been formally declared a British protectorate at the beginning of the war. The Empire had thus expanded by the addition of perhaps a million square miles of territory, if we call the territories held under mandate British territory. Spheres of British influence they surely are and sources of much future wealth for Britain, — coal mines, oil wells, tropical products of many sorts, phosphate deposits, cereals and cattle, pearl fisheries and raw materials of divers kinds for her industries. With all these assets and effects went other benefits, such as new ports, new coaling and cable stations, new opportunities for British shipping and for the investment of British capital. The catalogue of gains is a long and impressive one. And then there is the heightened prestige and the increased sense of security, with one serious rival, Germany, removed from the colonial field, and another, Russia, in a quite dilipidated condition.

But along with this striking expansion of the Empire went certain pronounced disruptive tendencies, also stimulated by the war, which, if not checked and countered, might undermine the colossal structure and turn the hypocritical favors of fortune into a by-word and a hissing. Let us examine a little more closely this darker side of things.

EGYPT

The declaration by Great Britain in February 1922 that Egypt is " a sovereign independent state " and the proclamation the following month (March 16) of the Sultan Ahmed Fuad Pasha as King of Egypt were important events and had behind them an interesting history. For forty years the English had practically been in control of the country, a control which had greatly benefited the masses of the Egyptian people, who had been raised from virtual slavery to a position of considerable prosperity. Lord Cromer's administration (1883–1907) had been one of great and distinguished accomplishment. Many drastic and far-reaching reforms had been carried through. The *courbash* (whip) and the *corvée* (forced labor) had been abolished, corruption in official position had been reduced, taxes

had been equalized, and water, the one essential in that country, had been distributed fairly to the poor as well as to the rich. Before the English came to Egypt the fellahin, or peasants, had been the victims of a cruel and sordid oppression. Now they had a chance in life, and they prospered as they never had in their history. The English were popular with the fellahin.

But they were not popular with the former native governing classes or with the educated. Among these, nationalistic feeling was strong and was growing. These men, or their predecessors, had been nationalists in 1881 when the English first intervened in Egyptian affairs, and the independence movement of 1882, suppressed by the British army, had been fought under the banner of "Egypt for the Egyptians." Moreover, the English had at that time and repeatedly thereafter declared that their "occupation" was only provisional and that they would withdraw when the necessary work was done. As they had stayed on and on and had shown no signs of going, the nationalist sentiment of the educated and prosperous Egyptians had been kept alive, and had increased. But this feeling after all was not general, was limited to certain minorities of the people, and did not touch the masses of the peasantry.

The World War, its effects and after-effects, rapidly changed the situation. Egypt had hitherto been nominally a part of the Turkish Empire. The English were only "advisers" to the native Egyptian officials who in turn were theoretically subjects of the Sultan of Constantinople. On the outbreak of the war this complex status of Egypt was simplified and made to conform to the realities of the situation. As the Egyptians were nominally subjects of the Sultan, and as the Sultan was the enemy of England, the "occupying" power, there was an urgent need for a clarification of the situation. Therefore on December 18, 1914, a proclamation of the English Foreign Secretary announced that "in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey Egypt is placed under the protection of His Majesty and will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate." A second proclamation issued the following day deposed the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, who was then in Constantinople and was adhering to England's enemies. His uncle, Hussein Kamil, was recognized as the future ruler and given the title of Sultan.

This action of Great Britain in deposing the Sultan and in declaring Egypt a British protectorate, without any consultation or explanation, was resented by the nationalists who saw

that the repeated promises of evacuation were now definitely withdrawn, that the English were in Egypt to stay. A religious element also entered into the situation. The Mohammedans of Egypt were not indifferent to the dangers to the caliphate of the war of the Allies against Turkey. The nationalist feeling grew. Still Egypt remained on the whole quiet during the entire war. There were a few plots against British authority but they were always discovered in time and suppressed. England had no notion of allowing her connections with Australia, New Zealand, and India, so essential to the successful prosecution of the war, to be cut by a few conspirators. She, therefore, imprisoned or deported them. The mass of the people took no part in these plots. Turkey and Germany made two attempts to get control of the Suez Canal and to invade Egypt. Both were unsuccessful. In April and in July, 1915, attempts were made on the life of the Sultan.

It was not until the war was over that serious trouble began. There were several contributory causes. The principles expressed by President Wilson and accepted by the Allies had a far-reaching effect upon the opinions of the educated people of Egypt. The British had repeatedly disclaimed any intention of remaining permanently in Egypt and now came the doctrine of self-determination, supported apparently by the victorious powers. In November 1918 an Anglo-French declaration announced that the policy of the Allies in the East would aim at the complete enfranchisement of the peoples so long oppressed by Turkish rule and the "institution of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the local populations." The Egyptians naturally felt that their right to manage their own affairs was as good as that apparently assured the people of Syria and Mesopotamia. Moreover they considered themselves as much entitled to representation at the Conference of Paris as the Kingdom of Hedjaz, recently carved out of a part of Arabia and certainly not superior in development or intelligence to their own country.

Under these conditions the Egyptian nationalistic movement grew more and more pronounced. It ended by demanding complete independence, control of the Soudan, neutralization of the Suez Canal. But the British government was determined not to relinquish its control. Its protectorate was recognized by the Allies at Paris, including the United States. Moreover it was later recognized by the Treaty of Sèvres, between Turkey and

the Allied powers (1920), a treaty which, supposedly, would soon be ratified.

The leader of the Egyptian nationalists, Zaghlul Pasha, was, with three of his principal followers, arrested early in March, 1919, and deported to the island of Malta. The effects of this assertion of authority were quite the contrary of what had been expected. Anti-British demonstrations occurred in various places. Railroads were torn up at certain points, there was much looting, British soldiers and civilians were attacked, foreign quarters were besieged, Cairo cut off from the rest of the country. The "revolution" was quite serious and it was noticed that a change had come over the fellahin. Hitherto contented under English rule and appreciative of its undoubted benefits to them, the fellahin had become estranged by certain severe measures taken by the British government owing to the exigencies of the war. Laborers had been needed to build roads and dig trenches for the armies in Gallipoli, Sinai, Mesopotamia and Palestine and had been recruited from the Egyptian villages. Some had been sent to France. At first everything had gone satisfactorily as the service was voluntary and well paid. But as the demands of the war increased volunteering did not furnish sufficient numbers, and officials, most of them natives and not English, had resorted more and more to pressure to secure the necessary quotas. Thus an abuse grew up, often amounting to forced labor. As laborers were an absolute necessity, the British were either unable or disinclined to interfere with the arbitrary procedure of the petty officials. The securing of the necessary food supplies for men and animals was also in the hands of native officials and also created a lively sense of grievance among the fellahin who came to regard their former benefactors as oppressors. Was this what the British protectorate was to mean?

The rebellion of March 1919, which was quite general throughout Egypt, arose out of these conditions. While quickly suppressed it showed the English government that the situation was far more serious than it had suspected. The Government consequently decided to send out a mission under the chairmanship of Lord Milner "to inquire into the causes of the recent disorders, and to report on the existing situation in the country and the form of the constitution which, under the protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests." Unfortunately the mission delayed eight months before going to Egypt and when it arrived

it found itself boycotted by the nationalists. However it made an able and liberal report, recommending a large measure of self-government for the Egyptians. But popular violence continued, interspersed with acts of repression. Finally Lord Allenby, High Commissioner in Egypt, gave it as his opinion that Great Britain must either grant Egypt her independence, or prepare to annex her by force to the Empire. The result was the declaration already referred to that "Egypt is an independent, sovereign state" and the proclamation on March 16, 1922, of the Sultan Ahmed Fuad as King of Egypt.

But these declarations defined only partially the new status of Egypt. What arrangements should be made concerning the Suez canal, concerning England's communications with India and the East, concerning the defense of Egypt against possible foreign aggression, concerning the protection of foreigners and foreign interests in Egypt? None of these was settled at the time. "In all these matters," says the official communication, "the status quo is maintained, but we declare our willingness to negotiate specific agreements upon them with the Egyptian Government at some later date, when they desire it and circumstances promise success. In the meantime Egyptians will be free to develop national institutions in accordance with their aspirations."

These questions, and also the problem of the relations of the vast province of the Soudan to Egypt, might give rise to much future trouble. But at any rate Great Britain had turned a sharp corner in her Egyptian policy and had under the compulsion of circumstances, tardily foreseen, taken steps which could not easily be retraced. Meanwhile Egypt, a country of 13,000,000 people, fell to discussing what the future constitution should be. But this much has been accomplished. The protectorate has been abolished and Egypt no longer forms a part of the British Empire. But her independence may, after all, prove only a semi-independence. Whether she is capable of developing real self-government, wise, and intelligent, and fair toward the various elements of the population, or whether she will fall into the hands of a selfish and exploiting minority addicted to oriental methods of oppression and corruption, remains to be seen.

Meanwhile Lord Allenby declared in April, 1922, that the relations between the British Empire and the Soudan would remain as hitherto.

INDIA

India, too, like Egypt, has her nationalist movement, although it has not yet gone so far. This movement, of comparatively recent origin, has developed rapidly in our highly nationalistic age and is now taxing, and will, no doubt, long continue to tax, the wisdom and ingenuity of the British government. The situation is an anxious one and may well become still more difficult in the future. "The most serious and testing time probably has not yet arrived," said Mr. Lloyd George recently in the House of Commons, adding that under no circumstances will Britain relinquish her responsibilities in India. To what is this Indian ferment due?

India is really a continent by itself, with its population of about 325,000,000, with its forty or fifty different races, its hundred and fifty languages mutually exclusive and repellent. In area India is half as large as Europe. Of the population 247,000,000 are directly under British rule, and constitute what is known as British India. The rest are under native Indian princes whose states have been preserved, but who are practically under British rule. There are many religions in India, the two most important being the Hindu, counting over 200,000,000 followers, and the Mohammedan counting about a third as many. If the word India conveys to the mind of the reader the idea of essential unity, as does that of England or France, it is a misnomer. There is no such thing as an Indian nation, an Indian patriotism, an Indian public opinion. The population is divided historically, racially, linguistically, religiously, into very numerous sections; and deeply, not superficially, divided. These seething millions of men have never known liberty or self-government either before the arrival of the English among them or since they have been under English rule, and only a minute fraction of the people of India have any education. Yet millions of them are at the present moment clamoring for the same things for which western peoples have clamored in the past and which they have more or less achieved, millions are responding to the same emotions or fighting under the same shibboleths, — independence, nationalism, self-government, democracy, — as have exercised so powerful a spell over the Occidental mind. Whether we have here a nation in the painful process of creation or a system in process of dissolution, who shall say? Certain it is that a vast, and more or less obscure, fermentation is going on among these hitherto dumb

and driven masses of mankind, who constitute one-fifth of the human race.

India is Britain's leading colonial possession and is, in a very real sense, the corner stone of the Empire, the broad base, and much of the superstructure, of that colossal fabric. From an economic and political point of view it has been and is a most valuable prize. It has furnished a great market for British manufacturers, a rich field for British investors. Moreover, it has been most serviceable, contributing to the expansion of the Empire and, in the late war, helping to preserve it.

Before the World War the nationalist movement in India was not particularly serious, although the accession of the Liberals to power in England in 1905 and the appointment of Lord Morley, a veteran champion of Liberalism, to the Secretaryship for India, aroused hopes among Indian politicians for a larger measure of self-government. Some reforms were made at that time, but they were after all quite conservative and were far from satisfying the demand. The Great War bore striking witness, however, to the general loyalty of the people of India to the English connection as contributing, whatever its disadvantages or defects, to their well-being. The native princes offered troops and money on a liberal scale and many of them themselves served in Europe, and British India showed its devotion by raising recruits to be used as England might demand, and by sharing in the military expenditures. During the war India sent overseas 800,000 combatants and 400,000 non-combatants, besides great quantities of food supplies, although this meant much privation among the poorer classes. Indian troops and workers took part in the campaigns of Mesopotamia, Gallipoli, German East Africa, Egypt, and France. The situation in India was on the whole so satisfactory that the government was able to reduce the number of British troops stationed in India far below the normal standard. At one time, in fact, the original British garrison numbered only about 15,000 men.

With the prolongation of the war, however, the situation became less satisfactory. Rising prices and unusual regulations concerning trade and travel aroused some discontent. The large Mohammedan population became disaffected and more or less turbulent when it saw that the war was a serious menace to Turkey, the home of the leading Mohammedan state and the religious center of the Mohammedan world. Then, too, nationalist aspirations became more vocal and more earnest in India as

e where under the influence of a war which was declared by the Allied leaders to be a war of liberation. Many Indians came to feel that the services they had so generously rendered merited not only the recognition which they received from the English authorities but a larger participation in the government of their country in the future. India's representatives sat in the Imperial War Conference side by side with the representatives of the Dominions, and yet India was not self-governing as were the others. Ought not the outcome of the war to be the frank recognition of equality among the component parts of the Empire? Ought not India to have the status of a dominion?

On August 20, 1917 Mr. Montague, Secretary of State for India, announced in the House of Commons that the Government's policy with regard to India was "that of increasing the association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." He added that "progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages" and that it was for the British authorities to be "the judges of the time and measure of each advance," a remark that naturally was not pleasing to extremists.

After the close of the war a beginning was made in harmony with this declaration of policy. A bill was passed in 1919 which established a measure of native participation, not in the government of India as a whole, but in that of eight of the larger provinces. In them the experiment was to be tried first. Based upon the assumption that India was not yet fit for responsible government in all its completeness, the new law provided a fairly large entering wedge. Each province has its governor appointed by the Viceroy. Each has an executive council and a legislative council, the former appointed by the executive, the latter having some appointed members but consisting in its large majority of members elected by the voters. The governor and the executive council are henceforth to have power over questions that are "reserved." But there are questions that are "transferred," that is, committed to the elected legislative council. Such questions are to be handled by that council, operating through "ministers," chosen from the elected members of that body. The distinctive feature of this new constitutional system is this so-called "dyarchy," or dual government, in the eight chief provinces. Law and order, the

administration of justice, the police, are among the subjects reserved. Among those transferred are local government, agriculture, education, public health, industrial development, public works. It is within this latter range of topics that the people will receive their training in the use of parliamentary methods. The ministers will normally resign if they should lose the support of the majority of the legislative council, as in other countries. For the provincial legislative councils the vote has been given to about five million people. The franchise is based on property qualifications which vary from province to province. It represents an enormous enlargement over the previous system which counted only about thirty thousand voters.

This dual form of government exists in eight provinces. It does not exist in the central government. But even there a change has been made, designed to give Indian opinion abundant opportunity to express itself, though not necessarily to control. Formerly the Indian legislature consisted of a single body of whom the majority were officials. Henceforth it is to consist of two houses, in one of which, the Legislative Assembly, there are to be 103 elected members out of a total of 144; in the other of which, the Council of State, there are 33 elected members and 27 nominated, and of these 27 not more than 20 may be officials.

The Viceroy or the Provincial Governor may, if the case is urgent, pass over the heads of the legislative assemblies bills rejected by them. This power to "certify" is one held in reserve to enable the Government of India to have its way in last resort if the crisis seems to justify such a peremptory procedure. But until that point is reached the elected representatives have a certain influence and even power. The normal course would be for the Viceroy or the Provincial Governor to use this right to "certify," very sparingly. Such has thus far proved to be the case (1922).

Thus a limited training in self-government is assured a fraction of the people of India. This is intended as a first step and other steps are expected to follow, if all works well. The Act of 1919 provides that the working of the new system shall be examined at the expiration of ten years, with a view to seeing whether the principle of self-government shall be extended, modified, or restricted. This allows time for a considerable experience, and also for elementary education to become more general.

Internationally India now stands on a basis of equality with

the Dominions. At the Paris Conference, as later at that of Washington, she was represented by separate delegates as were such self-governing countries as Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand. India signed the Treaty of Versailles and became a charter member of the League of Nations. Her status is that of equal partnership with these other parts of the Empire. Yet not equal, after all, for the Indian members of these conferences and of the League are not chosen by the people, even remotely or indirectly, as are the others. They are appointed by the British authorities who rule India.

The Government of India Act of 1919, intended as a first installment of a liberal and progressive policy, was well received by moderate opinion. But the radical nationalists would have nothing to do with it. Rallying around Gandhi, widely revered as a wise and holy man, the latter demanded the complete withdrawal of the English from India. They organized a boycott of English goods, they kept aloof from the elections held in conformity with the new constitution, they developed a definite "non-coöperation" movement, the thought being that, if native officials would give up their offices, if native lawyers would refuse to appear in the courts, if native children should not attend the schools, the English over-lords would soon find themselves isolated, with no contact with the people, functioning as it were in a vacuum. Passive resistance, civil disobedience, preached by Gandhi, were designed to the same end, the overthrow of English rule. While unsuccessful, they constituted alarm signals which the authorities would do well anxiously to consider, even after the arrest and imprisonment of the leader for seditious utterance. Though the non-coöperation movement met with wide-spread apathy among the people and began to decline after its first successes, it would not be wise to regard it as under all conditions destined to failure. Indicative of the unrest of the masses, it, or something like it, might easily reappear, if the constitutional reforms recently introduced should prove unsatisfactory or illusory. Or the radical Nationalists who at first abstained from voting for the provincial legislatures may find that their best policy is to take part in the elections in order to gain the power to bring about a constitutional deadlock. India's troubles are not yet over. What she needs particularly is economy in administration, and reduction of military expenditures, so as to produce a balanced budget. The present constitution cannot function if taxation continues to increase in a period of economic depression and of recurring deficits.

SOUTH AFRICA

Into still another part of the British Empire the World War brought serious trouble, South Africa. Indeed it was in the very nature of things peculiarly calculated to subject that state to a strain to which none of the other self-governing dominions was subjected. It had been only twelve years before that Briton and Boer had fought each other in grim and desperate combat, and although a remarkable reconciliation had been brought about by the grant of self-government to South Africa, and although many of the former Boer leaders had worked side by side with the victors in building up the new Union, still the conflict had left deep and bitter memories behind it and not all the Boers were as wise and magnanimous as were Botha and Smuts. Many of them thought that this new war did not at all concern them and that South Africa ought to remain neutral. Many actively sympathized with Germany. Some thought that the opportunity to pay off their score with the English and to recover the independence they had lost was too good to miss. The German Government unquestionably counted on Boer disaffection as a favorable element in the general world-situation.

But there is reason to believe that the majority of the Boers were behind Botha, Smuts, and other leaders of their race who believed that South Africa ought to support the imperial cause to the utmost of its ability. On August 7, 1914, the British Government cabled to the Union Government suggesting that if "they desired and felt able" to do so the seizure of German Southwest Africa would be "a great and urgent imperial service." General Botha, the prime minister, immediately proposed an expedition and was supported by a large majority of the Assembly. Botha himself took charge of the campaign and German Southwest Africa was overrun. But this action of the Government was the signal for a rebellion on the part of a section of the Boer population, a rebellion in which several of the men who had distinguished themselves in the war against England took part, Delarey, de Wet, and Beyers. The moving cause of the rebellion was the desire of those who participated in it to regain the independence which they had lost twelve years before. This unhappy internecine conflict lasted several weeks, ending in December, 1914. Perhaps 10,000 men took part in the rebellion and the number of those who sympathized with them was large. The Government losses were 132 killed and 227 wounded. The casualties on the

other side are not known, but over 5,700 of the rebels were either captured or forced to surrender. The punishments inflicted were few and comparatively light.

There was no further armed opposition to the policy of the Union government. But the same division of opinion expressed itself henceforth in political life, in elections, and in parliament. General Botha, the prime minister, had a majority sufficient to enable him to carry out his policies. The South African Union played a considerable part in the World War. Botha, as we have just seen, raised a force composed half of Dutch and half of British South Africans for the conquest of German Southwest Africa which was completed by July, 1915. An army, commanded for a while by General Smuts, was also sent into German East Africa, the conquest of which was a more difficult matter but which was finally effected. South Africa sent 30,000 men to fight in Europe. All told she raised over 146,000 white troops for service in the World War, and native laborers and colored combatants enough to make the sum total over 230,000 men. In the latter part of the war, General Smuts represented South Africa in the Imperial War Cabinet sitting in London, and when the war was over General Botha and himself represented their country in the Conference of Paris and were among the signers of the Treaty of Versailles. This was the last important service of Botha, an able and trusted South African statesman, for he died soon after his return from Paris, at midnight of August 27–28, 1919, at the age of fifty-seven. As friend or as foe he had always been simple, modest, disinterested, a man of honor, large-minded, and warm-hearted.

His successor in the premiership was General Smuts, a native South African of Dutch descent born in Cape Town in 1870, educated in part in local institutions, in part at Christ's College, Cambridge, where he had a distinguished career as a student, taking a "double first" in the Law Tripos in 1894, a forerunner of the distinctions he was destined to attain in the legal profession, and as a soldier and a statesman.

Smuts was now called to a position well calculated to test all his qualities of mind and character, for he was to face one of the most pervasive and persistent forces of the modern world, the principle of nationalism. His attitude was sufficiently indicated by his utterances in the South African parliament during the debates on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. He repeatedly pointed out to his countrymen the position they had acquired as a result of the war. South Africa now had a voice

in the direction of the foreign policy of the Empire, was one of the "nations" of the British Commonwealth of nations, and as such had an equal representation with the others in the League of Nations. She controlled her own destinies. Greater freedom, Smuts asserted, she could not hope to possess, but, with so advantageous a status within the loose and liberal framework of the British Empire, she ought not to try to sever completely that connection.

General Smuts was, therefore, the pronounced opponent of that nationalism which had expressed itself in the rebellion of 1914 and which was now expressing itself in parliament under the leadership of General Hertzog, head of the Nationalist party, a party which has adopted republicanism as its creed, which aspires to restore the old republics of the Transvaal and the Orange River Free State, and which possibly aims at the conversion of the South African Union into a republic. Smuts stands for the maintenance of South Africa's place in the British Empire and a close co-operation between the Boers and the English. Hertzog and the Nationalists wish complete independence of Great Britain. Smuts has thus far obtained a working majority in the parliament but the elections since 1915 have shown a constant increase in the strength of the Nationalist party. Whether this will continue and whether a clash will come sometime between the two sharply opposed policies, time alone will tell. The student should not lose sight of the fundamental fact that the Dutch element in South Africa, which was wholly anti-British in 1900, is now divided. The racial opposition is, therefore, not as clean-cut and definite as it was formerly. A considerable amalgamation of the Dutch and British sections of the population has been brought about.

South African politics are complicated by race problems. There are four and a half times as many blacks as there are whites in the population and the former are increasing more rapidly than the latter. Difficult labor and social questions arise out of this numerical inferiority of the ruling class. This race problem is always present in the public life of South Africa. It even has its repercussions upon other parts of the British Empire. The whites of South Africa are opposed to the admission of immigrants from India because that would increase the proportion of colored people, already far too large in the opinion of the whites. Laws have been passed to restrict this danger. Such laws give offense to the Indians who, members of the same Empire, find parts of the Empire unfriendly and inhospitable.

As Indian sensitiveness to racial discrimination is very great, as Indian nationalism is a growing force, as Indians resent, with increasing impatience, the implication of inferiority within an empire which claims to be composed of equals, it will be seen that the anxieties of British statesmen are not decreased by this struggle between the white and colored races which is going on within the Empire — as, in fact, it is going on, in a more or less accentuated form, throughout the world.

IRELAND

In still another part of the British Empire the years of the world commotion were to be most critical and painful. As early as January, 1913, *Irish Freedom*, the organ of the Sinn Feiners, declared that war between England and Germany was practically inevitable and that such a war would be "Ireland's opportunity." At the same time Protestant Ireland, the province of Ulster, was becoming daily more determined to oppose, cost what it might, the application to it of a Home Rule bill which was being slowly pushed through Parliament and which at any moment might become a law. The opposition of Ulster to the doom that appeared to be impending was based on the ineradicable conviction that the religious and material interests of the Protestant and industrial North would be highly insecure in an Irish Parliament dominated by Catholics representing the agricultural South. The Ulsterites, in 1913 and 1914, were ready to go to any length to prevent this catastrophe, even to armed resistance, should that prove necessary. The contrasts and discords of Irish life were being intensified and sharpened to a very dangerous point in the months preceding the outbreak of the Great War. Ireland was a country only in a geographical sense. In every other sense, in spiritual, intellectual, economic, matters she was two countries, as dissimilar and as antagonistic as any two could easily be. From the point of view of national unity, both history and psychology seemed peremptorily to forbid the banns of North and South.

Into the details of the extraordinarily tangled and tragic record of the years which began in 1914 and which are not ended yet, we cannot enter here. It is a wild and fiery chapter in which the passions of men ran riot, a veritable witch's caldron. What that caldron will finally give forth we are not even yet entirely able to foresee. The boiling process still continues, the foaming

metal has not yet, perhaps, been cast into a final mould.[1] In this summary narrative only a few of the most conspicuous aspects of a turbid and turbulent history can be indicated.

Ever since the beginning of the Home Rule movement about 1870 the relations between England and Ireland had been in a state of tension. That tension reached the snapping point, or nearly reached it, during the Great War. England's extremity was, as *Irish Freedom* had correctly said, Ireland's opportunity, an opportunity that was not missed. England's enemies were potentially Ireland's friends and many Irishmen hoped for the victory of Germany, if that were the only way whereby the hateful connection of Ireland with England could be broken. German agents were active in Ireland, as they were active elsewhere. Indeed, in Ireland the field was particularly inviting. But while recognizing the presence of this factor in the situation and while certain shady transactions of the time attest its influence, it is more than likely that the course of events would have been substantially what it was, had there been no contacts between Irishmen and Germans.

A period of turmoil is always propitious for the enterprises of extremists and the extremists of Ireland were numerous enough and energetic enough to force the pace of Irish evolution, with or without encouragement from outside. Irish agitators had for forty years been demanding Home Rule, but now the more advanced of them were passing far beyond and demanding absolute independence.

On Easter Monday, 1916, there was an uprising in Dublin, The insurgents seized several buildings of strategic importance, the Castle, the Four Courts, the Post Office. Policemen and others were murdered. Shops were looted. Fires were set and in the end a considerable section of the city was reduced to ruins. The mob did its work in thorough fashion.

This rebellion had been preceded by a proclamation "To the People of Ireland" issued in the name of "The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic." The proclamation announced that Ireland was a sovereign and independent state and that "the Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irish man and Irish woman."

There followed several days of uncertainty, of sniping, of difficult street fighting. In the end the rebellion was crushed by

[1] For an admirably informing and balanced account of this difficult period, written by a well-trained and fair historian, see *Encyclopaedia Britannica* New Volumes, II, 551–589, article by W. A. Phillips.

the use of infantry and artillery. It had been the work of a small minority and there can be little doubt that Mr. Redmond, the leader of the Home Rule Party in the House of Commons, correctly reflected the opinion of the overwhelming mass of the Irish people when he denounced the insurrection in vigorous and indignant terms. But the action of the British Government in executing fifteen of the ring-leaders and in sentencing hundreds to imprisonment caused a complete revulsion of feeling. Sinn Fein, momentarily discredited by its failure, revived under the influence of these events and spread with incredible rapidity. The fact that the sentences were such as might have been inflicted in any country, being, according to the codes of law prevailing in all civilized nations, the legal punishment for those who treasonably attack the state, made no difference with public opinion. Sinn Fein now had its "martyrs," who were far more powerful in death than they ever had been in life.

The political results of this Easter rebellion were very far-reaching. The old Home Rule Party, which had been built up by Parnell and which was subsequently led by Redmond and Dillon was now superseded by the Sinn Fein, or physical force, party founded by Arthur Griffith and led by Eamonn De Valera. This party put forth the old Fenian demand for a republic. De Valera's point of view is summarized in a phrase or two, uttered later in a party convention, and which declared that the object of the organization was to secure the international recognition of Ireland as an independent republic and to "make use of any and every means available to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection by military force or otherwise." De Valera also said: "That there would never be peace in Ireland till they got their independence. When the war was over England would be tottering. The Allies could not win. All nations at the Peace Conference would claim their right to the freedom of the seas, and Ireland was of such international importance in that respect that her claim must be admitted."

The first opportunity to count the adherents of this Sinn Fein or republican party was offered by the parliamentary elections of 1918. The republicans secured a sweeping victory. The Home Rulers were practically wiped out, retaining only six seats. John Redmond had died on March 6, 1918, his death probably hastened by his chagrin at the failure of his life work. The Sinn Feiners won 73 seats out of a total of 105. The Unionists won 26, — 23 from Ulster and 3 from Southern Ireland. Thus Catholic Ireland voted for independence; Protestant Ireland for

the preservation of the union with England. The Sinn Fein members refused to take their seats in the Parliament at Westminster. Instead they met in the Dublin Mansion House, constituted on January 21, 1919 the Dail Eireann (pron. Dahl Eerahn) or Assembly of Ireland, subscribed to a solemn Declaration of Independence which was read in English, Gaelic, and French, and elected Count Plunkett, Arthur Griffith and De Valera as "delegates to the Peace Conference," a conference which they were not destined to attend. On the following day De Valera was elected "President of the Irish Republic," and he forthwith established a ministry with departments of foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, and defense. Michael Collins, who was later to organize a system of terror, became what amounted to a minister of war.

To meet this new situation a new Government of Ireland Act was passed in December, 1920, by the British Parliament. This act superseded the Home Rule Bill which had been passed in 1914 and which had then been immediately suspended until the close of the war. The new measure, recognizing the division of the country shown by the elections, provided for two separate parliaments in Ireland, one for the six counties of Northeast Ulster and another for the rest of Ireland. The two parliaments were to choose a joint Council of Ireland, consisting of forty members, to serve as a connecting link and to represent the theory or the possibility of Irish unity, "with a view," says the statute, "to the eventual establishment of a parliament for the whole of Ireland, and to bringing about harmonious action between the parliaments and governments of Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland and to the promotion of mutual intercourse and uniformity in relation to matters affecting the whole of Ireland."

The Ulster Unionists accepted this scheme of two parliaments, not because they liked it but because they were fearful of something worse. The Northern Parliament was therefore duly elected on May 24, 1921, and was opened by King George V in the following June with a moving speech.

The Sinn Feiners, however, would have nothing to do with this scheme. They took part in the elections for the Southern Parliament, winning 124 seats out of 128. But they refused to constitute the Parliament. Instead their elected representatives met in the Mansion House in Dublin, again proclaimed the republic, and elected De Valera as President.

The issue was now fully joined. A rebellious government confronted the lawful government and denied its pretentions *in toto.*

Lloyd George had accurately described the ineluctable situation in these words; "Sinn Fein rejected Home Rule and demanded in its place an Irish Republic for the whole of Ireland. Sinn Fein went further. It deliberately went to work to destroy conciliation and constitutional methods because it recognized that violence was the only method by which it could realize a Republic. . . . I fully admit, and I have always admitted that the declared policy of Sinn Fein and the policy of His Majesty's Government are irreconcilable. I believe that the policy of establishing an Irish Republic is impossible for two reasons; first, because it is incompatible with the security of Great Britain and with the existence of the British commonwealth; and second, because if it were conceded it would mean civil war in Ireland — for Ulster would certainly resist incorporation in an Irish Republic by force — and in this war hundreds of thousands of people, not only from Great Britain but from all over the world, would hasten to take part. . . . It has never been our policy to refuse compromise about anything but the Union itself and the non-coercion of Ulster. . . . I regret that . . . up to the present the directing minds of the Sinn Fein movement . . . believe they can ultimately win a republic by continuing to fight, as they fight today, and are resolutely opposed to compromise. So long as the leaders of Sinn Fein stand in this position and receive the support of their countrymen, settlement is, in my judgment, impossible. The Government of which I am the head will never give way upon the fundamental question of secession. Nor do I believe that any alternative Government could do so either."

Such was the situation when the King opened the new parliament of Northern Ireland in Belfast in June, 1921. Northern Ireland expressed impressively its loyalty to the British connection. Southern Ireland stood forth in grim and determined rebellion. Indeed for three years a guerilla warfare had been going on characterized by all the odious features of such warfare, cold-blooded murders, often of innocent people, ambushes, arson, looting, riots, raids, attacks and reprisals without number. The contest now deepened and there ensued a period of complete chaos. The British Government declared the Irish Parliament, the Dail Eireann, an illegal body, made many arrests, suppressed newspapers, seized the headquarters, the books and papers and funds of the Sinn Fein Association. Sinn Fein hit back by more assassinations, by violence of every kind. Orderly government no longer functioned and utter lawlessness prevailed in Ireland.

Finally on July 7, 1921 a truce was declared between the warring parties and each side appointed a delegation to attend a conference in London "to explore to the utmost the possibility of a settlement." After prolonged and very difficult negotiations, which were interrupted more than once and which were repeatedly threatened with failure, a treaty, or, more accurately, eighteen Articles of Agreement were drawn up and were duly signed on December 6, 1921. It had been officially stated that the basis of the conference was to be "How the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations." Lloyd George had in his invitation to the conference made it clear that the British Government would under no conditions accept the establishment of an Irish Republic or any repudiation of allegiance to the Crown. Those extreme demands must be abandoned, but short of them England was willing to consider any arrangements that might lead to peace. In this temper Lloyd George and several members of his cabinet, Austen Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Lord Birkenhead and others met Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins and three other representatives of Southern Ireland, and a scheme was found that ultimately all could sign.

Article I of the Agreement defines the Ireland of the future. "Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the community of nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland, and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free State."

The relation of the Irish Free State to the Imperial Parliament and Government is to be that of the Dominion of Canada, and the representative of the Crown in Ireland is to be appointed in the same manner as the Governor-General of Canada. The members of the Irish Parliament must take an oath of allegiance to the Crown. The share of the Free State in the debt of the United Kingdom and certain other charges are to be determined, in default of agreement, "by the arbitration of one or more independent persons being citizens of the British Empire." The Irish Free State is to undertake her own coastal defense, the defense by sea of Great Britain and Ireland being undertaken by the Imperial forces, these provisions to be reviewed by the two governments at the end of five years. The Free State shall

afford in time of peace such harbor and other facilities to the Imperial forces as are indicated in the annex to the treaty or such as may, from time to time, be agreed upon. "In time of war or of strained relations with a foreign power," it shall afford "such harbor and other facilities as the British Government may require." Ireland may have an army of its own as large in proportion to its population as the British army is in proportion to the population of Great Britain. The ports of Great Britain and of Ireland are to be freely open to the ships "of the other country" on payment of the customary dues. The Free State is to have no representatives in the Parliament in London.

The Articles of Agreement provide for the determination within a month by the Parliament of Northern Ireland whether Northern Ireland shall be included in the Irish Free State or not. If Northern Ireland decides to stay out then the provisions of the Act of 1920, which set up two parliaments in Ireland, shall continue in force as far as Northern Ireland is concerned, subject to any necessary modifications. In that case a commission shall be appointed which "shall determine, in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland."

Article XVI reads as follows: "Neither the Parliament of the Irish Free State nor the Parliament of Northern Ireland shall make any law so as either directly or indirectly to endow any religion or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof or give any preference or impose any disability on account of religious belief or religious status, or affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction at the school." This article is designed to protect the Catholics of Northern Ireland and the Protestants of Southern Ireland from adverse legislation.

Such were the Articles of Agreement establishing the Irish Free State, such the surprising outcome of an agitation which had covered half a century. These articles granted far greater powers than any of the Home Rule Bills which have been discussed in this history. Southern Ireland was to be as free as Canada, that is as free as was consistent with the continued existence of the British Empire. She might have her own army, her own parliament and ministry, her own coinage and stamps, and whatever legislation suited her on all local matters.

From all parts of the world this radical solution of a question that had so long tormented the British Empire and embittered

its relations with other peoples was hailed with satisfaction and with unfeigned relief and Lloyd George was showered with congratulations. It was universally thought that one, at least, of the numerous specters that had long haunted the world to its great discomfort had been laid.

But the shouting was premature. The clouds had parted for a moment and the sun had shone, also only for a moment. Then the heavens grew black again. While the British Parliament was immediately summoned to ratify the treaty, which it did by large majorities, opposition of the most determined and passionate sort speedily developed in Ireland. Two days after the signature of the treaty De Valera, "President of the Republic," announced his attitude in a "Message to the Irish People," in which he said: "You have seen in the public press the text of the proposed treaty with Great Britain. The terms of this agreement are in violent conflict with the wishes of the majority of the nation, as expressed freely in successive elections in the past three years. I feel it my duty to inform you immediately that I cannot recommend acceptance of this treaty either to the Dail Eireann or to the country."

The "President" then repudiated the agreement which had been signed by all the Sinn Fein delegates to the conference. Certain members of the Irish cabinet also opposed the settlement. Anti-treaty speeches freely criticised the action of the Irish delegates. Ireland's divisions had always been Ireland's undoing. At the very moment which the outside world regarded as one of amazing triumph for the Irish, the Irish themselves presented a spectacle for which even the most cynical were hardly prepared. Hitherto a unit in opposition to Great Britain, Sinn Fein was now torn with dissension. The discussion in the Dail Eireann concerning the treaty was long and impassioned and it was only by the narrow majority of 64 to 57 that ratification was finally secured (January 7, 1922). The cleavage between Griffith and Collins on the one hand and De Valera on the other was a wide one. De Valera declared that the delegates had had no right or authority to abandon the "republic." The delegates hotly resented the charge that they had exceeded their powers. They had merely brought home a document which assured an unexpected measure of self-government, a document which it was wise to accept. After the vote of ratification De Valera resigned as "President," and Griffith was elected in his place. Collins became the head of the "cabinet." A Provisional Government

was set up for the purpose of bringing the new Irish Free State into existence.

But the ratification of the treaty by the Dail Eireann was only



a first step. It was decided that the treaty and also a constitution of the Free State, to be drafted forthwith, should be submitted to the Irish electorate together. The contest was thus transferred to the people. The Republicans wished the elections

postponed, distrusting the voters. Some of them even went so far as to deny that the voters had any right to abolish the "Republic." It existed apparently by virtue of some new-fangled divine right. Some began to talk of a dictatorship of the army, the electorate being ignored. A confused and bitter contest speedily developed and Ireland was plunged once more into wild disorder, a veritable war between the adherents of the idea of a Free State and those of an absolutely independent republic. The Provisional Government insisted upon the recognition of its authority everywhere, but it encountered the armed opposition of the republicans. It was necessary to compel obedience to the Government, in a country in which government had long been considered the enemy, to be combatted by every means. It was necessary for the Government to take rebellious towns or districts by siege or by assault. The gulf between the hostile parties grew rapidly deeper and the struggle, this time between Irishmen, took on all the features which had previously characterized the controversy between Irishmen and Englishmen, attacks on barracks and forts held by the Government forces, ambushes, shooting-affrays, kidnapping, and murders. Public order rapidly deteriorated in many sections of the country. Personal security did not exist. Ireland had never in its long and troubled history witnessed a more acrimonious controversy. For month after month in 1922 the confusion and blood-shedding continued, the Provisional Government gradually gaining ground, carrying the war to the strongholds of the irreconcilables. It was apparently on the point of restoring order throughout the land when Arthur Griffith, the real founder of the Sinn Fein movement and more than any other man the creator of the Irish Free State, suddenly died on August 12, 1922, succumbing to heart disease at the very moment when the rebellion seemed about to collapse. A week later Michael Collins, the next most important member of the Free State Government, was shot down in cold blood by men hiding in ambush.

What the effect would be, upon the fortunes of the treaty and the Free State, of this tragic removal of the two ablest and most popular members of the new government, no one could say. Whether the Free State would crumble and collapse before it had really been instituted, whether the irreconcilable republicans would be able to seize power and carry through their plans, whether Ireland was destined to pass through a period of utter anarchy and chaos, or whether, startled and sobered by the prospect, the sound and healthy forces of the national life would

rally around the banner which had fallen from the lifeless hands of Griffith and Collins, no one knew.

Little by little, however, the Free State emerged from its dubious and dangerous situation, proving itself more than a match for its enemies. While the difficulties continued, while assassination and arson were destined for many months to play their traditional and sorry rôle in the harrowing and stormful history of Ireland, and while the Republicans refused to disarm, nevertheless the Free State was able gradually to consolidate itself. Men were found to take the places of those removed, ready to carry on their work. Thus William Cosgrave and Richard Mulcahy were chosen to the positions left vacant by the death of Griffith and Collins. The work of disconnecting much the larger part of Ireland from Great Britain was carried by successive steps to completion. In December 1922, the last British soldiers were withdrawn from Dublin, and the new constitution, drawn up by the Irish, was duly enacted by the Imperial Parliament on December 4. On December 6, 1922, the Free State was established by Royal Proclamation.

The Constitution declares the Irish Free State to be a co-equal member of the community of nations that constitutes the British Commonwealth, and that "all powers of Government, and all authority, legislative, executive and judicial in Ireland, are derived from the people of Ireland." The Irish language is declared to be the national language, but English is equally recognized as an official language, which is a wise provision, as most Irishmen do not speak the national language which has thus far been more a symbol than a practical means of communication of thought or passion. There is to be in the Free State no endowment of any religion. Freedom of religion, freedom of association, freedom of elementary education are proclaimed.

The Legislature, known as the Oireachtas, consists of the King, a House of Representatives (Dail Eireann), and a Senate (Séanad Eireann). The Dail has supreme power over all money bills, although the Senate may make recommendations. Other bills presuppose normally the consent of both Chambers, but the Senate is deprived of the power of unduly delaying a bill passed by the other house. The Constitution makes provision for the referendum, the initiative, and for proportional representation. Suffrage is universal, men and women having at the age of 21 the right to vote for the Dail, and at the age of 30 for the Senate. The members of the former body are chosen for four years, of the Senate for twelve. The Dail numbers at present 153 mem-

bers. It may be dissolved at any time, in accordance with the operation of the parliamentary system. The Senate consists of 60 members. The Executive consists of a Council of not more than seven members nor less than five. They must be members of the Dail and are responsible to it.

The representative of the Crown in the Free State is the Governor General. The first occupant of this position was Timothy Michael Healy, appointed December, 1922. The Free State Parliament met as such, for the first time, on December 6, 1922. The estimated population of the Irish Free State at the moment of inauguration was about three million two hundred thousand.

Ireland is only a geographical expression. While the Free State includes by far the larger part of the island it does not include all. Northern Ireland took the earliest opportunity (December, 1922) to vote itself out of the Free State and to declare for a separate existence. It has a parliament of its own, consisting of a Senate of 26 members and a House of Commons of 52, and possessing extensive and specified powers. Its executive consists of a Governor, appointed by the Crown, and of a ministry responsible to parliament. Northern Ireland is represented in the Parliament in London by 13 members, while the Free State has no representatives in that body. Northern Ireland had in 1922 an estimated population of about one million three hundred thousand.

CHAPTER XLIX

TURKEY SINCE THE WAR

While the victorious Allies were able, after the Armistice, to make peace with reasonable celerity with most of their late enemies, while the new boundaries of the nations were set up generally and the new institutions attained a certain fixity, in one quarter of the much-distracted globe conditions long remained largely fluid and uncertain. Indeed essentially they remain so still. Not until nearly five years after the close of the war was peace made with Turkey, and, even then, the document that registered it, the Treaty of Lausanne, seemed decidedly lacking in all the attributes of finality or long endurance. That perennial and cheerless Eastern Question, which past generations were unable to solve and which may harass generations yet unborn, entered upon a new phase with the great convulsion of our day, a phase which cannot, however, be described with much precision or certitude. We stand in the midst of an unfinished chapter of contemporary history. Where so much is still tentative and doubtful, we may well be brief, seeking only to point out the main lines of change and settlement which have thus far appeared, and leaving in appropriate obscurity what is essentially obscure.

Turkey's entry into the war on the side of Germany in October, 1914, profoundly affected the course of the war. It cut off the Western Allies from Russia and Russia from the Western Allies, and thus contributed directly and powerfully to that revolution which was ultimately to work such havoc with the empire of the Tsars. But, more particularly, it enormously widened the theater of conflict, forcing the Allies to fight far from home, far from the bases of supply, and amid conditions of exceptional difficulty and strain. It nearly, but not quite, set the Mohammedan world aflame against the Christian, thus threatening the British and French colonial empires, with their hordes of Mohammedan subjects, with destruction in the consuming heat of religious and racial fanaticism. It subjected the Turkish Empire itself to the greatest strain it had ever known, causing all the fissures in its loose and unstable structure to widen portentously, and leaving

it in the end a derelict, battered beyond description. What the salvage might be from the colossal wreckage no one could foretell. The Turks, confronting the catastrophic consequences of their participation in the war, had need of all their fatalism.

The expedition to the Dardanelles, the Gallipoli campaign, the establishment of the Salonica front, the attacks upon the Suez Canal, the arduous fighting in Mesopotamia were consequences of this participation of the Turks in the war, necessitating a wide and costly dispersion of Allied effort, and leading, as the issue proved, to a more comprehensive victory. At the end of the war the vast stretches of the Arabic portion of the Turkish Empire, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia were lost to the Sultan, and General Allenby was in control. Constantinople itself had yielded to Allied occupation. The day of reckoning had arrived. The young Turk leaders, Taalat, Enver, Djemel, with their hands imbrued with the blood of hundreds of thousands of Armenians, assassinated or hounded to death by their orders, fled from the scene of their nefarious activity, seeking refuge from the wrath of men in unknown hiding-places. The Crescent was passing into penumbra and perhaps into permanent eclipse. Was Santa Sophia about to become once more a Christian church?

A severe peace was expected by the rulers and people of Turkey. They knew only too well that the crack of doom had sounded for a dominion that in 1914 had stretched from the Golden Horn to the furthest tip of spiced Arabia, a distance as far as that from San Francisco to New York. They knew that Arabia and Palestine and Syria and Mesopotamia were definitely lost, not only because British and Indian armies had swept over them right up to the gates of Asia Minor, but because the Arab tribes and peoples, fellow-Mohammedans, had turned against them, cleverly and adroitly induced by the British to take this step so decisive for their future and for the ultimate triumph of Allied arms. For these peoples, too, Orientals of Orientals, felt the lure of modern nationalism and seized with alacrity the opportunity of self-determining their destinies. The touch of the West was arousing strange breeds of men to unaccustomed thoughts and aspirations, was imparting a new life to a sleepy and supine section of the world. A transformation of the Levant had begun, whose ultimate issue defied the powers of prophecy. Whether one more instance of momentary illusion, or the indubitable dawning of a new day, let him pronounce who could. One thing was certain, Western Asia was astir.

The Turks also knew full well that in addition to the loss of extensive territories they must accept other distasteful terms from their conquerors; the restoration of the Capitulations, or special privileges for foreigners resident in Turkey, which that government had abolished at the beginning of the war; measures for the protection of Christians within the Empire; some kind of international control of the Straits and the Bosphorus. Such arrangements they were probably prepared to accept as the necessary penalty for defeat but, when the Allies went beyond and began to talk of the cession of Thrace, and Smyrna and a large region round about, resistance began to appear and rapidly crystallized. A new nationalism arose with which the world would be compelled to reckon, more limited in the territory it affected, more intense, and gathering leaders and momentum as month after month went by with no definite proposals from the Allies for a peace settlement, with only provisional and partial decisions which did not cover the whole field of dispute but which were sufficiently drastic to inspire alarm.

The main reason for the long inaction of the Allies was their absorption in the more pressing work of pacifying Europe, of drawing up the treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly. But another reason was the division of opinion, the clash of divergent interests among the Allies themselves over the future of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain and France, Italy and Greece became rivals in a field where rivalries had often operated in the past, to the advantage of the rickety and discredited régime of the Turks. It was the reappearance of this old and hoary phenomenon that prevented the speedy settlement of the terms of the Turkish treaty. It was this that enabled the Turks to get their second wind and to defy the treaty when it was finally presented to them.

From the end of 1918, Constantinople and its approaches were under the guns of the Allied fleets, and the Sultan in the Yildiz Kiosk preserved only the semblance of his power, presenting no serious obstacle to the will of the Allies when they themselves should know their will and should declare it. But in June, 1919, General Mustafa Kemal Pasha, an officer who had served with distinction in the defence of Gallipoli, left Constantinople and crossed into Asia Minor. There he displayed great activity, creating a separate government and army of his own and winning adherents to his programme, which was one of resistance to any attempt on the part of the Allies to partition Asia Minor (Anatolia), or Thrace. Under Kemal's leadership the national senti-

ment of the Turkish people was spurred to new efforts to check the disintegration of the empire and to recover as much of its former territory as circumstances might permit. Once more the mutual rivalries of the enemies of Turkey might be turned to account. The Kemalists, intent upon restoring the authority of the old Ottoman government, ignored or opposed the Sultan in Constantinople on the ground that he was no longer a free agent but merely a pawn in the hands of the Western Powers.

Finally the Allies were able to agree upon a treaty of peace which was to be submitted to the Sultan for his signature. This document is known as the Treaty of Sèvres and was signed by the Ottoman delegates on August 10, 1920. Its territorial terms reduced the empire to a state about the size of Spain. Turkey ceded Thrace west of the Chatalja line to Greece; also Tenedos and Imbros and the Aegean islands. Smyrna and a region around about were to be administered by Greece, under Turkish sovereignty, for a period of five years after which they might annex themselves to Greece by plebiscite. Greece received also the islands of the Dodecanese, islands which Italy had seized in the war with Turkey in 1911 and which she had held ever since. These islands were inhabited by Greeks, and they were now to be handed over to Greece with the exception of Rhodes, where a plebiscite might ultimately be held and might determine its future status, if England should cede Cyprus to Greece, a condition quite likely to postpone the plebiscite indefinitely. Turkey recognized the independence of Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and the new Arab kingdom of Hedjaz. Turkey was to retain Constantinople and a small European hinterland extending up to the Chatalja lines which are about twenty-five miles to the west. But the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus and strips of coast on both sides were to form a "Zone of the Straits" and were to be under the control of an International Commission, to be composed of representatives of various powers, this commission to have complete control of all the navigation of the Straits, its rules and regulations and financial charges. The Straits were to remain open and free to all nations in time of peace and were to be neutral in time of war. All fortifications within this neutral zone were to be demolished. Nominal sovereignty of the zone was to be divided between Turkey and Greece. The frontiers of the new Armenian state were to be referred to President Wilson for delimitation. The line which he finally drew included an area of about 30,000 square miles, with the port of Trebizond on the Black Sea.

Such were the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres. But this treaty, though signed by the powers concerned, was never ratified by any of them, and the Kemalist Nationalist Government of Angora, refusing to recognize the Sultan's signature, dedicated to it its undying hostility. Moreover the French and Italian governments began, almost on the morrow of the signature, to demand its revision, while the English government, though on the whole favoring it, nevertheless, followed a somewhat vacillating course in regard to its execution. The Treaty of Sèvres was, as a whole, never put into force and two years after its signature was generally recognized as dead or moribund.

Yet certain provisions of this incomplete and unratified treaty have been put into operation and such provisions are not likely to be disturbed. France has received from the League of Nations a mandate for Syria and is installed there in military force. England has received a mandate for Mesopotamia, and within that spacious area she has recognized the creation of the Kingdom of Irak, comprising the valley of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and the Emir Faisal, son of the King of Hedjaz, was crowned King of Irak at Bagdad on August 23, 1921. This state has a population of about 3,000,000 and an area of 143,000 square miles. East of the Jordan England has also recognized the Emirate of Transjordania, sometimes called Kerak, with a total population of possibly 180,000 Arabs, partly nomads, partly settled, and with the brother of Faisal, Abdullah, as Emir.

Great Britain has also been given by the League of Nations a mandate for Palestine. Embodied in the mandate is a provision for the establishment of a "National Home" for the Jewish People according to the principle laid down in the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, which reads as follows: "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

What this may mean remains to be seen, the term and conception of a "national home" being new to political science and of uncertain scope and significance. It represents the present status of the Jewish nationalist aspiration expressed in recent times in the movement called Zionism. Great Britain as the mandatory power is responsible for the carrying out of this purpose.

It has not yet indicated what its interpretation of the Balfour Declaration will actually be. It is quite obvious that the vague term "a national home" does not mean, and cannot safely be made to mean "a Jewish State." For Palestine as a Jewish State with supreme authority in the hands of the Jews would mean a clear and flagrant defiance of the principle of self-determination accepted as the underlying basis of the system of mandates created by the Conference of Paris. Palestine has a population of somewhat less than 800,000, of whom only about 80,000, or one in ten, are Jews, most of the rest being Arabs. The Arabs are absolutely opposed to the aims of Zionism. They consider Palestine their country, as it is, if majorities have any rights which the world is bound to respect. They regard the Balfour Declaration as the work of British politicians who have an eye to the advantage of British commerce and imperial expansion and who are sensitive to the influence of Jewish world finance. They see no reason why they should themselves be sacrificed to such considerations. There is an Arabic nationalist aspiration as there is a Jewish nationalism and a British imperialism. Whether the three can live together in harmony within the restricted area of Palestine remains to be seen. There are materials sufficient for a serious conflict. It should be noted, further, that there are nearly as many Christians as Jews in Palestine, 73,000 of the former, 83,000 of the latter.

Another change in the map of the former Turkish Empire is that represented by the rise of the Kingdom of Hedjaz. This state of Western Arabia, possessing a population of perhaps 900,000, achieved its independence during the Great War. It was a product of the policy adopted by the British early in the struggle of encouraging the revolt of the Arab world against the Turkish over-lords. Hedjaz was represented at the Conference of Paris by two delegates and was one of the high contracting parties of that famous assembly. It is important as containing the cities of Mecca and Medina, holy places for the followers of Mohammed. The King of Hedjaz is Hussein Ali. The Treaty of Sèvres recognized the Hedjaz as a free and independent state. Indeed that state was one of the signatories of the treaty.

The Treaty of Sèvres, although difficult to make, owing to the conflict of interests of those who drafted it, was nevertheless easier to make than to enforce. The delegates who signed it for Turkey represented only Constantinople and its vicinity.

It was not recognized by the Anatolian Turks, the Kemalists, who pronounced anathema upon it and who swore to resist it to the bitter end. It was clear that nothing but the application of force by the Allies could extort its acceptance by the Government of Angora. None of the Great Powers, England, France, or Italy, was willing to furnish men and money for that purpose. Those countries were exhausted militarily and financially by the war and the voters in each of them were opposed to further ventures. This situation created an opportunity for one of the small states of Europe for which she had been eagerly waiting and for which she was prepared. Venizelos, in the name of his country, offered the Greek army for the purpose, an army fully mobilized and already on the frontier of Thrace, ready to cross over. As the Entente Powers were confronted by only two alternatives, either the non-enforcement of the Treaty of Sèvres or its execution by the Greeks, they chose the latter and invited Greece to undertake the task of bringing the nationalist forces of Asia Minor to terms and compelling them to accept the new arrangements. France and Great Britain were already, as we have seen, in the military possession of the vast region east of the Mediterranean, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine. It was for the Greeks to execute the rest of the treaty and this they were eager to undertake as it meant for them a war of liberation of the Greeks of Thrace and of the western shores of Asia Minor, famous sites of ancient Greek civilization, where an important Greek population has persisted, literally for thousands of years. The Aegean had historically been a Greek sea. Might it not become so again? Might not ancient Hellas be restored? Adrianople, Smyrna beckoned, and in the distance lay Constantinople, for more than a thousand years the proud capital of the Byzantine Empire, the upholder of Greek arts and letters, the center of Greek traditions, the creator of the Greek Church, the Christian Mother of eastern and southeastern Europe. Might not this incomparable city, which every Greek felt to be as rightfully the capital of Greece as the Italians of the nineteenth century had felt Rome to be theirs, finally, by a happy turn of fortune, fall as a prize of war into its appropriate place as the head and crown of a redeemed and re-united Hellas? The prospect was alluring. And the predestined leader in this final and culminating phase of the long war of Greek Independence, which had begun a century before, could be no other, it seemed, than Eleutherios Venizelos, who in a career of a few years had achieved the most magnificent results that could be

ascribed to any statesman of modern Greece, who had already greatly increased the patrimony of his country, and who, though a representative of a petty state, had become one of the commanding figures upon the great stage of European politics. The man and the hour alike seemed to foretell a rapid and supreme success.

But things are not always what they seem. The famous Eastern Question still had some surprises in store for a supposedly blasé and sophisticated world. It still possessed a power to embroil the best of friends and to set the nations on edge. It still had victims to devour.

The Greeks entered upon the task assigned them with alacrity and enthusiasm. They overran Thrace and occupied it, and Greek armies shortly were in possession of western Asia Minor all the way from Brusa in the north to Ashak in the south on the famous river which has enriched the English language with the word "meander" (modern Menderez). But the Turkish Nationalists, the Kemalists, despite this fact showed no inclination to accept the Treaty of Sèvres, relying on the nature of their country whose poor roads and natural features seemed to them likely to prove an ultimate defence from the invader, relying also on intrigue with Russian Bolsheviks, on the likelihood of dissensions among the Allied nations, and, in general, on the chance that something might "turn up" to confound and paralyze their enemies.

And something did turn up, something formidable. Venizelos, the architect of the fortunes of contemporary Greece, was suddenly overthrown in the very moment of his greatest triumph, and fortune showed once more how fickle she can be.

The World War had divided the Greeks into two sharply opposed camps, the Venizelists and the adherents of King Constantine. The King, brother-in-law of the German Emperor, had followed a personal policy at variance with that of his minister, and secretly and treacherously hostile to the Entente, which, in order to end his dangerous intrigues, had forced his deposition in June 1917. Constantine was succeeded by his second son, Alexander, and Venizelos, henceforth all powerful, ranged his country on the side of the Allies. Constantine, who did not renounce his rights, withdrew to Switzerland, where he labored assiduously to prepare his return, astutely encouraging all the discontented elements in Greece against the hated premier. Venizelos was at a disadvantage in meeting this occult and insidious campaign, as the exigencies of the situation demanded long absences in western

Europe in connection with the diplomatic enterprises centering in the Conference of Paris. Moreover these absences relaxed his hold upon the internal administration of Greece and he was in a poor position to check or correct the mistakes of some of his subordinate officials whose unpopular acts played directly into the hands of the watchful opposition.

When Venizelos returned from Paris to Athens in August, 1920, he was publicly thanked by the national assembly as the savior of his country. He announced that new elections would shortly be held, laying down as the sole condition of them that the question of the return of Constantine should not be raised. But raised it was by events, and became the central and absorbing interest of the voters. In the midst of the campaign King Alexander suddenly died as the result of the bite of a monkey. The crown was offered to Paul, the third son of Constantine, who declined, unless the Hellenic people should clearly indicate that they did not wish the return of his "august father." On the contrary this was precisely what they did wish, most ardently. They gave a crushing majority to the opponents of Venizelos. Only 120 of his followers were elected to the new chamber, whereas twice as many of his opponents were returned. Venizelos immediately resigned and left the country, not considering it a safe place to live in, party feeling running so high. An attempt had been made by certain monarchists to assassinate him as he was leaving Paris and had been praised by the Royalist press as glorious tyrannicide. Manifestly it was wiser for him to live abroad until a more convenient season.

On December 5, 1920, a plebiscite was held on the question of the recall of King Constantine. The Venizelists stated that they would abstain from voting. The result of the poll was announced as 999,954 votes out of 1,013,724 in favor of the return of Constantine, and while there was without doubt much official pressure to obtain this end, still public opinion had expressed itself with exceptional emphasis. Constantine and Queen Sophia, the sister of William II and the first of the House of Hohenzollern to emerge from the late hurricane, soon landed at the Piraeus and were received with great enthusiasm.

But this re-enthronement of the popular favorite was not without its disquieting features for the Greek people and for Constantine himself. The Allies had already announced before the plebiscite that as Constantine had been hostile to them during the war they could have no confidence in him, and that, in the case of his remounting the Greek throne they would reserve

to themselves "complete liberty in dealing with the situation." They now refused to recognize him and cut short the financial aid they were extending to Greece. Whether they would go further and oppose any projects he might have remained to be seen.

Constantine, back in power, announced that he would continue to act in harmony with his "Great Allies" in carrying out the Treaty of Sèvres and in reuniting the Greek lands around the Aegean. This meant the prosecution of the war with the Turks in Anatolia. He affected to believe that his own reappearance upon the scene would not alter the adherence of the Allies to their policy, and that the irritation they showed upon his return to Athens would prove only momentary; that, in short, their interests were identical with his and would continue to prescribe the same course of conduct. In this he was in error. In the two succeeding years Greece received the support of England alone and that a vacillating support, cordial at times, at times lukewarm. France, on the other hand, favored the Turks against the Greeks and demanded the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, which would be accomplished only at the expense of the latter. The attitude of England and France was determined by general considerations of world policy in the Near East. Here the two countries appeared no longer as allies but as rivals. This difference of opinion and of purpose among the western Powers was ominous for the Greeks, favorable for the Turks. It contributed to the failure of conferences held in 1921 to bring about a final settlement of the Turkish question. Indeed the French went so far as to make peace with Turkey independently, an action which gave great offence to England and which subjected the relations between those two states to a considerable strain. On October 30, 1921, the French signed an agreement with the Government of Angora, promising to withdraw from the province of Cilicia where they had installed themselves and where they were hard pressed by the Kemalists. They gave Cilicia back to the Turks and in return were guaranteed immunity in Syria. Also they received certain concessions for French financial and mining interests, and the lease of a certain portion of the Bagdad Railway.

In this atmosphere of international intrigue, of rivalry, of the old familiar kind, for special political and economic advantages, the union of France and England, represented by the compromise of the Treaty of Sèvres, broke down. The only hearty supporters of that treaty were the Greeks. If it was

to be enforced they alone must enforce it. And to do so they must send armies across the Aegean Sea, and must tax still further a war-weary people. Was the task beyond their resources, material and moral? All through the years of 1921 and 1922 the exhausting struggle between the Greeks and the Anatolian Turks went on. In 1921 the Greeks were generally successful, advancing at one time to within fifty miles of Angora. It seemed that they would be able to compel the Turks finally to accept the Treaty of Sèvres, and might then proceed to consolidate their new position in Asia Minor. But the Turks held on, and, in August and September of 1922, they assumed the offensive, swept the Greeks rapidly back, and entered Smyrna. The defeated Greek troops, and hordes of civilian refugees in the last stages of distress, sought to reach the English and American ships in the harbor, but large numbers of them failed. Smyrna, fired probably by the Turks, burst into flames and burned for three days until all but the Turkish quarter was destroyed. Thousands and thousands of the wretched fugitives perished in the flames or were shot down by the Turks. The world was rudely awakened by these events, with their appalling climax, and became aware that the war which it had thought ended four years before had not ended yet, and might easily blaze up again in regions where it had died down, might still exact countless additional victims. The victory of Mustafa Kemal's armies in Asia Minor was complete.

What would be the effect of this overwhelming Turkish triumph? That was the redoubtable question. Would it mean not only the elimination of the Greeks from the mainland of Asia Minor but the extinction or renewed oppression of all non-Turks resident there, and resident there longer than the Turks themselves? Would the reinvigorated and triumphant nationalism of the Turks rest content with Anatolia or would it seek to get Thrace back again and, installing itself securely in Constantinople, recover once more the status of a European power, when the world had thought Europe at last freed from the scandal of Turkish misrule and inefficiency? And would the Turks, having recovered that much, not seek to recover all, even the Arabic-speaking portions of their former empire, would they not at the proper moment seek to reconquer Syria and Mesopotamia and the states of the Arabian peninsula? Such a possibility had the liveliest interest for England and for France, for Zionists and Arab kings and emirs, indeed, for the whole world. Would Constantine after his signal failure be again overthrown and

would Venizelos be recalled? These and many other questions surged into the public mind of the world in the autumn of 1922 on the morrow of the Turkish triumph. The answers to them, at least to some of them, were speedily forthcoming.

One of the earliest answers concerned Greece. The decisive events just described brought the Greek Government down with a crash and cost the Greek King his throne. In the Greek army, demoralized, disintegrated, and furious at what it considered its betrayal, the spirit of mutiny broke out. A revolutionary committee of army officers was formed which declared the King responsible for the disaster which had overtaken the nation, and demanded his immediate withdrawal. Constantine, recognizing the inevitable, formally abdicated on September 27 and for the second time took the road to exile, only to die very suddenly a few months later at Palermo (January 11, 1923). Constantine was succeeded on the throne by his son George, but the real government of Greece was a rigid military dictatorship exercised by a small group of self-appointed army officers, hitherto quite unknown. This group ruled with an iron hand. Several former ministers and officers of Constantine were summarily executed, including the late premier, Gounaris. Liberty of the press and of speech was suppressed and popular elections were postponed.

So much for the vanquished. What would the victors do, now that they had achieved a triumph more complete than any they had dreamed? Would the Turkish army, flushed with victory over the Greeks, for centuries hated and despised by the Turks, seek to cross over into Europe, to seize control of Constantinople, to recover Thrace, to wipe out the humiliation of the defeat of 1918, to replace the Crescent as high in the heavens as it had been in 1914. If it should attempt this, and the evidence was strong that such was its intention, would not war break out once more in the Balkans and might it not spread beyond? Was not Europe threatened with the revival of a general war?

The danger was serious and alarming. It was only averted, it seems, by the firm attitude of the British Government which announced its determination to oppose any attempt on the part of the Turks to cross into Europe and which took steps to reinforce the British troops in the threatened area, an attitude rendered all the more difficult by the simultaneous and hurried withdrawal of French and Italian troops, under the ill-concealed Turkish threat. In this critical hour, the old and costly divisions and jealousies among the Allies, which had largely caused the present catastrophe, showed themselves once more.

The mingled firmness and restraint of the British authorities proved sufficient to conjure the immediate danger, and after several weeks of standing on the very brink of war the Turks agreed to a conference with the European powers, a conference which should seek to determine terms of peace not only between the immediate combatants, the Turks and the Greeks, but between the Turks and the Allied Powers, the war which had begun between them, in 1914, never having been formally terminated. Before they would consent to enter that conference the Turks were promised the return to them of Eastern Thrace, which had been given to the Greeks by the Treaty of Sèvres.

The Conference of Lausanne, which was thus summoned to deal with one of the most tangled and obscure of all international problems, met on November 20, 1922, and was in session for eleven weeks, when it broke down, on February 4, 1923, on the definite refusal of the Turkish delegation to sign the treaty presented to them, five days before, by the allied leaders.

The discussions at Lausanne were long and involved, characterized by all the delays, intrigues, and backstairs influences long associated in the Western mind with every aspect of the Eastern question. The Turks had the advantage over the Allies in that they knew their own mind, were not at all in a hurry and were quite willing to continue fighting, whereas the Allies were more or less divided by conflicting rivalries and interests, were preoccupied with many other problems, and were, moreover, as they practically announced from the housetops, unwilling to make any further appeal to arms in order to enforce their views. In other words, the Allies wanted peace so badly that they were ready to make it almost at any price. The record of the Conference was, therefore, one of repeated, almost continuous, concessions to the Turkish demands, of humiliating capitulations to Turkish nationalism and xenophobia. The Western Powers swallowed one bitter pill after another, only to find a fresh one presented for their deglutition. The Turks showed an inclination to act as if they had defeated the Allies, whereas, in reality, they had only defeated the Greeks. And the incurable weakness of the Allied delegates arose from the fact that they knew that public opinion in their own countries would not support them in any insistence that might result in further fighting. And not only did they know this but the Turks knew it equally well. As none of the powers was prepared for a war against Turkey, a diplomatic *volte face* from the attitude represented by the Treaty of Sèvres was inevitable. Yet after nearly three months of yielding, ac-

companied with obvious and unsuccessful attempts to hide their discomfiture under elaborate veils of diplomatic phraseology, the Allies still found the longed-for peace most elusive. The Turkish delegates refused to sign and announced that they must refer the treaty to the National Assembly of Angora for its sovereign opinion. That body refused to accept it but voted in favor of a resumption of negotiations. The Allies acquiesced and on April 23, 1923, the Conference was re-opened, and finally on July 24, 1923, a treaty was signed, in the main hall of the University of Lausanne, by the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania, and Turkey. Turkey retains Constantinople and recovers Eastern Thrace up to the Maritza and at one or two points even beyond. On the other hand she pays heavily for having fought on the German side, as she has been shorn of her non-Turkish provinces, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, Hedjaz, and Yemen. In other words she has lost about a third of the population and about half of the area she possessed in 1914. This greatly reduced, impoverished, and backward state would soon drop into obscurity were it not for its possession of Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles. The Capitulations have been abandoned, because of the rigid and uncompromising hostility of the Turks to anything that infringed their national sovereignty. The Armenians are left to their fate, whatever it may be. A wholesale removal of Greeks from Turkey and Turks from Greece is provided for, a compulsory migration which will necessarily be attended with much acute suffering, moral and physical. Thus the problem of the Christians in Turkey will be settled by the elimination of the Christians. An elaborate convention pretends to regulate the Straits in time of war and in time of peace.

Meanwhile the historic Turkish state has disappeared. The House of Osman has ceased to rule. The Sultanate has been abolished, the last Sultan dethroned and driven into exile. The very name "Ottoman Empire" has been discarded in favor of the designation "Turkey." Turkey is now a republic. All power, executive as well as legislative, is vested in a Grand National Assembly, elected for two years. This is the supreme, unique authority, choosing the Caliph, or head of the established state religion, and also the members of the Cabinet, which is now called the Council of Commissioners.

CHAPTER L

BELGIUM DURING AND SINCE THE WAR

One of the conspicuous and gratuitous victims of the war was Belgium. Having scrupulously observed all the international obligations imposed upon her by her privileged position of neutrality solemnly guaranteed by venerable treaties that bore the signatures of the great powers of Europe, having refrained from any act of provocation or disquieting ambition, pursuing the even tenor of her ways which involved no threat nor shadow of threat to any sister state, she suddenly found herself the prey of a faithless and pitiless neighbor which eighty years before had plighted her protection. The moral brazenness of the invasion of Belgium, which so profoundly shocked the conscience of the world and which was visited with such general condemnation of Germany, was, for Belgium, but the announcement of the malignant fate, the manifold woes to mind and body, that impended at the hands of the ruthless aggressor, the prelude of a tyranny that was to know no bounds.

The invasion of August 1914 itself was accompanied by horrors to which the world had long been unaccustomed and which seemed inconceivable in the modern age. No sooner had the German army crossed the Belgian frontier than, to quote the words of Belgium's most distinguished historian, Henri Pirenne, "it immediately put into practice a system of terrorism in its dealings with the inhabitants, hoping in this way to terrorize the Government, demoralize the army, and break the national resistance." "The forward march of the German army," continues Professor Pirenne, "was marked by an uninterrupted succession of atrocities. Once it was perceived that the Belgian army meant to offer a resistance on which Germany had not counted, pillage, burnings and massacres began. On the pretext that the inhabitants were armed, that *francs tireurs* attacked the German troops, the invading military command methodically organized the devastation of the country. Maps were issued to the officers indicating what towns and villages were to be burned down. The siege of Liége, with the preliminary repulses suffered by the

German regiment which first attacked the outer forts, gave the signal for a campaign of reprisals directed against the civil population." Some twenty villages were forthwith destroyed. "Scenes of indescribable savagery were enacted: 623 persons were shot, massacred, or driven with blows of the rifle-butt into the flaming houses to be burnt alive." The burnings were scientifically organized, a branch of the German army being specially trained and equipped for that purpose. "Between August 4 and August 20 in the province of Liége alone, 1061 persons were massacred, shot, hanged or burnt by the German troops; more than 2,000 houses and 4 churches were burnt deliberately and by order, not counting those destroyed by bombardment. In the province of Limburg during the same period 65 persons fell victims to similar cruelties."

As the invasion progressed other localities were similarly visited by scenes of horror, houses burned, civilians shot *en masse* on military order, often after useless and horrible cruelty. In the province of Namur 1949 inhabitants were murdered and more than 3,000 houses systematically burnt (not counting those destroyed by ordinary acts of war). The policy of terrorism was ruthlessly applied at Namur, at Dinant, at Louvain, and in the neighboring villages on the line of march. At Dinant "at nightfall on August 23 German soldiers rushed shouting about the streets, and everywhere fires broke out. The church, the town hall, the entire town was soon in flames. The inhabitants, arrested *en masse*, were either massacred, or else driven into different enclosed places where, after a while, a methodical extermination was commenced. In the presence of their families men were formed into groups and shot; 665 persons were killed, including 75 women, and 35 children. This horrible butchery was copied in the neighboring villages." At Latour, Prince Oscar, son of the Emperor of Germany, "presided in person over the execution of 71 inhabitants." At Louvain 79 men were shot in the presence of their wives and children, while 334 others "were sent captive to Germany, where they were paraded through the streets of Cologne under the insults and threats of the populace who pelted them with mud and stones."[1] The priceless library of the University of Louvain was destroyed.

[1] These detailed statements and charges, and many others, are to be found in the article on Belgium by Professor Pirenne in Volume XXX of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. In writing this chapter I have mainly followed this article by the distinguished Belgian historian, whose trustworthiness is amply established by his entire career.

Such was the beginning of the martyrdom of Belgium, and martyrdom it was in every sense of the word, varied, interminable, characterized by every form of physical and mental suffering. Having easily occupied the country after a month's campaign, the Germans did not let it go but held it in a vise during the entire period of the war, giving an additional turn to the vise from time to time, as the vicissitudes of the prolonged struggle and the ingenuity of the German military and official mind suggested. Pitiless was the punishment meted out for four long years to this country whose only offence was that she lay between Germany and her principal enemy, and that she dared to try to defend her independence and neutrality, which she was bound to do not only by elementary self-respect but by solemn treaty obligations to which Prussia, and consequently Germany, was a party.

It is impossible, within the limits of this book, adequately to describe this odious chapter in the history of arbitrary and conscienceless oppression, associated mainly with the name of General von Bissing, the chief instrument employed by the German authorities in the execution of their tyranny. Germany was resolved to use, and did use, every resource Belgium possessed and upon which she could lay her hands for the prosecution of her war with the Allies. This was her primary and immediate aim. And the secondary aim, which she never lost from sight, was to prepare the ultimate annexation of Belgium to Germany, or at the least, the thorough and essential control of Belgium after the war should end in German victory. In any case Belgium should be ruined economically so that she could never hope to be an uncomfortable competitor with German industry in any sphere.

The Germans for four years ruled Belgium as uncontrolled and irresponsible masters. They imposed enormous fines and war-taxes upon cities and provinces and upon the nation as a whole. They established an elaborate system of espionage over the entire country. They set aside or undermined whatever national or local institutions, whatever machinery of self-government, might contest or impede the operation of their will, or might serve as a possible protection for the Belgian people. They arrested and deported to Germany, on mere military order, mayors of cities or other officials or private individuals who incurred their disfavor. In the end not only was the native administrative system entirely destroyed and succeeded by one composed of Germans, but the judicial system as well. The

constitution of Belgium became as much a piece of waste paper as had the treaty guaranteeing her neutrality. Edicts were issued and enforced which established the principle that should a penalty be imposed upon a guilty person, and should he be out of reach, the judge might inflict it upon some other person, in other words, a principle that sanctioned the punishment of the innocent where the authorities could not lay their hands on the alleged culprit. Thus the personal liberty of the Belgians was completely destroyed. "The same principle was applied by a series of edicts empowering the German authorities to take hostages who should pay with their lives for damage to railway tracks, to inflict heavy fines on communes, to deport the entire population of villages in whose area railway lines had been damaged, to punish whole families for faults committed by single members of them, to treat as guilty all persons found in company with anyone committing an offence. Again, the Belgian was penalized for 'not having done' or for 'having had the intention to do'" or for not giving information or not denouncing individuals desired by the authorities. As sufficient indication of the severity of this régime may be mentioned the sole "mitigation," namely, that a wife who did not denounce her husband in such cases might plead extenuating circumstances and was only liable to from three months to two years imprisonment or penal servitude![1]

Belgian industry was destroyed, as was personal liberty, by a series of drastic edicts and arbitrary acts of power. Requisitions of all materials desired by the military began at once and became, as time went by, more numerous and more rigid. Not only raw materials but machinery and tools were seized. German engineers and directors of German industry ransacked Belgian factories for machinery which was forthwith sent to Germany. In case such machinery could not be removed, it was broken up and pieces shipped to German factories. There were subsequently identified in Germany 24,308 Belgian machines. A large number of factories were seized and worked by the Germans; a large number destroyed and many more were marked for destruction. Of the 57 blast furnaces existing in Belgium, 26 had been razed to the ground, 20 were severely damaged, and 11 only remained fit for use at the end of the war. The coal mines were spared, Germany having need of them, but when the Germans were forced to retreat in the fall of 1918, orders were given to destroy them completely. These orders were not carried out, however, as the Germans were restrained by the emphatic threats

[1] Pirenne, *ibid.*

of economic reprisals from outside powers, if they did not desist from their purpose.

Thus the economic policy of the masters of Belgium aimed at two things, the utilization by the Germans for their own ends of all the resources and machinery of Belgian industry that they could so use, and the destruction, partial or complete, of the rest. This destruction would, in their opinion, serve two useful ends, the permanent or prolonged crippling of Belgian industry to the advantage of German industry in the economic competition of the future, and the justification of the policy of deportation of Belgian working-men to Germany.

For this deportation was the next thing on the programme. Deportation had begun early in the war as a punishment for those who refused to work for the Germans, for those who incurred the disfavor of the German authorities. It was now possible, with the breakdown of Belgian industry and the consequent throwing out of work of multitudes of Belgian laborers, to systematize and generalize this practice. As the direct and inevitable result of German policy, the unemployed of Belgium numbered many hundreds of thousands. Reduced to beggary, threatened with starvation, something must be done. The municipalities, by starting various public works, sought to give employment to these unhappy masses, only to find themselves suddenly forbidden by the German authorities to continue. If there was to be any relief for unemployment, it was to be of German invention and under the auspices of Germany. It was announced that if Belgian working-men between the ages of 18 and 50 would go to Germany to work, they would receive good wages and that the municipalities would then be permitted to provide employment for those under eighteen or over fifty. As this offer was not accepted, for reasons that require no explanation, another method was adopted. If laborers would not go of their own volition, they should be compelled to go. In the fall of 1916 the military authorities began the application of the new policy. All men between the ages of 17 and 60 were ordered to present themselves at indicated places. The military authorities then made their selection of those who were to be sent to Germany or to the fighting areas. The unlucky ones were then packed into trains and shipped off to various destinations. Ordered to work, to sign labor contracts, most of them refused and were subjected forthwith to cruel and barbarous treatment designed to break their spirit of resistance. The Germans appeared before the world in the second decade of the

twentieth century as slave-drivers. About a hundred and fifteen thousand of the able-bodied men of Belgium were thus deported either to Germany or to the fighting front. The system failed to yield the results that were expected by its authors, but it caused the death of considerable numbers, either because of the Allied bombardment, if they were in the exposed areas, or because of the inhuman treatment to which many were subjected if they were recalcitrant and refused to obey the commands of their masters. Even those who made a semblance of working rendered as inefficient service as they could.

This policy, though on the whole a failure, was continued, with some momentary relaxation, until the armistice. The advantages drawn from it were comparatively slight. But it was worse than a failure, it was a monstrous blunder. The indignation aroused throughout the world by this revival of slave-driving, did the German cause no good. Neutrals were indignant, and the United States was one of the neutrals at the time this ill-omened programme was instituted. One of the earliest and one of the most influential denunciations of the inhumanity of the deportations came from Cardinal Mercier, the leading prelate of Belgium, who protested to the Governor-General in these words: "I will not believe that the imperial authorities have said their last word. They will consider our unmerited sufferings, the reprobation of the civilized world, the judgment of history, the chastisement of God."

While the German authorities showed themselves quite callous to such considerations, their procedure was costly for themselves as well as quite unremunerative. It alienated still further the world's public opinion. It caused the iron to enter into the soul of Belgium more deeply than anything else had done, and it left behind it a record of horror that will not quickly disappear from the memories of men.

Not only did the Germans aim to destroy the economic prosperity of Belgium, not only did they mercilessly exploit Belgium's resources in men and in materials for their own advantage, not only did they labor to prepare for an economic absorption or control of Belgium after the war, but they did their best to disintegrate and destroy the Belgian nation. To this end, which they pursued from the beginning of the war to its close, they endeavored to stimulate and accentuate whatever parties, whatever differences of opinion, existed among the Belgians. Particularly did they exploit the language differences which had existed since time immemorial, and which had, in the years before the

war, led to serious contentions, dividing the country into two distinct, conflicting camps. Belgium, politically united, had never known unity of language. Its population possessed two mother tongues, not one, French and Flemish, the latter a language similar to the Dutch, and allied to the German. French was the language of the southern, or Walloon, part of the kingdom, Flemish of the northern. The last official census before the war, that of 1910, showed an approximately even division among the two. Out of a population of 7,423,784, more than 2,800,000 spoke exclusively French, more than 3,200,000 exclusively Flemish, and about 870,000 spoke both. Language differences had, in Belgium, as elsewhere in Europe, become more pronounced than ever during the previous half-century, and had given rise to animated and sometimes bitter controversies. Those speaking one language had become increasingly sensitive to any superiority, any privileged position possessed by those speaking the other, and in Belgium the French had long occupied such a position, owing to the fact that it was a great European language, with a rich historical and literary tradition. As early as 1850 a political movement was under way aiming to acquire for the Flemish a larger share in the national life, and gradually an important body of legislation had been enacted regulating the use of Flemish in official acts and publications, in the judicial and administrative sphere, in primary and secondary education. But the "Flamingants," as the militant leaders of this Flemish movement were called, were still unsatisfied and aspired to other conquests. There were in Belgium four universities, those of Brussels, Louvain, Ghent and Liége. The two last-named were state universities, organized by the state, supported by the public treasury. The two former were what we would call private institutions in the sense that they were not controlled by the state. Of these "free" universities one, Louvain, was frankly Catholic, controlled by the Church, and the other, that of Brussels, founded by the Liberals of the capital, was a lay institution, excluding all dogmatic conceptions from its programme. In all four universities French was the language of instruction and administration.

For years before the outbreak of the Great War, the Flemish party had advocated the transformation of one of the two state institutions, that of Ghent, into a Flemish university by the dethronement of French and the adoption of Flemish as the language in which its courses should be given. Was it not fair that a population comprising half of the inhabitants of Bel-

gium should have a university of its own? This controversy about the University of Ghent was burning brightly in 1914, generating much unpleasant heat.

The Germans, soon masters of the bilingual kingdom, saw, as they thought, in this situation a favorable opportunity to divide the Belgians in order better to rule them and ultimately to split their nationality asunder, destroying it piecemeal. The Machiavellianism was rather heavy but it was to prove persistent, although unsuccessful. At the beginning of the invasion the authorities of all four institutions had decided not to open the universities, in order that the students might have full liberty to join the army, a liberty which they magnificently used. General von Bissing invited the professors of the University of Ghent to reopen their courses. They unanimously refused. Somewhat later it was announced that the university would be transformed into a Flemish institution under the name of "Vlaamasche Hoogeschool" and on December 31, 1915, a decree was issued by Bissing ordering this change.

The manoeuvre was too obvious and too gross. If the German authorities imagined that their tactics would be gratefully appreciated by the Flemish party, they were soon undeceived. From every corner of the land came indignant protests, and none more speedy or more vehement than those expressed by the Flemish leaders. Addressing the Governor-General directly, they wrote: "Honor and dignity are also, for an occupied country, priceless possessions. How would history judge us, Flemings as we are, if, at a time when our sons are still fighting in the trenches, we should accept advantages from the conqueror, even in the form of a bestowal of a right. In the past our people have always insisted upon regulating their own affairs in their own country."

In order to terrorize the professors of the University of Ghent who declined to be his tools, the Governor-General ordered the arrest and the deportation as prisoners to Germany without the slightest semblance of a trial, of two of their most eminent colleagues, Henri Pirenne and Paul Fredericq, whose influence over them he feared. The only result was a collective protest of the faculty of Ghent.

Von Bissing's attempt to create his "Flemish" university was a sorry comedy. He was obliged to resort to the services of a professor of the University of Munich to organize the new "Hoogeschool" and to round up a body of instructors and of students. This recruiting sergeant, after much labor and many

humiliations, was able to get together a hybrid teaching staff composed of a few renegade Belgians, a few Dutchmen, and many Germans, "*célébrités inconnues*," to quote Brand Whitlock's description, and a student body of perhaps two hundred, allured by various devices some of which were of a quite exceptional nature in the academic world, such as the promise of extra food rations, and in a number of cases, the privilege of choosing between a career of forced labor in Germany or of following the courses at Ghent. A refinement in educational policy was presented in the omission of Belgian history from the curriculum of the University.

The University, thus renovated, was solemnly inaugurated under the high patronage of the German authorities, the King of Bavaria honoring the occasion with his presence. It was, however, not destined to a long or a distinguished career. The wretched farce was soon brought to a close by the unexpected approach of Allied victory. The Germans reckoned without their host when they counted on the Flemings to help in the dismemberment of Belgium. The transformation of the University of Ghent was, in the words of Mr. Whitlock, "to be used as the thin wedge which, as they hoped, would divide the Belgian people and enable them to kill the very soul of the nation they had already violated and despoiled." This hope was doomed to utter disappointment. The spirit of Belgian nationality and of Belgian resistance was only strengthened by the sinister attack.

Another and more elaborate attempt to effect this disintegration of the Belgian nation, the one constant aim of the German conquerors, was the division, proclaimed in March 1917, of Belgium into two distinct parts, Flanders or the Flemish part to be administered from Brussels, and Wallonia or the French part to be administered from Namur. Each was to have its own ministry. In Flanders, Flemish was proclaimed the sole official language. In Wallonia, on the other hand, Flemish and German were to be considered official languages, along with French. A number of Belgians, the so-called "Activist Party," consented to be the tools of the German invaders in this projected ruin of their country. But the nation as a whole rejected peremptorily and with contempt this malign scheme made in Germany, and all its agents. A new explosion of public feeling showed the futility of the German purpose unless it should constantly be supported by the success of German arms. When the fortunes of war turned, this project necessarily lapsed, as did so many others.

While these assaults upon the soul of Belgium were in progress the body was in peril. The dislocation and destruction of the economic life of the country, systematically pursued, had its inevitable result. From the earliest days starvation impended and was only conjured away by a vast system of international relief in which the Allied Governments and the Commission for the Relief of Belgium, organized by Herbert Hoover, were the agents. By various means, public and private, vast amounts of foodstuffs were imported year after year, and distributed in the face of manifold difficulties, natural and artificial. While the Belgian people were thus being kept alive by the financial aid of the Allied governments and by private charity, the invaders were requisitioning various supplies for their own use and that of their compatriots. Besides the requisitions of Belgian produce, they sent home to Germany 92,000 horses (out of 317,000), 560,000 head of horned stock (out of 1,879,000), 250,000 pigs (out of 1,494,000), 3,000 sheep, and 1,690,000 fowls.

Such, then, were some of the blows that rained down upon the Belgians during four long years. The martyrdom of Belgium was no figure of speech but a grim and protracted reality. Yet the long torture of body and of soul did not crush the spirit of this people, nor cause it to capitulate before the oppressor. The honor of this small state was preserved untarnished by its citizens. And it should not be forgotten that, though the land and its resources were tightly held and exploited by the foreigner, though the King and his government were fugitives who had found a refuge upon the soil of France, though Havre and not Brussels was for the time being the capital of Belgium, and though the Belgian people found themselves faced by gigantic problems and provided with few means for their solution, yet they found a way of keeping in the field an army of 75,000 men with as many more in reserve, and thus contributed what they could to the general outcome of the war. If any one wishes to know what the contrary result would have meant for the world, what a German peace would have been like, he has only to remember the treatment meted out during the war to occupied Belgium and occupied France, he has only to recall the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Treaty of Bucharest.

But the peace that was to end the World War was to be dictated, not by the Germans, but by the victorious Allies. For the Belgians the most important question was that of the future international status of their country. They desired the revision

of the treaties of 1839 in the light of the instructive and costly experiences of the war. Those treaties had declared the perpetual neutralization of Belgium under the guarantee of the signatory powers. Events had proved that that guarantee was not worth the paper it was written on. The Belgians now wished the recognition of their untrammeled right to make treaties of alliance, of defence, and to act in military matters as they should see fit. This right they now secured. The Treaty of Versailles states that as the treaties of 1839 "no longer conform to the requirements of the situation" they are abrogated and will be replaced by other treaties. As a matter of fact, they have since been replaced by a defensive military alliance with France. Thus the régime of neutrality under which Belgium had so long lived has been definitely abandoned, as has that of Luxemburg also, by specific clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. The neutrality of Switzerland alone remains.

But the Belgians also wished a revision of the territorial provisions of the treaties of 1839 which deprived them of certain territories which they considered rightfully theirs and whose possession was essential to the defence of their country, as, they held, the war had abundantly proved. But in this matter, as in that of the question of the Scheldt, which they hoped to have reopened, they were doomed to disappointment. The Treaty of Versailles was the work of the Five Great Powers. As Belgium was not one of the five, she was shut out from their deliberations. Her people felt that they had not been given a proper chance to present and defend their interests. Their only territorial gains were the two Prussian cantons of Malmédy and Eupen, and, in former German East Africa, the districts of Ruanda and Urundi, ceded to Belgium as mandatory of the League of Nations, Great Britain securing the mandate for the rest, that is, for over nine-tenths of the former German colony. Belgium was not able to retain control over all the African territories she had conquered.

With the coming of peace and the return of the royal government to Brussels, Belgium was confronted, as was every other country, with the formidable problems of the removal of the wreckage of the war and the reconstruction of a terribly disorganized and impoverished society. The national debt had enormously increased, two-and-a-half million people, that is, a third of the population, were kept alive only by the aid of public relief, industry and commerce had been damaged and mangled beyond recognition. To the vast and varied work of national

rehabilitation, the Belgians applied themselves with zeal and with noteworthy success. Gradually economic life revived, in some branches with unexpected rapidity. New and heavy taxes were assumed, but it was clear that the restoration of the national finances was dependent upon the payment by Germany for the damages she had committed. Belgium would therefore inevitably have a continuing and vital interest in the success of the system of reparations decreed by the Treaty of Versailles. Belgian policy was almost certain to be the same as that of France, since the situation and the necessities of the two nations were similar. The close co-operation of the governments of the two countries during the period following the war lay in the nature of things, and what was to be expected has thus far been realized. The two governments have gone hand in hand toward the same goal, undisturbed by any serious divergence of interest.

Within the strictly domestic domain an important change was made in the institutions of Belgium after the armistice. Under pressure from the Socialists, parliament established in 1919 universal manhood suffrage at the age of 21. The Catholic party demanded, as compensation, that the vote be also given to women. The parliament yielded to the extent that women were given the right to vote in communal, but not in parliamentary elections. The first elections under the new system, held on November 16, 1919, resulted in the loss by the Catholic party of the majority it had enjoyed since 1884, and in considerable Socialist gains.

A question that has latterly much aroused public opinion, generating a heated controversy, is that of the transformation of the University of Ghent, the substitution in all its courses of instruction of the Flemish language for the French. What the Flemish people had desired before the advent of the Germans, what they had indignantly rejected at the hands of the Germans, they still desired. And now that the intruder had been thrown back into his own country it was felt that the question might properly be reopened and decided on its merits, by the Belgians themselves, without any immixture of foreign influence. The debates in parliament on this matter, in 1922 and 1923, were passionate and inconclusive, but it seemed likely that the Flemings would, in the end, achieve their object, though perhaps not in the precise form or to quite the extent desired.

Since the establishment of the League of Nations, Belgium has played a considerable part in its operations. From its inception she has been one of the members of the Council, and the president of the first Assembly was a Belgian, M. Paul Hymans.

CHAPTER LI

CONTEMPORARY ITALY

Of those countries of western Europe which had been victors in the World War, Italy is the one that has had, perhaps, the most troubled history since the signing of the armistice in the clearing of the forest of Compiègne on November 11, 1918. Some of the reasons for this unhappy state of affairs lie upon the surface and are easily understood. Others are less obvious, more complex and are connected with certain features of her previous evolution, and with certain characteristics of the national psychology. Victory had left Italy, as it had left the other Entente powers, exhausted and severely bruised and gashed. The return to the normal, to the life that had been known before the war, was not to be as easy or as rapid as men in their credulity and their craving for peace had imagined. The illusion that peace is a wizard's charm, capable, by a wave of a wand, of exorcising the evils of the body politic, was destined everywhere to be rudely dispelled, and in no country more drearily than in Italy. Peace was seen to be, not an open sesame to happiness and prosperity, but a disconcerting jumble of good and evil, somewhat rough and unsavory in taste, in short, bittersweet.

Hardly had Italy issued from her war in Tripoli which, though successful, had been costly and had imposed upon her budget a heavy financial burden which she had not yet had time to lighten, than the European conflict broke out in August, 1914. For nine months Italy remained neutral, torn between two contradictory sentiments. She did not desire war, knowing from her fresh experience the burden it entails and which was, in this case, by reason of the magnitude of the combat, bound to be aggravated and incalculable. But, on the other hand, participation in the war offered her a unique opportunity to realize some of her fondest dreams, the bringing within the kingdom of those Italians whom the work of the Risorgimento had been compelled to leave outside, the redeeming of Italia Irredenta, the final and complete achievement of her national unity, begun by Cavour fifty years before, and carried far, but not far enough. Apart

from this interest, often unsympathetically represented as purely selfish, though it was no more selfish than the legitimate national aspirations which other peoples, including our own, had expressed and realized in the course of their history, there was an idealistic side to Italy's intervention in the war, too often ignored abroad but very real. From the beginning of hostilities there was, in Italy, a popular sympathy with the Allied cause, which grew steadily in strength as the months passed, with their revelation of the deep meaning of the issues at stake. This moral response of the Italian people to the challenge of the crisis is one of the prominent reasons for Italian intervention in the war and explains the impatience of the masses with the delays of a realistic official policy and the general enthusiasm when the government finally gave way to popular pressure and enlisted in the fight on the side of the Entente.

Italy's services to the Allied cause were important and invaluable. The war was a rude affair for every nation caught within its grip. Italy, like her allies, experienced grave reverses as well as notable successes and some of her leaders, military and political, proved inadequate to their task. But without the Italians the Allies never could have won the war, a remark which may be made of every nation in turn. Had they not fought on the Carso, what would have happened in France? The collective effort of all was essential to the salvation of each, and it is idle and invidious to seek to award the palm for courage and bravery and endurance among so many valorous combatants.

Very heavy were the losses sustained by Italy as the result of her participation in the war. She had called more than five and a half million men to the colors. Nearly half a million of these had been killed, nearly a million had been seriously wounded and of this million more than two hundred thousand were permanently disabled. There was a widespread feeling among Italians that their Allies did not sufficiently appreciate the magnitude or the significance of these losses, a feeling that was to embitter the difficult days that were to come. It is easy to imagine how different the outcome would have been had Italy made this effort, not for the Entente, but for the Central Powers with which she had been allied for thirty years and more.

With the advent of peace and the meeting of the Conference of Paris came disillusionment and disappointment for the Italians and bitter and protracted contentions with their recent partners on the field of battle. The powers that entered the Peace Conference entered with numerous formal commitments

which they had been driven to make during the dark and critical days of the war. These agreements were justified by the gravity of the situation. One of the most important was the Treaty of London, of April 1915, by which, in return for her co-operation, explicit promises were made to Italy by France, Great Britain and Russia in regard to Tyrol, Istria, Dalmatia, southwestern Asia Minor and the islands of the Dodecanese. These pledges set forth the territorial rewards that Italy should receive in case of a common victory. They were exacted by the Italian government and were freely consented to by the leading Allied powers. They were binding in honor upon the parties concerned, unless international agreements may be converted into scraps of paper whenever they are questioned or are found, for one reason or another, inconvenient. These agreements, along with others concluded at different times with Japan, Roumania and other countries, were made in the form of treaties, the famous " Secret Treaties " which formed one of the hardest bones of contention thrown among the conferees of Paris.

But the situation in 1918 was very different from what it had been in 1915. The United States had entered the conflict in 1917, had contributed much to the final outcome, and the terms of the armistice had recognized, with certain reservations, as the basis and criterion of the future peace, the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, and the subsequent Four Principles, and Four Ends and Five Particulars enunciated by him during the year 1918. The powers, convened in the diplomatic halls of Paris, were confronted with a mass of linen which needed to be cleaned and ironed out. Did the Secret Treaties agree with each other and did the President's dicta agree with each other and did the two sets of affirmations agree with each other, or were they mutually repellent and destructive. The matter was not as simple as it seemed to many who brought the simple mind to the contemplation of international affairs. There was abundant material here for strong argument and for subtle casuistry, enough to satisfy the cravings of the most contentious or the most metaphysically inclined. A council of Byzantine theologians would have been content with the opportunity offered for the exercise of their special talents in the art of fine-spun exegesis.

Of these treaties the one destined to enjoy the greatest celebrity was that which concerned Italy, the Pact of London, made in consideration of her participation in the war. Generally called " secret," it was secret only in a Pickwickian sense.

Its terms were known almost at once and with substantial accuracy to the Jugo-Slavs, the people most immediately affected. It, and the other secret treaties, were, according to the testimony of Ambassador Page, made known to President Wilson by Mr. Balfour in the early summer of 1917. "This is the sort of thing you have to do when you are engaged in a war," said Mr. Balfour as he told the President of the territorial arrangements with Italy. It was later said that the President only "officially" heard of these secret treaties at the Conference of Paris. The distinction seems, to the lay mind, one without a difference.

But, without venturing further into the mazes of this particular labyrinth, and fixing our attention closely upon the obvious realities of the situation confronting the assembled diplomats of Paris, we must recognize at once that one of their most carking cares arose out of this problem of Italy's future frontiers. The problem was rendered all the more perplexing by the demand of Italy for Fiume, a place not covered by the Pact of London, and which the Jugo-Slavs considered should by all rights be assigned to them as their natural and only possible good port. The opposing nationalistic aspirations of Italy and Jugo-Slavia clashed along the eastern Adriatic and an adjustment between them was only reached after vast vexation of spirit, pretty generally distributed among all the parties to the controversy. This Italo-Jugoslav conflict was acute from the moment it first began to darken the deliberations of the Conference of Paris and remained acute and unsettled for many months after that Conference had adjourned. Its history has been already given in the chapter on the rise of Jugo-Slavia and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say here that that history was characterized by repeated crises, many surprises, astonishing vicissitudes. England and France, having signed the Pact of London, were ready to carry out its provisions but were willing, and even anxious, to solve the problem in any practical way that could win the consent of their ally, Italy. But the Italian claims found a pronounced opponent in President Wilson who considered that they conflicted flatly with his principles, which had been accepted as the basis of the armistice. Point Nine of the famous Fourteen had stated that the peace should effect a rectification of the frontiers of Italy "along clearly recognized lines of nationality," and certainly the Pact of London violated that principle by providing for the annexation to Italy of several hundreds of thousands of Jugo-Slavs. While this vexatious dis-

cussion raged, the English and American newspapers generally asserted that Italy had spoiled her case by accepting the Fourteen Points. But this, as a matter of fact, she had never done. Just as England had refused to recognize as binding that "point" which asserted the freedom of the seas, "alike in peace and in war," and just as Point Ten had proclaimed the continuance of the existence of Austria-Hungary as desirable, a point which the President himself had since dropped, so in the discussion of the acceptance of the Fourteen Points as the basis of the armistice, Italy had made a reservation, Orlando having formally declared that he must make such a reservation to Point Nine as it was "liable to interpretations which Italy could not accept." As this reservation was as important for Italy as England's was for England, as presumably one reservation does not differ from another in glory, or in moral force, this attitude of the Italian Government should, in justice to Italy, have been given a publicity which it has, as a matter of fact, never received, perhaps owing to the negligence of the Italian Government itself, in not advertising it.

The discussion concerning Italy's Adriatic frontiers disturbed the Conference mightily and convulsed the public press. Repeated were the attempts made to draw a line that should suit Italy and the President, attempts as vain as those made by ingenious or ambitious minds to square the circle. All were blocked by the President's firm stand. The heat generated by this controversy threatened at one time to consume the work of the Conference. It was raised to the point of incandescence when President Wilson appealed directly to the Italian people, over the head of their Government, to accept his solution of the problem. The result of this unprecedented violation of universally recognized and correct international usage was exactly what might have been expected. It infuriated the Italians and jeopardized the work of the Conference. It is not difficult to imagine the national ebullition that would have occurred in America had the head of any foreign state assumed to bring pressure upon the President and the Congress by asking the American people to support him, not them.

The dangerous contention continued and was intensified. New propositions were made from one side or another, variants of each other. It came to be recognized that the Adriatic problem could not be solved as long as Mr. Wilson was in the White House, or rather as long as he was in real power. The boundary of Italy and Jugo-Slavia was not drawn by the Conference of

Paris but was ultimately settled, as already explained above,[1] by direct negotiation between the two countries concerned, and was incorporated in the Treaty of Rapallo of November 12, 1920.

By the final settlement of this troublesome Adriatic problem, Italy acquired most of Istria and a strip of territory connecting it with Fiume, but not Fiume itself, which was recognized as a fully independent state, a state consisting of about eight square miles of territory and a population of about fifty thousand. Italy renounced most of Dalmatia assigned to her by the Pact of London, with the particular exception of the town of Zara, which was made a free city under Italian sovereignty. By the Treaty of Rapallo, which entered into force February 2, 1921, Italy acquired about 3300 square miles of territory and about 910,000 inhabitants.

By the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria, previously concluded, Italy acquired all of the Tyrol south of the Brenner Pass, with a population of about 650,000. Her total acquisitions in Europe thus amounted to over 7,300 square miles of territory and somewhat less than 1,600,000 inhabitants.

Italy's new European boundaries were not drawn "along clearly recognized lines of nationality." Both in the north and in the northeast the boundaries clearly passed beyond those lines. In that part of the Tyrol which was henceforth to be included in the Italian kingdom were about 250,000 German-speaking peoples, all of whose sympathies were with Austria and who resented this transfer to an alien people. In the new Adriatic possessions were half a million or more Slavs, whose manifest inclinations were toward association with the new Jugo-Slav state. Thus in the completion of the work of national unification begun in 1859 by Cavour, in the redeeming of their unredeemed brothers the Italians now created new irredentisms, and annexed sources of disaffection, likely to fester and to plague the future of the kingdom. The situation was now reversed and instead of hundreds of thousands of Italians subject to Austrian control, there were now hundreds of thousands of the former subjects of Austria, resentful of their new status as compulsory subjects of the House of Savoy. The situation was not one conducive to the permanent peace of Europe. It should, however, be said that the number of the new "unredeemed" was somewhat smaller than that of the old. Numerically there was a certain gain.

In still another direction the Italians entertained aspirations

[1] Chap. XLII.

which they were, in the end, unable to realize. They wished to establish their control and influence in Albania, a country about the size of Vermont and lying opposite the heel of the Italian peninsula. Thus guarding the eastern shores of the entrance to the Adriatic sea, as well as the western, they might hope to make that sea an Italian lake. The situation seemed for a while favorable to such an enterprise. The newest of states, Albania, created in 1913, had disappeared at the first touch of the war of 1914 and was a derelict upon the waters. The war aroused the covetousness of several of Albania's neighbors, eager to seize or to divide the prize. The Austrian armies over-ran a large part of Albania and the Serbs and Greeks and Italians either sent troops into certain regions or staked out claims which only victory could transform into anything real and substantial. In June, 1917, Italy proclaimed the independence of Albania under Italian protection, and when the Austrian troops retreated, in the fall of the following year, the greater part of the country was occupied by Italian troops, while Serbian troops and an Inter-Allied contingent held certain sections.

Meanwhile the Albanians themselves were showing a tendency to take a hand in shaping their future destinies. Permitted by the Italians to form a new national provisional government within the area of their occupation, they were preparing the way for the re-establishment of Albanian independence. Albania's case was presented by an Albanian delegation at the Conference of Paris in 1919. The general tangle over the Adriatic question prevented the Conference from reaching any definite conclusion concerning Albania. President Wilson forbade the partitioning of the country. The Italians, it was asserted, were hoping for a mandate over this very mountainous and tumultuous territory. It was quite evident that they intended to stay. Italian officials gave offence to native sentiment by a lack of tact and sympathy, and the agreements by which Italy was to hand over parts of Albania to Greece and Jugo-Slavia naturally aroused great dissatisfaction.

The situation soon developed into one favorable to the display by the Albanians of one of their special talents. Past-masters in the art of guerilla warfare, their bands of irregulars attacked the Italian troops, which had been reduced to a dangerous minimum and which were further weakened by malaria. They pressed the Italians hard, finally virtually shutting them up in Valona and that city was itself attacked in June, 1920. While the attack was repelled, the Italians were in no mood for further

wars and the veteran politician Giolitti, who had just become prime minister, decided to end this unpromising enterprise. The result was an agreement whereby Albanian independence was completely recognized and the Italian troops were withdrawn. In September 1920 the evacuation occurred. Even Valona was abandoned, the Italians retaining only the island of Saseno which is supposed to dominate that harbor, the possession of which had recently seemed so important to multitudes of Italians.

Thus ended Italy's Albanian adventure. That youthful and precarious state, which had in seven years known such ups and downs and which had been seriously threatened with extinction, had managed to survive the tumult of the times and the ills of infancy, and was evidently destined to a modest place in the rather promiscuous and poorly assorted, as well as quite contentious, family of nations. No one knows how large its population is but it is estimated at over eight hundred thousand. Its government consists of a Diet, a ministry, and a Council of Regents composed of four members, two Moslems, one Roman Catholic and one Greek Orthodox, for this small country has three religions, sturdily supported by their adherents. It is difficult to classify this state, as, although it has Regents, it has, as yet, no king nor prince. Albania was formally admitted, in January 1921, to full membership in the League of Nations, Italy, Jugo-Slavia, and Greece, which so recently had planned her dismemberment, going on record as in favor of her admission. In 1922 an international commission was engaged in drawing the boundaries of the new state, not without difficulty and considerable popular perturbation.

Italian aspirations for territorial expansion were not limited to Europe, to the Tyrol and the eastern Adriatic, but extended beyond, to Africa and Asia. Only to a small degree, however, were her expectations destined to be realized. She had been promised by England and France that if those powers gained African territory as a result of the war, she, too, should receive additions in that continent. But there was delay in carrying out the promise. The colony of Libya or Tripoli was enlarged by small concessions by France and by considerable ones by England, and Italy was also given by England a part of British Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden. These additions to her colonial possessions were far from being commensurate with her desires.

Italy was destined to ultimate disappointment in another quarter. She was anxious to secure a foothold in Asia Minor,

opposite the islands of the Dodecanese, which she had won in her recent war with Turkey (1912), and in the various proposed divisions of Turkish territory, drawn up during the Great War by the Allied Powers, Southwestern Anatolia was to be her sphere of influence. But all these arrangements, such as the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 and the Sèvres Treaty of 1920, rested on too many contingencies and were destined, with the rise and success of the Turkish nationalist movement under Kemal Pasha, to go a-glimmering. The territorial charter of the new Turkey was not to be determined by those transient and ephemeral compacts but by the Treaty of Lausanne, which the Powers succeeded in making during the course of the year 1923.

The total impression left upon the Italian mind by these post-war territorial adjustments, which we have thus passed in review, was one of disappointment. The Italians had the feeling that they had come out of the little end of the horn, that they had been made to play third fiddle to their colleagues, France and England, which, they thought, had not supported their claims as they should have done. This feeling, though only partially justified, was, nevertheless, important in that it influenced the trend of public opinion and of policy. There was, during the years immediately following the war, a distinct cooling of sentiment toward France and England and a certain revival of sentiment favorable to Germany, the ally of thirty years. The exaggerations and contradictions and devious manoeuvres of many of their own politicians during this period were ignored or glossed over by Italian public opinion, little considerate of the general interests of Europe and too inclined to nourish grievances, — in large measure imaginary. But a sense of grievance, however ill-founded, may be a factor in history as the annals of contemporary Italy were soon to show quite clearly.

During this period when the international position of Italy was being worked out in a way only partially satisfactory to the Italians, events of grave importance were occurring in Italy itself. Foreign policy and domestic policy can never be entirely separated and they react inevitably upon each other. For reasons of convenience we have thus far considered the former. It is necessary now to examine the latter. Italy has since 1918 gone through a severe and dangerous crisis in which the existence of the state itself and of the national institutions has been at stake. Revolutionary parties, seeing in the necessarily hard conditions and inevitable distress of the time a favorable oppor-

tunity for pushing their propaganda, became intensely active. A period of exceptional internal agitation followed upon the heels of the foreign war, threatening the political and social dissolution of the country.

Italy suffered cruelly from the increase in the cost of living which was everywhere the most obvious and most unavoidable legacy of the war. In none of the great countries of Europe did retail prices rise as high during the war. Taking the number 100 as the price unit, what cost 100 in 1914, cost 248 in January 1918, and 399 in January 1919, while on the last mentioned date the price current in Paris was 248. There was a serious shortage in such essentials as coal, wheat, meat, sugar. The causes of this situation were the same in Italy as in other countries but the results were more accentuated. Government measures, intended to meet the situation, were inadequate and ineffective. By selling bread below cost, the government built up a huge deficit which only increased the derangement of the national budget created by the war. By granting subsidies to certain classes, idleness was encouraged. By limiting prices, goods were driven from the market, only to reappear, in time, higher than ever. "The working classes," says a recent Italian writer, "were enjoying very high wages, and squandering their earnings, but were discontented because prices had risen, largely in consequence of the rise in wages. War profiteers, on the other hand, were seen indulging in an orgy of extravagance and vulgar display. It was only the people with fixed incomes who were really hard hit by the rise of prices and of taxation, but everybody alike grumbled and was dissatisfied. The extreme Socialist leaders exploited this situation for their own purposes, and encouraged the working-classes in the belief that they had been made to fight in the war for the benefit of the capitalists, while it was now their right to obtain an ever-increasing share in the nation's wealth, with no corresponding obligation to work and produce. The example of Russia was made the most of, and by depicting the condition of that unhappy country as an earthly paradise, they persuaded large masses of people that if a similar régime were introduced into Italy, everyone would be happy."[1]

The prevalent discontent began to express itself shortly after the armistice, in a series of strikes in this trade and in that, and in every section of the country. Public officials, such as railway and post-office employees, as well as the workers in private in-

[1] Luigi Villari, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* XXXI, 629.

dustries, struck or threatened to strike, and were generally awarded higher wages, which meant a further increase in the prices of commodities, an increase all the greater because accompanied by a general disinclination to work and a consequent reduction of output at a time when more and not fewer goods were demanded because of the depletion or exhaustion of supplies by the operation of the war. These strikes were attended by more or less violence, rioting, pillaging of shops. The extreme Socialists, anxious to bring about a revolution of the Russian type, helped the disorderly work along to the best of their ability, aided in this by the apathy of government officials who did nothing to prevent or suppress the outbreaks, either because intimidated by the apparent strength of the movement or because half-sympathizing with it. The policy of Nitti, who had become prime minister in June 1919, after the overthrow of Orlando, was characterized by extreme weakness, innumerable acts of violence by Socialists and Communists passing unreproved and unpunished. Charged by the nature of his office with the enforcement of law and order, Nitti merely looked on, while turbulence and crime enjoyed a practical immunity.

As the government was either unable or disinclined to discharge the primal duties of all governments, the preservation of order and the suppression of lawless factions bent upon discrediting or overthrowing existing institutions, certain elements of the population began to take it upon themselves to fight the forces of disorder and revolution with whatever weapons were at hand. These were principally ex-soldiers, young men of great energy and coming from all classes of society, men who had saved the country in war and were now resolved to save it in peace. Intensely nationalistic in feeling these men indignantly rejected the disintegrating internationalism of the Socialists, their constant depreciation of the national aims, their incessant disparagement of Italy's victories in the war, their criticism and even defamation of those who had won it, their offensive exaltation of individuals who had played a scurvy part in the dark and desperate days through which the country had recently passed, lukewarm adherents, sly purveyors of pessimism, even rank deserters from the army. This Association of Combatants, joined by committees of citizens resolved to react with whatever vigor they might against the corrupting and corrosive influences about them, was the nucleus of a movement, that of the Fascisti, which was destined to a great expansion and ultimately to a most emphatic triumph.

But it was at first quite feeble, merely a beginning, merely a rallying point for those for whom patriotism was a real and precious thing, and who wished to maintain order and to preserve the national ideals and the national institutions. For the time being, however, adherents of this group were few in number and poorly organized.

In the first parliamentary elections held after the armistice (November, 1919), the Combatants, as they were called at this time, gained only thirty seats. The most numerous party returned was the Socialist with 156 seats; the next largest the Popular or Catholic party with 101 seats. The Socialists had already adopted a revolutionary "maximalist" programme, had adhered to the Moscow Third International, having swallowed the Moscow programme whole, and aimed at the abolition of capitalism and the setting up of a Socialist republic of the Russian kind. The Catholics, while in general opposed to the Socialists, nevertheless contained an extreme wing whose principles and methods differed little from theirs. These Catholic extremists were particularly active among the peasants, and, though condemned by the bishops and even by the Vatican, they fanned the popular unrest. The remaining members of the new Chamber, most of them believers in the established constitutional institutions and practices of the country, many of them Nationalists, were nevertheless divided into several parties and could therefore offer but an ineffective opposition to the more radical and aggressive elements.

Such was the parliament, the most numerous party frankly revolutionary, the next most numerous, the Popular party, largely conservative, partly radical, bent upon following a policy of its own instead of co-operating closely with the others, the rest divided and subdivided. Ministries holding power from such a body would probably be weak ministries, resting upon a precarious foundation, little inclined to a clear or vigorous policy. And weak, indeed, they proved to be.

The situation, then, favored the restless and subversive elements in the state and they exploited it to the full. On the opening of Parliament, the King was enthusiastically acclaimed by the majority, but the Socialists, shouting "Long live Socialism," ostentatiously left the Chamber. In return for this gratuitous insult to a popular monarch, who had played a very honorable part in the war and who was the embodiment of patriotic sentiment, popular demonstrations of loyalty occurred and several of the Socialist members were pounced upon and beaten. On the

other hand, the Socialist successes in the recent elections encouraged radical labor leaders and discontented workingmen to renewed activity. The relaxation of discipline among government employees in the railway and postal services proceeded apace. Fresh strikes broke out among these classes, rendered partially unsuccessful by volunteers who offered to do the work so essential to the life of the nation, but partially successful in that Nitti, the prime minister, came forward with concessions. Other strikes and disorders followed, strikes in cotton mills, in the metal industries, and again on certain of the railways.

The weak ministry of Nitti was forced out in May 1920 owing to general dissatisfaction with its internal policy or mockery of a policy, and Giolitti came in. Giolitti's reappearance upon the scene was not reassuring. An old and battered parliamentary hand, Giolitti had bitterly opposed Italy's entrance into the war and was widely considered a Germanophile. His access to power did not promise that re-invigoration of the national consciousness, that pride in the victory, that determination that those who had achieved it should receive the whole-hearted and official approbation of the country, that position of honor and esteem to which their deeds entitled them, which, in the opinion of the Fascisti, were the things most necessary for the welfare and the moral health of Italy, the attainment of which, they considered, justified their movement.

But before things were to get better for Italy they were to get worse. Under the Giolitti ministry, the internal troubles of the country were not only continued but entered upon a more aggravated phase. The street railway employees of Rome struck and were aided by the electricians, who cut the electric supply, leaving the town in darkness, and sympathetic strikes were ordered in most of the towns of Italy. Returning to work after a while they endeavored to carry out a demonstration with red flags, but were attacked by the people who took occasion to wreck the offices of the leading Socialist newspapers and to beat up several Socialist deputies. In the metal trades workmen seized a number of factories and tried to compel the owners and managers to conduct them for the sole advantage of the laborers. The movement spread to the textile and chemical industries. "Red Guards" were organized, revolutionary tribunals set up, and outsiders trying to enter the factories were shot at. These essays in Communism passed unrebuked and unmolested by the authorities. The workingmen, finding it difficult to run the factories without the managers who knew the business, to get raw

materials and to market finished goods, ended by indulging to excess in the pleasures of the bowl and the factories became the scenes of some exceptionally convivial spectacles. As the conflict continued it became, as such conflicts almost always do, more bitter and more dangerous. In some cases the leaders of the workmen broke open the safes and filched the contents. Clashes between individuals occurred and there were some murders in which the "red" guards justified their name and color. Giolitti, the prime minister, who had, without any sign of displeasure, allowed the carnival of disorder to drag along unconscionably, finally decided that something must be done and summoned owners and workmen to meet him at Turin. An agreement was finally worked out which was accepted by the owners only under pressure from the government. The workingmen finally evacuated the factories in which they had camped for several weeks, leaving them in a state of indescribable filth. After the factories had been cleaned up, work was resumed but Italian industry had not gained much from this costly and disgraceful experiment.

Meanwhile agrarian disorder had broken out in various parts of Italy, large estates had been seized by the peasantry, a few landlords had been murdered, more had been ruined. This movement had the support of the extreme wing of the Popular or Catholic party. While seriously disorganizing, and accompanied by more or less violence, it did not go as far as the industrial disturbance just described.

The public was becoming tired of these continued disorders and of the high-handed acts of an organized minority, and began to organize for self-defence. They rallied in increasing numbers to the Fascisti; the bourgeoisie, anxious to preserve their rights and their property, and many of the more solid workingmen and peasants and small landed proprietors joining the ex-officers and soldiers who had founded the Association of Combatants, already alluded to. The Socialists broke up into factions and a good number of the more moderate, disgusted by the actions of the extremists and the Communists, also joined the Fascisti. The latter, resolved to fight fire with fire, and to exact a tooth for a tooth, redoubled their activity. Groups of Fascisti organized in almost every town throughout the country and found plenty to do. In Bologna a veritable "red terror" existed, administered by a band of extremists. Two moderate members of the city council having been shot by hired assassins in the city hall, the public arose in anger and shook down the whole local Bol-

shevist system. The Fascisti burned the Labor Exchange, which was the headquarters of the Communists. In many of the communes of Italy the Socialists or Communists had secured control of the municipal government and used their petty force tyrannically. Robbery, extortion, blackmail became rife. To root out these nests of local despotism became one of the chief undertakings of the Fascisti, who used methods which, as their leaders admitted, were far from being evangelical. Frequent were the clashes between them and the Communists, and many an affray resulted in the loss of human lives. The Italy of 1920, with its passionate municipal and popular struggle, reminded one a little of the Italy of the Age of Despots, when politics possessed many of the characteristics of war.

Against this murky background of internecine dissension, which threatened the very existence of that nation which Cavour and Garibaldi and Mazzini had created, the smooth and crafty Giolitti, past-master in all the tricks of parliamentary manipulation and intrigue, but essentially lacking faith and courage, was an unimpressive figure from whom nothing fresh and vital was to be expected. Too old to change either ideas or methods, too blasé and cynical, Giolitti was incapable of any bold and creative policy, of any action that should seize the imagination of the people or fire their energies. Little adjustments of questions pending with foreign nations, timid and superficial measures of internal policy designed to tide the ministry along from day to day, this was all that could be expected, and all that was forthcoming. Yet the country was seething with emotion, was craving leadership, was anxious to have someone give it a dominant note, a watchword that should lift it out of the slough of dissatisfaction into which it had fallen, dissatisfaction with itself and with the rest of the world. And neither Giolitti, nor Nitti, who wanted Giolitti's place, could express that vigorous feeling of nationalism, of pride in the army and in the achievements of the war, which were in the air, their own records in the war and in the subsequent discussions of the peace having been so dubious, so little edifying.

Giolitti fell from power in June 1921, and was succeeded by the weak ministry of Bonomi, which, in turn, was succeeded, in February 1922, by the still weaker one of Facta. Whatever prestige parliament had ever possessed was being rapidly frittered away and was now well-nigh gone. Meanwhile Fascisti and Communists were fighting each other furiously. There was a general recrudescence of violence. The former were growing

rapidly in numbers and in power. Street fighting occurred in Rome, and in Florence toward the end of May 65,000 Fascisti assembled, cut off all communication with the outside world, and bombed or burned the surrounding villages, forcing their Socialist or Communist mayors to resign. The country seemed to be on the brink of a general civil war.

Toward the end of October 1922 events took a sudden and most dramatic turn. The Facta Ministry was in the last stage of decomposition. Its days were numbered. Behind the scenes the politicians were preparing the return to power of the old parliamentary prestidigitator, Giolitti. In other words, the people of Italy, restless, dissatisfied, anxious for a leadership which would really lead, tired of governments that did not dare to govern, eager for the adoption and execution of fresh and vigorous policies of a constructive nature, adapted to the new situation created by the war, were to be treated merely to a new chapter of the old and discredited game of political manipulation, a game which, in the opinion of the public, had become utterly stale, flat and unprofitable. It was generally felt that the needs of Italy called for something more than simply a new distribution of cabinet portfolios among parliamentary and party hacks.

This fervid, impatient national mood found a spokesman in that Fascist movement which we have seen battling its way up by rough and ready methods during the years of deceptive and imaginary peace which had followed the Conference of Paris. The word *Facismo*, the Italian name for this movement, was itself a programme. It was derived from the Latin *fasces*, that bundle of twigs which Roman lictors carried round the axe, and which served as a symbol of authority, as an instrument of punishment, and as a reminder of the need of combined effort. In ancient Rome lesser criminals were whipped with twigs, greater criminals were beheaded with an axe. The Fascist movement had begun, as we have seen, among the ex-veterans of the war, young men who had fought with honor and who did not propose to see the victories they had won sacrificed and turned to ashes to please the pacifists, the "defeatists" of the war period, and the Communists who drew their intellectual sustenance from Soviet Moscow rather than from the native sources of Italian history, Italian greatness, Italian thought and Italian interests. Nationalists to the core, these men entertained a deep and abiding hatred of that international revolutionary Socialism, Marxist and German in origin, with its numerous Jewish affinities and its Muscovite sympathies, which seemed to them the deadly enemy

of the Italian people, bent upon the destruction of the national genius. Patriotism was the life-breath of the Fascisti, death to Communism their watchword. At first but a small group in 1919, they had steadily grown in strength, and latterly all kinds of people had joined their ranks in great numbers, ex-officers, ex-soldiers, university professors and students, the bourgeoisie, many of the working classes, many of the peasants, some even of the moderate Socialists. Standing for order, standing for justice to the men who had fought in the war, standing for the preservation of the national inheritance, the Fascisti developed a compact and coherent military organization, well equipped, well disciplined, well led. This was the army of the "Black Shirts," the dullness of whose costume was relieved by the medals which these young men had honorably won in the Great War. It was reputed to consist of several hundred thousand members, and was subject to the orders of a governing directory, at whose head stood a man of thirty-seven, immensely popular, a natural leader of men, Benito Mussolini. Round about this army were multitudes of civilian sympathizers, enthusiastic supporters who believed that it alone could pull Italy out of the slough of despond into which its numerous factions and its timid politicians had plunged it.

Thus far the Fascisti had been a lawless body or a body above the law, bent upon smashing the terrorism of Communists by a counter-terrorism. If they acted in a lawless way, it was, they said, because the law in Italy had broken down, its official representatives having miserably and shamefully run away from their imperative duties. With their rapid growth in numbers had grown their self-confidence and their ambition.

In October 1922 occurred a brief, dramatic, decisive struggle between the Black Shirts and the constituted authorities for the control of the state. While the politicians in Rome were discussing among themselves as to who the new prime minister, the successor of Facta, should be, the Fascisti were holding a congress in Naples, attended by perhaps forty thousand members and dominated by a wild enthusiasm for Mussolini. Mussolini had already on October 5 declared in a speech at Milan: "In Italy there exist two governments — a fictitious one, run by Facta, and a real one, run by the Fascisti. The first of these must give way to the second." Now at Naples, in the midst of the ministerial crisis in Rome, he said to the assembled Fascisti: "I take a solemn oath that either the Government of the country must be given peacefully to the Fascisti, or we will take

it by force." He called together the military leaders of his organization and ordered them to hold their forces ready to march, if necessary, upon Rome.

What would the Government in Rome say to such a bold defiance, such an insolent and peremptory challenge? Would it oppose force by force, and if it should, what would be the result? Might it not be the overthrow of the monarchy, the fall of another throne in Europe, exile for the House of Savoy? Victor Emmanuel III, head of that House, rejecting the advice given him by his immediate entourage to fight the issue through, showed typical Italian suppleness. He invited Mussolini to come to Rome and form his own ministry. He even sent his private motor car to meet him and bring him to the city. The progress of the royal automobile was impeded because the roads were crowded with Fascisti soldiers marching to Rome and insisting upon repeatedly acclaiming their leader. But Mussolini finally entered the Eternal City on October 30, wearing a soiled black shirt, much the worse for the trip in the open car. He went directly to the Quirinal and was ushered into the King's presence. The frenzied crowd outside cheered loud and long, interrupting the historic colloquy by calls for the men engaged in it. The King came out on the balcony three times and was received with thunderous applause. After the interview, Mussolini drove to his hotel and from a window addressed the thousands of admirers below. "To-day," said he, "Italy has not only a Ministry but a Government, a strong Government, such as she has needed for many years past, but never obtained."

Thus the leader of the Fascist insurrection, which had been in progress for three years, had become the President of the Council of Ministers, the real head of the state. Here was a veritable *coup d'état*, a seizure of power by force, or rather by the threat of force, which proved sufficient. The incident and its meaning, its essential violence and illegality, were partially veiled, for those who do not like to look upon the bald reality, by the action of the King in inviting the idol of the Facismo to become prime minister. But Mussolini became prime minister not by the normal operation of parliamentary processes, not by the grace of the Chamber of Deputies, but by the grace of an organization outside parliament, ratified by a strong public opinion.

In a proclamation issued to the people on the morrow of these events, Mussolini called on the nation "to adapt itself to the hard necessities of the moment," and declared that "the Government understands how to govern and will govern. All its

energies will be directed to the maintenance of internal peace and increasing Italy's prestige abroad." "Only by work, discipline and concord," concluded this proclamation, "will the fatherland emerge from the present crisis to tread the path of prosperity and greatness."

What kind of a man was this who had thus been raised to the headship of the state by the momentum of a movement of which he was the driving force, a movement designed primarily to prevent a social revolution in Italy, to reawaken and intensify the patriotic spirit of the country, and to regenerate the national life? The question could be answered only partially and tentatively. The full revelation of Mussolini's personality could only come with time. That he was a born leader of men, that he knew the secret of appealing to the masses, that he was a person capable of prompt decision and of swift action, that he was an animating and magnetic figure, that he possessed in high degree the sense of organization and discipline, had been sufficiently demonstrated. But whether he possessed the qualities of the statesman, the knowledge, the judgment, the tact, the perseverance and the circumspection required for success in the field of politics, national and international, whether to his undoubted gifts as an agitator were added constructive ability and breadth of view, no one could tell. Mussolini's rise to power aroused wide-spread curiosity and his courage and audacity suggested promising possibilities. What was definitely known of him was this, that he was the child of working-class parents, his father having been a village smith in a little town in Romagna, that before the war he had been a convinced Socialist and an editor of the leading Socialist newspaper, the *Avanti*, that he had picked up whatever education he could but that it had been limited and unsystematic, that he had passed some time in Switzerland, living the hard life of an *émigré* and a militant Socialist, not unacquainted with the police, with imprisonment and with expulsion, that, when the Great War had come, he had left his party and repudiated its cosmopolitan and pacifist ideas, that he had advocated Italy's entrance into the war, that he had fought with gallantry and had been decorated for his exploits, that he had been severely wounded, and, incapacitated for the firing line, had become editor of a strongly nationalist newspaper, nationalism now dominating his every thought and action, that he had organized the Fascisti and had led them, through manifold dangers and vicissitudes, to a stunning triumph, that he had seized the imagination of a people whose

imagination had always been easily set aflame, and that the thrill of this new and dashing personality had not been diminished by the report that he had been known to drive his automobile at the rate of a hundred kilometers an hour through the streets of Milan, an exploit not calculated to displease a sporting age.

Evidently a man of action! Also a fighter accustomed to fight openly and above the board. But he was now prime minister of a great European state, a nation of nearly forty million people, and he had had no preparation, properly speaking, for a political career. Would he prove equal to the new and most exacting situation?

At least he did not lack self-confidence nor was he without certain definite ideas. One of these was that it was the business of the prime minister really to rule and not to be the timorous lackey of politicians and parties. His earliest acts in his novel position were indicative of his conceptions of the statesman's rôle. They strongly suggested, though perhaps they did not absolutely prove, that in his opinion the statesman must be a dictator. He organized a ministry taken from several parties but from which Socialists and Communists were conspicuously absent. Its most prominent member was General Armando Diaz, Italy's most outstanding military figure, hero of the battle of Vittoria Veneto, an event which Italians celebrate as their Allies celebrate the signing of the armistice. On appearing with his cabinet before the parliament, Mussolini treated the latter with cool and rare contempt: "I am to-day performing in this hall what is an act of purely formal deference toward you and for which I do not ask your thanks. Italy has given herself a Government outside, above, and against any designation by Parliament. Now I affirm that revolution has its rights and I add that I am here in order to defend and make the most of the Black Shirts' revolution by inserting it intimately as a force tending towards development, progress and equilibrium in the history of the nation." He added that he might have bivouacked his troops in the Chamber itself, that he might have turned Parliament out of doors, but that "at least for the present" he did not care to do so.

Evidently the new premier entertained scant respect for parliamentary institutions. They might perhaps be permitted to continue to function formally if they would frankly recognize that the real authority in the state lay elsewhere, and that they did not exist for the purpose of controlling or blocking the execu-

tive. Such was the hint which the orator conveyed to the Chamber with unmistakable clarity. The Chamber promptly took the hint, applauded the master who had cracked the whip, and proceeded to show all necessary docility. When, a few days later, Mussolini demanded that he be given virtually dictatorial powers until January 1, 1924, Parliament quickly passed the necessary measures, thus recognizing its own humiliation and its impotence — at least for the time being.

We will take leave of the new lord and master at this point. What account he would give of himself in the actual exercise of power, no one could foretell. That he embodied the will and the hope of the majority of the people can hardly be gainsaid. But the possession of power is a singularly perilous test for a tribune of the people who owes his position to a revolution, even though that revolution be, on the whole, a pacific one. It is one thing to arouse the masses and lead them to the conquest of power. It is another to regenerate the life of a nation, to balance a sadly disordered budget, to frame and carry through specific reforms, to work that most complicated of all machines, a modern government. Even in normal times the task is a crushing one, — and the times were anything but normal. Many a reformer looming large while in opposition has shrunk notably in stature when the moment has come to pass from the rôle of criticism to that of creation. But there can be no doubt that the accession to power of this young and vigorous chieftain was greeted with the greatest optimism, and the dismal croakings of the pessimists were swallowed up in the general rejoicing.

CHAPTER LII

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The first section of the Treaty of Versailles contains in twenty-six articles the constitution of a new instrument of international activity, the League of Nations. The same articles were incorporated textually in the other treaties subsequently concluded with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. The ratification of any or all of those treaties involved, therefore, recognition of the Covenant. We have seen that that country, the United States, whose representative at the Conference of Paris had been the most conspicuous factor in the creation of the League, refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, largely because of the presence in it of the Covenant.

The League came into existence automatically on the day when the required number of states exchanged their ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles, that is, on January 10, 1920. Its constitution has already been set forth. Let us now examine briefly its operation during the first three years of its history.

It will be remembered that the Covenant provided for three chief organs, a Council, an Assembly, and a Secretariat. The first and third began to function almost immediately; the second entered upon the scene several months later, in November 1920. The first meeting of the Council was held in Paris on January 16, the second in London on February 11, the third in Paris on March 13, the fourth in Paris on April 9, the fifth in Rome on May 14, the sixth in London on June 14. Thus during the first six months of its existence the Council had convened six times and in whatever place was considered most convenient. A small and permanent body, it can be summoned at any time, whenever it may seem necessary or desirable, and a few days notice is sufficient to enable its members to get together. Meeting frequently or infrequently, according to the pressure of events, and sitting as briefly or as long as it may choose, it is, in this regard, a flexible organ of action, adapting itself easily to the requirements of a constantly changing situation. Up to June, 1923 the Council had held twenty-four meetings.

The Secretariat, organized at first in London and transferred to Geneva some months later, when the necessary measures for housing it had been completed, is the agent of the League in the preparation of the work of the Council and of the Assembly and for the execution of their orders. Its internal machinery, its boards and commissions, have been gradually set up as the need for them has appeared. It constitutes at present (1923) a technical staff of about three hundred persons, representing some twenty nationalities, using the two official languages, French and English. Many of its members are experts, or are supposed to be, in the various lines of investigation or control to which they are assigned. Like the Council, the Secretariat is a flexible instrument and may be enlarged or diminished or otherwise altered, as circumstances may require or suggest.

The Secretariat not only prepares the work and executes the decisions of the Council and the Assembly, but it places at the disposal of these two bodies, and this is likely to prove its most important service, as extensive, detailed, concrete information as can be brought together upon the topics and problems that one or the other may be considering. By keeping this body of information up to date and in accessible form, the Secretariat is able to furnish a mass of positive and sifted data upon which the Council and the Assembly may, if they care to, base their decisions. The League of Nations is primarily and essentially an organ engaged in diplomacy, not in legislation. It is a new piece of machinery added to the other devices and usages of diplomacy, which it was felt did not wholly suffice to carry on the international work of the present age. Diplomacy is like politics, an art and not a science. But there is every reason why diplomacy should have a scientific basis, should follow a scientific method, just as painting and sculpture and music are subject to the laws of science and may be permeated with its spirit. The League of Nations, through its Secretariat and its various standing commissions, would seem to be equipped to furnish this solid substructure to the diplomatic discussions and creations of an age which demands, with increasing insistence, the application of more substantial knowledge and of a keener and more objective critical spirit to the solution of its problems, in the international as well as in the domestic sphere, than have been hitherto bestowed upon them.

The other organ of the League of Nations is the Assembly. In the Council only a few nations are represented, while the

Assembly is composed of delegates from all the nations which are members of the League. There is state inequality in the one body, state equality in the other. The first Assembly was held in Geneva in November and December 1920, and was the first gathering of the nations of the world under a written constitution. One of its earliest decisions was that it should meet every year henceforth on the first Monday in September. This Assembly consisted of the representatives of forty-two states. It admitted six new states to membership in the League, among which were Albania and two ex-enemy states, Austria and Bulgaria. The second Assembly admitted three more, namely Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The third admitted another, Hungary. Thus at the close of 1922, the League consisted of fifty-two states. Those remaining, for one reason or another, outside were the United States, Germany, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Ecuador, Mexico, and Ireland. It is interesting to observe that Switzerland, selected as the seat of the new international capital, consented to enter the League only with reservations safeguarding certain historic rights, namely those establishing and guaranteeing her neutrality in war, rights dating from 1815 and to which she clung tenaciously. The League accepted these conditions. Even then Switzerland voted in favor of membership in the League only by a narrow majority.

Since its inception in January 1920, the League of Nations has accomplished much useful and some important work. Although it can never be said with certainty that wars which did not actually break out would have broken out had not certain specific things been done, it can be asserted that the League of Nations has intervened efficaciously in certain international disputes of the kind which have frequently in the past led to war. One of these was the Aaland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden. These Baltic islands were claimed by both, by Finland on the ground of undisputed possession for a hundred years, by Sweden on the ground that the inhabitants of the islands are Swedes in language, in sentiment, and in economic interests, all of which was true. The Aalanders had themselves voted by an overwhelming majority of 95 per cent. in favor of union with Sweden. They appealed to the right of self-determination. Finland asserted the right to preserve the integrity of her national territory.

It should be noted that it was not the parties concerned in the quarrel but a third power, Great Britain, which requested the mediation of the League, basing her request upon Article

11 of the Covenant which declares that any member of the League may bring before it any matter affecting international relations or likely to disturb the peace of the world, a very wide charter permitting all kinds of what the world has hitherto called "interference." An elaborate and able investigation of every aspect of the problem ensued under the auspices of the League. The result was a decision by the Council that the islands were to belong to Finland but that they were to be demilitarized and given the most extensive rights of self-government. Sweden accepted the decision, though under protest.

In the case of another dispute, that of Poland and Lithuania for the possession of Vilna, the intervention of the League, solicited by both the parties concerned, had less satisfactory results. After elaborate investigations and after exhausting all possible efforts at conciliation, the League was unable to secure a settlement owing to the strength of the passions involved on both sides. It had, however, probably succeeded in postponing hostilities, and there is a chance that hostilities temporarily averted may in the end be found to have been permanently avoided. It was not until April, 1923, that this problem was settled and then not by the League but by the Council of Ambassadors. It must be remembered that the League has no power to enforce a decision; whatever power it possesses is moral and intellectual, not physical.

In another quarter the mediation of the League achieved a distinct success, that is in the question of the division of Eastern Silesia between Germany and Poland. This extremely complicated and dangerous question has already been described.[1] Suffice it to say here that the Supreme Council, in which England and France were the leading members, had completely failed to find a solution, and in desperation appealed to the Council of the League. The Council quickly found one, which the Powers at once accepted. Thus a particularly threatening subject was removed from the field of immediate contention. In still other difficult problems the League has already played a helpful part, in that of the Albanian frontiers, and in that of the financial reconstruction of Austria.

But not only has the League of Nations played a part, and an important one, in clearing up some highly contentious international questions; it has also had to discharge certain delicate and complicated tasks imposed upon it by various clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, for the League was intentionally woven

[1] Chap. XL.

into every part of that document in the expectation that that procedure would compel the ratification of the treaty by the Senate of the United States. The expected result was not achieved, but those states that have ratified the Treaty of Versailles have necessarily recognized the League as the agent for the execution of many of its articles. Acting under these, the League has organized and administered the territory of the Saar Basin and will continue to control that entity until at least 1935; has organized the Free State of Danzig, placed under its protection; and has begun the surveillance of the manner in which the mandates to the former German colonies and the territories torn from Turkey are being executed by the powers to which they have been assigned.

The League of Nations has, by the investigations of various commissions, done much to throw light upon and to contribute to the solution of many economic, financial, commercial, social and humanitarian problems which have to do not primarily with international peace but with the general well-being of the world. A financial conference, called by the League, and held at Brussels in 1920, brought forth an amount of financial and economic data not available before, and a transportation conference, meeting under its auspices at Barcelona in 1921 and representing forty nations, drafted a series of conventions which, when ratified by the various parliaments, will do much to liberate and stimulate the movement of commerce. The League has considerably furthered the crusade which had long been going on against opium and other drugs; also that against the white slave traffic. Among the social and humanitarian activities of the League may be mentioned its interest in problems of international health, its despatch of an Epidemics Commission to Poland to fight a wave of typhus that might otherwise have spread over Europe and have threatened more distant sections of the world. The repatriation to their native lands of nearly half a million prisoners of war whom the armistice found destitute and helpless in Russia and Siberia and who were threatened with cold and hunger and death; the assistance rendered hundreds of thousands of Russians and Armenians who had fled in terror from their homes and were refugees upon the face of the earth, without resources, without work, — these conspicuous services to humanity stand to the credit of the League of Nations which by its machinery, ready to function when the need arises, is well adapted to confront emergencies without a regrettable loss of time.

We have described the primary organs of the League, namely

the Council, the Assembly and the Secretariat. Another organ, created in 1921, has been added to these and may prove of great importance, a Permanent International Court of Justice. The Council and the Assembly are political bodies and their functions are fundamentally political. The Court, however, is, by definition, a judicial body, representing the idea of law in international affairs. It is intended to be an impartial, permanent, judicial organ, capable of settling international disputes of a purely legal character without the intrusion of political considerations. It is not intended to suggest arrangements, adjustments, compromises, as a way of harmonizing the conflicts that may arise between states, as the Council and even the Assembly may do. It is intended to declare the law and to do nothing else.

The agitation for the creation of such an agency did not begin with the Conference of Paris. The subject had been earnestly discussed by the Second Hague Conference in 1907 and a certain solution had been reached at that time. The need of such a court had been clearly laid down by Elihu Root, Secretary of State under President Roosevelt, in his instructions to the American delegates at that Conference. The delegates were ordered to work for the creation of "a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing else, who are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international cases by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility."

The Hague Conference failed to create a court of that character, and the fundamental reason for its failure was that it was unable to solve the problem of how to select ten or twelve judges from fifty or more nations to the satisfaction of all. The big powers wished to be always represented upon the court and the little powers would not consent to so partial an arrangement. Were not all nations equal in law, whether big or little? The Hague Conference did establish a Court of Arbitration but this consisted, not of a definite body of judges meeting at stated times, but of a panel of some two hundred names from which any two states which might agree to arbitrate a pending difficulty might select a number of judges for that special purpose. As in no two cases would the judges chosen be likely to be the same, there might be no continuity of development in such an institution.

The discussion, therefore, continued and it resulted twelve years later in the insertion, in the Covenant of the League of

Nations, of Article 14, which charges the Council with the drawing up of a plan for a permanent court of international justice and with submitting it to the members of the League. Acting in accordance with this provision, the Council invited a number of prominent jurists, among whom was Mr. Root, to formulate a plan. This was later approved, with some changes, by the Council and the Assembly, and by the parliaments of the various members of the League. It was Mr. Root who suggested the method of selecting the judges which was satisfactory to both big and little states, the difficulty which the Second Hague Conference had been unable to surmount. The Council, representing state inequality by the permanent membership in it of the Great Powers, and the Assembly, representing the cherished principle of the equality of all states, were given an equal voice in the election of judges. The Council and the Assembly are to vote separately. Any candidate who has an absolute majority in both bodies is declared elected. Thus the Great Powers, probably controlling the Council, and the Little Powers, certainly controlling the Assembly, have a veto on each other.

In September 1921, eleven judges and four deputy judges were elected in this way and the Permanent International Court of Justice was instituted. Among the judges chosen was a citizen of the United States, Professor John Bassett Moore, although the United States had no part in the proceedings. The first regular session of the Court was opened on June 1, 1922, a preliminary session for the purpose of organization having been held in the preceding January. The seat of the Court is at the Hague.

It should be noted that the Permanent Court of International Justice as thus instituted does not supersede the Court of Arbitration created by the Hague Conference. The latter continues to exist. The new Court is merely an additional agency for the peaceful settlement of differences between states, an agency employing a different method and aiming at a different objective. The one "arbitrates" a difficulty; the other decides what is the law that applies to it.

The judges of the new Court are elected for nine years and may be re-elected. They receive salaries varying from $6,000 to $24,000, depending on the days of actual service. They may not exercise any political or administrative functions but there is nothing to prevent their practicing their usual professions in the intervals between the sessions of the Court, except that no judge may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case of

an international nature. The only one of the judges who is required to reside at the Hague is the President of the Court, who is elected by his colleagues. The expenses of the Court are borne by the League of Nations. The official languages of the Court are French and English but the Court may, at the request of the parties involved in any given case, authorize the use of another language.

"The jurisdiction of the Court," says Article 36 of the Statute creating it, "comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in Treaties and Conventions in force." In other words, the Court does not possess compulsory jurisdiction over all disputes which may arise between the members of the League, but it is there merely to try those cases which the parties to them may agree, in the individual instance, to refer to it. Thus its activity may be limited or extensive according as the members of the League resort to it infrequently or frequently. They are not required to resort to it at all if they do not wish to.

There were those who desired to give the Court compulsory jurisdiction but they were unsuccessful in bringing this about. There was, however, added to the Statute of the Court an optional clause which any state may accept, thereby pledging itself to compulsory jurisdiction on all, or on a series of specially defined, disputes of a legal nature (Art. 36), with states which are also parties to the optional clause. About twenty states have accepted this clause but among them is to be found no one of the Great Powers.

Such is the new international tribunal. It is hoped that by its decisions it may be the means of defining and developing and certifying international law and of giving it an influence over the minds of men such as it has never had before, an influence severely shattered by the events of the last few years. But whether it will be able to play so important and difficult a rôle will depend upon whether two political bodies, the Council and the Assembly, choose men to sit upon the Court who are eminent and qualified jurists or whether their choice will be influenced by political considerations. The success of the Court will also depend, it goes without saying, upon the character of its decisions and upon the way in which those decisions are received, matters upon which we have little evidence as yet, concerning which prophecy would be entirely futile.

We have thus passed in review some of the activities and some of the achievements of the League of Nations during the first

three years of its existence. There are other phases of this brief history which deserve mention. The League is only one of the agencies used for the discharge of the international business of the contemporary world, nor is it, thus far, the most important. The old diplomatic machinery in use among the nations has remained intact and continues to function according to the old methods. Undoubtedly the greater part of the international business of the world will continue to be transacted through the ordinary diplomatic channels, as hitherto. Then again, more conspicuous thus far than the League, and more directly influential, has been the Supreme Council, that is the prime ministers of the Allied states, who have held a long series of conferences, really continuations of the Conference of Paris, and who have reached decisions concerning international questions of primary importance. Failing to reach them in certain matters, they have latterly manifested a tendency to refer such matters to the League of Nations, as if it were a handy-man ready to tackle problems which either the want of sufficient leisure or of sufficient harmony among themselves has prevented them from solving. But the Governments of Europe have shown that they intend to keep the control of the most important matters in their own hands, yielding the field to the League only when compelled to by dissensions among themselves.

The governments of the world are, therefore, using and are likely to continue to use various instruments for the accomplishment of their ends, namely the long-established, traditional system of ambassadors and ministers, also special conferences of the chief Allied powers for the enforcement or interpretation of the Treaty of Versailles, larger conferences, like that of Genoa in 1922, to which other countries such as Germany and Russia were invited, and, finally, the machinery of the League of Nations, whenever they feel inclined. The relation of the League to the governments should be clearly understood and always kept in mind. The center of authority in the League is not in the organs of the League itself, but is in the Governments, that is, speaking generally, in the cabinets of the countries composing the League. There is the supreme power, the real initiator of policy. It is the Governments that appoint the members of the Council and the members of the Assembly. The members of those bodies do not exercise an independent authority but are under instructions, or may be placed under instructions at any moment, from the appointing power. As they are appointed by the Governments they may be removed by them; in other words, they are fundamentally

agents of the executives of the different countries, just as are the members of the diplomatic services of those countries, or the special plenipotentiaries sent to individual conferences. It is not the parliaments, much less is it the voters, who determine directly the choice of the representatives at Geneva, or the character of the policies which they follow. The Governments may allow a certain freedom of action to their delegates, just as they may do to their diplomatic agents. But impulsion comes from above, not from within. Ultimate decision comes from London, Paris, Rome, Tokio and other capitals, not from the free and unrestrained impulses or reflections of the men gathered together upon the shores of Lake Geneva. If the national ministries care to keep their hands off and allow the subordinates really to make independent decisions, they may do so, just as they may, if such is their will, with conferences or congresses held outside the framework of the League. And not only may the national ministries exercise this direct influence upon the debates at Geneva, but many of the decisions of the Council and Assembly are only valid when ratified by the Governments, sometimes by the parliaments. In this latter case ultimate authority rests with the legislatures. The League of Nations has thus far shown none of the characteristics of a super-state. It is one of the instruments, and the newest, which the world possesses for international collaboration. Its decisions express the amount of harmony or of discord which its members are able or inclined to generate. They possess, generally speaking, the value of decisions reached by a conference of plenipotentiaries.

Bearing in mind the considerations just stated as to where the real power lies in this new institution created by the Treaty of Versailles, what are we to say of the relative power of the two organs of the League, the Council and the Assembly? This, that the experience of three years shows that the former is the more important body. What the experience of the future may show we will not attempt to forecast, remarking only that it may be very different. In our own history it has sometimes been the Senate, sometimes the House, that has exerted the greater influence, but up to the present it is the Council that has, on the whole, been the initiating body in the League of Nations, and the most fruitful in achievement. It is also the one that has developed the most *esprit de corps*, the most salient personality. A small body, and practically a continuing one, for its sessions are frequent and its membership, as a matter of fact, quite stable, it is more efficient, its members knowing each other well and

working in a quiet and non-oratorical atmosphere, and finding it easier to adjust difficulties and effect compromises than larger gatherings do. Conversational argument is the feature of its meetings, since one cannot be eloquent, and therefore perhaps long-winded, in a small committee, the environment not being sympathetic, as one's associates are so few in number, and so little impressed with the oratorical effusions of others, so blasé. There is here a gain in speed.

In the large field of international administration, the Assembly can do little more than exercise a certain control. It examines the measures taken by the Council and the results obtained, and votes the appropriations necessary for the continuance of the various undertakings. In the solution of political questions, such as the Silesian and Austrian affairs, it is the Council that counts and not the Assembly, and it is the Council consequently that gains prestige and power from any successes that are achieved. The Assembly, meeting for only a month a year, and requiring unanimity for most of its decisions, is not an organ well adapted for action and execution. Its rôle is poorly defined in the Covenant, being expressed in terms so large that all precision, a thing highly desirable in such a matter, is lacking. The Assembly evidently has a power of initiative, but are the steps it takes in using that power efficacious or merely platonic? It would be difficult to answer that question at the present moment. The record of the three sessions thus far held is far from throwing a clear light upon it. One thing is certain, that we are far from possessing in this body that "parliament of the world," that spokesman of mankind, expressing "world opinion," whatever that may mean, which many enthusiasts hoped, at the time of its creation, it would prove to be. It is a much less pretentious and imposing a body. An instrument of the Governments, its members appointed by the Governments, its decisions generally requiring the ratification of the Governments, its actual rôle is much more modest. Several of the decisions of the Assembly of 1921 had not received the necessary ratification when the Assembly of 1922 adjourned. However, the Assembly offers a certain field, more limited than had been hoped, for the expression of views on international affairs which might not otherwise gain the attention of so large a public. It also, without question, is an arena for the display and struggle of purely personal and national ambitions. Each Assembly has contained many able men, among them several prime ministers, like Benes of Czecho-Slovakia or Branting of Sweden, several ministers of foreign

affairs, and members of national parliaments, men who bring to their task experience in public affairs, powers of criticism, and, in some cases, real constructive ability. This association of such men with each other, even for a brief period each year, this interplay of national and international points of view is of obvious utility.

Any constitution, to adapt itself to the constantly changing conditions of life and thought, is likely to need amendment from time to time. The Covenant of the League of Nations will prove no exception to this rule. "The Covenant," says one of its admirers, "was a brilliant improvisation drawn up at the Peace Conference in a few weeks by a Commission working at red-hot pressure. . . . In result, many of its clauses have a vague or semi-political meaning. This fact has been of a certain advantage, for the conditions under which the Covenant was drawn up were such as to make precision dangerous. It resembles Napoleon's ideal of a constitution which was that it should be 'short and obscure.' The Covenant is certainly both. It contains hardly a sentence, certainly no one article, whose meaning is absolutely clear." [1]

One may question the brilliancy of the improvisation, one may doubt whether improvisation at red-hot pressure was the happy way to create so grave a document, and may believe that a slower and less sensational method would have given a more mature and more generally acceptable result; one may deny that Napoleon was an authority on the qualities that a constitution should possess; but one can hardly dissent from the view that the Covenant is a state paper that would gain much from greater clarification, greater precision in many of its clauses, that, in short, amendment might make it a more satisfactory instrument, terminating much formidable criticism.

The desirability of making certain changes in the Covenant has been felt within the circles of the League itself almost from its inception. Many amendments have been discussed and some have been rejected while others have been started on their way to possible adoption. Curiously enough, a difficulty was found at the outset in that very article of the Covenant which provides a process of amendment, namely Article 26, which reads as follows: "Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the members of the League whose representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the members of the

[1] H. W. V. Temperley, *The Second Year of the League*, (London, 1922), pp. 57–58.

League whose representatives compose the Assembly. No such amendment shall bind any member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a member of the League." It will be noted that this article lays down merely the requirements for *ratification* of amendments, that is for the final stage in the process, but that it says nothing as to who shall draft the proposed amendments, or how. Shall this preliminary and essential work be done by the Assembly alone, or by the Assembly and the Council? And what majority shall be required for the acceptance of a proposed amendment by the drafting body? Shall it be a mere majority or a majority of two-thirds or three-fourths, or shall a unanimous vote be required?

On this vital matter Article 26 is silent. Yet how can the amending process be even started without a preliminary agreement concerning it? The Covenant is based upon the principle that unanimity is required in all votes in both the Council and the Assembly, unless otherwise especially stated. But unanimity in this case would almost inevitably mean that no amendment could be framed, that the Covenant must remain unchangeable in a world of change. Suffocation would ultimately result.

There was some reason to believe that the intention of the framers of Article 26 had been to permit amendment of the Covenant either by a simple majority or a three-fourths majority, and not to require unanimity. But if so, they had neglected to state the fact, and their neglect practically raised the question as to whether it was really possible ever to amend the constitution. Feeling that this poorly edited article itself needed amendment, before any other changes could profitably be considered, the Second Assembly drew up in 1921 and adopted the following clauses: "Amendments to the present Covenant, the text of which shall have been voted by the Assembly by a three-fourths majority in which there shall be included the votes of all the members of the Council represented at the meeting, will take effect when ratified by the members of the League whose representatives composed the Council when the vote was taken, and by a majority of those whose representatives formed the Assembly. If the required number of ratifications shall not have been obtained within eighteen months after the vote of the Assembly, the proposed amendment shall remain without effect."

In order that the legality of the Assembly's action might not itself be questioned, it was urged that this amendment of Article 26 ought to be carried unanimously. This was done by the

Assembly. No vote was cast in the negative, although there were 14 abstentions.

Thus a real danger to the utility and continuing life of the League was conjured away, or rather, will be when the necessary number of states shall have ratified the amendment, as they presumably will do.

Interesting amendments have also been proposed to Article 16, concerning the use of the economic weapon, to Article 18, concerning the registration of treaties, to Article 21, concerning "regional understandings" or the possibility of "leagues within the League," the last named being urged by Mr. Benes of Czecho-Slovakia in the interest of such combinations as that of the Little Entente. None of these has been accepted by the Assembly. An amendment to Article 1 concerning the admission of states, an amendment proposed by the Argentine Republic, would have had the effect of admitting Germany and other states to the League upon their own volition and without the conditions laid down in that article, such as the giving of "effective guarantees" of their "sincere intention to observe" their international obligations or to regulate their armaments in such a way as might be prescribed by the League. This proposal was rejected and this rejection is given as the reason why the Argentine Republic withdrew for the time being from active participation in the League. It has been suggested, however, that the real reason for this action was that she, the leading representative of Spanish America, was not chosen to the Council, whereas Brazil, which represents Portuguese America, was given membership in that body. Spanish America was at that time unrepresented in it.

It was inevitable that Article 10, which President Wilson had declared to be "the heart" of the Covenant and which had contributed so much to the defeat of the League in America, should be considered as meriting amendment, and a definite proposition to this effect was early brought forward by Canada. Her delegates urged the impropriety of the members of the League undertaking to respect and preserve, as against external aggression, the territorial integrity of all members of the League when no examination had ever been made as to whether the boundaries of those states were just and ought to be permanently assured; when, indeed, at the time of the adoption of the article, some of those boundaries had not even been drawn. The proposal to amend this famous article has, however, revealed the strength of the forces in favor of its maintenance unchanged, among them the

feeling of France, which sees in it a possible protection, also that of the small states generally, and, in particular, that of the newly created or newly enlarged states of central and southeastern Europe which regard it as a bulwark of their independence and integrity. The Canadian proposition has not been accepted and it seems a reasonable prophecy to say that Article 10 will long remain unchanged.

While Article 10 stands as written and with no official interpretation that tends to weaken it, Article 21, concerning the economic weapon, and to which reference has already been made, became in 1921 the object of a long series of proposals, adopted by the Second Assembly, which should they become the policy of the League would seem likely to decrease, if not to nullify, the effect and universality of the much discussed economic pressure as a preventive of war.

In 1922 a step was taken by the League which may well in time have important consequences. The Council had hitherto consisted of four permanent members, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and of four non-permanent members, representatives of the lesser states. Almost from the beginning there has been a demand for an increase in the number of these elective members. The natural and inevitable competition among the forty and more powers not represented upon the Council tended to become more acute as time went on, and an increasing pressure for the enlargement of the Council developed. This became very apparent at the meeting of the third Assembly in 1922, national intrigues and rivalries revolving around this question, intrigues and rivalries which were not conducive to the harmony of the League. The result was that the Council was enlarged by the addition of two new members, Sweden, representing the Scandinavian states, and Uruguay, the smallest of South American states, representing Spanish America.

This is probably but a first step. What will the consequences be? It may reasonably be doubted whether the enlargement of the Council will increase its effectiveness and it is not unlikely that the larger the Council becomes the less inclined will the Great Powers be to entrust it with important business. Also should the pressure for the enlargement of the Council continue, and there is reason to expect it will; should the Council be increased to a dozen or fifteen members, it would also almost certainly undergo a change of character. The requirement that the decisions of the Council must have the unanimous consent of all its members has not worked badly thus far, has, indeed,

been an advantage. But the unanimity among eight men, knowing each other intimately and accustomed to make mutual concessions, is easier to secure than among a dozen or fifteen. The more numerous the Council becomes, the more difficult it will be to maintain the rule of unanimity, for it will become a principle of death, the veto of a single state, be it a large one or a petty one, sufficing to prevent action. A chief merit of the Council thus far has been that it has been able to act with reasonable speed.

But if, in order to avoid paralysis, it should be decided that a majority should suffice for decisions, even if it be a reënforced majority of two-thirds or three-fourths, the League of Nations would be entering upon a new and difficult path. Admit the principle of the vote by majority and you break clearly with the classic principle of state sovereignty and, whether you wish it or not, you take a decided step toward the principle of the super-state. Before that step is taken there will be some memorable discussions and contests in the League.

But it is unnecessary to borrow trouble of the future, the present containing enough. It is sufficient here merely to point out the fact that the adoption of the majority system of voting would involve an essential modification of the present constitution of the League.

The record of the League's activities during the first three years of its existence, presented summarily in this chapter, establishes the fact that here is a useful, and at times a very useful institution, whose influence, whose achievements, no one is at liberty legitimately to question. Its humanitarian work has been varied and efficient. It has been the means of settling a number of delicate international problems. It has, by its technical and extensive investigations of economic and social problems not yet settled, already thrown much light upon them and will perhaps have contributed to their future solution. It has worked out an elaborate and flexible organization and is better equipped than ever to operate, when invoked, with intelligence and with speed. But the great impulse behind the creation of the League was not the desire to provide the world with a more convenient and more efficient instrument for humanitarian purposes, such as the relief of suffering, the prevention of disease or of its diffusion, the abolition of evils such as the white slave traffic or the trade in opium or other noxious drugs; nor was it the desire to provide the means for the administration of bankrupt states like Austria, or new political creations such as the free city of Danzig or the

basin of the Saar. The performance of just such tasks was, without doubt, included in the conception which the founders of the League had in mind. But their primary and absorbing preoccupation was the creation of an organization able to prevent future war.

What light does the history of the past three years throw upon their success in this laudable intention? An uncertain light. The period has been too brief and the experiment has been conducted under too exceptional circumstances, to justify seeing positive conclusions. It is often said, as we have already indicated, that the League averted probable wars by its management of the Aaland Islands and Albanian questions, and it may be true. But it may also be said, in regard to the former, that it was highly unlikely that Sweden, a country which had not fought for the retention of Norway in 1905 but had allowed that country peacefully to sever its connections with her, would have gone to war in order to wrest a few thousand citizens from Finland. In regard to the latter, experience is more enlightening as actual fighting was brought to a close by the intervention of the League. On the other hand, the League, either because of lack of power or because not summoned to intervene, counted for nothing in the Russo-Polish war of 1920 or the Greco-Turkish war.

In a related field the League has thus far been even less successful, in the reduction of the world's armaments. There have been debates in the Assembly and in one of the important commissions of the Assembly. There have been investigations and reports, but this activity has not yet led to any direct result. This may be because there has been too pronounced a disposition to consider the subject from a sentimental rather than from a practical and rational point of view, or it may be because of the inherent and formidable difficulty of the problem. But certain it is that the only positive achievement in the sphere of the limitation of armaments since the close of the Great War has been accomplished not at Geneva but at Washington, and has affected the navies and not the armies of the world. The Assembly of 1922 appears to have recognized the blunt fact that many states, and most conspicuous among them France, will never consent to any extensive reduction in armament, unless they receive in exchange a more definite and substantial guarantee of security than that proffered by the clauses of the Covenant, clauses which inspire at best but a limited confidence. It is quite safe to say that no serious progress will be made in this direction unless a satisfactory guarantee is found, a guar-

antee more tangible, more obvious, and more solid than any yet forthcoming. The demand for this protection cannot be eluded. It constitutes the most serious, most insistent challenge to the wisdom and the address of the League.

Whether the world possesses in the League of Nations, as at present constituted, a more effective, a more practical means of preventing war than it possessed before is, after all, as debatable a matter as it was in 1919 when the Covenant was recommended to a war-sick world. On the one hand, it may be stated, that the League possesses no physical but only moral force, that its new court lacks compulsory jurisdiction, that the economic weapon seems to have been weakened by the resolutions of the Assembly, and that opinion as to the obligations carried by Article 10 appears as blurred as ever. On the other hand, the League offers a swifter and a broader method of international conference than the world has ever had before, and conference may prevent war. Further, the general activities of the League may gradually create a more contented world, offering fewer points of friction. And the fact that the League has continued to exist during three troubled years, that its membership has increased, and that through it the nations have co-operated fruitfully in a number of important matters, is obviously of good augury.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

Forming a real part of the League of Nations, yet occupying a semi-autonomous position within it, is the International Labor Organization whose establishment and powers have already been described.[1] One of its chief functions is to hold an International Labor Conference each year for the purpose of drawing up "draft conventions" or "recommendations" designed to improve the general industrial conditions of the world. Four conferences have thus far been held and have formulated a considerable number of recommendations, some of which have been accepted by several nations or are in process of discussion by them. The character of their activity is indicated by the subjects treated in these suggestions, one limiting the hours of work in industrial undertakings to eight in the day and forty-eight in the week, others concerning the employment of women at night, and before and after childbirth, concerning the employment of children, and still others regulating conditions of labor in agriculture and at sea. Latterly this organization has undertaken the systematic study of problems of emigration and immigration.

[1] Pp. 752–753.

CHAPTER LIII

THE CONFERENCE OF WASHINGTON

The United States had declined to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and had consequently refused to enter the League of Nations, mainly because it did not care to become involved in all the entanglements of European politics, and to assume the unknown obligations contained in certain sweeping and indefinite articles of the Covenant. Refusing to co-operate in working the new and hastily designed mechanism of international negotiation and action, it was at once accused of a resolution to follow a policy of isolation in a world in which isolation was impossible, of a selfish indifference to the welfare of the world, of an egoistic insensibility to its paramount need for peace. The charge begged the whole question and was, therefore, as puerile as it was footless. Independent action and isolation are not necessarily one and the same thing. The United States had never followed a policy of isolation since it had become a nation in 1776. Nor did a comparison of its history with the histories of the other great powers suggest that it was likely in the future to be less solicitous than they about the reign of justice and of peace among men, less willing to make sacrifices for such supreme and beneficent ends. All that could justly be said was that the United States declined to be associated with a particular organization and that it reserved for itself liberty of action in foreign policy.

That the desire for a peaceful ordering of the world was earnest and widespread, everything indicated. That the liberty of action might be made greatly to enhance the cause of peace, to further the true interests of other nations as well as of their own, was a view ardently entertained by multitudes of Americans, whether private citizens or government officials. That such was the case was abundantly proved by the interest and enthusiasm aroused by President Harding's convocation in 1921 of a conference in Washington to consider the general question of disarmament and specific questions relating to the Pacific and the Far East. Authorized by an act of Congress, this conference

met on November 12, 1921, and continued in session until February 6, 1922, when it finally adjourned, leaving the fate of its decisions in the hands of the parliaments of the nations concerned, for their approval or disapproval.

The motives prompting the summoning of this conference were varied. One was the desire for a reduction of the armaments of the world, armaments which constituted a heavy financial and economic burden for the nations which carried them, and which were widely considered as likely to provoke further wars. The Conference of Paris had decreed a large measure of disarmament, but only for the nations defeated in the late conflict. But neither it, nor the succeeding conferences held in Europe, nor the League of Nations had accomplished anything, beyond some discussion as yet barren of results, in the line of disarmament of the victors and the neutrals in the Great War, who were much more numerous than the vanquished. This, the most difficult and most complicated of questions, was as far from solution as ever. Might not a new and more promising effort now be made to find a way out of the impasse? By attempting to do too much, with its scheme of new world organization, had not the Conference of Paris done too little? Might not a more modest attempt yield a more palpable result? By a concentration of attention upon certain aspects merely of the general world situation, might not a distinct though limited progress be registered, and possibly a practical example set and a useful method indicated?

The Conference of Washington was not a general world conference but was restricted to a few powers, those most immediately concerned in the settlement of the problems that prompted its convocation. It was hoped that by definitely limiting the subjects to be discussed and the number of participants in the discussion, the conference would not prove unwieldy and would not lose itself in protracted rambles over the whole surface of international affairs but might hew close to the line. In the mind of those who called the Conference, the limitation of armament was regarded as closely connected with certain problems of the Pacific and the Far East, and this conception determined the list of invitations sent out from Washington. Greatly interested in the former were our chief associates in the late war, England and France and Italy and Japan. Interested in the latter were those same powers and also China, Holland, Belgium and Portugal: consequently, it was these eight powers which were asked to come to Washington. One Pacific power was not

invited, Russia, because she was in the grip of a revolutionary government whose legality has not been recognized by the other states, and because that government was the declared enemy of the political, economic and social system represented by the latter. Moreover, it would have been difficult in 1921 to state with any precision what were the territories included within the Soviet Republic. The Russian government protested against this neglect of the American government to include her among the negotiating powers, and practically declared in advance null and void all decisions the conference might make upon Pacific and Far Eastern matters.

The Conference of Washington consisted, then, of the representatives of nine states, six European, one American, and two Asiatic. The sessions of its various commissions and committees were not open to the public, but long and fairly detailed communiqués of their discussions were given to the press, and the decisions reached were announced in plenary and open sessions of which there were six. Those decisions, embodied in seven main treaties and in several supplementary agreements, concerned navies and submarines, poison gases, the status of the islands of the Pacific, and Chinese affairs. Under these general heads were included a large number of special and distinctive matters, each arousing a particular contention of its own, and all closely interrelated. It was not found possible to separate these numerous subjects sharply from each other, and to study and decide each independently and in sequence. All were more or less intermingled, discussions were carried along simultaneously, and the solutions reached in one category were affected by those reached in the others. In other words, few questions were decided exclusively on their merits, but there was the usual give and take of diplomacy. Concessions here had to be paid for by concessions there. Adherence to principle was necessarily tempered by a recognition of the claims of expediency, if the attainment of the possible was not to be sacrificed to the desire for the rigid and irrealisable ideal. The spirit of compromise, which is the only spirit by which conflicting principles and clashing interests can be harmonized to any practical end, hovered over the proceedings of the conference and shaped its results, to the unconcealed displeasure of intransigent reformers.

Into the details of these manoeuvres for position and advantage on the part of the several powers represented at Washington, and of the measures employed to bring about the final adjustment of opposing wills, we cannot enter here. Suffice it to say

the way of the intriguer was rendered harder in this conference than in most of its predecessors. On the whole, though not entirely, subterranean methods were in considerable disrepute.

The Conference of Washington was summoned to consider primarily the question of the limitation of armaments. But while that question might be considered in its entirety, yet it was, after all, a single aspect of the problem that the organizers of the conference had particularly in mind, the possible limitation of naval armaments. The war and the course of events subsequent to the war revealed a new and striking situation in regard to naval power. The rivalry of England and Germany was now over, after a feverish competition of twenty years. The German fleet was at the bottom of the sea and Neptune's trident, which William II had once said must pass from the hand of Britannia to that of Germania, was still in the firm grip of the jolly tars of England. But the grip was less secure than was at first supposed, for, on sweeping the horizon, the British Admiralty perceived a new and lusty rival in the West. The American navy, long in process of becoming, had now attained formidable proportions and seemed destined speedily to attain proportions more formidable still.

At the outbreak of the war, the American navy was a poor third to that of England and of Germany. We had hitherto followed a quiet policy of shipbuilding, but the war enormously accelerated the pace. Stirred to unwonted reflection by the emergence and the menace of the German submarine, Congress, in August 1916, adopted a policy of large and rapid naval expansion. It authorized the building, within three years, of ten first-class battleships, of six battle cruisers and of many smaller vessels. With the entrance of the United States into the war early in the following year, the actual building of the ships was suspended and the government turned its attention to the construction of submarines and a merchant fleet capable of transporting armies and supplies. But with the return of peace, the programme of 1916 was resumed and between 1918 and 1921 the building of the ships authorized was begun. There was much talk of even extending the programme. In 1900 the tonnage of the American navy was less than a million; but in 1920 it was nearly three millions. Naval expenditures had expanded from about $137,000,000 in 1914 to over $433,000,000 in 1921.[1]

[1] These facts and many others in this chapter are drawn from Buell, R. L., *The Washington Conference* (1922), the most important book that has yet appeared upon that subject.

What did all this mean? It meant, in brief, that the United States intended to have a navy as large as any in the world. President Wilson had demanded in a speech delivered in St. Louis in February, 1916, that we should have "incomparably the most adequate navy in the world," and while the adverb had been later dropped as due perhaps to the excessive warmth of impromptu eloquence, the fundamental idea was retained and was in the mind of Congress when it adopted later in the year the programme just described. The succeeding administration of President Harding followed in the path thus marked out. That the United States had no such need of a large navy as had England was obvious. The United States would not starve if its communications with the rest of the world were cut off. England would. Moreover, the British Empire, whose population was four times as large as that of the United States, was scattered everywhere over the face of the waters. In comparison, our transoceanic possessions were few and relatively unimportant. Yet we were suddenly challenging the naval supremacy of England, a growth of several centuries, and a natural result, if not a necessity, of her position and her economic requirements.

But a redoubtable navy was arising not only in the West. In the East, also, in Japan, a similar instrument was in process of rapid creation. In 1914, in 1915, and again in 1920, the Japanese government had expanded its naval programme and by 1928, if nothing intervened to stop the feverish activity, Japan would be provided with a large and powerful navy of the latest, post-Jutland design. Spending $85,000,000 in 1917, she was spending $245,000,000 in 1921, one-third of her entire national budget. In 1927 her appropriations for this programme would need to be $400,000,000 and she would be spending as much as the United States, a country twice as large in population and whose inhabitants had an average income of $350 to hers of $29.

Meanwhile England, burdened by the extraordinary cost of the recent war, and with a greatly disorganized internal economic life, was in no position, at least for the time being, to engage in this merry competition. Indeed her Admiralty announced in 1920 the abandonment of the two-power standard upon which it had insisted for a generation. Henceforth England would be content with a navy as large as that of any other single power, instead of as large as those of any two powers. It should also be pointed out that between 1916 and 1921 she did not begin the construction of any new capital ship, and that at the same

time perhaps two hundred of her old ships had become obsolete or were far advanced in obsolescence.

A capital ship is, by the definition adopted by the Conference of Washington itself, a war vessel whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons or which carries guns whose calibre exceeds eight inches. It was estimated that should the naval development of the three countries continue as planned without change, the United States and England would in 1924 possess each 33 capital ships and Japan 17. But the fleets of the United States and Japan would have an advantage over that of England because they would contain relatively more ships of the newest type, the type, that is, that was developed as a result of the lessons learned from the battle of Jutland, and which was characterized by stronger armor and larger guns.

Such was the situation in 1921. Naval competition of increasing intensity whose limit could not be foreseen — such was the unexpected phenomenon of the years which followed immediately upon that war which many optimistic people had thought was destined to end war. It could only be a question of time when England would re-enter this costly struggle with redoubled energy.

Against whom were these redoubtable engines to be used? This was a question that no one cared to answer, or could answer with frankness or certitude. A war between England and America was widely declared to be unthinkable, but history amply attests the fact that what is considered impossible to-day may become very real tomorrow. There were several sources of friction between Japan and the United States and there were elements in the population of both those countries which were doing what they could to fan and foster the spirit of suspicion, and at any moment unfortunate incidents might arise to aid them. The prospect was not reassuring. The United States was in the best position to stand the strain of this race for naval supremacy, because it was the richest of the powers involved. But even for it the costs would prove a tremendous burden. Moreover, the apparent endlessness of the expense was repugnant to the national conscience and the opinion was widespread that large armaments increase the probability of their ultimate use and that, meanwhile, they embitter international relations.

On November 12, 1921, at the opening session of the Conference of Washington, Charles E. Hughes, the American Secretary of State, in a speech remarkable for audacity, for frankness, and for precision, called halt upon the perilous tendency of the

time and delivered the most serious blow at the prevalent practice which it had received within the memory of man. Refraining from that emotional exuberance and rhetorical extravagance which characterized so much of the current peace propaganda, holding himself well within the bounds of the reasonable and the practical, he advocated, not disarmament, but a limitation of naval armament, and he proposed to that end a definite and detailed programme. "We can no longer content ourselves," he said, "with investigations, with statistics, with reports, with the circumlocution of inquiry. . . . The world wants a practical programme which shall at once be put into execution." He suggested a "naval holiday." "For a period of ten years there shall be no further construction of capital ships." In addition, he called upon the United States, Great Britain and Japan to scrap some sixty ships already in existence or in process of construction, with a total tonnage of nearly 1,900,000. That the United States was not asking others to do something she was disinclined to do herself, but that she was prepared to make even greater sacrifices than she was demanding, was shown by the fact that she was ready to scrap 30 ships to England's 23 and Japan's 17, and that the tonnage scrapped would be, in round numbers, for herself 845,000, for England 583,000 and for Japan 449,000.

Passing over the details of Secretary Hughes' carefully elaborated scheme and fixing our attention upon one or two of the more outstanding features, we note the all-important fact that when the proposed number of ships had been actually scrapped and when those not scrapped should in the course of time be replaced by new constructions, which replacements should be limited to 500,000 tons each for Great Britain and the United States, and to 300,000 for Japan, the navies of the three countries would be in the ratio of 5 — 5 — 3.

Such, most inadequately described, was Mr. Hughes' proposal for the limitation of naval armament, a proposal which profoundly impressed the Conference and the public. Mr. Balfour, the chief of the British delegation, expressed the prevalent opinion when he declared this speech to be "one of the landmarks of human civilization" because it actually combined "profession" with "practice."

But it is much easier to propose a plan than it is to get it adopted. While all the powers concerned immediately accepted the proposal "in principle," many weeks of stiff and tense negotiation were necessary to bring the project through. Japan

insisted stubbornly upon being allowed a larger percentage. Unable to secure this, she demanded the right to retain one of her best ships, the *Mutsu*, which, by Secretary Hughes' schedule, was destined for destruction. In the end this demand was granted, but at the same time the quota to be allowed to the United States and Great Britain was proportionately increased, the ratio of 5 — 5 — 3, or one hundred per cent. for those two powers to sixty per cent. for Japan, was preserved. Even then Japanese adherence was gained only by another and more serious concession. In return for agreeing to a navy forty per cent. inferior to that of the United States, Japan insisted that the United States must agree to stop all further fortifications in the Pacific islands. As the fortifications, naval bases, coaling stations which the latter power possessed had in no case been developed in a manner adequate to the needs of a possible war in the Far East, this Japanese demand virtually meant that America must definitely renounce all hope of supporting her favorite policy of the Open Door in the Orient, or even of defending the Philippines, by arms. If America wished to bring about the limitation of armaments, it must be at this price. The price was a heavy one and the renunciation might practically prevent her from following any but a verbal policy in the Orient, which might prove far from efficacious. But the price was paid and America consented, as did England, to the adoption of the *status quo* "with respect to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific region." But there were certain exceptions. This restriction was not to apply to the Hawaiian Islands, to Australia, to the islands of Japan proper or to those lying off the coasts of the United States and Canada, — except the Aleutian islands. England was to have the right to continue certain developments of her naval base at Singapore.

Another serious difficulty had to be overcome before the central idea of Mr. Hughes' famous speech could be lodged in an actual treaty, signed and sealed. That speech had defined the future strength of the fleets of the United States, Great Britain and Japan. But the ratio to be applied to the navies of France and Italy was left for the time being in abeyance. When later it was proposed that that ratio should be fixed at 1.75 compared with the 3 for Japan and the 5 for the United States and England, France objected and demanded more. Her argument was as follows. Mr. Hughes' proposal was frankly based upon the *status quo* of 1921, that is, it recognized, and would continue in the future, the comparative strength of the different navies

as they stood at the time of the meeting of the Conference. But France was, in 1914, involved in a naval building programme which, had she been able to carry it through, would have given her a far larger fleet in 1921 than she actually possessed. The war had forced her to suspend this programme and to concentrate her efforts upon her land armies. She had ceased work upon her four new super-dreadnoughts already begun, and since 1914 she had not even launched a submarine. But since that date England and Japan had gone on building on a great scale and the navy of the United States had grown extraordinarily. Was the *status quo* of 1921 fair to France? Was it just that she should be heavily penalized for doing a thing which had been of the greatest advantage to her allies, for directing all her resources to the prosecution of the war on land? Mr. Hughes' ratio worked admirably for the United States and England, assuring their superiority on the seas, which superiority, moreover, in the case of the former, was one of very recent origin. France was now virtually told that she must henceforth accept the position of a fourth-rate naval power, inferior to Japan, whose services to the world had certainly not been more conspicuous than hers.

Whether the capital ship ratio was fair to France or not, it was insisted upon and in the end France yielded, but with a reservation which precipitated a new and bitter controversy and which seriously affected the final outcome of the Conference. She accepted the ratio in capital ships but declared that it would be impossible to accept the corresponding reductions in the case of such "defensive ships" as light cruisers, torpedo boats and submarines. "The idea which dominates the Washington Conference," telegraphed M. Briand from Paris, "is to restrict naval armaments which are offensive and costly. But I do not believe that it is the programme to deny to a nation like France, which has a large extent of coasts and a great number of distant colonies, the means of defending its communications and its security."

M. Briand's telegram settled one controversy, that of capital ships, and opened another, that of the submarines. It accepted the ratio proposed for the former but not that proposed for the latter. Immediately a discussion began, mainly between France and England, which generated an unpleasant and dangerous amount of heat and which ended in gravely restricting the scope of the possible achievements of the Conference in the direction of disarmament. The British delegation demanded the total

30°
20°
10°
0°
10°
70°
60°
50°
40°
ARCTIC CIRCLE
ARCTIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTH SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Jan Mayen I. (To Norway)
Reikiavik
ICELAND
Faroe Is. (To Denmark)
Shetland Is.
Orkney Is.
Hebrides
Bergen
Trondhjem
Lofoden
Stavanger
Christiansand
Christiania
Stockholm
Gothenburg
Skagerrack
Kattegat
Copenhagen
Malmo
DENMARK
Helgoland
Aberdeen
Edinburgh
Scotland
Northern Ireland
Belfast
Ireland
Irish Free State
Limerick
Cork
Dublin
GREAT BRITAIN
Liverpool
Hull
Manchester
Birmingham
Wales
St. George's Channel
Amsterdam
The Hague
Antwerp
Brussels
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
England
London
Southampton
Dover
Lands End
English Channel
Calais
Cherbourg
Havre
Rouen
Lille
Liege
Luxemburg
Brest
Versailles
Paris
Orleans
Loire R.
Rheims
Strasbourg
Nantes
Tours
Dijon
Girondo R.
BAY OF BISCAY
Bordeaux
FRANCE
Lyon
St. Etienne
Geneva
Rhone R.
Garonne R.
Toulouse
Bilbao
Burgos
Oporto
Duero R.
Ebro R.
PYRENEES
ANDORRA
PORTUGAL
Lisbon
Madrid
Saragossa
SPAIN
Toledo
Barcelona
Marseilles
Corsica (To France)
Florence
Rome
Naples
Sardinia (To Italy)
Balearic Is.
Palma
Valencia
Seville
Murcia
Granada
Malaga
Gibraltar (Br.)
Algeciras
Strait of Gibraltar
C. St. Vincent
C. Finisterre
Berlin
Hamburg
Bremen
Hanover
Magdeburg
Essen
Cologne
Leipzig
Frankfort
Nuremberg
Stuttgart
Munich
Prague
CZECHO
Brunn
Dresden
Breslau
Vienna
Danube R.
Rhine R.
Main R.
Elbe R.
Oder R.
Weser R.
Ems R.
Kiel
Altona
Rostock
Danzig
Stettin
Posen
Berne
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA
Grazo
Trieste
Milano
Venice
Turin
Genoa
Po R.
Fiume
Sarajevo
Drave R.
Save R.
JUGO
ADRIATIC SEA
APENNINES
Tyrrhenian Sea
Palermo
Messina
Sicily (To Italy)
Ionian
Malta (Br.)
Taran
Longitude West
0° Longitude East from Greenwich
10°


EUROPE
in 1923
0 50 100 150 200 250
English Miles
Williams Engraving Co., N.Y.
ARCTIC OCEAN
Nova Zembla
Kolguev I.
Obdorsk
Obi R.
ARCTIC CIRCLE
Pechora R.
URAL MOUNTAINS
Tobolsk
Kola
Kola Peninsula
WHITE SEA
Archangel
Tornea
Ufeaborg
Kem
Kayana
Dwina R.
Kotlas
Perm
Ekaterinburg
Chelyabinsk
Onega Lake
Ladoga Lake
Viborg
Vologda
Viatka
Petrograd
Reval
Novgorod
Volga
Kazan
Ufa
Uralsk
Yaroslaw
Tver
Vladimir
Nijni Novgorod
Pskov
Riga
Dunaburg
Polotsk
Moscow
Saimbirsk
Samara
Orenburg
Orsk
Smolensk
Tula
Penza
Tambov
Saratov
Uralsk
Minsk
Gomel
Kursk
Voronezh
Don R.
Volga R.
Ural R.
Guriev
Kiev
Kharkov
Sarepta
Astrakhan
Caspian Sea
Alexandrovsk
Lemberg
Berdichev
Dniester R.
Dniepr R.
Taganrog
Don R.
Czernowitz
Jassy
Nikolaiev
Kherson
Sea of Azov
Stavropol
Mozdok
Kishinev
Odessa
Crimea
Galatz
Sulina
Sebastopol
Bucharest
Danube R.
Rustchuk
Black Sea
Poti
Tiflis
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Baku
Batum
Armenia
Erivan
Aras R.
Varna
Balkan Mts.
Bulgaria
Adrianople
Constantinople
Bosporus
Turkey
Sea of Marmora
Angora
Asia Minor
Salonica
Dardanelles
Aegean Sea
Smyrna
Athens
Rhodes (To Italy)
Candia
Crete

abolition of the submarine, declaring that it was not really an instrument of war, that recent history showed that it was no defense for weak nations and that it had done little damage to battleships, but that its only successes were against merchant vessels, that its use for this purpose was barbarous and had been universally condemned, that it was merely a weapon of murder and piracy and ought to be summarily suppressed. The French, Italian and Japanese delegations joined the British in expressing their execration of the way in which the submarines had been used in the recent war. Nevertheless, they held that they were "useful and effective means of defense," that they had proved serviceable against battleships and as scouts, and that, in the words of the French representative, it was unwise to limit them unreasonably "since we have before us an entirely new weapon, concerning which no one of us can foresee the possible transformation and growth, perhaps in the near future."

It was found impossible to harmonize such utterly divergent views or to agree upon any of the practical propositions which were brought forward. The result was that the Conference was unable to take any restrictive action in regard to the building of submarines. The nations might, therefore, build as many as they should choose. But the failure to abolish the submarine was somewhat offset by certain resolutions introduced by former American Secretary of State, Elihu Root, and later adopted by the Conference in a special treaty, signed by the five powers, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. That treaty reaffirmed as principles of international law the well-known rules about "visit and search," in regard to merchant ships, and the removal to places of safety, before such vessels could be sunk, of their crews and passengers, and declared that belligerent submarines were not exempt from these rules. Article IV of the treaty reads as follows: "The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 1914–1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations, they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves, and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto." Article V of the same treaty prohibits "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of all analogous

liquids, materials and devices." The five powers accept this prohibition for themselves and invite " all the civilized nations " to adhere thereto.

The Conference of Washington therefore stopped competition in battleships, at least for ten years. It did not stop nor did it limit competition in the building of submarines or of aircraft. It forbade the use of submarines in the way made hideously memorable to Americans by the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and to the English by the narrowness of their escape from starvation. Henceforth, if its stipulations were observed, there could be in war no repetition of the recent German achievement of sinking 12,000,000 tons of merchant shipping and the drowning of 20,000 non-combatants.

The Conference of Washington accomplished nothing in the matter of military armament as distinct from naval armament. The subject was brought up for discussion but was speedily laid aside as a result of the decided stand of France. The attitude of that country toward the reduction of her army was stated by M. Briand, prime minister of France and head of the French delegation at the Conference. That attitude was based upon her need of security. There could be no physical disarmament of France until Germany had disarmed " morally," that is, until she had conclusively shown that her temper and her purposes had changed, that she recognized her responsibilities and her wrong-doing, and that she was not merely waiting and planning for a new war of revenge. There were few indications that she had undergone any such change and many that she was a highly dangerous neighbor to France and enemy to the peace of the world. Had not her greatest military leader, Ludendorff, just published a book in which it was stated that war was of God and eternal peace a dream? With 7,000,000 men trained by the late war and who could be mobilized at any time, with her systematic evasions of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, with her " police " organizations, ostensibly designed for the preservation of internal order but really for the expert training of men who could instantly become officers, should a new war break out, and with her war industries essentially intact and readily available, Germany was a menace so formidable that it would be suicidal for France to disarm. Yet the Government of France was doing what it safely could. France had already reduced her army since the armistice by a third, and her military service from three years to two, and an additional reduction was contemplated. But, said M. Briand, " if

any one asks us to go further, I should have to answer clearly and definitely that it would be impossible for us to do it without exposing us to a most serious danger." If the other nations would voice their readiness to guarantee the security of his country, if attacked, then France would be willing and happy to adopt another plan, but M. Briand said that thus far he had heard no such voice.

This attitude of France was natural and inevitable. It is quite safe to say that any other nation, in the same situation and confronted with the same problem, would have acted and spoken in the same way. Nevertheless, her answer gave offence to all those who hoped that the Conference of Washington would introduce a new era of reduced armaments, not only on the sea but on the land. Public opinion, and for that matter much official opinion, passed lightly over the essential difficulty in its eagerness to inaugurate a new dispensation. No nation will disarm if it feels that thereby it will imperil its security. This is axiomatic, as all experience attests. Disarmament, therefore, will wait upon the discovery of a substitute for armament that shall offer at least equal, if not better, guarantees of protection, equal, if not superior, weapons of defense. But neither at Paris nor at Geneva nor at Washington was this fundamental difficulty either sufficiently recognized or sufficiently studied. But until the discussion should be concentrated, not upon the evils of war but upon the necessity of national self-preservation as the central aspect of the matter, no considerable progress could be made. There is some evidence that the Third Assembly of the League of Nations in the fall of 1922 was becoming aware as to where the real crux of the problem lay. But the Washington Conference which preceded that meeting did not wrestle with the problem. It merely recognized the obstacle furnished by the firm attitude of France, and passed on to the consideration of other matters.

There were several other topics of great importance upon its programme as announced, — the future of the Pacific, the future of the Far East which included the problem of China, and of the relation to China of Japan, and, to a lesser degree, of the Occident. Under these general heads was a tangle of delicate and knotty questions, questions whose increasing insistence and gravity had been the chief reason for the summoning of the Conference and which, obviously, it must attempt to answer. The answer was not destined to be either easy or very satisfactory. Nevertheless, the labors of the Conference in this field succeeded,

at least provisionally, in somewhat relieving a dangerous situation, in somewhat reducing an ominous international tension.

The tension was primarily that existing between the United States and Japan. This was nothing new, but in 1921 it had reached a point which it had never reached before and which was unfavorable for the peace of the world. Japan had objected to the annexation of Hawaii by the United States and the United States had objected to any considerable immigration of Japanese. Friction had arisen in California out of the desire of Japanese settlers in that state to extend their land holdings and to send their children to the public schools. But these were lesser matters. In 1921, what most disturbed and somewhat alarmed public opinion in the United States was Japan's policy in the Orient, not her policy in the Occident. That policy was aggressive, watchful, continuous, and successful, and it crossed and thwarted American policy and American sentiment at many points. The end of the World War accentuated the growing suspicion and estrangement. With German imperialism out of the way, at least provisionally, Americans came to feel more generally than they had felt before that Japanese imperialism was the menace of the present and of the future, and that it was the same in essence, the same in spirit, in method and in purpose as the one now laid low.

This opinion of America was based upon an observation of the recent history of Japan and of the present tendencies, and the more Americans observed, the less satisfied they became. Japan's policy toward China for a generation offended American sentiment and counteracted a long established American tradition. That sentiment and that tradition, expressed by the term of the "Open Door," demanded the recognition of the independence and the territorial integrity of China and of the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China. Japan had readily accepted, as had other powers, the principle of the open door as long as it was limited to a general phrase, but when it came to embodying it in actual conduct, her record was far less satisfactory. As a result of the Chinese-Japanese War of 1894–5, Japan had acquired from China the island of Formosa and the group of the Pescadores. As a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, she had acquired the Russian leases of Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung peninsula, the cession of the southern half of the island of Saghalin, and had forced the withdrawal of Russia from Korea, whose independence was to be assured, but in

which Japan was recognized as having "paramount" interests. Five years later Japan had destroyed even the shadowy semblance of Korean independence and had formally incorporated that country in her Empire. The World War of 1914–1918 offered her an unexampled opportunity to extend her power and to consolidate her position in China and in Asia, which opportunity she exploited to the full. She declared war upon Germany, seized Kiauchau and the province of Shantung which were thereupon guaranteed her in 1917 by secret treaties with the Allies and which were definitely handed over to her by the Treaty of Versailles. Further, taking advantage of the weakness of China and of the preoccupation of the Western Powers in the war in Europe, she had forced, by a forty-eight hour ultimatum, the notorious "Twenty-one Demands" upon China, which not only gave her the practical control of Manchuria, which not only extended the leases of Port Arthur and Darien to 1997 and of the Southern Manchurian Railway to 2002, but which also established a virtual protectorate over China. As a further result of the Great War, her armies were in Eastern Siberia, held Vladivostok and had seized the northern half of the island of Saghalin.

Along with this remarkable military and political expansion, had gone measures designed to secure the economic supremacy of Japan, in the vast areas brought under her influence, and the increasing practical exclusion of other powers. Japan's economic policy was more efficient than that of Russia and less liberal even than that of Germany. The Open Door was being gradually but firmly closed.

By the Treaty of Versailles, as has just been stated, Japan was recognized as the heir of Germany in regard to all the rights, titles and privileges which the latter power had enjoyed in Kiauchau and the province of Shantung. President Wilson's consent to this transfer had aroused vehement opposition in America and was one of the reasons for the refusal of America to accept the treaty. Japan had, it is true, given a verbal and informal promise to the President that she would return the political sovereignty of this territory to China, but American public opinion was by this time very sceptical in regard to Japanese promises and, moreover, it noted that this particular one concerned political sovereignty alone, Japan "retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany."

Behind this aggressive, persistent, successful policy of political and economic expansion, the American people saw something

more than merely the energy of an ambitious and efficient people, imitating Western imperialism as it had imitated so much else that was of Western origin. They saw that a certain international political arrangement had facilitated and encouraged this, to them unwelcome, development of Japan's position in the Orient, namely the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, an alliance which had subsisted since 1902. They believed that Japan never could have gone so far had it not been for that alliance, which, moreover, they believed had encouraged British imperialism in Asia as well. Moreover, a fundamental provision of that alliance gave great offence to America. In the treaty as first concluded in 1902, Japan and England promised each other that in case either one should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests, the other would remain strictly neutral, but that in case any third power should join in the hostilities, then the other contracting power should support its ally by arms. But as early as 1905 the Alliance was altered. Hitherto England had been obliged to give military aid to Japan, or Japan to England, only in case of the intervention of a third power. Now each agreed to come to the aid of the other and make war and peace in common, if either party should become involved — and without waiting for the intervention of any third power. The military obligation was thus greatly enlarged.

This obligation was in force from 1905 to 1921. What did it mean? The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been at first directed against Russian imperialistic policies in Asia. It had later served against another imperialistic power, Germany. But now both Russia and Germany had been eliminated as a menace to the peace of Asia. Against whom was the treaty now directed, if against anyone? What was the need of its continuance? Americans observed that it would operate in this way, namely, that if either China or the United States should ever care to challenge Japan's position in Asia by force, it would be confronted by the combined military and naval strength of England and Japan. As from the nature of things no such challenge could come from China, a feeble military power, a disorganized state, against whom would the Alliance operate?

The idea of a possible war between England and America was utterly repugnant to both countries. Yet the fact remained that the former was legally bound, under certain conditions, to take up arms against the latter. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with its ten-year term, was due to expire on July 13, 1921. The United States made it very plain that in her opinion it ought

not to be renewed. Yet England, anxious though she was not to offend the United States, desired, for various reasons, to preserve the Alliance, and Japan was strongly opposed to its abandonment. Statesmen of both countries "assured" the United States that it was "well understood" that the Alliance would never be directed against her. But whatever the understandings might be, the terms of the Alliance were explicit. Moreover, the United States objected to the Alliance, not primarily because she feared war with England and Japan, as she was morally certain that England would not take up arms against her whatever the terms of the treaty might be, but because she believed that the Alliance had distinctly fostered and would continue to foster, Japanese militarism and imperialism in Asia. A fresh and striking illustration of its tendency was at hand. The Alliance had contributed to the defeat of China and the discomfiture of President Wilson at the Conference of Paris, because it absolutely prevented England from opposing the Shantung award; in other words, from freely considering the merits of the matter.

As the date for the expiration of the Anglo-Japanese agreement approached, Lloyd George hit upon a scheme that would prolong it indefinitely and that yet would, it was hoped, satisfy those opposed to and those in favor of the Alliance, — a plan as ingenious as it was futile. The United States remained unpropitiated by the ministerial cleverness.

Such were some of the aspects of the Far Eastern situation when the Conference of Washington opened in November, 1921. One of the achievements of the Conference was the abolition of this Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This was accomplished by the means of a larger combination, into which the smaller one was absorbed. The Four-Power Treaty, signed by Great Britain, Japan, the United States, and France, was the method devised for removing this obstacle from the international scene. That treaty did not create an alliance, one of four powers to take the place of one of two. But it substituted for an alliance an agreement designed to safeguard the interests of the nations concerned and to provide a method of adjusting disputes and meeting dangers that might arise in the future. The four powers agreed to "respect" the rights of each other in their "insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean," declaring, in a separate document, that this phrase did not include the islands of Japan proper. They agreed that if any controversy should develop between them

"arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights," and which cannot be settled by ordinary diplomatic processes, then they shall meet in joint conference for the purpose of considering and adjusting the matter; that if any outside Power shall threaten their "said rights" by aggressive action, the Four "shall communicate with one another fully and frankly," in order to "arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation"; that the Treaty shall remain in force for a period of ten years and shall continue in force thereafter, subject to the right of any of the Four Powers to terminate it upon giving twelve months' notice; that as soon as this Treaty is ratified, the Agreement between Japan and England "shall terminate."

A "Declaration," accompanying this Treaty and designed for the satisfaction of the United States, provided that the Treaty should not be considered as involving the assent of the United States to "mandates" granted in the Pacific under the Treaty of Versailles, should not prevent her making separate agreements concerning islands held under mandates, and declaring also that the controversies contemplated in the treaty should not be held to include those questions which "according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the respective Powers." Such questions as immigration and the independence of the Philippines were in the minds of the authors of these reservations.

Another set of problems, namely, those concerning China, demanded consideration at the hands of the Conference of Washington. If the policy of the "Open Door," if the recognition of the territorial integrity and political independence of China, objects to which the American government had over and over again declared its adhesion, were to pass from the domain of words to the domain of realities, much of the work of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would have to be undone, for those centuries had brought about very numerous and intricate infringements upon both the commercial and political and territorial and institutional freedom of China. Treaty restrictions, exacted generally as the result of wars, held that country tightly enmeshed, and imposed upon her a variety of obligations to foreign powers prejudicial to her interests and well-being. These encroachments upon her territory and her freedom of action had increased greatly during the past twenty years. At the time when the Washington Conference was opened, Japan possessed

undeniable political and economic ascendency over Manchuria, Shantung, and a part of Siberia, and other powers possessed rights that derogated from China's sovereignty and rendered her international position humiliating and weak. Had not the time come to begin the work of liberation from the aggressions and injustices of the past?

It can hardly be said that it had. The Conference of Washington accomplished some things in this direction but not many. The work of history is not easily reversed. The Chinese delegation presented China's demands in a series of ten resolutions which, had they been accepted and acted upon, would have given China administrative and political independence, would have undermined the "vested interests" of foreign powers, would have given her the right to make her own tariffs as she might choose, would have abolished extra-territoriality in its various forms, and would have preserved her neutrality. But the achievements of the Conference were to have no such scope or significance. China was given the right to raise her tariff somewhat, but not as much as she desired or as was necessary to put the national finances in good condition. Her tariff was still to be made to serve primarily the interests of foreign powers, as had long been the case, instead of her own interests. When China asked the right to manage her own postal system, she was not given it. For some fifty years, various nations had maintained their own post offices in China. In 1921 Japan maintained there about 125 post offices, Great Britain and France about a dozen each, and the United States one. China was powerless to inspect the mail going through these agencies and smuggling of such things as opium and morphine could not be prevented by the Chinese authorities. Yet, although the Chinese postal system had long been efficient, the Conference only hesitatingly granted this entire minor request. A resolution was passed providing for the voluntary withdrawal of foreign post offices by January 1, 1923, on condition that China maintain an efficient service and that she continue the supervision of "the foreign Co-Director General."

The request for the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China was not granted but, considering that any determination in the matter "must depend upon the ascertainment and appreciation of complicated states of fact in regard to the law and the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration in China," the Conference decided that an international committee should be appointed to inquire into the matter and to report

within a year, each power concerned being free to accept or reject any or all of the recommendations of the committee.

The demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops from China was accepted in "principle," but the practical execution was to be made the subject of "a full and impartial inquiry," the Powers being deemed free "to accept or reject all or any of the findings of facts or opinions expressed in the report" that would follow the inquiry.

Where there was such slight eagerness to meet the Chinese point of view, the efforts of the Chinese delegation to find out how extensive and what precisely were the "foreign commitments," the "private contracts" of foreigners in China, were blocked quickly and decisively by the interested Powers. And, of course, the relinquishment of foreign lease-holds was not secured, chiefly because of the opposition of Japan. These included the British leaseholds of Wei-hai-wei in Shantung, and Kowloon, opposite Hongkong, the French lease of Kwangchow-wan in South China, and the Japanese leases in Port Arthur and Darien. Mr. Balfour announced that England was willing to give up Wei-hai-wei but not Kowloon, M. Viviani declared that France was ready "to join in the collective restitution of territories leased to various powers in China," under conditions, and the Japanese delegates announced that they wished "to make it clear that Japan has no intention at present to relinquish the important rights she has lawfully acquired and at no small sacrifice." Nothing, therefore, was accomplished directly by the raising of this question. Later, something was accomplished in another way.

Few indeed were the practical measures taken at the Conference of Washington for the liberation of China from the trammels which the aggressions of other nations had imposed upon her and which had rendered illusory her territorial integrity and her political independence. But while in practice the powers were little disposed to sacrifice their actual "vested rights," they were very willing to join in general statements of the most reassuring character concerning their policies and purposes in China. A treaty was signed by all the nine powers at the Conference whose declared aim was "to safeguard the rights and interests of China and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity." The Powers recognized once more, as they had done before, the principle of the Open Door, a principle now formulated anew and with somewhat greater pre-

cision than ever previously. If they should carry out in practice what they expressed in words, a large liberation of China would result, a real invigoration of her national life and institutions. But in view of the previous record of the Powers and of the revelations of their temper at the Conference of Washington, the reader may well preserve an attitude of considerable scepticism as regards the value of this treaty.

There was one practical question, recent in origin, which the public opinion of America would not allow the Conference to elude, the question of the Japanese occupation of Shantung, which had lain uneasily upon the national conscience ever since the Conference of Paris. The Conference as a whole, indisposed frankly to take up this matter itself, referred it to China and Japan for direct negotiation. That negotiation was long and difficult and was brought to a conclusion largely through the efforts of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour. A treaty was made between the two powers concerned which provided for the withdrawal of the Japanese from Kiauchau, the former German leased territory, and its restoration to China. A more important matter was the disposition of the Tsinan-fu railway, the control of which carried with it the virtual economic control of the province of Shantung. It was finally agreed that China was to purchase this railway for about $32,000,000, but that until complete payment was made the railway was to have a Japanese traffic manager, subject to the direction of a Chinese managing director, a Japanese accountant and a Chinese accountant of equal rank. As the actual payment, which is on the instalment plan, will not be completed for five years, there remains a chance, given the disturbed internal conditions of China, that obstacles may be placed in the way of payment. The economic control of Shantung will, therefore, remain, at least provisionally, somewhat in doubt.

As to the problem of Siberia, raised by the late war, all that the Conference accomplished was to bring forth a statement from the Japanese delegation to the effect that "it was the fixed and settled policy" of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia and to observe the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations.

Such was the work of the Conference of Washington, a valuable work, yet one whose value is unequal and, in parts, problematical. The probability of a war between England and the United States was now reduced to a minimum, one between Japan and the United States was rendered less likely. On the other hand, the Open Door in China remains a theory, not a reality,

a principle and not a fact. It may reasonably be argued that Japan's position in the Orient is stronger than ever, unless moral force, the only weapon the United States is willing to use, should be sufficient to restrain her imperialism. World opinion, declared Mr. Root at one of the sessions of the Conference, "is the greatest power known to human history." It may well be doubted whether such a thing as "world opinion" has ever existed, but it is not forbidden to hope that it may come to exist some day, and that it may be of the right kind.

CHAPTER LIV

THE ECLIPSE OF THE ENTENTE

One subject, of capital importance, remains to be considered, the fate of the Treaty of Versailles. That document is none too popular in the world to-day, but this fact need occasion no surprise and need not unduly disturb us. Unless all types of human nature had changed it was to be expected that the defeated would denounce as an outrage a document that signalized their discomfiture. All treaties are unpopular with those who, by their terms, are required to pay the piper. And the Treaty of Versailles, perhaps the most comprehensive and varied treaty on record, exposes so large a surface, treats so many questions, delivers so many verdicts, offends so many interests and so many schools of thought, Socialists, Pacifists, Communists, that it was inevitably bound to raise a multitude of enemies whose collective voice was quite sufficient to cleave the general ear. The critics might not agree among themselves, nor did they in this instance, one reserving his denunciation for this section or provision or aspect of the treaty, another for that. The widespread clamor might consist of dissonances rather than of harmonies, but the result was the same, a most horrendous din. And criticism came from the victors who had drawn it up and who might be expected to support it, as it came from the vanquished who had but a slight share in its composition and who were its predestined opponents, dedicated to its revision or annihilation, as Hannibal was dedicated to the destruction of Rome, — an enterprise, be it said in passing, which proved beyond his powers.

M. Poincaré, President of the French Republic, whom the formidable document displeased in certain of its features, said, on the morrow of its signature: "The Treaty of Versailles will be a continuous creation." This observation has been abundantly vindicated by subsequent history. For that treaty differs to-day in several respects from what it was on June 28, 1919. For instance, those clauses which promised the trial of the Kaiser and the war criminals have practically been dropped after a preliminary and half-hearted attempt to enforce them. Again,

the treaty was based upon the assumption that it would have behind it the support of America. That support lacking, its practical, though not its juridical, force has been diminished and particularly has the experiment of the League of Nations been conducted under very different conditions from those contemplated when the clauses ordering it were written. The "continuous creation" of this part of the treaty has undoubtedly produced an institution departing, how far it would be difficult to say, from the original conception of its founders.

Other clauses might be mentioned which have been nullified or altered by the course of events since the midsummer of the year 1919. We will mention only one. That entire section of the treaty which establishes a system of reparations which Germany must pay for the damage done to those whom she unjustly attacked has thus far not been fulfilled. Around its elaborate and somewhat flexible provisions has raged a fierce discussion, among the Allies themselves, and between them and Germany. The result has been thus far a deadlock, that is in a certain measure, a nullification of the clauses in question. At the present moment, July 1923, the whole matter is in suspense, having meanwhile contributed greatly to the unfortunate and costly embroilment of the world.

It is impossible here to summarize the discussion of this subject, which has given rise to a vast controversial literature. Suffice it to say that the treaty imposed a heavy financial burden upon Germany, but one much inferior to the financial burdens imposed by her action upon the Allies. It established a special agency for the final determination of the exact sums she must pay and for their collection, the Commission of Reparations. It soon became apparent that the treaty was seriously defective in that, while establishing a severe, yet just, obligation, it provided inadequate means for compelling its discharge. There was no reason to suppose that a country like Germany would ever execute its promises, signed and sealed, unless held constantly and firmly to the punctual performance of the articles of agreement. And in the matter of compulsion the treaty was very weak. Indeed the vicissitudes of the controversy over reparations has brought into relief the imperfections and the vices of the Treaty of Versailles as nothing else has done. The makers of that document asserted, to the point of wearisome iteration, that, unlike their predecessors in diplomacy, they were dominated in their work by a higher and more virtuous philosophy of statecraft. But, as a liberal and learned Frenchman has recently said: "The

traditional diplomacy, which did not possess the high preoccupations, rational and moral, of the new diplomacy, did possess, on the other hand, certain positive and realistic qualities. Its solutions were often imperfect but, most of the time, they were clear. The old treaties had a definite character; they settled questions. Thus the Treaties of Vienna, which, according to the consecrated phrase, treated peoples like herds of cattle, nevertheless assured Europe a long peace. On the contrary the Treaty of Versailles leaves a quantity of questions in suspense, indicating only the principles which ought to dominate their solution." [1]

Nowhere does the Treaty of Versailles more completely justify this stricture than in the section devoted to the problem of reparations. Strong in the assertion of rights and principles it is most defective in all that concerns penalties for non-observance. Unless one assumes that the apparent standpoint of its authors was sound and sufficient, namely, that once formally accepted by Germany the latter would faithfully and scrupulously, however reluctantly, observe its terms, a standpoint as naïve as it was rash, and one not justified by any previous revelations of either history or psychology, one must admit that the lack of clear and certain compulsion in its provisions offered a minimum of a guarantee and invited a maximum of discussion, and consequent uncertainty to the interested parties. Those parties were, after the unexpected withdrawal of America from participation in the execution of the treaty, France and England, Italy and Belgium, and Germany. These five were destined, as the issue was to prove, to diverge from each other, in ways dangerous to the effective enforcement of the reparation programme, — and perhaps disastrous.

The period that succeeded the war proved disappointing. Peace did not come, as pictured in ancient fable, abounding and robust, charged with fruits and flowers. She had been so long awaited, so ardently desired that the majority of men had formed altogether too uncritical, too optimistic a notion of what she would be like. Disappointed that she did not bring back prosperity in her train, deceived in their hopes, which were entirely unreasonable, many men, shortsighted and superficial, fell upon the Treaty of Versailles, holding it responsible for the existing situation, which was certainly distressing. The economic consequences of the peace, disastrous consequences of course, became

[1] Joseph Barthélemy, *Revue Politique et Parlementaire,* March, 1923, p. 481.

the shibboleth of the hour. It ought not to be necessary to point out that no treaty, whatever its provisions, could restore to the economic organism of Europe its former vigor. It ought to be superfluous, but it is not, to recall the very evident truth that the real source of the world's suffering lies chiefly and overwhelmingly elsewhere. We are experiencing not primarily the economic consequences of the peace, but the economic and numerous other consequences of the war. This matter, however, involves certain embarrassing questions of responsibility which many of the critics of the Treaty would prefer to transfer to the authors of the peace rather than to the authors of the war.

But, whatever the causes of the distress and disorder of the world, the work of reconstruction must obviously be undertaken and pushed as vigorously as possible. The basis of reconstruction, as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles, was the right of the victors to reparations for damages inflicted by the war. The country most deeply concerned in this policy was France, to a lesser degree Belgium, England and Italy. Of the victors then, France became the most insistent defender of the Treaty of Versailles because, despite its numerous and grave defects, it at least decreed the essential thing, the right to reparations. But in practice it soon became evident that this right would be extraordinarily difficult to enforce. The subject became the theme of endless discussion, of frequent conferences, of agreements reached, only shortly to be re-opened. As the years went by France saw her prospects of ever recovering her just due becoming constantly less and threatening utterly to disappear. By 1922 what had she received? Certain reparations in kind, of which the most important were deliveries of coal, irregular at that, and obtained only by repeated threats of penalties to be imposed; also a partial reimbursement of the expenses of her army of occupation, — these and not much else. Very little, if anything, paid by the German Government for the restoration of the devastated regions. If Germany would not pay for this restoration, France herself must do so, or it must remain indefinitely postponed. One fact was registered by the passage of time, namely that, either because she could not pay or because she would not, Germany at every moment, fiercely, and often successfully, resisted the claims and orders of the Reparation Commission, and that her record in the matter of deliveries of coal or coke or live stock was one of repeated delays or of failure, partial or extensive, to discharge her obligations. Over and over again was the Commission obliged formally to register these acts

of commission or omission and to protest against them. Particularly determined was Germany's resistance when it came to any payment of money, and very vehement was her opposition to giving any of the positive guarantees or securities for payment which the Allies might suggest. Meanwhile she was spending enormous sums on the replenishment and expansion of her economic equipment, factories, shipyards, railroads, canals, so that when the moment for normal world trade should come again, she would probably be in a better situation than any of her competitors. Indisposed to seek seriously to repair the damages she had inflicted upon others, her governing classes were most eager to work for themselves, and to see the state assume formidable burdens in order to place the national industries in the most perfect condition anent the day which must come in time when Germany might try to resume that economic war with the rest of the world which had been interrupted by the late conflict on the field of battle, with its unexpected consequences. And another alarming aspect of the situation, which cast deepening shadows before it and which threatened the Allies with the total loss of their hopes for partial remuneration of their just claims, was the reckless, and, as it seemed to increasing numbers of people, the dishonest financial policy of the German government with its issues of paper money, at first moderate and later fantastic and unrestrained, until the dollar which, in 1914, could buy only four German marks could in 1923, buy twenty, thirty, forty and ultimately hundreds of thousands of them. This wild inflation might ruin multitudes of Germans, but it had its advantages for a few, indeed for precisely those rich industrialists who had, according to Rathenau, become the economic barons of Germany, replacing the feudal and military barons of the old régime. But whatever the effect of this inflation upon the Germans might be, it would perhaps be for the Allies disastrous, even catastrophic. For it meant inevitably the ultimate bankruptcy of the state. Then where would reparations be? By a bankruptcy, which Frenchmen, and increasing numbers of other people, came to believe was, in considerable measure, intentional, deliberately organized, and therefore fraudulent, reparations might vanish into air, thin air, and become such stuff as dreams are made of.

Unhappily for the French their leading partner in the enforcement of the peace, as recently in the prosecution of the war, took a different view of the situation and of the measures that should be adopted to meet it. As the months went by the divergence of England and France became more and more accentuated,

whether in the numerous conferences that succeeded each other, or in the discussions of the Commission of Reparation, or in the independent policies which each country followed more or less outside the framework of the Treaty of Versailles. England, whose representative, Lloyd George, had had perhaps more to do with making the reparation clauses of the Treaty than anyone else, soon began to change her tone. Never denying the right of France to reparations, she, however, soon came to put less and less emphasis upon them and more and more upon the reconstruction of Europe as a whole, including Russia and Germany and the central states. When the French talked of their devastated regions, the English talked of theirs, their idle factories, their army of unemployed, and they were prone to ascribe their economic distress to the burden of reparations that hung over Germany like a pall and prevented her recovery, thereby preventing her from becoming a profitable customer again. This was much too easy and too complacent a theory of the causes of England's economic difficulties, many of which must be ascribed to her own questionable or unwise domestic measures and not to the Treaty of Versailles or to the state of Central Europe or Russia or France, or to reparations, or to something outside herself, making for misery.

But, whether rightly or wrongly, English opinion generally held that the demands made upon Germany were exaggerated, were far beyond her power to pay, and that they explained the continuance of the world crisis. From this attitude flowed several consequences whose effect was steadily to weaken the French-English entente and to encourage German resistance. The English regarded this resistance as justified, at least to a certain extent, and were emphatically opposed to the adoption of coercive measures to make the Germans pay, measures which the French were more and more coming to believe the only ones that would yield any results. Thus the reduction of reparations, constantly demanded by the Germans, was held to be reasonable and inevitable by the English, who urged the French to moderate their claims, and to consent to the reduction. Otherwise Europe could never be restored. The French replied that to refuse France, the obvious and great victim of the war, the reparations without which she could not live, and to aid the Germans, the chief creators of the world's present poverty and distress, to escape their just obligations, on the assumption that only thus could the world begin to mend, was an iniquitous proceeding and a reversal of the moral law. As between an action that perhaps

might impede the highly problematical restoration of Europe and a certain and inevitable crippling, if not the utter ruin, of France, obviously it was not difficult for Frenchmen to choose. They must insist upon reparations to the full possible extent, and that extent did not mean merely the present capacity of the German government, fraudulently on the verge of bankruptcy, but meant the future productiveness of German industry, left uninjured and intact by the war, and even expanded and perfected in its equipment since the armistice. They pointed out that England had secured some very important advantages over Germany as a result of the war, that her mastery of the sea was no longer threatened by the latter, that the German navy and the German mercantile fleet had almost entirely been handed over or were lying at the bottom of the ocean, that German submarines had been destroyed and that Germany was forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles to construct or acquire submarines in the future, even those intended for commercial purposes, that the largest and best parts of the German colonial empire had been added to the British Empire, that Germany for many, many years, would not become, if indeed she ever could, the redoubtable rival of England that she had been in the two decades before the war, that not only was England's security immensely augmented by these and other facts, but that very palpable advantages resulted from them to English industry and commerce.

What, on the other hand, was the prevalent French opinion of their own situation? It seems perfectly safe to say that the French negotiators of the Treaty of Versailles would never have signed that document, nor the French Parliament have ratified it, had not their English and American colleagues agreed to guarantee the security of France and to see that ample reparations were forthcoming. Guarantees of a military nature France must have, and this was her most poignant preoccupation at the Conference of Paris; and reparations, too, have an obvious connection with national security. Only when President Wilson and Lloyd George agreed to sign defensive treaties promising the support of their two countries to France in case of an unprovoked attack upon her by Germany, did the French negotiators abandon their own ideas as to the best method to attain the end desired. What was the result? President Wilson's signature was shortly seen to have no value. The Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and never seriously considered the defensive military treaty. As England had made her observance of the latter conditional upon its acceptance by the United States, she was

not bound to observe or execute it alone. In the most important single matter that came before them, namely the future security of France, the American and English negotiators at Paris had assumed a responsibility which they should never have assumed without having had overwhelming evidence that their action would have the support of their respective countries. One of them, at least, lacked that assurance. While the Treaty of Versailles and the defensive military treaties were not formally connected, yet in reality they were most closely associated, for the latter were written and signed only because the former was recognized by the American President and the British Prime Minister as defective, at least provisionally, as a guarantee of French security. The ability of Lloyd George to win the acceptance by Parliament of the Treaty of Versailles and the military convention could not reasonably be doubted. But the ability of President Wilson to secure the ratification at home of his work at Paris was, at least, problematical. To make the future territorial security of France dependent upon the conjectural influence of the American Executive with the American Senate, which had already given numerous monitory evidences of its indocility, was, to put it mildly, a grave and hazardous decision. The outcome is sufficiently well known. The method adopted at Paris of settling this fundamental and vital matter was both unsound and risky, in other words, unworthy of a great conference in a great crisis of history. This was certainly no way to treat the primary necessity of a nation that had been the bulwark of the Allied cause, that had, in the convulsions of the times, lost an ally, Russia, whose service to her for a quarter of a century had been precious, and that stood confronting a people more populous and essentially more powerful than itself, a people which, if the past had any light to throw upon the present, would in all likelihood, seek to recover its former possessions and to requite the humiliation of defeat.

As time went by, France saw the other promise of the Treaty of Versailles which meant the most to her, namely reparations, gradually disappearing, under the dilatory and obstructive methods of the Germans, constantly demanding a reduction in their debt, pleading extenuating circumstances and at the same time following out an extravagant and reckless financial policy, which diminished the value of the mark to the vanishing point, and presaged speedy bankruptcy. The problem of reparations led to a series of discords and disputes between France and England, as England was generally found arguing for what it

called moderation, a moderation which the French thought was entirely at their expense. The French hoped for a moment that the overthrow of Lloyd George on October 19, 1922, and the advent to power of the Conservative party under Bonar Law might bring about a more cordial co-operation between the two Allies.[1] But the elections which followed that event were anything but reassuring. Mr. Lloyd George was head of a government that rested upon a coalition of Conservatives and Liberals. But the majority of his Conservative supporters finally became restive and considered that the return to the old system of strictly party government was, for many reasons, desirable. When, therefore, they indicated that they were no longer disposed to support the coalition, Lloyd George's majority vanished over-night and there was nothing for him to do but resign. But in the electoral campaign which ensued the essentials of Lloyd George's policy with reference to France and reparations were not assailed by many of the Conservative candidates. And there was, from the French standpoint, another disquieting sign, the attitude of the Labor candidates. The Labor Party had been slowly growing for many years and there was a widespread belief that it would emerge from the present struggle at least the second party in Parliament. Such proved to be the case. The strength of the parties in the new House of Commons, elected November 15, 1922, was as follows: Conservatives 344, Labor 138, Asquith Liberals 60, Lloyd George Liberals 57. From neither branch of the Liberal party had the French any reason to expect support for their point of view, and still less from the Labor party. There was much discussion during the campaign as to whether the Labor party was a Socialist party or not. Indeed there was discussion within the party itself as to its precise complexion. Certain it was that it contained a very large number of Socialists, and it proceeded on the opening of the new Parliament to choose as its official leader an able and convinced Socialist, J. Ramsay Macdonald.

This party, now the official Opposition, had, during the campaign, advocated, within the purely domestic field, such measures as the nationalization of mines and railways with increased share of control for the workers, a national housing scheme, an increase of the inheritance and super-taxes, a reduction of the taxes on incomes below £500, no taxation of those below £250, a gradu-

[1] Mr. Bonar Law was compelled, owing to ill health, to resign in May, 1923, and was succeeded in the premiership by Mr. Stanley Baldwin, at that time Chancellor of the Exchequer.

ated levy on fortunes exceeding £5000; real independence for Egypt, real self-government for India, and the acceptance of the constitution of the Irish Free State. Within the field which particularly interested the French, that of foreign policy, the Labor party had advocated the revision of the Peace Treaties, and reparations "within the capacity of Germany to pay," a phrase which meant but one thing, the further reduction of the claims of the Allies against their recalcitrant debtor. As the Labor party would have about a hundred and fifty votes in the new Parliament and as it might, in the near future, if the confident predictions of its supporters should be realized, secure control of the Government itself, its programme was of undoubted importance to other nations as well as to England herself.

Thus as the French examined the results of this local English crisis which had interjected itself into the general European crisis they saw that no change had occurred favorable to their point of view. Meanwhile events were taking place in Germany itself which were not calculated to reduce the tension between that country and France. The fairly conciliatory Wirth ministry, which had enjoyed the support of the Majority Socialists, fell, and was succeeded, on November 22, 1922, by the ministry of Dr. Cuno, Manager of the Hamburg-American Line, the seventh Chancellor the republic had seen since its proclamation in 1918. As the Social Democrats refused to join this ministry it could only count on the support of the frankly "bourgeois" parties. Cuno himself claimed to be of no party and he organized a so-called Business Ministry. As his own affiliations were with the big business interests whose power had become steadily more and more apparent, it seemed likely that his conduct would be one pleasing to those interests.

Such then was the situation at the close of 1922. The French became convinced that the Germans did not mean to pay for the damage they had done. They on their side were determined to collect what they could upon a bill which was just. They were willing to grant a moratorium for a certain length of time, that Germany might try to put her finances in some kind of order, but they insisted upon possessing some positive guarantees, some security, in case of continued default or bad faith. It was over this proposal to bring a greater presssure to bear upon the German government than had been brought before to compel it to a policy of payment that the final discussions between England and France occurred. At a conference held in London in December 1922 and at one held in Paris in Jan-

uary 1923, the sharpness of the disagreement of the two powers was shown to be too great for continued co-operation. A few days later, on January 11, 1923, the French began the occupation of the Ruhr, the richest industrial and coal-producing region of Germany. The English government condemned this action as doomed to failure, as certain to make a bad situation worse. English, and many American, economists and bankers held this occupation an economic mistake, but the French observed that there was some reason to believe that wisdom would not necessarily die with economists and bankers, and that the limitations of their powers as prophets had been proved in 1914 when many of them had asserted that the war could not last six months, whereas Lord Kitchener, whose pretensions to economic knowledge were slight, had asserted that it would very likely last three years.

In entering the Basin of the Ruhr, what the French did was to seize the most valuable single asset of the defiant and slippery debtor. In 1919 President Wilson and Premier Lloyd George assured the French that if they would abandon certain securities upon which they were inclined to insist, they should receive protection and payment. Having received neither but being left in the lurch by the nations whose representatives made the promise, the French had come to see, by 1923, that if they were to have protection and payment it must be through their own efforts. From the authorities of the Anglo-Saxon countries France had received nothing but advice to abate her claims, those countries in their own cases not abating theirs. Reluctantly she came to the conclusion that she must break, if possible, the manifest determination of the directing classes of Germany not to make any real effort to comply with the terms of the Treaty of Peace, even if, in so doing, she should encounter English opposition, an opposition which would encourage her opponents and weaken her action.

The English and American critics of the French programme chiefly emphasized economics. They desired the economic rehabilitation of Germany, so that that country might become the customer she had been before, and therefore contribute to the general rehabilitation of Europe. But before attaining this apparently liberal attitude both England and America had carefully assured themselves that she would not become unduly dangerous. America had raised her tariff, she had adopted, among others, measures that, for instance, would practically keep German dyes out of the country. England had protected

her vital interests by taking most of Germany's colonies and shipping and by adopting a policy of protection for her key industries.

The French point of view was both political and economic, and Frenchmen saw no reason why they should not have the same right to consider their vital interests as Englishmen and Americans had to consider theirs, especially as they were really much more serious, including national security, obviously the most serious of all. Consequently when the government of M. Poincaré ordered the occupation of the Ruhr, January 11, 1923, it had the determined and overwhelming support of the French people. France had as ally Belgium, and as partial ally Italy, the latter power agreeing largely in principle but being prepared to participate only slightly in action.

We may well close the discussion of this matter by quoting the judgment, not of a French official but of one of the most eminent, most objective and least chauvinistic of French historians, Professor Seignobos of the University of Paris, who summarizes the reasons for this French intervention in the Ruhr as follows:

"France was damaged by Germany. She has a right to complete reparation, and intends to preserve that right intact, even though she may consent to delay.

"After three years of waiting France decided to apply force to collect her debt, and she is using the army which she keeps up for her security, and using it to carry out an operation of justice and not of war. Perhaps she will get nothing out of it, but she certainly would have gotten nothing out of the moratorium without security, and she would have increased her own danger and encouraged the Germans to fight.

"To replace armed force we are offered an arbitration by neutrals and experts, who are to fix Germany's capacity to pay. But these experts would take the point of view of bankers and business men. They would consider Germany's capacity to-day, while France bases her hopes upon Germany's capacity in the future, and she has not enough confidence in German good faith to be content with promises without a material pledge. For, once free of the Ruhr occupation, Germany would reconstitute her army, conquer Poland, and then turn against France.

"The two countries [England and France] do not differ about the facts, as Mr. Bonar Law pretended, but about the interpretation of the facts. These facts are the deficit of the German budget, and the fall of the mark. The English think

that they show Germany's incapacity to pay — the French that they show her determination to pretend to be ruined.

"France is still more astonished that the British public cannot see why she bears the cost of a great army. French democracy has a horror of war. There are no doubt some officers who have made warlike threats, and there are certainly some journalists who have printed pseudo-historical fairy tales about the Rhineland and the Rhine frontier. But neither of these groups will ever govern France. The French army on the Rhine is an instrument not of domination but of defense, and it represents, not the imperialism, but the fear, of Frenchmen. In spite of her strong army, France feels weak before even a disarmed Germany, with her more numerous population, her more powerful industry, her aristocracy imbued with the cult of force, and her people trained to military obedience. France is in fear of being attacked, and her fear has increased since she has felt that she no longer has the support of England." [1]

What the outcome of the French action in occupying the basin of the Ruhr would be, no one could foretell. The resistance encountered proved more serious and more systematic than had been expected. The French Government, taking a leaf out of Bismarck's diplomacy and out of the German methods of making France pay at the close of the War of 1870, announced that the French army would remain in the Ruhr, as the German army had remained in France, until the final and complete liquidation of the debt incurred by the Treaty of Peace. The French were thus pledged to the proposition that history can, at least in one of its aspects, be made to repeat itself. Whether this proposition was, in this instance, sound or senseless could not be stated with certainty. The prophets disagreed.

[1] Charles Seignobos, *The Observer* (London), March 4, 1923.

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A comprehensive and altogether admirable history of modern France is that edited by E. Lavisse, *Histoire de France Contemporaine,* in ten volumes (1920–1922), covering the period since 1789. Vol. IV is by S. Charléty and treats the period of the Restoration (1815–1830). Excellent bibliographies. The best history in English of France in the nineteenth century is Bourgeois, E., *History of Modern France, 1815–1913* (1919); good bibliographies, W. S. Davis, *History of France* (1919), good general account from the earliest times to the present. Lebon, *Modern France,* 1789–1895 (Story of the Nations Series, 1898), is a brief, frequently inaccurate outline by an active politician. Coubertin, *France since 1814* (1890), is a brief, popular, unscholarly account. W. G. Berry,

France since Waterloo (1909), more satisfactory than the preceding, is readable and useful. A suggestive little book is G. Lowes Dickinson, *Revolution and Reaction in Modern France* (1892), not a history of France, but a description of the various phases and schools of political thought from 1789 to 1871.

On the period of this chapter, 1815 to 1830, there are chapters in the *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. X, chaps. II and III, and Lavisse et Rambaud, *Histoire générale,* vol. X, chaps. III, VII, XI, XII, XIII. A thorough and scholarly treatment is in Stern, *Geschichte Europas,* vol. I, chaps. I, VI; vol. II, chaps. VIII, X, XI; vol. III, chap. X; vol. IV, chap. I.

The French works, Viel Castel, *Histoire de la Restauration,* in 20 vols. (1860–1878), and Duvergier de Hauranne, *Histoire du Gouvernement parlementaire en France, 1814–1830,* 10 vols., may be consulted as works of reference but are much too extensive and too unscientific for general use. Viviani's volume in Jaurès *Histoire Socialiste,* vol. VII, *La Restauration, 1814–1830,* is brilliantly written, abounds in criticism but is marked by a total absence of references to authorities and is one-sided; useful, however, for the study of social and labor questions and conditions.

There are a number of important monographs on aspects of this history: Pierre Simon's *L'élaboration de la charte constitutionnelle de 1814,* 184 pp. (1906), a valuable study containing a description of the sources used, a narrative of the events of the two months, April and May, 1814, which bore upon the framing of the charter, and a critical study of the text — of the origin of its general principles and its particular provisions. Pierre Rain, *L'Europe et la Restauration des Bourbons* (1908, 493 pp.), is a scholarly investigation of the first years of the Restoration, 1814–1818, and an important addition to our knowledge of the supervision which the Allies exercised over the French government during the years of military occupation, 1815–1818. Henry Houssaye, *1815, La Seconde Abdication, La Terreur blanche,* is a graphic and on the whole sound description of an unfortunate and turbulent year of transition, far superior to E. Daudet's *La Terreur blanche.* L. Michon, *Le Gouvernement parlementaire sous la Restauration* (1905, 471 pp.), is a solid study, partly historical, partly juristic, of the introduction and establishment of the theory and practice of cabinet and parliamentary government in France under Louis XVIII and Charles X. J. Barthélemy, *L'Introduction du régime parlementaire en France sous Louis XVIII et Charles X* (1904, 323 pp.), is another valuable study of the same subject, a work crowned by the Faculty of Law of Paris. Thureau-Dangin, *Le parti libéral sous la Restauration*

(1876), a study of the "Opposition" from 1815 to 1830, useful for an understanding of the July Revolution. On the history of the republican party during this period: see, G. Weill, *Histoire du parti républicain en France de 1814 à 1870* (1900), pp. 1–32. On questions of church and state and the activity of the clerical party see, Debidour, *L'Église et l'État en France de 1789 à 1870,* pp. 325–412, a valuable contribution to modern church history, readable, analytical, supplied with footnotes and appendices. A special topic, fully treated, is *Les royalistes contre l'armée, 1815–1820,* by Édouard Bonnal, Paris (1906), 2 vols. Useful books on this and succeeding periods of French history are: Duguit (Léon) et Monnier (Henri), *Les constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789,* based upon official texts and containing an analytical index (1898); Hélie, F. A., *Les constitutions de la France* (1880), contains the texts of the various constitutions and historical notes. E. Pierre, *Histoire des assemblées politiques en France* (1877), covering the years 1789 to 1831, and G. D. Weil, *Les élections législatives depuis 1789* (1895), are useful. Much information, in clear and compact form, on constitutions, electoral laws, liberties, finances, army, navy, education, letters, sciences, and arts, may be found in Rambaud, *Histoire de la civilisation contemporaine en France* (Paris, 1888, 2 vols.); vol. II, 320–724, covers the period from 1814 to 1888.

CHAPTER VI

Revolutions Beyond France

Much the most scholarly and authoritative treatment of the revolutionary movements in the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, and Germany, is Stern, *Geschichte Europas,* vol. IV, chaps. II–VI. The *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. X, and Lavisse et Rambaud, *Histoire générale,* vol. X, have sections on the subjects treated in this chapter; also Debidour, *L'histoire diplomatique,* vol. I, chaps. VII–IX. On Poland, 1815–1830: consult, Orvis, Julia S., *A Brief History of Poland* (1916), chap. VII, the best brief history of Poland in English; Phillips, W. A., *Poland,* chap. VIII; Lewinski-Corwin, E. H., *Political History of Poland* (1917); Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands unter Nikolaus I,* vol. I, chaps. V, VI; vol. II, chap. XII; also Skrine, *Expansion of Russia,* pp. 110–122. The movements in Germany are described in Treitschke, *Deutsche Geschichte,* vol. V, chap. II; in Kaufmann, *Politische Geschichte Deutschlands,*

pp. 170–193; in SYBEL, *The Founding of the German Empire,* vol. I, pp. 82–107. For events in Italy consult, THAYER, *Dawn of Italian Independence,* vol. I, pp. 342–378.

CHAPTER VII

REIGN OF LOUIS PHILIPPE

For sources: see, ANDERSON, *Constitutions and Documents,* No. 105, the constitution of 1830, and No. 106, the electoral law of 1831; ROBINSON and BEARD, *Readings in Modern European History,* vol. II, No. 213, LOUIS BLANC's labor programme. Illustrative extracts from parliamentary speeches are in PELLISON, *Les orateurs politiques de la France de 1830 à nos jours* (1898), pp. 1–208. The most recent, most authoritive and best history of France during this period is by S. CHARLÉTY, *La Monarchie de Juillet,* vol. V in LAVISSE's *Histoire de France Contemporaine* (1921). Provided with valuable bibliographical notes. The most extensive French history of the reign of Louis Philippe is that by THUREAU-DANGIN, *Histoire de la monarchie de juillet,* 7 vols. (1884–1892). Very different in interpretation and emphasis is FOURNIÈRE's *Le règne de Louis Philippe* (JAURÈS, *Histoire Socialiste,* vol. VIII). HILLEBRAND, *Geschichte Frankreichs 1830–1848,* 2 vols. (1877–1879), is a work of value. LOUIS BLANC's *Histoire de dix ans* (1830–1840), 5 vols., is important for the radical movements of the time. See also, STEIN, L., *Geschichte der socialen Bewegung in Frankreich,* 3 vols. (1850). Covers years 1789 to 1849. An admirable treatment of the first five years of the reign is found in STERN, *Geschichte Europas,* vol. IV, chaps. I and XII. A favorable view of the policy of Louis Philippe is given by Professor BOURGEOIS in *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. X, chap. XV, and vol. XI, chap. II. See also BOURGEOIS, *History of Modern France, 1815–1913,* vol. I.

On the history of the Republicans: WEILL, *Histoire du parti républicain,* pp. 33–275, a careful study based upon a large number of pamphlets, memoirs, and newspapers, and containing an excellent bibliography and index. I. TCHERNOFF, *Le parti républicain sous la monarchie de juillet* (1901), shows that the doctrines of the republicans were changing under the stress of new and imperative needs and were not a mere repetition of revolutionary phrases. Carefully documented. OCTAVE FESTY's *Le mouvement ouvrier au début de la monarchie de juillet,* 2 vols. (1908), covers the years 1830–1834, and is an important monograph tracing the growth of

labor organizations and the development of the ideas and programmes of the working class. Debidour, *L'Église et l'État en France,* pp. 413–480, describes the relation of the church and state during the reign. Debidour, *Études critiques sur la Révolution,* etc., has essays on *Louis Philippe émigré* and *Metternich et le gouvernement de juillet.* A. Bardoux, *Guizot* (1894), is a criticism of Guizot as statesman, historian, political orator, critic, and publicist. Other biographies are J. de Crozals, *Guizot;* I. Tchernoff, *Louis Blanc* (1904); E. Zevort, *Thiers* (1892); de Mazade, *Thiers, Cinquante années d'histoire contemporaine* (1884); and Jules Simon, *Thiers, Guizot, Rémusat* (1885).

CHAPTER VIII

Central Europe Between Two Revolutions

For Prussia during this period no very satisfactory history exists. Sybel covers these years briefly in *The Founding of the German Empire,* vol. I, pp. 82–141. The fullest treatment in German is that of Treitschke, *Deutsche Geschichte;* among the important subjects treated are the Zollverein, vol. IV, pp. 350–406; railroads and telegraphs, vol. IV, pp. 581–598; accession and early reign of Frederick William IV, vol. V, pp. 3–60; on dissatisfaction with the reign and general confusion, vol. V, pp. 138–275; on economic conditions, vol. V, pp. 433–523. An English translation of this work is now available. Kaufmann, *Politische Geschichte,* covers this period, pp. 193–218; 273–304. On the Zollverein: see also, B. Rand, *Economic History,* chap. VIII; also W. H. Dawson, *Protection in Germany* (1904), chaps. I and II, the best book in English on German commercial policy, and coming down to the tariff of 1902. Wendell, H. C. M., *The Evolution of Industrial Freedom in Prussia, 1845–1849* (1922), interesting and valuable.

On Austria: see, Springer, *Geschichte Oesterreichs seit dem Wiener Frieden,* Zweiter Theil, pp. 1–134; Leger, L., *A History of Austria-Hungary from the earliest Time to the Year 1889.* Translated by Mrs. B. Hill (1889), chaps. XXVII–XXIX; Whitman, S., *Austria* (Story of the Nations Series), chaps. XXII–XXIII. On Hungary: Eisenmann, L., *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois de 1867, Étude sur le dualisme* (1904), pp. 1–71, contains an excellent survey of the old régime in Hungary, a description of the Hungarian constitution and the relations of Hungary to the Austrian monarchy, and an account of the awakening of the new ideas and the prepara-

tion for revolution; a very valuable monograph, containing a bibliography of the source and secondary material. Florence Arnold Forster, *Deák, A Memoir,* first published anonymously in 1880 with a preface by M. E. Grant Duff, is a very useful biography. On Bohemia: E. Denis, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne-Blanche,* 2 vols. (1903). Vol. II, 675 pp., constitutes probably the best history of Bohemia from 1815 to 1901, detailed and full. Pages 87–231 cover the years 1815 to 1848. Some of the subjects treated are the Czech renaissance, literature, science, the Metternich régime, the growth of the spirit of nationality, the years 1848–1849.

For Italy: Thayer, W. R., *The Dawn of Italian Independence,* vol. I, pp. 379–453; vol. II, pp. 1–76; also the various histories cited above by King, Stillman, Cesaresco, Probyn. L. C. Farini, *The Roman State from 1815–1850,* translated by W. E. Gladstone, 4 vols. (1852). Farini was a Liberal politician opposed to Clericals and Republicans, and generally well informed. R. M. Johnston, *The Roman Theocracy and the Republic, 1846–1849,* pp. 1–112, on the election and early years of the pontificate of Pius IX. Bulle, O., *Die italienische Einheitsidee in ihrer literarischen Entwicklung von Parini bis Manzoni* (Berlin, 1893). A valuable monograph on the early presentation of the ideal of national unity as contained in the writings of Parini and Alfieri, on the intellectual movement during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, mirrored in the works of Monti and Foscolo, and on the patriotic significance of Manzoni's productions. Important as showing the pre-Mazzinian development of the idea of unity. The best biography of Mazzini is that by Bolton King, *Joseph Mazzini* (1902). Pages 1–221 are devoted to a chronological account of Mazzini's life, 222–341 mainly to a presentation of his principal teachings. Includes a bibliography. Myers, F. W. H., *Essays — Modern;* contains an excellent study of Mazzini's life. Some of the works of Mazzini have been translated into English and published in six volumes under the title, *Life and Writings of Joseph Mazzini* (1890–1891). A small collection of *Essays by Joseph Mazzini* has been made by Thomas Okey (1894). There is now being published in Italy a complete collection of Mazzini's writings, *Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini.* This will probably number sixty volumes when completed, will include the vast correspondence of Mazzini, and will inevitably constitute a most important source for the history of Italy during the awakening. There is an interesting essay on Mazzini in W. R. Thayer's *Italica* (1908), and brief popular sketches may be found in J. A. R. Marriott's *Makers of Modern Italy,* and in R. S. Holland's *Builders of United Italy* (1908).

CHAPTER IX

Central Europe in Revolt

Excellent general accounts of the revolutions of 1848–1849 are to be found in Fyffe, *History of Modern Europe,* single volume edition, pp. 707–804, three volume edition, vol. III, pp. 1–148; and in Andrews, *Historical Development of Modern Europe,* vol. I, chaps. IX and X. Maurice, C. E., *The Revolutionary Movement of 1848–1849, in Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, with some Examination of the Previous Thirty-three Years* (1887), contains a great amount of information, poorly presented; also contains a bibliography.

For Austria, the chief authorities are Friedjung, H., *Oesterreich von 1848 bis 1860.* Vol. I covers the period from 1848 to 1851 (1908); Springer, *Geschichte Oesterreichs,* Zweiter Theil, pp. 135–774; Helfert, J. A., *Geschichte Oesterreichs seit 1848.* For Hungary, the most important treatment is Eisenmann, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois,* pp. 75–148. Consult, also, Arnold Forster, *Deák, A Memoir,* pp. 72–112. Kossuth's *Speeches in America,* explaining and defending the Hungarian movement, were edited by F. W. Newman and published in New York in 1854. For Bohemia: Denis, *La Bohème depuis la Montagne-Blanche* (1903), vol. II, pp. 235–381.

For Germany: see, Sybel, *The Founding of the German Empire,* vol. I, pp. 145–492; vol. II, pp. 3–82; Kaufmann, *Politische Geschichte Deutschlands,* chap. V; Matter, P., *La Prusse et la Révolution de 1848* (1903). Veit Valentin, *Die erste deutsche Nationalversammlung* (1919). The best account of the German revolution is in Hans Blum's *Die deutsche Revolution, 1848–49* (1897). A sketch of the attempts to achieve unity before 1848, followed by an account of the revolutionary movements in the several states and of the work of the Frankfort Parliament. Bismarck's opinions on the revolutionary events are in his *Reflections and Reminiscences,* vol. I, chaps. II and III. Vol. I of the *Reminiscences of Carl Schurz* (1907), a revolutionist and refugee, is exceedingly interesting on these years.

For Italy, by far the best account in English is Thayer, *Dawn of Italian Independence,* vol. II, pp. 77–415. On the French expedition against the Roman Republic: see, Bourgeois et Clermont, *Rome et Napoléon III;* also the scholarly and very graphic book of G. M. Trevelyan on *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic* (1907). Chapters I, II, and III give an admirable account of Garibaldi's previous career, and chaps. XII–XVII a description

of his famous retreat. An excellent bibliography is appended. Garibaldi's own account is contained in his *Autobiography,* translated by A. Werner, vol. II, pp. 1–51. On Mazzini's connection with the Republic: see, Bolton King's *Life of Mazzini,* chap. VII.

CHAPTER X

The Second Republic and the Founding of the Second Empire

The Constitution of 1848 may be found in Anderson, *Constitutions and Documents,* No. 110. There are clear accounts of the Second Republic, by Bourgeois, in *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. XI, chap. V, and by Seignobos in Lavisse et Rambaud, *Histoire générale,* vol. XI, chap. I. The most valuable and most critical history of this period is by Charles Seignobos, *La Révolution de 1848 — Le Second Empire (1848–1859)* (1921), being vol. VI in Lavisse's *Histoire de France Contemporaine.* Excellent bibliographies. Other general histories are: Pierre, V., *Histoire de la république de 1848,* 2 vols. (1873–1878), anti-Bonapartist; Gorce, *Histoire de la deuxième république,* 2 vols. (1887), written from the standpoint of sympathy with a liberal monarchy, critical of the republic, and merciless towards socialists and socialistic theories. An admirable counterweight to this is Georges Renard's *La république de 1848 (1848–1852),* vol. IX of *Histoire Socialiste.* Part I, pp. 1–227, is devoted to the political history, Part II, pp. 227–384, to the economic and social evolution. Important for the period are: Debidour, *L'Église et l'État en France,* pp. 481–523 on the expedition to Rome and the Falloux law concerning education; Bourgeois et Clermont, *Rome et Napoléon III* (1907), a study in diplomacy, based upon unpublished official documents as well as upon published material, and showing that the Roman expedition of 1849 prepared the Empire by forming a close alliance between Louis Napoleon, the clergy, and the army; Whitehouse, H. Remsen, *The Life of Lamartine,* 2 vols. (1918), the best biography of Lamartine in English, scholarly, and well-written. Quentin-Bauchart, P., *Lamartine, homme politique,* 2 vols. (1903–1908). E. N. Curtis, *French Assembly of 1848,* a scholarly monograph, studying thoroughly the influence of American example in the making of the French constitution of 1848. Excellent recent studies are: Ferdinand Dreyfus, *L'assistance sous la deuxième république* (1907), 220 pp., a treatment of the question of poverty and an account of

the various measures of social reform passed at this time; Weill, G., *Histoire du parti républicain en France,* chaps. IX and X; I. Tchernoff, *Associations et sociétés secrètes sous la deuxième république, 1848–1851* (1905), 396 pp., a treatise based upon much unpublished material in the archives of the ministries of justice and the interior; aims to show that the *coup d'état* was prepared by the previous systematic destruction of republican organizations; a collection of valuable documents; Marriott, J. A. R., *The French Revolution of 1848 in its Economic Aspect,* 2 vols. (1913), contains reprints (in French) of Louis Blanc's *Organization of Labor* and Emile Thomas' *History of the National Workshops.* I. Tchernoff, *Le parti républicain au Coup d'État et sous le Second Empire* (1906), 676 pp., richly documented, shows that the *coup d'état* was far from being received by the laboring classes with amiable indifference; I. Tchernoff, *Louis Blanc,* 1904; Ténot, E., *The Coup d'État;* Thirria, *Napoléon III avant l'Empire,* 2 vols., is an apology for the Prince President, diffuse, useful as showing the state of public opinion, as the author has industriously ransacked English and French newspaper files; Cheetham, F. H., *Louis Napoleon and the Genesis of the Second Republic; being a Life of the Emperor Napoleon III to the Time of his Election to the Presidency of the French Republic* (1909), is a popular, readable narrative, but adds nothing to our knowledge; Jerrold, *The Life of Napoleon III, Derived from State Records, from Unpublished Family Correspondence, and from Personal Testimony,* 4 vols. (1871–1874), is sympathetic and full; Forbes, A., *Life of Napoleon III,* is popular, superficial, untrustworthy; H. A. L. Fisher, *Bonapartism, Six Lectures Delivered in the University of London* (1908), is popular and brilliantly written, attempts to show the essential unity of the two Napoleonic régimes, more interesting and suggestive than convincing; Pellisson, *Les orateurs politiques,* pp. 209–277, contains interesting extracts from parliamentary speeches. Alvin R. Calman's two volumes on *Ledru-Rollin* treat at length the career of that Radical.

For the Second Empire, the leading secondary authority is Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire,* 7 vols. (1894–1905), the fullest and ablest history we have of the period from 1850 to 1871, very important, not only for the history of France, but of Italy and Germany also. Presents a wealth of information with great lucidity, admirable impartiality, and largeness of view. Vols. I, pp. 1–131, and II, pp. 1–129, cover the field of this chapter. Charles Seignobos in Lavisse, *Histoire de France contemporaine,* vols. 6 and 7, fresh, informing, critical, of the first importance. Taxile Delord, *Histoire du Second Empire,* 6 vols. (1869–1875), an older work,

based on careful research, strongly opposed to the Empire. Albert Thomas, *Le Second Empire (Histoire Socialiste,* vol. X), very instructive; see chaps. I and II. There is no satisfactory account of the Second Empire in English. Chapters I and IV in vol. II of Andrews, *Historical Development of Modern Europe,* are clear and well-balanced, but necessarily restricted. See, also, *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. XI, chap. X. For the history of the relations of church and state: see, Debidour, *L'Église et l'État en France,* pp. 524–550; for history of the republican party: Weill, *Histoire du parti républicain,* chaps. XI–XIII; I. Tchernoff, *Le parti républicain au Coup d'État et sous le Second Empire;* for description of the political system of the autocratic Empire: H. Berton, *L'évolution constitutionelle du Second Empire* (1900). Part I treats of the despotic empire and the constitution of 1852. A very important monograph. For labor and social questions and movements: Weill, G., *Histoire du mouvement social en France, 1852–1902* (1905), chaps. I–III.

CHAPTER XI

Cavour and the Creation of the Kingdom of Italy

The general histories of Italy on this period are: King, *A History of Italian Unity,* 2 vols., the most extensive and informing history in English, thoroughly documented. Vol. I, pp. 353–416, and all of vol. II concern the period of this chapter; Cesaresco, *The Liberation of Italy,* pp. 165–415, written with much charm, sympathy, and understanding, but without scientific apparatus; Stillman, *The Union of Italy,* pp. 242–325; Probyn, *Italy 1815–1890,* pp. 159–242. There is an excellent chapter in Walpole's *History of Twenty-five Years,* vol. I, pp. 206–308. Much the best account of Napoleon III's Italian policy and of the war of 1859 is in Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire,* vol. II, pp. 211–449, and vol. III, pp. 1–123; and on the annexations, *Ibid.* vol. III, pp. 125–212, a treatment marked by admirable lucidity, keenness of analysis, solidity of judgment, and sustained interest of narration. For Cavour see Thayer, W. R., *The Life and Times of Cavour,* 2 vols (1911), the best biography of Cavour in any language, brilliantly written. A masterly and authoritative work. Cesaresco, *Cavour* (1898), a brief biography of unusual merits, well-informed, just to the other figures of the time as well as to Cavour, epigrammatic, full of color and life. Countess Cesaresco traces the shifting diplomacy of the period with precision and comprehension. Her chapters

on the internal reforms in Piedmont and her revelation of Cavour's activity between the interview of Plombières and April 1859 are admirable. William de la Rive, *Le Comte de Cavour, Récits et Souvenirs* (Paris, 1862), an intimate portrait by a close personal friend. This has been translated into English by Edward Romilly (London, 1862), but the French edition is preferable. D. Berti, *Il Conte di Cavour avanti il 1848* (1886), important. Villari in his *Studies, Critical and Historical* (London, 1907), has a chapter on the youth of Cavour (pp. 119–141). D. Zanichelli, *Cavour* (1905), a solid study by a professor in the University of Pisa. N. Bianchi, *La politique du Comte de Cavour de 1852 à 1861, Lettres inédites,* 419 pp. (1885), is an important collection of over two hundred letters of Cavour to Marquis Emmanuel d'Azeglio, the ambassador of Piedmont to England during the period. Treitschke, *Cavour,* in vol. III of his *Historische und Politische Aufsätze,* a study first published in 1869, and Kraus, F. X., *Cavour, Die Erhebung Italiens im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert,* with bibliography and illustrations (1902), may also be consulted; see, also, Mazade, *Le Comte de Cavour* (1877). The parliamentary speeches of Cavour have been published in 12 vols., *Discorsi parlementari* (1863–1874), and Chiala, L., has edited his correspondence, *Lettere edite ed inedite di Camillo Cavour,* 2nd edit. (1883–1887), 10 vols. Chiala's extensive introductions and notes in these volumes are of great value. See, also, Bert, A., *Nouvelles lettres inédites de Cavour* (1889). Brief essays on Cavour are found in Marriott's *Makers of Modern Italy,* and in Holland's *Builders of United Italy.* Lord Acton has a suggestive essay on Cavour, first published in 1861, and reprinted in 1907, in his *Historical Essays and Studies,* chap. VI. W. R. Thayer compares Cavour and Bismarck in the *Atlantic Monthly,* March 1909; same article, *Fortnightly Review,* March and April 1909. Nigra, *Cavour and Madame de Circourt* (1894), contains some unpublished letters from the years 1836–1860. P. Matter, *Cavour et l'Unité Italienne,* 3 vols., in process of publication. One volume was published in 1923; by a well-known French biographer. Cadogan's *Life of Cavour* is worthless.

On Garibaldi the most recent work is G. M. Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Thousand* (1909), an account of the Sicilian expedition, and *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy* (1911), an account of the conquest of the mainland. These, with the work already cited by the same author on *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic,* constitute the most scholarly account, in English, of Garibaldi's career. Their literary merit is high. Each volume contains a critical bibliography. W. R. Thayer's *Throne Makers* (1899) has a spirited essay on Garibaldi. H. R. Whitehouse, *Collapse of the Kingdom*

of Naples (1899), gives a brief survey of affairs in Naples down to 1848, describes the reaction of the years 1850–1859, and then the catastrophe of 1860; an excellent book.

On the Papacy: see, R. de Cesare, *The Last Days of Papal Rome (1850–1870)*, translated by Helen Zimmern, with an introduction by G. M. Trevelyan (Boston, 1909). *The Birth of Modern Italy* (1909) consists of the posthumous papers of Jessie White Mario, edited by the Duke Litta-Visconti-Arese; interesting for the careers of Mazzini and Garibaldi whose friend Madame Mario was; unjust toward Cavour; full of the emotion of the Risorgimento — at least of the republican agitation. Della Rocca, *The Autobiography of a Veteran* (1898), is an interesting narrative by an important participant in events from 1848 to 1870.

The most elaborate Italian histories of the Risorgimento are: Tivaroni, C., *Storia critica del risorgimento d'Italia* (Turin, 1888–1897), 9 vols.; and, Bersezio, V., *Il regno di Vittorio Emanuele II; Trent' anni di vita italiana* (Turin, 1878–1895), 8 vols.

CHAPTER XII

Bismarck and German Unity

There is no satisfactory work in English on the founding of the German Empire. Ward, A. W., *Germany, 1815–1890*, 3 vols., is accurate, judicial and dry. Malleson's *The Refounding of the German Empire, 1848–1871* (1893), is brief and concerned chiefly with military events. The articles in the *Cambridge Modern History* are unsatisfactory. Walpole, *History of Twenty-Five Years*, vol. II, chaps. X and XIII, is straightforward, informing, concerned mainly with diplomacy. Sybel's *The Founding of the German Empire by William I*, 7 vols. (1890–1898), is a monumental work, based chiefly upon Prussian state documents, to which he alone was allowed access by Bismarck. While a work of remarkable industry and erudition, it is a thorough-going defense and panegyric of the conduct of the Prussian Government. Moreover, in many important matters it is not subject to effective control. Zwiedeneck-Südenhorst's *Deutsche Geschichte von der Auflösung des alten bis zur Errichtung des neuen Kaiserreichs, 1806–1871*, 3 vols. (1905), is characterized by much the same partisanship, as is also Ottokar Lorenz's *Kaiser Wilhelm und die Begründung des Reichs, 1866–1871* (Jena, 1902). On the other hand, the German scholarship which commands greater respect abroad as more critical and objective

is that of Marcks, Lenz, Delbrück, Meinecke, who are adhering to the Ranke traditions of historical writing. H. Friedjung's *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland,* is by an Austrian scholar and covers the years 1859–1866, 2 vols. (1898). It is the most important treatment we have of the relations of Prussia and Austria on the critical years before 1866. Contains also an excellent account of the Austro-Prussian war. The work is already in its seventh edition. One of the most brilliant and suggestive books on this period is by E. Denis, *La fondation de l'empire allemand* (1906), a study covering the years 1850 to 1870, limited to a single series of facts, those which prepared and which explain the foundation of the German Empire. Large space is given to the evolution of ideas and to the economic transformation. The book is marked by profound and wide investigation, by penetration and subtlety of characterization, by an admirable impartiality. It contains no references, footnotes, or bibliography.

The literature on Bismarck is very extensive and is constantly expanding. His speeches have been published by Koiil, *Die politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck,* 14 vols. (1892–1905). There is an excellent selection in two small volumes, sold cheaply, entitled, *Otto von Bismarck, Setzen wir Deutschland in den Sattel, Reden aus der grossen Zeit,* edited by Eugen Kalkschmidt (1907). A smaller collection is that of Otto Lyon, *Bismarcks Reden und Briefe* (Leipsic, 1895). Professor Hermann Schoenfeld has published a collection entitled *Bismarck's Speeches and Letters* (in German, 1905). *The Correspondence of William I and Bismarck, with Other Letters from and to Prince Bismarck,* translated by J. A. Ford, 2 vols. (1903), consists of about five hundred letters selected by Bismarck himself, to show his relationship to the Emperor and also to authenticate and supplement his *Reminiscences* in certain respects. *Prince Bismarck's Letters to His Wife, His Sister and Others, from 1844 to 1870,* translated by F. Maxse (New York, 1878), are vivacious and entertaining.

Bismarck's *Reflections and Reminiscences,* 2 vols. (1899), are important but must be used with caution. For criticism of them, see, Erich Marcks' *Fürst Bismarcks Gedanken und Erinnerungen; Versuch einer kritischen Würdigung* (1899); also Max Lenz, *Zur Kritik der Gedanken und Erinnerungen des Fürsten Bismarck* (1899); Friedrich Meinecke, in *Historische Zeitschrift,* Band 82, pp. 282–295; Sorel, *Études de littérature et d'histoire* (1901). On the new Bismarck historiography (writings of Busch, Blume, Bamberger, etc.), see, Hans Delbrück, in *Preussische Jahrbücher,* Band 96, pp. 461–480 (June, 1899). There are many biographies of Bismarck.

The best in English is that by Robertson, C. G., *Bismarck* (1919), appreciative, yet critical. Contains a very useful bibliography. Headlam, J. W., *Bismarck* (1899), briefer but well informed and judicial. Munroe Smith, *Bismarck and German Unity* (1898), is a clear epitome, with a slight bibliography. In French, P. Matter, *Bismarck et son temps,* 3 vols. (1905–1908), full, critical, remarkably impartial, and very readable. In German, Max Lenz, *Geschichte Bismarcks* (1902), compact and critical; Erich Marcks, *Bismarck, Eine Biographie.* The first volume appeared in 1909 and was entitled *Bismarcks Jugend, 1815–1848.* One may hazard the conjecture that this, when completed, will be the most satisfactory biography in German. Ed. Heyck, *Bismarck* in *Monographien zur Weltgeschichte,* is interestingly illustrated. Erich Marcks' *Kaiser Wilhelm I* (5th edition, 1905) is admirable in knowledge, criticism, and temper, an indispensable book both by reason of its presentation and interpretation of the Emperor's career and his relations to others, especially to Bismarck, and also because of its critical bibliography.

A clear account of the Danish and Austro-Prussian wars may be found in Murdock, *The Reconstruction of Europe* (1894), chaps. XV–XXI. Hozier, H. M., *Seven Weeks' War,* is readable, founded on letters written from Bohemia to the London *Times,* well supplied with maps and plans. Sybel's account of the war of 1866 is in vol. V, *The Founding of the German Empire.* See, also, Friedjung, *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft,* vols. I–II, and Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire,* vol. IV, pp. 522–631; vol. V, pp. 1–80.

CHAPTER XIII

The Transformation of the Second Empire

The most recent account, well-informed, fresh and critical, is Seignobos, *Le Déclin de l'Empire et l'Etablissement de la 3^e^ République* (1859–1875), being vol. VII in Lavisse, *Histoire de France Contemporaine.* A valuable account of the transformation of the Second Empire between 1860 and 1870 is in Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire,* vol. III, livre XXII, and vols. IV and V. Ollivier, Emile, *L'Empire Libéral,* 17 vols. (1895–1915), an elaborate personal apology under the guise of a history of the period, full of detail, conversations, notes, etc. Interesting and informing but needs to be controlled. Berton, H., *L'évolution constitutionelle du Second Empire* (1900), parts two and three, is full and trustworthy; an important monograph by a French lawyer. For the growth of

the republican party: Weill, *Histoire du parti républicain,* chaps. XII–XV; Tchernoff, *Le parti républicain au Coup d'Etat et sous le Second Empire.* For labor movements: Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social,* chaps. III–VI; for relations with the church: Debidour, *L'Église et l'État en France,* pp. 551–627.

CHAPTER XIV

The Franco-German War

Palat, *Bibliographie générale de la guerre de 1870–1871* (1896), is indispensable for any detailed study of this period. There is a good account of the causes of the war in Rose, *Development of European Nations,* vol. I, chap. I; also in Walpole, *History of Twenty-five Years,* vol. II, chap. VIII; Robertson, *Bismarck,* chap. V; Headlam, *Bismarck,* chap. XIII. Vols. VI and VII of Sybel's *Founding of the German Empire* contain an elaborate account of the events and diplomacy of the period; pronounced special pleading. These volumes have not the value of the earlier ones, as Bismarck did not allow the author access to the Prussian archives for the period after 1867. The seventh volume was composed under the inspiration of Bismarck himself, and is based on information largely furnished by him. Delbrück says it is "not history but diplomacy — and calculated to inspire laughter at that." (Delbrück, *Das Geheimniss der Napoleonischen Politik,* p. 34.) Bismarck's description is in his *Reflections and Reminiscences,* chaps. XX–XXIII. Far the most judicial, as well as most interesting account of the causes of the war and of the war itself (down to Sedan) is in Gorce's *Histoire du Second Empire,* vols. VI and VII, volumes of absorbing interest, clear, vivid, admirably arranged, and written with scrupulous fairness. Two hundred pages of vol. VI are given to the Hohenzollern candidacy. An earlier but very able study is Sorel, A., *Histoire diplomatique de la guerre franco-allemande,* 2 vols. (1875). Ollivier's *L'Empire libéral,* 17 vols, (1895–1915), is an elaborate account of the Empire by one who was badly compromised by the war. On the bearing upon the fall of the Empire of Napoleon's relations to the Pope, Bourgeois et Clermont, *Rome et Napoléon III,* is important. The authors' thesis is that Napoleon's refusal to withdraw his troops from Rome occasioned the failure of the projected triple alliance with Italy and Austria, and that that was the cause of the subsequent disasters. See, also, Debidour, *L'Église et l'État en France,* pp. 551–627.

Debidour's account of the diplomacy of the period is found in his *Histoire diplomatique,* vol. II, chaps. VII–X. The numerous biographies of Bismarck, cited above, should be consulted; also Marcks, *Kaiser Wilhelm I.* Lord Acton has a study of the causes of the Franco-Prussian war in his *Historical Essays and Studies* (1907), chap. VII.

Of the war itself there is a good account in Rose, *Development of the European Nations,* vol. I, chaps. II, III, and IV; also in Murdock, *Reconstruction of Europe,* chaps. XXIII–XXX. The most recent account is that given by Seignobos, in *Le Déclin de l'Empire,* pp. 209–314, in Lavisse, *Histoire de France Contemporaine,* vol. VII. Gen. J. F. Maurice, *The Franco-German War,* is a translation of a German work, edited by Pflugk-Hartung, entitled *Krieg und Sieg* (1896); Col. L. Hale's *The People's War in France* (1904) is founded on Hönig, *Der Volkskrieg an der Loire,* and describes the latter part of the war, after Sedan. Moltke, *The Franco-German War* is important but technical. Chuquet, *La guerre de 1870–1871* (1895), is an excellent account in a single volume. The extensive histories by the German General Staff and by Lehautcourt are too detailed and technical for general use. Probably the best account for the general reader is Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire,* vol. VI, pp. 321–434, and VII throughout (comes down to September 4, 1870). E. B. Washburne, *Recollections of a Minister to France,* 2 vols. (1887), a very interesting and important book by the United States Minister to France, the only foreign minister who remained at his post in Paris throughout the Franco-German war, and whose firm conduct won the praise of William I, Bismarck, Gambetta, and Thiers. There was published by the Government Printing Office, 1878, Senate Executive Document No. 24, a book of 222 pages entitled *Franco-German War and the Insurrection of the Commune. Correspondence of E. B. Washburne.* This includes the correspondence of Washburne with the State Department in Washington in relation to the war, together with correspondence with Bismarck, Bancroft, United States Minister to Berlin, and Motley, United States Minister to London. The letters cover the period from July 19, 1870, to June 29, 1871. Interesting volumes are Busch, *Bismarck in the Franco-German War* (1879); A. Forbes, *My Experiences in the War Between France and Germany* (1872); W. H. Russell, *My Diary During the Last Great War* (1874); *Bismarck's Letters to His Wife from the Seat of War (1870–1871),* translated by A. Harder (1903); *Diaries of Emperor Frederick, During the Compaigns of 1866 and 1870–1871,* translated by F. A. Welby (1902); Henry Labouchere, *Diary of the Besieged Resident in Paris* (1871); Sir Edwin Arnold,

Inside Paris During the Siege (1871); Jules Claretie, *Paris assiégé;* F. Sarcey, *Le siège de Paris.* This attained its thirtieth edition within its first year. See Thiers, *Notes et Souvenirs,* on the years 1870–1873 (1903), for an account of Thiers' attempts to secure the intervention of foreign powers. Raymond, Dora Neill, *British Policy and Opinion during the Franco-Prussian War* (1921), illuminating and extremely well-written. Gaston May, *Le Traité de Francfort* (1909). The most important study of the subject.

CHAPTER XV

The Rise of Socialism

Thomas Kirkup, *A History of Socialism* (5th edit., 1913); R. C. K. Ensor, *Modern Socialism, as set forth by Socialists in their Speeches, Writings and Programmes* (3rd edit., 1910); S. P. Orth, *Socialism and Democracy in Europe* (1913); John Spargo, *Socialism; a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles* (ed. 1909); O. D. Skelton, *A Critical Examination of Socialism* (1907); V. G. Simkhovitch, *Marxism versus Socialism* (1913); W. G. Walling, *Socialism as it is: A Survey of the World-wide Revolutionary Movement* (1912); J. R. Macdonald, *The Socialist Movement* (1911); John Rae, *Contemporary Socialism* (4th ed., 1908); Morris Hillquit, *Socialism in Theory and Practice* (1909); M. Beer, *A History of British Socialism,* 2 vols. (1919–20); Karl Marx, *Capital: a Critique of Political Economy,* Eng. trans., 3 vols. (1906–1909); John Spargo, *Karl Marx, His Life and Work* (1910); Edward Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism: a Criticism and an Affirmation* (1909); and (same author) *Ferdinand Lassalle as a Social Reformer* (1893); Frank Podmore, *Robert Owen, a Biography,* 2 vols. (1906).

CHAPTER XVI

The German Empire under William I

The fullest account of this period in English is Dawson, W. H., *The German Empire, 1867–1914,* 2 vols. (1919). See also Barker, J. E., *Modern Germany* (1915), informing on the industrial side of German development; Ward, A. W., *Germany, 1815–1890,* vol III. Useful brief accounts are to be found in Schevill, F., *The Making of Modern Germany,* pp. 99–206, and Priest, G. M., *Germany since*

1740, pp. 124–184. Fife, R. H., *The German Empire between Two Wars* (1916), has sections on the Empire Abroad, The Empire at Home, The Empire's Problems, etc. Lichtenberger, H., *Germany and its Evolution in Modern Times* (1913), treats particularly cultural history; K. Helfferich, *Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth: 1888–1913* (1915); F. A. Ogg, *Economic Development of Modern Europe* (1917). The treatment in Andrews, *Contemporary Europe, Asia and Africa,* is excellent. That in Rose, *Development of European Nations,* vol. I, chap. VI, and vol. II, chap. I, is slight; that in Headlam, *Bismarck,* pp. 377–463, good. See also Robertson, C. G., *Bismarck.* Lowell, A. L., *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe,* vol. II., chap. VII, gives a clear outline of party history from 1871 to 1894. An extensive account is H. Blum, *Das deutsche Reich zur Zeit Bismarcks,* covering the years 1871–1890 (1893), a book largely inspired by Bismarck himself. Oncken's *Das Zeitalter des Kaisers Wilhelm I,* vol. II, pp. 369–768, 952–1005, comes down to 1888. Bulle, *Geschichte der Jahre 1871–1877,* is useful. Kaufmann, *Politische Geschichte Deutschlands,* covers the period from 1870–1888 very poorly. One of the most useful and readable accounts is in Matter, *Bismarck et son temps,* vol. III, a book based on wide and careful investigation, impartial in tone, an interesting narrative. The writings of Marcks and Lenz, cited above, should be used. F. Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879–1914,* 2 vols. (1920); A. C. Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance* (1917); Singer, *Geschichte des Dreibundes,* all important for the Triple Alliance. See also Gooch, *History of Modern Europe, 1878–1919* (1923), ch. II. J. V. Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith,* 1922. Treats Bismarck's diplomacy during the Bulgarian crisis of 1885–1887. A monograph of high quality, with an annotated bibliography. Bismarck's *Reflections and Reminiscences,* vol. II, chaps. XXIV–XXXIII, concern the period 1871–1888. The *Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst,* 2 vols. (1906), are of importance. Hohenlohe was head of the Bavarian ministry 1866–1870, German ambassador to Paris 1874–1885, and Chancellor of the Empire 1894–1900. The *Memoirs* throw light upon the relations between the South German States and the North German Confederation, upon the conflict with the Roman Catholic Church, and upon French politics from 1874 to 1885. Of slight importance for the period after 1890. Bülow, *B.* von, *Imperial Germany.* By the man who was German Chancellor from 1900–1909. Describes Germany's foreign and domestic policies between 1888 and 1913 from the official point of view (Trans. 1914).

On the Kulturkampf: Hahn, *Geschichte des Kulturkampfes;* on

Social Democracy: E. Milhaud, *La Démocratie socialiste allemande* (1903); Kirkup, *History of Socialism* (1906), chaps. V, VII, IX (contains Erfurt programme in full, pp. 223–229); Werner Sombart, *Socialism* (1898); A. Schaeffle, *The Quintessence of Socialism;* W. H. Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism* (1891); on protection: W. H. Dawson, *Protection in Germany, A History of German Fiscal Policy During the Nineteenth Century* (1904), the best book in English on the subject, coming down to the tariff of 1902; on state insurance: F. W. Lewis, *State Insurance,* chap. IV (Boston, 1909); also, J. G. Brooks, *Compulsory Insurance in Germany;* Ludwig Lass, *German Workmen's Insurance;* on government; Krüger, F. K., *Government and Politics of the German Empire* (1915), serviceable handbook; Ogg, F. A., *The Governments of Europe* (1913), chaps. IX–XIV; Joseph Barthélemy, *Les Institutions de l'Allemagne contemporaine* (1915); B. E. Howard, *The German Empire* (1906), an exhaustive account of the structure of the imperial government, not a description of the manner in which it worked, a juridical rather than an historical study; Lowell, *Governments and Parties,* chaps. V, VI, VII, an account of both structure and operation of imperial and state governments; Combes de Lestrade, *Les monarchies de l'empire allemand, organisation constitutionelle et administrative* (1904); probably the best, most complete account of German governments, imperial and state; describes the powers and functions of sovereigns, chambers, ministers, communes, financial and judicial systems, etc.; Charles Borgeaud, *The Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions in Europe and America,* translated by C. D. Hazen (1895), pp. 47–78. Kloeppel, P., *Dreissig Jahre deutscher Verfassungsgeschichte, 1867–1897;* vol. I (1900) covers period to 1877; Laband, P., *Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches,* 4 vols. (4th edit., 1901), a very important work on German public law. Has been translated into French. A most informing book on Germany before the War is W. H. Dawson's *The Evolution of Modern Germany* (1908), a book that aims to trace the economic and social transformation of Germany, her industrial and colonial expansion, the growth of socialism, etc. Mary Evelyn Townsend, *Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871–1885* (1921), is a thorough, careful, scholarly monograph on an important subject. A useful recent book is Clapham, J. H., *The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815–1914* (1921). See, also, E. D. Howard, *The Recent Industrial Progress of Germany* (1907); "Veritas," *The German Empire of To-day* (1902); Eltzbacher, O. (or J. Ellis Barker), *Modern Germany, Her Political and Economic Problems* (1905).

CHAPTER XVII

Germany under William II

W. H. Dawson, *The German Empire, 1867–1914,* 2 vols. (1919). Vol. II, pp. 261–502, treats of the reign of William II. Best account in English. G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe, 1878–1919* (1923), ch. 6, good short account. Bismarck, *The Kaiser versus Bismarck* (1921), being the third volume of Bismarck's autobiography, gives the Chancellor's account of his dismissal and the causes leading up to it. G. M. Priest, *Germany Since 1740* (1914), pp. 146–184, and F. Schevill, *The Making of Modern Germany* (1916), pp. 178–206, contain brief accounts of the reign. C. Gauss, *The German Emperor as Shown in his Public Utterances* (1915), is useful. Emile Laloy, *La Diplomatie de Guillaume II* (1917), covers the period from 1888 to 1914. W. Martin, *La Crise politique de l'Allemagne Contemporaine* (1913), penetrating criticism. Maurice Muret, *L'Orgeuil allemand,* admirable study of a prominent aspect of German national psychology; also (same author), *L'Évolution belliqueuse de Guillaume II* (1917), excellent survey. A good German history is Fritz Hartung, *Deutsche Geschichte von 1870 bis 1914* (1920), pp. 141–293, devoted to the reign of William II. A. Hurd and H. Castle, *German Sea Power* (1913), describes the growth of the German navy. Schmitt, *England and Germany* (1916), and Seymour, *Diplomatic Background of the War* (1916), have excellent chapters on phases of recent German history. See also Beyens, *L'Allemagne avant la guerre* (1915). English translation (1916).

William II, *My Memories* (1922) and *Comparative History* (1922), are two volumes issuing from the former Emperor since the war and designed for self-vindication; of mediocre value.

CHAPTER XVIII

The Third Republic

There is no satisfactory history of the Third Republic in English. Wright, C. H. C., *A History of the Third French Republic* (1916), is a brief account, coming down to 1914. Lowell, *Governments and Parties,* chap. II, has a clear outline of party history down to 1896. Coubertin, *Evolution of the Third Republic,* is not always clear, presupposes some knowledge of the subject, contains chapters on education, the army, literature, socialism; is poorly

translated. F. Lawton, *The Third French Republic* (1909), covers in a superficial way the years 1871–1906, and has entertaining chapters on literature, science, art, education, the parliamentary system. W. G. Berry, *France since Waterloo* (1909), devotes pages 249–368 to the years 1871–1908. An excellent single volume in French is M. Lhéritier, *La France depuis 1870* (1923). A work of great importance, detailed, authoritative, and brilliantly written is Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, 4 vols. (1903–1909), covering the years 1871–1882, a full narrative, abounding in vivid and instructive accounts of men and events. The best history of the Third Republic is contained in vols. VII, VIII and IX of Lavisse, *Histoire de France Contemporaine* (1921), volumes by Seignobos, Bidou, and Gauvain. Zevort, E., *Histoire de la Troisième République*, 4 vols. (1896–1901), covers the years 1870–1894, a useful narrative, full of detail, fair, careful, pleasantly written. Labusquière, *La Troisième République, 1871–1900*, is vol. XII of Jaurès, *Histoire Socialiste*. F. T. Marzials, *Life of Léon Gambetta*, in the Statesmen Series (London, 1890), is a brief account. Two excellent biographies of Gambetta, by Deschanel and Stannard, have recently appeared. Charles de Mazade, *Monsieur Thiers, Cinquante années d'histoire contemporaine* (1884), is an interesting book. More important is the life of *Jules Ferry* by Alfred Rambaud (Paris, 1903), a biography of a forceful and far-sighted statesman, a founder of the Republic, written by a trained historian. See, also, Henry Leyret, *Waldeck-Rousseau et la Troisième République, 1869–1899*.

On protection: see H. O. Meredith, *Protection in France;* on labor and social movements: G. Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social en France, 1852–1902* (1905), pp. 133–472, with bibliography; on diplomatic history: Hippeau, *Histoire diplomatique de la Troisième République* (1888); A. Tardieu, *France and the Alliances* (1908); Billot, M. A., *La France et l'Italie, Histoire des années troubles* (1905); the author was French ambassador in Rome, and treats of the period between 1881 and 1899 — useful for French history, also for Italian; on colonial expansion: Levasseur, *La France et ses colonies*, 3 vols. (1889); L. Vignon, *L'expansion de la France* (1891), and by the same author, *Les colonies françaises, leur commerce, leur situation économique, leur utilité pour la métropole, leur avenir* (1886), containing a description of the different French colonies; Dubois et Terrier, *Les colonies françaises: un siècle d'expansion coloniale, 1800–1900* (1902); on the Dreyfus case: Reinach, J., *Histoire de l'affaire Dreyfus*, 7 vols., 1901–1911; also by Dreyfus himself, *Five Years of My Life* (1901); Steevens, *The Tragedy of Dreyfus* (1899).

On state and church: Arthur Galton, *Church and State in France, 1300–1907*, pp. 201–268. Of the first importance is Debidour, A., *L'Église Catholique et l'État sous la Troisième République, 1870–1906*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1906–1909). Vol. I covers the period 1870–1889; vol. II, 1889–1906; the fullest account concerning the separation of Church and State to be found is in vol. II, pp. 231–498; excellent bibliographies; many important documents, including the law of April 13, 1908, modifying certain articles of the law of December 9, 1905. See, also, Briand, A., *La Séparation des Églises et de l'État. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Chambre des Députés, suivi des pièces annexes* (1905). On the government of France, an excellent description in English is Lowell's *Governments and Parties*, chaps. I and II. This is far superior to Bodley, J. S. C., *France*, 2 vols. (1898), a pretentious book which, with much information, is dominated by the melancholy thesis that parliamentary government is unsuccessful in France, because it is not the same as parliamentary government in England. The book contains many other preconceptions, more entertaining than important. Lebon and Pelet, *France as It Is* (1888), is a useful book. George, W. L., *France in the Twentieth Century* (1909), contains chapters on the political institutions, relations of church and state, socialism, trades-unionism, colonies, education, etc. On Catholic Church and labor questions, Parker T. Moon, *The Labor Problem and the Social Catholic Movement* (1921). A penetrating analysis of the French mind and character is W. C. Brownell's *French Traits* (1889). See also Barrett Wendell, *The France of Today* (1907). Useful collections of the constitutions of France are: Duguit et Monnier, *Les constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789* (2nd edit., 1908); Hélie, F. A., *Les constitutions de la France* (1880). Professor F. M. Anderson has rendered an important service to students by translating many of the important documents in the history of nineteenth century France in his *Constitutions and Documents* (2nd edit., revised and enlarged, 1909). Pellisson, *Les orateurs politiques de la France de 1830 à nos jours*, pp. 381–434; contains extracts illustrating the history of the Third Republic from 1871 to 1889. Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (1921), vol. I, pp. 208–326, a weighty discussion of French democracy and institutions; Jacques, Léon, *Les partis politiques sous la troisième république* (1912); Barthélemy, J., *Le gouvernement de la France* (1919), best brief description in French of the government of the Third Republic. The best account in English is Sait, E. M., *Government and Politics of France* (1921), excellent in every way. Important books on the foreign policies

and diplomatic history are, besides Debidour and Bourgeois already cited: G. H. Stuart, *French Foreign Policy, 1898–1914;* Pinon, René, *France et Allemagne (1870–1913)*, (1913); Tardieu, André, *La Conférence d'Algésiras* (1909), and *Le Mystère d'Agadir* (1912); Albin, P., *D'Agadir à Serajevo (1911–1914)*, (1915); Pribram, *Secret Treaties,* vol. II; Elie de Cyon, *Histoire de l'entente franco-russe;* Freycinet, *Souvenirs,* 2 vols.

CHAPTER XIX

The Kingdom of Italy

The literature on this period of Italian history is not extensive. Stillman's history may be used; pages 358 to 393 cover the years 1871 to 1886. Lowell's account of party history down to 1896 is clear and his description of the political institutions adequate, *Governments and Parties,* vol. I, chaps. III and IV. See also Ogg, F. A., *Governments of Europe,* chaps. XIX–XXI. Stillman's *Francesco Crispi* (1899) and Justin McCarthy's *Pope Leo XIII* (1896) are useful biographies. A. Billot, *La France et l'Italie, 1881–1899,* 2 vols. (1905), a book by a former French ambassador to Italy. For conditions in Italy before the war: see, King and Okey, *Italy To-day* (2nd edit., 1909); W. R. Thayer, *Italica* (1908), containing an essay on "Thirty Years of Italian Progress," and one on "Italy in 1907"; Ed. Driault, *Les problèmes politiques et sociaux à la fin du XIX^e^ siècle* (1900), chap. II, La question romaine: le pape, le roi, le peuple.

Other books descriptive of Italy before the Great War are: R. Bagot, *The Italians of Today* (1912); Borghese (G.), *L'Italie moderne* (1913); A. Dauzat, *L'Italie nouvelle;* R. F. Foerster, *The Italian Emigration of War Times* (1919); E. Lémonon, *L'Italie économique et sociale, 1861–1912* (1913); F. M. Underwood, *United Italy* (1912). On expansion, see W. K. Wallace, *Greater Italy* (1917).

The *Encyclopedia Americana* contains more than thirty articles, mostly by Italian specialists, on various Italian institutions and conditions.

CHAPTER XX

Austria-Hungary Since 1849

On Austria and Hungary, there is very little that is important in English. Leger, L., *History of Austria-Hungary* (1889), chaps. XXXIII–XXXVIII, is probably the most satisfactory treatment. Whitman, S., *Austria* (Story of the Nations Series), gives a brief account of the period from 1815 to 1898, pp. 308–381. *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. XI, chap. XV, contains an account of the reaction and reorganization in Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation, by Professor Friedjung, of the University of Vienna. Consult, also, *Ibid.,* chap. XVI. Seignobos, *Europe Since 1814,* has useful chapters. Vámbéry, A., *The Story of Hungary,* 1886, pp. 400–440. Florence Arnold Forster, *Francis Deák, A Memoir,* first published anonymously (1880), is important for the period 1840 to 1876. Sir Horace Rumbold's *Francis Joseph and His Times* (1909) is an interesting and vivid account of this reign. The author was long British ambassador at Vienna. His book is useful, though frequently superficial and biased. Rumbold has, however, made much use of the solid works of Friedjung. A brief biography is René Pinon's *François-Joseph, Essai d'histoire psychologique* (1917).

The most important work on Austria after 1848 is H. Friedjung, *Oesterreich von 1848 bis 1860* (1908–1912). Vol. I, *Die Jahre der Revolution und der Reform, 1848–1851,* comes down to end of 1851; vol. II down through 1856. L. Eisenmann, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois,* is very valuable: on the period of reaction, 1849–1859, see pp. 149–203; on the various attempts at constitution-making, the struggle over the unitary and federal principles, see *Ibid.,* pp. 207–399. See, also, *Deák, A Memoir,* passim; A. de Bertha, *La Hongrie moderne, de 1849 à 1901* (Paris, 1901), a book by a native of Hungary, laudatory of men and things Hungarian, yet well-informed and useful. Chap. I describes Hungary under Austrian absolutism, 1849–1859; chap. II, Hungary under the provisional schemes, 1859–1865. H. Friedjung, *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland,* is invaluable for the period 1859–1866. On the making of the Ausgleich, 1865–1867: see, Eisenmann, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois,* pp. 403–657; Forster, *Deák, A Memoir,* pp. 113–322; Bertha, *La Hongrie moderne,* chap. III, pp. 83–160; see, also, Bertha, *La constitution hongroise* (Paris, 1898), a good outline and description containing chapters on the laws of 1848, on the attempts at centralization, on dualism, on Croatia, the nationalities, develop-

ment from 1867–1897; see, also, M. G. Horn, *Le compromis de 1868 entre la Hongrie et la Croatie* (Paris, 1907). Bertha also has a book on *François-Joseph I et son règne, 1848–1888* (Paris, 1888). See, also, Beust, *Aus drei Viertel-Jahrhunderten,* vols. I and II (Stuttgart, 1887). On the working of the Ausgleich: Eisenmann, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois,* pp. 659–680; on history of Hungary, 1867–1901: Bertha, *La Hongrie moderne,* pp. 161–358. A clear and instructive account of party history in Austria-Hungary from 1867 to 1896, and a description of the political institutions of each country, and of the Dual Monarchy, is given by Lowell in *Governments and Parties,* vol. II, chaps. VIII–X. The fullest account of Bohemia in the nineteenth century is to be found in E. Denis, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne-Blanche,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1903); vol. II, pp. 381–670, covers the period from 1850 to 1901.

For descriptions of contemporary Austria and Hungary: Geoffrey Drage, *Austria-Hungary* (1909); H. W. Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy* (3rd edit., 1914), the most informing volume on Austria on the eve of the Great War; Scotus-Viator (R. W. Seton-Watson), *The Future of the Hungarian Nation* (1908), *Racial Problems in Hungary* (1908), *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy* (1911), and *German, Slav and Magyar* (1916). Seton-Watson is the leading English authority on the problems and aspirations of the Southern Slavs; A. R. Colquhoun, *The Whirlpool of Europe* (1907). A careful, scientific study of the races and nationalities in the dual monarchy is Auerbach, *Les races et les nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie* (1898). The leading authority on Austrian public law is Ulbrich, J., *Oesterreiches Staatsrecht* (3rd edit., Tübingen, 1904). See, also, for general conditions: André Chéradame, *L'Europe et la question d'Autriche au seuil du XX^e siècle* (Paris, 1901, 452 pp.); Driault, *Le monde actuel* (1909), chap. III.

On foreign policy of Austria-Hungary the following books are useful: J. Larmeroux, *La politique extérieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie, 1875–1914* (1918), 2 vols.; A. Fournier, *Wie wir nach Bosnien Kamen* (1909); T. von Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns seit 1886,* 2 vols. (1913–14); Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879–1914,* 2 vols.; Wertheimer, *Graf Julius Andrassy,* 3 vols. (1910–13).

CHAPTER XXI

England to the Reform Bill of 1832

The best bibliographies on English history during the nineteenth century are in vols. XI and XII of Hunt and Poole's *Political History of England.* These are arranged under topics and are not mere lists of titles but are critical and descriptive, and constitute a very valuable guide. There are lists, without criticism, in connection with the various chapters of the *Cambridge Modern History.* G. M. Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century* (1922). Admirable general account. Treats political, social and economic history of Great Britain and to some extent of the Empire. Traill, *Social England,* vol. VI, contains useful bibliographies on many subjects not included in the preceding lists, such as literature, arts, sciences, industries, social life, etc. One can find source material in a form available for class use in Cheyney, *Readings in English History Drawn from the Original Sources* (1908), pp. 663–767; Adams and Stephens, *Select Documents of English Constitutional History* (1901), pp. 507–555; Robinson and Beard, *Readings in Modern European History* (1909), vol. II, pp. 239–337; Kendall, *Source-Book of English History* (1900), pp. 381–465; Lee, *Source-Book of English History* (1900), pp. 497–585. The fullest and most informing general history of this period is Walpole, *History of England Since 1815* (1890), reaching to 1856, a work of solid scholarship and abundantly supplied with references to authorities; indispensable. Molesworth, *History of England,* 3 vols., is particularly full on the reform movements; account of the reform of 1832 exceptionally good. Broderick and Fotheringham, vol. XI, in Hunt and Poole, *The Political History of England,* covering years 1801–1837, a book marked by good judgment and accuracy, but overloaded with detail; a clear, substantial, and dry résumé. See, also, Bright, *History of England,* vol. III; Traill, *Social England,* vol. VI, illustrated edit., more an encyclopedia of history than a history itself, with articles by specialists on many different departments of the national life, religion, laws, learning, arts, industry, commerce, manners. The political sections are the least satisfactory. The illustrations are numerous and admirable. A. L. Cross, *A History of England and Greater Britain* (1914), pp. 867–1089 cover the period from 1815 to 1914. The *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783–1919,* in process of publication under the editorship of Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, will undoubtedly be the standard work on this subject. Vol. I appeared in 1922 and covers

the period from 1783 to 1815, vol. II (1923), covers period from 1815 to 1866. Oman, *England in the Nineteenth Century* (1899), a sketch of no great importance, readable but not always impartial. On Catholic Emancipation: see, Bryce, *Two Centuries of Irish History,* pp. 272–314; W. E. H. Lecky, *Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland,* 2 vols. (new edit., 1903). Vol. II is a life of O'Connell; Shaw-Lefevre, G. J., *Peel and O'Connell. A Review of the Irish Policy of Parliament from the Union to the Death of Sir Robert Peel* (1887), pp. 1–13; Parker, C. S., *Sir Robert Peel,* 3 vols. (1899); vol. I, chaps. IX–XII; vol. II, chaps. III–V. On the movement for parliamentary reform: see, Molesworth, *History of England,* vol. I; McCarthy, *Epoch of Reform,* a convenient and clear, brief account; Rose, J. H., *The Rise and Growth of Democracy in Great Britain* (1898), chaps. I and II. An indispensable work for the understanding of the political system of England before the Reform is Porritt, E and A. G., *The Unreformed House of Commons,* 2 vols. (1903), a clear, full, authoritative description of the representative system in England, not at all a description of the Reform itself. On the Reform consult, also, Walpole, *Life of Lord John Russell;* Trevelyan, G. M., *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill* (1920) and Stuart Reid, *Life and Letters of Lord Durham,* 2 vols. (1906). Books important for understanding the movement of ideas are Kent, C. B. R., *The English Radicals* (1899); Sir Leslie Stephen, *The English Utilitarians* (1900), both valuable for the history of the radical party; Dicey, A. V., *Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century* (1905), a masterly exposition, commentary, and criticism; indispensable for the history of the whole century; contains an admirable statement of the influence of Bentham upon the legislation; valuable footnotes. On the foreign policy of Canning, the *Life of Canning* by H. W. V. Temperley (1905) is useful. Written from the point of view of an advocate and defender. Chaps. VIII–XII contain some new material on England and the Holy Alliance, the Congresses, America, and Greece. Stapleton's older *Political Life of George Canning,* 3 vols. (1831), is very valuable for foreign relations. W. Cunningham, *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times,* 3 vols., is best on the period before the nineteenth century. Vol. III, covering period from 1776–1850, does little more than touch on general aspects. Important matters are treated very slightly — as, for instance, the work of Huskisson.

CHAPTER XXII

England Between Two Great Reforms

On this period, Walpole, *History of England Since 1815,* remains the most important account. Vols. III, IV, V, and VI cover the period from 1832–1856; and the same author brings his narrative down to 1880 in his *History of Twenty-five Years,* 4 vols. (1904–1908), of which vols. I and II concern the period treated in this chapter. Molesworth's *History of England* and Traill's *Social England,* vol. VI, continue useful. The volume by Low and Sanders in the *Political History of England* covers the whole reign of Victoria (1837–1901), and is the best single volume on the subject. It is a clear, solid, and substantial history of political warfare and parliamentary proceedings, but is colorless and overloaded with details. Its critical bibliography is a very useful feature of the book. Justin McCarthy, *History of Our Own Times,* covers the Queen's reign in 5 vols., is written by a journalist and active politician, is very readable, interesting for its portraits of important persons and its description of events, but is diffuse and sometimes trivial. McCarthy, J., *Short History of Our Own Times* (1908), 1 vol., treats the entire reign. Herbert Paul, *A History of Modern England,* 5 vols. (1904–1906), covers the years from 1846 to 1895, is a direct and vivid narrative limited largely to parliamentary proceedings, with, however, chapters on literature and theology and ecclesiastical disputes; no treatment of social and economic problems and changes; written with dash and emphasis, always confident, frequently partisan; standpoint that of a Gladstonian Liberal.

The biographical literature on this period is very extensive. Two excellent biographies of Queen Victoria are those by Sidney Lee (1903) and Lytton Strachey (1921); both have useful bibliographies. Of very great value are *The Letters of Queen Victoria,* edited by Benson and Fisher, in 3 vols. (1907). There are two editions of this work, one costing three pounds, the other costing six shillings, the latter not sold, at present, in the United States. This is a selection from the Queen's correspondence between the years 1837 and 1861, very important as proving the Queen's ability and worth, her seriousness and intelligence as a ruler; also, as throwing much light on the characters and conduct of important statesmen, Melbourne, Peel, Palmerston, Russell, and others. A work of great historical significance.

Brief biographies of the leading statesmen of the realm are contained in the series called *The Prime Ministers of Queen Victoria;*

edited by Stuart J. Reid, a volume devoted to each. Morley's *Life of W. E. Gladstone,* 3 vols. (1903), and *Life of Richard Cobden* (1881); Dalling's and Ashley's *Life of Palmerston* (1879); Monypenny and Buckle's *Life of Disraeli,* 6 vols. (1910–1920); Robertson's *Life of John Bright* (1889); G. M. Trevelyan's *Life of John Bright* (1913) and *Life of Lord Grey;* Walpole's *Life of Lord John Russell,* 2 vols. (1879); S. J. Reid's *Lord John Russell* (1895); Rosebery's *Sir Robert Peel* (1899); Sir T. Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort,* 5 vols. (1874–1880); Hodder's *Life of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury,* 3 vols. (1886); Frank Podmore's *Life of Robert Owen,* 2 vols. (1906); and Graham Wallas's *Life of Francis Place* (1891), are among the most useful biographies on the period.

On Chartism: see, R. G. Gammage, *History of Chartism* (1894); Carlyle, T., *Chartism;* P. W. Slosson, *The Decline of the Chartist Movement* (1916); E. Dolléans, *Le chartisme, 1830–1848,* (1912–1913); Rose, *The Rise of Democracy,* chaps. VI, VII, and VIII; Thomas Cooper's *Life,* Written by Himself (1872). On Free Trade movement: Armitage-Smith, *The Free Trade Movement* (1898); Morley, *Life of Cobden;* Disraeli, *Life of Sir George Bentinck;* Parker, C. S., *Sir Robert Peel,* 3 vols. (1899), vol. III, an important collection of Peel's correspondence; also, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Peel,* 2 vols. (1856–1857). See, also, J. S. Nicholson, *History of the English Corn Laws* (1904). On factory legislation: B. L. Hutchins and L. Harrison, *History of Factory Legislation* (1903). On the American Civil War: see, Walpole, *History of Twenty-five Years,* vol. II, chap. VIII. On constitutional questions: see, Sir Thomas Erskine May, *Constitutional History of England;* Taswell-Langmead, *English Constitutional History;* G. B. Adams, *Constitutional History of England.*

CHAPTER XXIII

England Under Gladstone and Disraeli

For this period, the general histories are: Walpole, *History of Twenty-five Years,* vols. II, III, and IV (coming down to 1880); Paul, *History of Modern England,* vols. III and IV; Bright, *History of England,* vol. IV, pp. 450–577; vol. V, pp. 1–87; McCarthy, *History of Our Own Times,* vols. II and III; Low and Sanders, pp. 223–376; Traill's *Social England.* Morley's *Life of Gladstone* is indispensable, written by a close personal friend, an experienced politician, and a master of historical prose. Monypenny and

Buckle's *Life of Disraeli,* 6 vols. (1910–20), is the standard biography; very valuable for the history of the period. Froude's biography of Beaconsfield in the Queen's Prime Ministers series, is brief, superficial, and is very poor on the administration 1874–1880. Bryce has an essay on Lord Beaconsfield in his *Studies in Contemporary Biography* (1903), and Sir Spencer Walpole one in his *Studies in Biography* (1907). T. S. Kebbel, *Selected Speeches of the Earl of Beaconsfield,* 2 vols. (1882), is useful. Lady Gwendolin Cecil's *Life of Lord Salisbury* is important, 2 vols. (1922). Fitzmaurice, *Life of Earl Granville,* 2 vols. (1905), vol. II, and Winston Churchill, *Lord Randolph Churchill,* 2 vols. (1906), are important for the period. On Ireland: Johnston and Spencer, *Ireland's Story;* Bryce, J., *Two Centuries of Irish History* (1888); J. McCarthy, *Ireland and Her Story;* W. O. Morris, *Ireland, 1798–1898* (1898); W. P. O'Brien, *The Great Famine* (1896); R. B. O'Brien, *Parliamentary History of the Irish Land Question* (1880), *Fifty Years of Concessions to Ireland,* 2 vols. (1883–1885), *Irish Wrongs and English Remedies* (1887). G. Shaw-Lefevre, *English and Irish Land Questions* (1881); A. G. Richey, *The Irish Land Laws* (1880); E. Barker, *Ireland in the Last Fifty Years, 1866–1918* (1919); D. A. Chart, *Economic History of Ireland* (1920); E. R. Turner, *Ireland and England* (1919).

CHAPTER XXIV

England from 1886 to 1914

The most satisfactory account of recent English history is J. F. Bright, *History of England,* vol. V, 1880–1901, a book of solid merits; clearness of arrangement, directness of narrative, and remarkable freedom from partisanship. For the period of this chapter; see also, Low and Sanders, pp. 366–489; Paul, *Modern England,* vol. V; McCarthy, *Our Own Times,* vol. III, chaps. X–XXV. Of the first importance for the Home Rule bills is Morley, *Life of Gladstone,* vol. III, a book that by reason of Morley's intimacy with Gladstone at this time has practically the value of a source; see, also, Churchill's *Lord Randolph Churchill,* vol. II, and Fitzmaurice's *Life of Earl Granville,* vol. II, chaps. XIII–XIV, authoritative biographies, based on letters and documents. Churchill's great influence on the Conservative party is clearly shown by the former. Consult, also, R. B. O'Brien, *Life of Charles Stewart Parnell,* 3 vols. (1898). Interesting personal descriptions and appreciations of Glad-

stone are James Bryce, *William Ewart Gladstone,* in his *Studies in Contemporary Biography* (also published separately), and Sir E. W. Hamilton, *Mr. Gladstone, a Monograph* (1898). Lord Rosebery, *Lord Randolph Churchill* (1896), is also suggestive. Traill, *Life of the Marquis of Salisbury,* contains practically nothing after 1886. H. Whates, *The Third Salisbury Administration* (1895–1900), is a useful book, containing maps and diplomatic papers bearing on the South African war. C. W. Boyd, editor, *Speeches of Joseph Chamberlain* 2 vols. (1914); Morley, *Recollections,* 2 vols. 1917.

On Ireland, a very important monograph is L. Paul Dubois, *Contemporary Ireland* (1908). This is an English translation of *L'Irlande contemporaine* (Paris, 1907). Paul Dubois was the son-in-law of Taine. His book is largely historical and is useful for the whole nineteenth century. It contains a full discussion of the land question, and educational, economic, and religious problems.

On the revived interest in the question of Protection and Free Trade: see, G. Armitage-Smith, *The Free Trade Movement and Its Results* (1898); W. Smart, *The Return of Protection* (1903); W. J. Ashley, *The Tariff Problem* (1903); W. Cunningham, *The Rise and Decline of the Free Trade Movement* (2nd ed., 1905). These represent various points of view. While the theoretical economists like Marshall at Cambridge, and Edgeworth at Oxford, adhered to the belief in free trade, the economic historians, Cunningham and Ashley, adopted the Chamberlain programme on the ground that the rise of industrial rivals and the decline of her own resources had created a critical situation for England, and that one way of recovering or maintaining her leadership was a closer union of the empire, which, it was held, a system of protection would facilitate. An interesting general view by an outside observer is to be found in Carl Johannes Fuchs, *The Trade Policy of Great Britain and Her Colonies Since 1860,* a German book translated by C. H. M. Archibald (1905). On education: see, Sir Henry Craik, *The State in its Relation to Education* (2nd edit., 1896); Graham Balfour, *The Educational Systems of Great Britain and Ireland* (2nd edit., 1903), a comprehensive account of general education in the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century, based on departmental reports and the blue books of the numerous commissions which have investigated the subject; full of precise information. A very useful comparison of the systems of England, the United States, France, and Germany, is to be found in R. E. Hughes, *The Making of Citizens: A Study in Comparative Education* (1902). On government: see, A. L. Lowell, *The Government of England,* 2 vols. (1908), by far the most authoritative, comprehensive, and illuminating treatise on the

subject; a study, moreover, broadly conceived; indispensable not only for its profound and clear analysis and description of British government, imperial, national, and local, but for the light it throws upon party machinery and party programmes or tendencies. Other useful books on English government are the various volumes of the English Citizen Series, edited by HENRY CRAIK; also, A. V. DICEY, *The Law of the Constitution of the United Kingdom* (1885); SIDNEY LOW, *The Governance of England* (1904). An excellent brief description is T. F. MORAN, *The Theory and Practice of the English Government* (new edit., 1908). F. A. OGG, *The Governments of Europe* (1913), chaps. I–VIII. BAGEHOT, *English Constitution,* and BOUTMY, *The English Constitution,* are also useful. Of the first importance is ANSON, *Law and Custom of the Constitution,* 2 vols. (1892). See, also, ALPHEUS TODD, *Parliamentary Government in England,* 2 vols. (2nd edit., 1887–1889). A useful abridgment and revision of this work was made by Sir Spencer Walpole and published in 1892. SIR COURTNEY ILBERT, *Legislative Methods and Forms* (Oxford, 1901), is an authority. The fullest historical account of parliamentary procedure is REDLICH, J., *The Procedure of the House of Commons, a Study of its History and Present Form,* 3 vols. (1908). On political parties before the war see: LORD HUGH CECIL, *Conservatism* (1912); L. T. HOBHOUSE, *Liberalism* (1911); A. W. HUMPHREY, *History of Labor Representation* (1912); S. P. ORTH, *Socialism and Democracy in Europe* (1913); ch. IX. On social legislation before the war see C. J. H. HAYES, *British Social Politics* (1913). Consult on history of trade unions S. & B. WEBB, *The History of Trade Unionism* (1911) and *Industrial Democracy* (1911).

CHAPTER XXV

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

On the general subject of European colonial expansion, the most extensive work is ALFRED ZIMMERMANN'S *Die europaischen Kolonien* (1896–1903). Five volumes have appeared. The first volume treats of the colonial policy of Spain and Portugal to the present, the second that of Great Britain to the American Revolution, the third that of Great Britain since the American Revolution, the fourth that of France to the present, the fifth that of the Netherlands. The volumes are well supplied with bibliographies and maps. CHARLES DE LANNOY and HERMANN VAN DER LINDEN have undertaken a work called *Histoire de l'expansion coloniale des peuples européens,* intended to

show how each nation has acquired its colonies, how it has developed them, what the characteristics of each are. Three volumes thus far since 1907 (Brussels), with bibliography and maps. They give an account of Portuguese and Spanish, Dutch, Danish and Swedish colonies. A useful book is Paul Leroy-Beaulieu's *La colonisation chez les peuples modernes,* 2 vols. (6th edit., 1908).

On English colonial expansion in general: Zimmermann, cited above; H. E. Egerton, *A Short History of British Colonial Policy* (1897); covers the period from Cabot, 1497, down, treating British colonization as a continuous movement; the latter part concerns the nineteenth century; a careful, thoughtful book. By the same author, *The Origin and Growth of the English Colonies and of their System of Government* (Oxford, 1904), being an introduction to Lucas's *Historical Geography of the British Colonies.* Contains very interesting chapters on the labor problem in new colonies, on the introduction of responsible government, on the problem of the future relations between the colonies and the mother country; also, a chronological outline of the various acquisitions made by Great Britain during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Sir Charles Dilke, *Problems of Greater Britain* (1890), had a great influence in educating English opinion to the importance of the Empire and is full of information; by the same author, *The British Empire* (1899), a sort of bird's-eye view. C. P. Lucas's *Historical Geography of the British Empire,* 7 vols., new edit., 1906–, in course of publication, is of the first importance, comprehensive, accurate, containing much historical matter. W. H. Woodward's *Short History of the Expansion of the British Empire, 1500–1870* (Cambridge, 1899), is a useful epitome. E. J. Payne, *Colonies and Colonial Federations* (1904), studies the Empire from geographical, historical, economic, and political points of view. See, also, Greswell, W. P., *The Growth and Administration of British Colonies, 1837–1897* (1898). J. R. Seeley, *Expansion of England,* is useful for an understanding of the general subject. *The British Empire Series,* 5 vols. (1899–1902), contains a large amount of information, historical, political, economic, conditions for colonization, outlook for the future, etc.; vol. I concerns India; vol. II, British Africa; vol. III, British America; vol. IV, Australia. Bryce's *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* contain very important studies on The Roman Empire and the British Empire in India, on Two South African Constitutions, and on the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. Consult, also, on the Empire: Lowell, *The Government of England,* vol. II, chaps. LIV–LVIII; *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. XI, chaps. XXVI and XXVII, with bibliographies; also, for colonial

development from 1815–1852, mainly in South Africa and Australia: Walpole's *History of England Since 1815,* vol. VI, pp. 325–379; also A. T. Story, *The British Empire* (Story of the Nations Series). Alpheus Todd, *Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies* (2nd edit., 1894), is an authoritative treatment of the operation of responsible government in the colonies.

On India: see, *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. XI, chap. XXVI (from 1815 to 1869); R. W. Fraser, *British Rule in India* (Story of the Nations Series); Boulger, *India in the Nineteenth Century* (1901); Digby, *Prosperous British India* (1901), a severe arraignment of British government in India; M. Innes, *The Sepoy Revolt* (1897); Sir John Kaye, *The Sepoy War,* 3 vols. (1864–1876), completed by G. B. Malleson (1878–1880); G. W. Forrest, *A History of the Indian Mutiny, Reviewed and Illustrated from Original Documents,* 2 vols. (1904); G. B. Malleson, *The Indian Mutiny of 1857* (1891); Lilly, *India and Its Problems.* A. L. Lowell has a valuable chapter on the Civil Service of India in his *Colonial Civil Service* (1900). Sir Courtney Ilbert, *The Government of India* (1898), is pronounced by Lowell to be "by far the best work on the public law of India." The *Cambridge History of India,* will, when completed, be a most valuable work on Indian history in general. Sir Valentine Chirol, *India Old and New* (1921).

On Canada: Bibliography may be found in the *A. L. A. Annotated Guide to the Literature of American History,* edited by J. N. Larned (1902); bibliographies also in *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. XI, and in Low and Sanders, *History of England, 1837–1901.* Good brief histories are: Sir John Bourinot, *Canada Under British Rule, 1760–1900;* C. G. D. Roberts, *History of Canada* (1904). Kingsford's elaborate history in ten volumes only reaches 1841. On Lord Durham's mission: see, F. Bradshaw, *Self-Government in Canada and How it was Achieved, the Story of Lord Durham's Report* (London, 1903); eight chapters are devoted to a careful account of the history of Canada to the outbreak of the Rebellion, and show the growth of the demand for responsible government; see, also, S. J. Reid, *Life and Letters of Lord Durham,* 2 vols. (1906), a very laudatory book but full of information concerning Lord Durham's work in Canada. Lord Durham's *Report* was republished in London in 1901. Perhaps the best manual dealing with the constitutional history of Canada is Sir John Bourinot's *A Manual of the Constitutional History of Canada* (1901). *Canadian Constitutional Development,* by H. E. Egerton and W. L. Grant (1907), contains speeches and despatches pertinent to the subject, with introduction

and notes; see, also, William Houston, *Documents Illustrative of the Canadian Constitution* (1891). *Canada and the Empire,* by E. Montague and B. Herbert (1904), is written from an imperialist standpoint. Holland, B., *Imperium et Libertas. A Study in History and Politics* (1901); pp. 95–190 treat Canadian history from 1763 to 1867. Bryce, J., *Modern Democracies* (2 vols. 1921). Vol. I pp. 455–508 has an important treatment of Canadian government and politics.

On Australasia: see, the excellent *History of the Australasian Colonies* by E. Jenks (1895), which comes down to 1893; also, G. Tregarthen, *Australian Commonwealth* (Story of the Nations Series); comes down to 1891; also an admirable volume by J. D. Rogers in Lucas's *Historical Geography of the British Colonies,* vol. VI (1907). The most valuable work for the recent constitutional development is *The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth* by Sir J. Quick and R. R. Garran (Sidney, 1901). This contains a full history of the movement toward federation and of each clause of the constitution. W. H. Moore, *The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia* (1902), is an important commentary. Bryce has a useful account of the making and character of the constitution in his *Studies in History and Jurisprudence.* See also, Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (1921), vol. II. pp. 166–264 for a valuable examination of Australian history, parties and policies. Same volume, pp. 265–332 treats institutions and problems of New Zealand. On social and economic conditions and measures and experiments: see, Reeves, *The Long White Cloud* (1899), and *State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand,* 2 vols. (1902); H. D. Lloyd, *Newest England* (New Zealand and Australia) (1900); V. S. Clark, *The Labor Movement in Australia* (1906). A serviceable book is by B. R. Wise, entitled *The Commonwealth of Australia* (Boston, 1909), a description of the country, of political institutions, of industrial legislation, etc. On New Zealand: see, also, Sir Arthur P. Douglas, *The Dominion of New Zealand* (1909).

For South Africa: see, G. M. Theal, *South Africa* (Story of the Nations Series, 1894); pp. 138–387 cover the years 1815–1890; Frank R. Cana, *South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union* (1909). An excellent account of the history of Europeans in South Africa down to 1895 is contained in Bryce's *Impressions of South Africa* (1897), pp. 99–182. A clear account of the causes and early course of the Boer war is given in Bright's *History of England,* vol. V, pp 234–266. Many of the important state papers, mostly English, bearing on this war, are in Larned, *History for Ready Reference,* vol. VI, pp. 456–517. For the Boer side of the case:

see, the *Memoirs* of Paul Kruger. Sir A. Conan Doyle, *The Great Boer War* (1902), is a useful narrative, from the British standpoint. The Times *History of the War in South Africa,* edited by L. C. Amery, vols. I–IV (1900–1906), is very detailed. G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe 1878–1919* (1923), has a chapter of this war (ch. 9). On the literature of the South African War: see, *American Historical Review,* vol. XII, pp. 299–321. Concerning the federation movement: see, R. H. Brand, *The Union of South Africa* (1909), which contains the South Africa Act of 20th September, 1909, an account of its elaboration and adoption and a study of its provisions. See also, W. B. Worsfold, *The Union of South Africa* (1912); B. R. Wise, *The Making of the Australian Commonwealth, 1889–1900* (1913).

On the reaction of imperialism upon the mother country: see, Richard Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism* (1905); contains chapters on Canada, From Colonies to Commonwealth (Australia), New Zealand, South African War, the Colonial Conference of 1902, Nationalism in Tariffs, and Imperial Partnership. See, also, J. W. Root, *Colonial Tariffs* (Liverpool, 1906); Carl Johannes Fuchs, *The Trade Policy of Great Britain and her Colonies Since 1860* (1905). See, also, Bernard Holland, *Imperium et Libertas* (1901), pp. 265–319. An important work concerning the colonies, is *The Legislation of the Empire: Being a Survey of the Legislative Enactments of the British Dominions from 1898 to 1909.* Edited by C. E. A. Bedwell, with a preface by Lord Rosebery, 4 vols. (1909). Contains about 25,000 acts and ordinances.

CHAPTER XXVI

Africa

For explorations in Africa: see, *David Livingstone,* by Thomas Hughes (1889); (by Livingstone himself), *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa* (1857), and *Last Journals in Central Africa,* from 1865 to death, edited by Waller (1875); H. M. Stanley, *How I Found Livingstone; Travels, Adventures, and Discoveries in Central Africa* (1872); *Through the Dark Continent or the Sources of the Nile,* 2 vols. (1878); *The Congo and the Founding of Its Free State,* 2 vols. (1885); *In Darkest Africa,* 2 vols. (1890); *The Autobiography of Henry M. Stanley,* edited by his wife, Dorothy Stanley (1909), chaps. XIII, XV–XVIII; V. L. Cameron, *Across Africa* (1876); Carl Peters, *New*

Light on Dark Africa (1891). A very useful collection of contemporary accounts is, *Africa and Its Exploration, as Told by Its Explorers,* 2 vols. (London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co., no date). See, also, Robert Brown, *Story of Africa,* 4 vols. (1894–1895).

On the partition of Africa, the most important book is J. Scott Keltie, *The Partition of Africa* (1895); see, also, Emile Banning, *Le partage politique de l'Afrique d'après les transactions internationales les plus récentes, 1885-1888* (1888); A. S. White, *The Development of Africa. A Study in Applied Geography* (2nd edit., 1892); for a short account, Rose, J. H., *The Development of European Nations,* vol. II, chap. VII. Sir Harry Johnston, *History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races* (1899), is a very useful manual, compressing a large amount of information into a small compass; written by a man who is an authority on African affairs, having traveled extensively in that continent, and having been consul and administrator there; describes the efforts of the Portuguese, Dutch, English, and the other nations; has brief chapters on the history of the slave trade, of exploration, of missions, etc. Sir Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty,* 3 vols. (ed. 1909), invaluable; H. T. Johnston; *The Opening up of Africa* (1911); H. A. Gibbons, *The New Map of Africa* (1916).

On England in Egypt: Rose, *Development of European Nations,* vol. II, chaps. IV–VI; Cromer, *Modern Egypt,* 2 vols. (1908), practically a history of Egypt from 1876 to 1908, of the Dual Control which was succeeded by the Single Control of England, by the man who was the British representative in Egypt for twenty-seven years. An invaluable book, marked by a wealth of precise information, by positiveness, by judicial temper, and by an extraordinary detachment of view. Is, to a considerable degree, an historical source as well as a history. For an important review of this book by Lord Bryce, see, *American Historical Review,* vol. XIV, pp. 357–362. On the British intervention and the Gordon chapter one should consult in addition to Cromer: Morley's *Gladstone,* vol. III, and Fitzmaurice's *Granville,* vol. II. Other important books on Egypt are: Sir Alfred Milner's *England in Egypt* (11th edit., 1904); Sir A. Colvin's *The Making of Modern Egypt* (2nd edit., 1906); A. Metin's *La Transformation de l'Egypte* (1903); J. C. Roux, *L'Isthme et le Canal de Suez,* 2 vols. (1901). Popular accounts are E. Dicey, *Story of the Khedivate* (1902), and *The Egypt of the Future* (1906). The story of Kitchener's campaign is told by G. W. Steevens, *With Kitchener to Khartum* (1898). On the Congo Free State, Rose, *Development of European Nations,* vol. II, chap. VIII.

CHAPTER XXVII

Spain and Portugal

There is no satisfactory history of Spain in the nineteenth century in English. Butler Clarke's *Modern Spain, 1815–1898,* is the fullest, but is overloaded with details, not effectively presented. Pages 91–470 cover the period of this chapter. A bibliography is appended. Hume, *Modern Spain, 1788–1898* (1899), is a shorter and more interesting account; pages 248–563 treat the period 1823–1898. There are brief chapters in *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. X, chap. VII, and vol. XI, chap. XX, bringing the history down to 1871.

Hubbard, *Histoire contemporaine de l'Espagne,* 6 vols. (1869–1883), is useful, treating the period 1814 to 1868. Vols. III and IV cover the years 1833 to 1843, and vols. V and VI the reign of Isabella II, 1843–1868. Yves Guyot, *L'Évolution politique et sociale de l'Espagne* (1899), is mainly a description of social, political, and economic conditions, not a history. Consult also A. Marvaud, *La question sociale en Espagne* (1910); same author's *L'Espagne au XX^e siècle* (1913).

In German, see, Baumgarten, H., *Geschichte Spaniens vom Ausbruch der französischen Revolution bis auf unsere Tage,* 3 vols. (1865–1871). Vol. II treats of the restoration of Ferdinand, the revolution of 1820, and the subsequent intervention (1814–1825); vol. III, the remainder of Ferdinand's reign and the Carlist wars. A more recent German work is Gustav Diercks, *Geschichte Spaniens von der frühesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart,* 2 vols. (1895–1896); pp. 544–674 concern our period. E. H. Strobel, *The Spanish Revolution, 1868–1875* (Boston, 1898), is a clear and comprehensive account of the parliamentary history of Spain during the six years from the overthrow of Isabella II to the restoration of Alfonso XII. The book also throws much light on the manipulation of parliamentary institutions in Spain. H. Remsen Whitehouse, *The Sacrifice of a Throne* (1897), is the best description we have of the election, reign, and abdication of Amadeo of Savoy. Hannay, D., *Don Emilio Castelar* (1896), a life of the republican leader. On the colonies: see, J. W. Root, *Spain and Its Colonies* (1898); Zimmermann, A., *Die europäischen Kolonien,* vol. I, Die Kolonialpolitik Portugals und Spaniens (1899); H. W. Wilson, *The Downfall of Spain* (1900), is a naval history of the Spanish-American war of 1898.

On constitutional history: see, Gmelin, *Studien zur spanischen Verfassungsgeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart,

1905); also, J. L. M. Curry, *Constitutional Government in Spain* (1899). Curry was United States Minister to Spain from 1885 to 1889. The constitution itself is in Dodd, *Modern Constitutions*, vol. II. On Portugal in the nineteenth century, there is a slight sketch of the years 1815 to 1880 in H. Morse Stephens, *Portugal* (Story of the Nations Series, 1891), pp. 409–432; see, also, chapters in *Cambridge Modern History* cited above. On the colonies: see Zimmerman, *op. cit.;* Marvaud, A., *Le Portugal et ses colonies* (1912); G. M. Theal, *The Portuguese in South Africa* (1896). Hans Meyer, *Das portugiesische Kolonialreich der Gegenwart* (1918); E. Peixotto, *Spain and Portugal* (1922). See, in general, George Young, *Portugal, Old and Young* (1917).

CHAPTER XXVIII

Holland and Belgium after 1830

For Holland and Belgium: consult, *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. X, chap. XVI, and vol. XI, chap. XXIII; Lavisse et Rambaud, *Histoire générale*, vol. X, chap. IX, vol. XI, chap. XI, vol. XII, chap. VI; also Seignobos, *Political History of Europe Since 1814*, chap. VIII. The best history of Holland in the last century is: Blok, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk;* vol. VII (1907) covers the French period and the history of the United Netherlands to the secession of Belgium; vol. VIII (1908) continues the narrative down to the opening of the twentieth century; an impartial, critical, scientific work, containing much more than simply political history. This work has been translated into English under the title *History of the Netherlands*, 5 vols. (1898–1912). Clive Day, *The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java* (1904), is a book of the first importance. On Belgium: see, Smythe, C., *The Story of Belgium* (Story of the Nations Series, 1900); T. Juste, *Léopold I, Roi des Belges, d'après les documents inédits*, 2 vols. (1868); Bertrand, L., *Léopold II et son règne 1865–1890* (Brussels, 1890); Wilmotte, M., *La Belgique morale et politique, 1830–1890* (Brussels, 1902); MacDonnell, J. de C., *King Leopold II, His Rule in Belgium and the Congo* (London, 1905); Bertrand, L., *Histoire de la démocratie et du socialisme en Belgique depuis 1830*, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1907); comes down to 1905; Flandin, E., *Institutions politiques de l'Europe contemporaine* (Paris, 1907), vol. I, pp. 160–307; Banning, E., *La Belgique au point de vue militaire et internationale* (Brussels, 1901); Dupriez, Léon, *L'organisation du suffrage universel en Belgique. Vote plural, vote obligatoire, repré-*

sentation proportionelle (Paris, 1901). Constitution of Belgium in Dodd, *Modern Constitutions,* vol. I. J. Barthélemy, *L'Organisation du suffrage et l'expérience belge* (1912), excellent study of Belgian political institutions. Rowntree, S., *Land and Labor: Lessons from Belgium* (1910). Author is an English sociologist. Ensor, R. C. K., *Belgium* (1915), has informing chapters on the Belgian constitution, politics and parties, social conditions and art and literature. H. van der Linden, *Belgium* (1920).

CHAPTER XXIX

Switzerland

There are in English only brief accounts of Swiss history since 1815. See, *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. XI, chap. VIII, down to 1874; Seignobos, *Political History of Europe since 1814,* chap. IX; Hug and Stead, *Switzerland* (Story of the Nations Series, 1890), pp. 382–421; comes down to 1889. McCracken, W. D., *The Rise of the Swiss Republic* (2nd edit., 1901), pp. 319–372; see, also, Baker, F. G., *The Model Republic. A History of the Rise and Progress of the Swiss People* (1895), pp. 462–538. The most important work is Seippel, Paul, *La Suisse au dix-neuvième siècle,* 3 vols. (Lausanne, 1899–1900). A coöperative work by a group of Swiss writers. The section on the political history of Switzerland in the nineteenth century, vol. I, pp. 51–378, is by Numa Droz, a former President of the Confederation. The work also contains very valuable chapters on the history of institutions, on constitutional, civil, and criminal law, on the international rôle of Switzerland, on education, religion, economic history, arts, etc. Karl Dändliker, *A Short History of Switzerland,* translated by E. Salisbury (London, 1899), has a section covering the period 1813–1874, pp. 237–294. On Swiss political institutions, the best book in English is J. M. Vincent, *Government in Switzerland* (1900); contains the federal constitution and an excellent critical chapter on the literature of the subject. Borgeaud, C., *Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions,* translated by C. D. Hazen (1895), pp. 258–332, is important for the evolution of Swiss constitutional law. Lowell, A. L., *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe,* vol. II, chaps. XI–XIII, contains an admirable description of the political institutions of Switzerland and of the party history after 1848. Other books descriptive of Swiss institutions are: Adams, F. O., and Cunningham, C. D., *The Swiss Confederation* (1889); Winchester, B., *The Swiss Republic* (1891); Lloyd, H. D.,

and Hobson, J. A., *A Sovereign People; a Study of Swiss Democracy* (1907). An interesting study of democratic government in one of the *Landesgemeinde* cantons is I. B. Richman's *Appenzell, Pure Democracy and Pastoral Life in Inner Rhoden* (1895). Contains chapters on politics, laws, administration, cantonal and domestic economy, education, charities, etc. Useful for the study of the referendum, is Deploige, *The Referendum in Switzerland,* translated by C. P. Trevelyan (London, 1898); by a Belgian lawyer. W. H. Dawson, *Social Switzerland, Studies of Present Day Social Movements and Legislation in the Swiss Republic* (London, 1897); contains chapters on the organization and protection of labor, on industrial peace, the problem of the unemployed, poor law agencies, technical education, control of the liquor traffic. Bryce, J., *Modern Democracies* (1921). Vol. I, pp. 327–454, is an important study of Swiss political institutions and parties.

CHAPTER XXX

The Scandinavian States

There is very little in English on the subject of this chapter. Useful brief accounts are to be found in Bain, R. N., *Scandinavia, A Political History of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, from 1513 to 1900* (Cambridge, 1905); chap. XVI concerns Denmark since 1814; chap. XVII, Sweden and Norway since 1814; *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. XI, chap. XXIV, Scandinavia 1815–1870; Seignobos, *Political History of Europe,* chap. XVIII; Lavisse et Rambaud, *Histoire générale,* vol. X, chap. XVIII; vol. XI, chap. XII; vol. XII, chap. VII, give an excellent, though brief narrative, covering the period 1815–1900. H. H. Boyesen, *The History of Norway* (Story of the Nations Series, 1886), pp. 516–538. Gjerset, K., *History of the Norwegian People,* 2 vols. (1915), most important work on this subject in English; by an American scholar of Norwegian origin. P. Drachman, *The Industrial Development and Commercial Policies of the three Scandinavian Countries* (1915). On the Norwegian-Swedish crisis: see, Fridtjof Nansen's *Norway and the Union with Sweden* (London, 1905); an historical sketch from the Treaty of Kiel, 1814, through the dissolution of the Union; presents the Norwegian side. K. Nordlund, *The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis, A History with Documents* (Stockholm, 1905), presents the Swedish side and criticises Nansen. Consult, also, Mohn, A., *La Suède et la révolution norvégienne* (Paris, 1905); Fahlbeck, P.,

La constitution suédoise et le parlementarisme moderne (Paris, 1905), a brief sketch of Swedish constitutional history and government. The constitutions of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, are in Dodd, *Modern Constitutions*. Much useful, miscellaneous information is contained in Sundbärg, *Sweden, Its People and Industries* (1900); Weitemeyer, H., *Denmark* (London, 1891); and Carlsen, Olrik, and Starcke, *Le Danemark, État actuel de sa civilisation et de son organisation sociale* (Copenhagen, 1900); a work published on the occasion of the Universal Exposition at Paris in 1900.

CHAPTER XXXI

The Disruption of the Ottoman Empire and the Rise of the Balkan States

There is no adequate treatment in English of the Eastern Question in its entirety. An admirable French book is Édouard Driault, *La question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'à la paix de Sèvres* (1920) (8th edit., 1921), a book that may be cordially recommended to any one desiring a guide to a very complicated and widely ramified branch of history. The author's conception of the Eastern Question is large, including not only the fate of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, but the decline of Islam in Europe, Asia, and Africa. After a brief sketch of the Byzantine and Latin Empires, the conquests of the Turks, Driault traces the history of the Eastern Question in the eighteenth century, Napoleon's Oriental projects, the Greek war of independence, the internal reforms in Turkey, the Crimean war and its consequences, the war in the Balkans, the rise of the various states. Recent phases of the general problem are then treated: the Armenian Massacres, the Cretan problem, the Greco-Turkish war, the Macedonian question, and the relations of Occidental powers with Islam in Asia and Africa, the European War and its effects. The chief merit of the work lies, not in research, but in the orderly and effective arrangement and presentation of a mass of widely scattered information. The book contains useful bibliographical references to important secondary material.

A brief and able study of the Eastern Question by an American scholar is S. P. Duggan, *The Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy* (1902).

For the Slavs, an admirable and indispensable work is that of R. J. Kerner, *Slavic Europe, A Select Bibliography in the Western European Languages* (1918).

There is a useful though limited bibliography on the Eastern Question by Georges Bengesco, *Essai d'une notice bibliographique sur la question d'Orient. Orient Européen, 1821–1897* (Brussels, 1897). This concerns only the question of Europe in Turkey and is limited to works published in France and Belgium. Bengesco was formerly Roumanian minister to Belgium. T. E. Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question,* contains many treaties, etc., bearing on the general question (1885).

The best single volume in English on Balkan history from the early migrations down to the present is that by Ferdinand Schevill, *The Balkans* (1922). Other useful recent books are N. Forbes, and others, *The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Roumania, Turkey* (1915); A. H. E. Taylor, *The Future of the Southern Slavs* (1917); Louis André, *Les états chrétiens des Balkans depuis 1815* (1918); W. S. Davis, *A Short History of the Near East* (1922).

On the Greek war of independence, there is a long and interesting chapter, sketching the Greek renaissance and describing vividly the military and diplomatic aspects of the stirring story in Fyffe, *History of Modern Europe,* vol. II, chap. IV (or chap. XV, in the one volume edition). W. Allison Phillips, *The War of Greek Independence* (1897), treats the years 1821 to 1833. Having no adequate introduction, the book lacks background, but the narrative of events is full, fair, and interesting. It is not based upon original investigation but upon works of Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Finlay, Gordon, and Prokesch-Osten. Finlay, G., *History of the Greek Revolution,* is an important account, drawn largely upon the author's first-hand knowledge of events. Tozer's edition, 1877, is the best as representing Finlay's matured views. The *Letters and Journals of Samuel Gridley Howe,* edited by his daughter, Laura E. Richards, are very valuable; vol. I, entitled *The Greek Revolution* (Boston, 1906), throws a flood of light upon the course of the war. The volume is based almost entirely upon the journal of Howe, who, graduating from Brown University in 1821, and from Harvard Medical School in 1824, went immediately to Greece, joined the Greek army, created a surgical corps and also distinguished himself as a commander. His journal, though marked by serious gaps, is a vivid historical source for the years 1825 to 1829. Howe's volume called *Sketch of the Greek Revolution,* published in 1828, also abounds in graphic descriptions at first hand of men and events. Interesting sidelights on the Greek war are also to be found in the works of Lord Byron, *Letters and Journals,* vol. VI, edited by Rowland E. Prothero (London, 1904).

Perhaps the most important recent account of this whole chapter of Greek history is in STERN, *Geschichte Europas,* vol. II, chaps. VII and XIV; vol. III, chaps. IV–VI; vol. IV, chap. X.

On the Crimean War: see, WALPOLE, *History of England Since 1815,* vol. VI, chap. XXIV; MCCARTHY, *History of Our Own Times,* vol. I, chaps. XXV–XXVIII; PAUL, *History of Modern England,* vol. I, chaps. XVII–XIX, and vol. II, chap. I. Paul's characterization of Napoleon III is so overdone as to approach the ridiculous. KINGLAKE's monumental *Invasion of the Crimea* (8 vols., 1863–1887) is a brilliant performance in a way, picturesque and full of detail, but is frequently amusingly portentous and Homeric in tone; is marked by a pronounced dislike of Napoleon III; and is, moreover, incomplete, stopping at the death of Lord Raglan. Probably the most informing and most interesting account, judicial as well, is that of GORCE in his *Histoire du Second Empire,* vol. I, pp. 134–481, an excellent piece of exposition. An important phase of this war is well treated by H. FRIEDJUNG in *Der Krimkrieg und die oesterreichische Politik* (1907), a clear, scientific analysis of the peculiarly involved and difficult foreign relations of Austria during the years 1853–1856; a purely diplomatic study. An excellent brief treatment of the diplomacy of the period is contained in ANDREWS, *Historical Development of Modern Europe,* vol. II, chap. II.

On the re-opening of the Eastern Question, the war in the Balkans and the Congress of Berlin: WALPOLE, *History of Twenty-five Years,* vol. IV, chaps. XVII and XVIII; PAUL, *History of Modern England,* vol. IV, chaps. I and II; MCCARTHY, *History of Our Own Times,* vol. II, chaps. LXIV and LXV; ROSE, *The Development of the European Nations,* vol. I, chaps. VII–IX (includes a clear account of the Russo-Turkish campaign); HANOTAUX, *Contemporary France,* vol. IV, chaps. II and V; DEBIDOUR, *Histoire diplomatique,* vol. II, chap. XIII; BOURGEOIS, E., *Manuel historique de politique étrangère,* vol. III, pp. 783–815; MORLEY, *Life of Gladstone,* vol. II, pp. 548–583; BISMARCK, *Reflections and Reminiscences,* vol. II, chap. XXVIII; SKRINE, *Expansion of Russia,* pp. 243–265; SERGEANT, L., *Greece in the Nineteenth Century,* pp. 270–307; WHITMAN, S., *Reminiscences of the King of Roumania,* chaps. VIII–XI.

On Bulgaria since 1878: SCHEVILL, *The Balkan Peninsula,* ch. XXVI; ROSE, *Development of the European Nations,* vol. I, chap. X; MILLER, W., *The Balkans* (Story of the Nations Series), pp. 215–248 (comes down to 1896); A. H. BEAMAN, *Stambuloff* (1895); E. DICEY, *The Peasant State* (1894); ODYSSEUS (SIR C. ELIOT), *Turkey in Europe.*

On Roumanian history: The best account of the founding of the

Roumanian state is contained in King Charles' papers: *Aus dem Leben König Karls,* 4 vols., see also Whitman, *Reminiscences of the King of Roumania,* chap. XI; Frédéric Damé, *Histoire de la Roumanie contemporaine depuis l'avènement des princes indigènes jusqu'à nos jours. 1822–1900* (Paris, 1900); Bellesort, A., *La Roumanie contemporaine* (Paris, 1905), a book of travel; G. Benger, *Roumania in 1900,* translated by A. H. Keene (London, 1900), with bibliography; contains chapters on history, political organizations, commerce, religion, art, etc.; A. de Bertha, *Magyars et Roumains devant l'histoire* (Paris, 1899); Eliade, P., *Histoire de l'esprit public en Roumanie au XIX^e^ siècle* (Paris, 1905); Fisher, E., *Die Herkunft der Rumanen* (Bamberg, 1904); Georges Bengesco, *Bibliographie Franco-Roumaine, depuis le commencement du XIX^e^ siècle jusquà nos jours* (Paris, 1907), a list of works edited or published in France concerning Roumania, French works published by Roumanian authors, doctoral theses sustained by Roumanians down to 1894 before French faculties. O. Brillant, *Roumania* (1915), is a useful work.

On Serbian history: see, H. W. V. Temperley, *The History of Serbia* (1917); Miller, *The Balkans,* part III, chap. VII; very brief. Miller's book in general is very inadequate on period since 1878; P. Coquelle, *Le Royaume de Serbie* (Paris, 1901). Covers the history from 610 A. D. down; pp. 215–298 concern the nineteenth century from 1815 to 1900; W. M. Petrovitch, *Serbia, Her People, History, and Aspirations* (1915); E. Denis, *La Grande Serbie* (1915).

On Greece under Otto: see, Sergeant, L., *Greece in the Nineteenth Century* (1897), pp. 218–258; Finlay, G., *History of the Greek Revolution,* book V, chap. IV (down to 1843). On reign of George I: see, Sergeant, *Greece in the Nineteenth Century,* pp. 258–395. Bickford-Smith, R. A. H., *Greece Under King George* (1893), is not a history but a description of economic conditions, education, army and navy, constitution, etc. On Greece: see, also, Sir Richard C. Jebb's *Modern Greece* (1st Edition 1880, 2nd Edition 1901). On later Greek history; P. F. Martin, *Greece of the Twentieth Century* (1913); H. A. Gibbons, *Venizelos* (1920); William Miller, *History of the Greek People, 1821–1921* (1922).

On Turkey in the nineteenth century: see, Schevill, *The Balkan Peninsula,* pp. 293–481; Seignobos, *Political History of Europe Since 1814,* chap XX; S. Lane-Poole, *Turkey* (Story of the Nations Series, 1888), pp. 340–365; Odysseus (Sir C. Eliot), *Turkey in Europe* (1900); Lord Eversley, *The Turkish Empire: Its Growth and Decay* (1917); Villari, editor, *The Balkan*

Question (1905); Brailsford, H. N., *Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future* (1906); W. M. Ramsay, *Impressions of Turkey;* René Pinon, *L'Europe et la jeune Turquie; les aspects nouveaux de la question d'Orient* (1911). On the Revolution: see, Barton, *Daybreak in Turkey* (Boston, 1909); C. R. Buxton, *Turkey in Revolution* (London, 1909); G. F. Abbott, *Turkey in Transition* (1909). Sir E. Pears, *Turkey and its People* (ed. 1912); by an Englishman long resident in Turkey.

CHAPTER XXXII

Russia to the War with Japan

The best history of Russia in English covering this period is Skrine, F. H., *Expansion of Russia, 1815–1900* (1903); clear and free from partisanship; contains maps and bibliography. Rambaud, *History of Russia from the Earliest Times to 1877,* translated by L. B. Lang, 2 vols., vol. II, pp. 200–285, is useful. The last French edition is continued by Haumant to 1913. Rambaud's work was pronounced by Turgenieff "superior to any other history accessible to Western Europe." Rambaud, *The Expansion of Russia, Problems of the East and Problems of the Far East* (Burlington, Vt., 1900), a very useful résumé of the Russian advance into Asia. Morfill, W. R. A., *History of Russia from the Birth of Peter the Great to the Death of Alexander II* (1902), contains a good deal of information, poorly presented. Pages 342–471 cover the years from 1815 to 1898. By the same author, *Russia* (Story of the Nations Series, 1890), chaps. XI–XIV. James Mavor, *An Economic History of Russia,* 2 vols. (1914), masterly treatment of the subject.

On the reign of Alexander I, the most important work is T. Schiemann, *Russland unter Nikolaus I,* vol. I. This volume treats the reign of Alexander I, though not fully. Chap. IX, pp. 351–487, is a remarkably fine chapter on the conditions of Russia at that time. There are also chapters on Polish questions and a sketch of the career of Nicholas before his accession. Stern, *Geschichte Europas,* vol. III, chap I, has a valuable survey of the last ten years of Alexander's reign; consult, also, C. Joyneville, *Life and Times of Alexander I,* 3 vols. (1875).

On Nicholas I: Schiemann, work cited, vol. II, covers the five years 1825 to 1830, and contains many important documents; Stern, *Geschichte Europas,* vol. III, chap. II; on the beginning of the reign, 1825–1827; Bernhardi, T., *Unter Nikolaus und Friedrich*

Wilhelm IV (1893); THOUVENEL, L., *Nicholas et Napoléon III, 1852–1854* (1891); HAXTHAUSEN, *Étude sur les institutions nationales de la Russie,* translated from the German, 3 vols. (1847–1853); important for its description of the mir. On the reforms of Alexander II: see, SIR DONALD MACKENZIE WALLACE, *Russia* (revised edition, 1905), chaps. XXVII–XXXIII; ANATOLE LEROY-BEAULIEU, *The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians,* translated by Z. A. RAGOZIN, 3 vols. (1893–1896); vol. I devoted to the country and the people; vol. II to institutions; vol. III to religion and church affairs. These two are the best general descriptions of Russia and contain a great deal of history. See, also, for the reforms: MAXIME KOVALEVSKY, *Russian Political Institutions* (Chicago, 1902), chaps. VI–IX. On social unrest and nihilism: WALLACE, chap. XXXIV; LEROY-BEAULIEU, vol. II, Book VI; A. THUN, *Geschichte der revolutionären Bewegungen in Russland* (1883) — covers the period from 1863 to 1880 and has a good bibliography. The writings of a Russian refugee, STEPNIAK (pseudonym), *Underground Russia* (1882), *The Russian Peasant* (1888), are important, as describing conditions and state of mind of the masses; also, GOGOL, *Dead Souls.*

On the reign of Alexander III: see, H. VON SAMSON-HIMMELSTIERNA, *Russia Under Alexander III* (1897); CHARLES LOWE, *Alexander III* (1895); E. FLOURENS, *Alexander III* (1894); GEORGE KENNAN, *Siberia and the Exile System,* 2 vols. (4th edit., 1897); POBYEDONOSTSEFF, K. P., *Reflections of a Russian Statesman* (London, 1898); COUNT WITTE'S *Memoirs* (1921).

On the reign of Nicholas II: consult, WALLACE, *Russia,* chaps. XXXVI–XXXIX; PIERRE LEROY-BEAULIEU, *The Awakening of The East, Siberia, Japan, China* (1900); for a description of the development of Siberia: VLADIMIR, *Russia on the Pacific, and the Siberian Railway* (1899); M. M. SHOEMAKER, *The Great Siberian Railway* (1903); G. F. WRIGHT, *Asiatic Russia,* 2 vols. (1902); A. KRAUSSE, *Russia in Asia* (1899), strongly partisan, Russophobe; COMBES DE LESTRADE, *La Russie économique et sociale à l'avènement de S. M. Nicholas II* (1896); M. KOVALEVSKY, *Le régime économique de la Russie* (1898), and W. DE KOVALEVSKY, *L'Agriculture en Russie* (1897) and *La Russie à la fin du XIX^e siècle* (1900); GEOFFREY DRAGE, *Russian Affairs* (1904). STEPNIAK, *King Log and King Stork, a Study of Modern Russia,* 2 vols. (1895), and PRINCE KROPOTKIN, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist,* 2 vols. (1899), throw much light on conditions of Russian life.

On Poland: see, MORFILL, *Poland* (1893), (Story of the Nations Series), chaps. XII–XIV, and BRANDES, G. M. C., *Poland, A Study*

of the Land, People, and Literature (1903), a recent book by a Danish literary critic; KOVALEVSKY, M., *Russian Political Institutions,* chap. X. ORVIS, JULIA, *A Brief History of Poland* (1916), best short history of the whole subject; W. A. PHILLIPS, *Poland;* E. H. LEWINSKI-CORWIN, *Political History of Poland* (1917).

On Finland: J. R. FISHER, *Finland and the Tsars, 1809–1899* (London, 1899); F. MOREAU, *La question finlandaise* (1900); H. DE WUNDT, *Finland as It Is* (London, 1901); KOVALEVSKY, M., *Russian Political Institutions,* chap. XI. H. NORMAN, *All the Russias* (1902), presents the Russian side of the Finnish question, pp. 84–95.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE FAR EAST

The best English book on the relations between Europe and the East is SIR ROBERT K. DOUGLAS, *Europe and the Far East* (1904); contains a bibliography; treats of the opening of China and Japan to Western influences, the rise and re-organization of Japan, the Asiatic wars with European powers, the Chino-Japanese war, the Boxer insurrection, etc.; comes down to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. An admirable French book is EDOUARD DRIAULT, *La Question d'Extrême Orient* (1908); studies Chinese and Japanese civilizations, the history of the relations of Asia with Europe from the sixteenth to the twentieth century, gives an account of the Chino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars and describes the situation at the opening of the present century. PIERRE LEROY-BEAULIEU, *The Awakening of the East* (1900), comes down to 1899 and contains a good chapter on Japan (pp. 81–182), and on China (pp.183–289). For a briefer treatment: see, *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. XI, chap. XXVIII. The Library of Congress published (Washington, 1904) a *Select List of Books Relating to the Far East.*

On the opening of China: see, HENRI CORDIER, *Histoire générale de la Chine et ses relations avec les pays étrangers,* 4 vols. (1921), the best general history of China; REINSCH, P. S., *World Politics* (1900), pp. 86–257, very clear and illuminating; COLQUHOUN, A. R., *China in Transformation* (1898); SMITH, A. H., *China in Convulsion,* 2 vols. (1901), by an American, long a missionary in China; BROWN, A. J., *New Forces in Old China* (1904); MARTIN, W. A. P., *The Awakening of China* (1907). CORDIER, H., *Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales,* 2 vols. (1901–1902), covers the period since 1860. A. H. SMITH'S *Chinese Characteristics* (1890), a very informing book by a recognized authority

on China. Morse, H. M., *The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire* (1908), by a Harvard graduate, for thirty-three years resident in China.

On Japan: see, Murray, D., *The Story of Japan* (1894), chaps. XIII–XV; Griffis, W. E., *Life of Matthew Calbraith Perry* (1887), *The Mikado's Empire* (10th edit., 1903); *The Japanese Nation in Evolution* (1907); Iyenaga, *The Constitutional Development of Japan* (Johns Hopkins University Studies, Baltimore, 1891); Gollier, Théophile, *Essai sur les institutions politiques du Japon* (Brussels, 1903), a good account of the Japanese government; Knox, G. W., *Imperial Japan* (1905). On the causes of the Russo-Japanese war: see, Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict* (1904). For a list of books on the Russo-Japanese war: see, *Statesman's Year Book* for 1908, p. 1223. An important book is Hershey, A. S., *The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (1906); contains, among others, excellent chapters on the causes of the war and on the Treaty of Portsmouth.

A very interesting account by a participant in one of the great events of the war is Capt. Vladimir Semenoff, *The Battle of Tsushima between the Japanese and Russian Fleets, Fought on 27th of May, 1905.* Translated by A. B. Lindsay (London, 1906, 165 pp.).

Millard, T. F., *The New Far East* (1907); an examination of the situation of Japan and her relation to the Far Eastern Question, with special reference to the interests of the United States and the future of China; contains chapters on Japan in Korea, in Manchuria, the New China, Japan, China and the West; contains, also, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Japanese-Korean Agreement of 1905.

Dyer, Henry, *Japan in World Politics* (1909), by a professor emeritus in the University of Tokio; has chapters on the Meeting of the Far East and the West, on the Rise of Japan as a World Power, on the Factors of National Life, on the Civilizations of the East and the West, etc.

On the recent history of the Far East see:

Hornbeck, S. K., *Contemporary Politics in the Far East* (1916), invaluable, treats the recent history of China, Japan, and the relations of those countries with the United States; Count S. Okuma, *Fifty Years of New Japan* (1909); Count T. Hayashi, *The Secret Memoirs of,* edited by A. M. Pooley (1915), the memoirs of a Japanese statesman and diplomat; K. Kawakami, *Japan in World Politics* (1917); W. W. McLaren, *A Political History of Japan* (1916); A. S. Hershey, *Modern Japan* (1919), excellent recent

study. On China: Henri Cordier, *Histoire générale de la Chine et ses relations avec les pays étrangers*, 4 vols. (1921), best general history. A standard work is H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 3 vols. (1918); K. S. Latourette, *The Development of China* (1921), good brief account; T. F. F. Millard's *Democracy and the Eastern Question* (1919) is by an American long resident in the East, critical of the Japanese; Reinsch, P. S., *An American Diplomat in China, 1913–1919* (1922), by the late American minister to China (1920); W. W. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China* (1920); H. A. Gibbons, *The New Map of Asia* (1919), a popular account.

CHAPTER XXXIV

Russia After the War with Japan

The most useful description of the events of this period will be found in the *Annual Register*. Dodd, *Modern Constitutions*, gives the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire of May 6th, 1906, with useful notes. Harper, S. N., *The New Electoral Law for the Russian Duma* (Chicago, 1908), is an excellent description of the electoral law. Miliukov, Paul, *Russia and its Crisis* (Chicago, 1905), presents the Liberal theory of the crisis: a very instructive book. Victor Bérard, *The Russian Empire and Czarism*, translated by G. Fox-Davies and G. O. Pope (1905), has certain chapters describing the process of Russification attempted with the Poles, Jews, Finns, and Armenians. Other books that may be consulted are: Pares, B., *Russia and Reform* (1907); Nevinson, H. W., *The Dawn in Russia* (1906); Perris, G. H., *Russia in Revolution* (1905); Martin, R., *The Future of Russia* (1906); Korff, S. A., *Autocracy and Revolution in Russia* (1923).

CHAPTER XXXV

The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913

On the peace movement: see, Holls, F. W., *The Peace Conference at the Hague, and Its Bearings on International Law and Policy* (1900); an account of the First Conference of 1899 by a member of the delegation of the United States; Hull, W. I., *The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to International Law* (1908), a comparative study of the discussions and achievements of the Con-

ferences of 1899 and 1907, well arranged and clearly presented; Scott, J. B., *The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907,* two elaborate and authoritative volumes (1909). Vol. I consists of lectures delivered at Johns Hopkins University by Scott, one of the delegates of the United States at the conference of 1907, lectures now much revised and enlarged; vol. II contains the official documents, the instructions to American delegates, their official reports, and the various texts drawn up at the Conferences and ratified by the participating powers; Higgins, A. P., *The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International Conferences Concerning the Laws and Usages of War* (Cambridge University Press, 1909); Foster, J. W., *Arbitration and the Hague Court* (1904).

On the régime of the Young Turks: Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe,* Chap. XI, pp. 180–219; Pears, *Forty Years in Constantinople.*

On the war between Italy and Turkey: Gibbons, Chap. XIII, pp. 241–262.

On the war between the Balkan States and Turkey: Gibbons, Chap. XIV, pp. 263–318; J. G. Schurman, *The Balkan Wars* (1914), pp. 3–60; G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe, 1878–1919,* ch. 15; Seymour, *The Diplomatic Background of the War,* Chap. X. G. E. Gueshoff, *The Balkan League* (with documents), (1915).

On the war between the Balkan States: Gibbons, Chap. XV, pp. 319–350; Schurman, pp. 63–131; Seymour, Chap. X. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; *Report of International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (1914).

On Albania: Chekrezi, C. A., *Albania Past and Present* (1919); J. Bourcart, *L'Albanie et les Albanais* (1921); J. Godart, *L'Albanie en 1921* (1922).

CHAPTER XXXVI

The World War

General Causes of the War

General Causes of the War:

A good introduction to this whole subject is to be found in Charles Seymour, *The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870–1914* (1916), an interesting and informing book which shows clearly the relation of the crisis of 1914 to the history of Europe since 1870, the various factors of that crisis in their historical develop-

ment. Very useful is: F. M. Anderson and A. S. Hershey, *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1870–1914* (1918). Consult also W. S. Davis, *The Roots of the War* (1918). See also, Achille Viallate, *L'Impérialisme économique et les relations internationales pendant le dernier demi-siècle, 1870–1920* (1923). Gooch, G. P., *History of Modern Europe, 1878–1919* (1923), ch. XVI, brief statement.

The most extensive survey of the diplomatic history preceding the war is Debidour, A., *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Congrès de Berlin jusqu'à nos jours, 1878–1916* (2 Vols. 1917–1920). H. A. Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe (1911–1914)* (1914), a popular account of the years immediately preceding the war. Essential for an understanding of the period is A. C. Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance* (1917), an illuminating and thoroughly informed, compact volume, describing the formation and development of the most important single factor in the international situation. With this book as an introduction the student is in a position to use and greatly profit from F. Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879–1914* (2 vols. 1920), English Edition by A. C. Coolidge, a work of the first importance, throwing a flood of light upon the origins of the Triple Alliance and upon Austrian Eastern policies, containing invaluable documents, treaties, correspondence, memoranda, collected since the war by a distinguished Austrian historian from the Austrian State Archives. Vol. II, pp. 3–180, contains an elaborate history of the negotiations between the nations concerned. The documents and the historical narrative have been carefully translated by D. P. Myers and J. G. D'Arcy Paul. A most instructive book on the deep-lying causes of the war.

Useful for international relations are the 162 *Handbooks Prepared Under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office* (London, 1920), of uneven value.

There is a large literature on the foreign policies of the different countries before the war. A few useful titles are the following:

Germany:

W. H. Dawson, *The German Empire, 1867–1914* (1919), vol. II, chaps. XV, XVI, XVII, XX–XXIV; B. E. Schmitt, *England and Germany, 1740–1914*, excellent; G. W. Prothero, *German Policy before the War* (1916), good brief account; Reventlow, *Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik, 1888–1913* (ed. 1918), from standpoint of a Pan-German; P. Rohrbach, *German World Policies* (1915) and *Germany's Isolation; An Exposition of the Economic*

Causes of the War (1915); Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1914); Bülow, B. von, *Imperial Germany* (1914), official point of view (the German edition of 1917, *Deutsche Politik,* contains matter not in the edition of 1914); Émile Laloy, *La diplomatie de Guillaume II* (1917), covers period from 1888 to 1914; Morris Jastrow, *The War and the Bagdad Railway* (1917); R. G. Usher, *Pan-Germanism* (1913), a lively and popular book; André Chéradame, *The Pan-German Plot Unmasked* (1917); Freidrich Naumann, *Central Europe* (1917); Baron Beyens, *Germany before the War* (1915); D. J. Hill, *Impressions of the Kaiser* (1918), interesting and close observation and analysis of the Kaiser's personality and diplomacy; C. D. Hazen, *Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule* (1917).

England:

Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *England and Germany, 1740–1914* (1916), an admirable treatment of Anglo-German relations from the historical point of view. The best general survey. Treats with particular fulness the period since 1870. Gilbert Murray, *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906–1915* (1915), critical; G. H. Perris, *Our Foreign Policy and Sir Edward Grey's Failure* (1912), a severe attack; Egerton, H. E., *British Foreign Policy in Europe* (1917); Hassall, A., *History of British Foreign Policy* (1912), the last two general but useful for our purposes; Trevelyan, G. M., *The British Empire;* Sarolea, C., *The Anglo-German Problem.*

France:

R. Pinon, *France et Allemagne, 1870–1913* (1913); André Tardieu, *France and the Alliances* (1909); *La Conférence d'Algésiras* (1909), and *Le Mystère d'Agadir* (1912); P. Albin, *D'Agadir à Serajevo (1911–1914)* (1915); W. M. Fullerton, *Problems of Power* (2nd ed., 1915).

Immediate Causes of the War:

Valuable books upon the attitude of different countries and upon the official negotiations and explanations at the beginning of the war are: J. B. Scott (editor), *Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War,* 2 vols. (1916); E. C. Stowell, *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914* (1915), marked by much careful analysis of the documents; J. W. Headlam, *The History of Twelve Days, July 24 to August 4th, 1914* (1915); *Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European*

War, published by Harrison and Sons, London; F. Roches, *Manuel des origines de la guerre,* clear and well documented, based on the multi-colored official books; Bourgeois et Pagès, *Les origines et les responsibilités de la grande guerre,* very useful. Poincaré, R., *Les origines de la guerre* (1921), a book of the first importance by the man who, at the outbreak of the war, was President of France. All these books contain important source material, and several of them much pertinent discussion and criticism. Valentin, *Deutschland Aussenpolitik,* good discussion by a German. O. P. Chitwood, *The Immediate Causes of the Great War* (1917), an excellent small volume; J. M. Beck, *The Evidence in the Case* (1914), effective and popular marshalling of the facts; J. H. Rose, *The Origins of the War;* Leon van der Essen, *The Invasion and the War in Belgium, with a Sketch of the Diplomatic Negotiations Preceding the Conflict* (1917); Charles de Visscher, *Belgium's Case, a Juridical Enquiry,* translated by E. F. Jaurdain (1916); Émile Waxweiler, *Belgium, Neutral and Loyal, the War of 1914* (1915), and the same author's *Belgium and the Great Powers* (1916); Charles Sarolea, *How Belgium Saved Europe* (1915); Émile Hovelaque, *Les causes profondes de la guerre* (1915), a suggestive brief study. Very important are: *The Disclosures from Germany,* edited and translated by Munroe Smith (1918) and containing the Lichnowsky Memorandum and the Memorandum and Letters of Dr. Muehlon; and Munroe Smith, *Militarism* and *Statecraft* (1918), powerful and acute criticism of military strategy versus diplomacy in Germany in Bismarck's time and at the beginning of the war, and containing also an account of German land-hunger and other underlying causes of the war. Indispensable post-war publications from the archives of Germany and Austria are Karl Kautsky, *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch,* 4 vols. (1919), and Richard Gooss, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges, 1914,* 3 vols. (1919–). Sidney B. Fay subjects some of the new literature on the subject to examination in several articles on *New Light on the Origin of the War,* published in the *American Historical Review,* 1920–21. Five altogether exceptional articles, revealing wide knowledge and the finest kind of criticism, are those by Pierre Renouvin, lecturer at the Sorbonne, on *Les origines immédiates de la guerre mondiale* in the *Revue des Cours et Conférences* (1923). See also Heinrich Kanner, *Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik; Ein Stück Zeitgenössischer Geschichte* (1922), a book based mainly on the documents published by Kautsky and Gooss. Important material, taken from the Russian Archives and published by the Bolshevist government, is to be found in E. Laloy, *Les documents secrets,* and in *Un*

Livre Noir, containing documents covering years 1910–1914. (Paris, 1923.)

The World War:

The literature is already enormous and is rapidly growing. Probably the best single volume history of the war is vol. IX of Lavisse, *Histoire de France contemporaine,* 1922. The three new volumes of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1922) contains a great number of valuable articles on every aspect of the war, military campaigns, political and diplomatic history, technical matter, biographical data. Of the very first importance for the study of certain aspects of the War is *The Economic and Social History of the World War,* which is being published by the Carnegie Endowment under the general editorship of James T. Shotwell. This elaborately planned survey deals with the economic and social effects of the war upon sixteen European countries. It will comprise, when finished, some hundred and fifty volumes, written by historians, economists, statesmen, men of affairs. Eleven volumes have already appeared (June 1923). The exceptional value of this great undertaking is already apparent. The student will have to go elsewhere for the military, political, and diplomatic events of the war, but within its carefully defined limits this history is a mine of information. A useful aid in the study of the war is S. B. Harding, *A Syllabus of the Great War* (1918); also F. W. T. Lange and W. T. Berry, *Books on the Great War,* an annotated bibliography (1915); Serviceable short histories of the war are: C. J. H. Hayes, *A Brief History of the Great War* (1920), a clear, well-arranged, and balanced account, with an excellent bibliography; A. F. Pollard, *A Short History of the Great War* (1920), by a distinguished English historian; H. Vast, *Little History of the Great War,* by a careful French historian; Victor Giraud, *Histoire de la grande guerre* (1920), more extensive than the former. Elaborate general histories of the war are: F. H. Simonds, *The Great War,* 5 vols. (1914–1920); John Buchan, *A History of the Great War,* 4 vols. (1921–22); John Buchan, *Nelson's History of the War* (1915–); Hermann Stegemann, *Geschichte des Krieges,* 3 vols. (1917–19). *The London Times History of the War* and the *New York Times Current History of the War* are journalistic and uncritical but contain much information and many pictorial illustrations.

Special subjects are treated in the following: D. W. Johnson, *Topography and Strategy in the War* (1917), and, also, *Battlefields of the World War* (1921), both excellent, by an authority on geography; Louis Madelin, *La Victoire de la Marne* (1919); John Masefield, *Gallipoli* (1916); Louis Gillet, *La Bataille de*

Verdun (1920); H. W. Nevinson, *The Dardanelles Campaign* (1918); Raymond Recouley, *Foch, le vainqueur de la guerre* (1919), and (same author) *La Bataille de Foch* (1920); H. A. Atteridge, *Marshal Ferdinand Foch* (1919); G. M. Trevelyan, *Scenes from Italy's War* (1919).

Many accounts by participants in the war, military or civil, have appeared, of which a few are: Ludendorff, *My War Memories, 1914–1918,* 2 vols. (1919); Hindenburg, *Out of My Life* (1920); Tirpitz, *My Memoirs,* 2 vols. (1919); Bethmann-Hollweg, T. von, *Reflections on the World War,* Part I (1920); Erzberger, M., *Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg* (1920); Scheidemann, P., *Der Zusammenbruch* (1921). Charles Schmidt, *Les plans secrets de la politique allemande en Alsace-Lorraine, 1915–1918* (1922). Bernstorff, J. H. von, *My Three Years in America* (1920); French *"1914," the Memoirs of Field Marshall Viscount French (1914);* Haig, *Despatches December 1915–April 1919* (1920), edited by J. H. Boraston; Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet, 1914–1916* (1918). The memoirs of Lloyd George and Herbert Asquith are announced. Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis 1911–1914* (1923), by the man who was head of the British admiralty from 1911 to 1915. Brand Whitlock, *Belgium, a Personal Narrative,* 2 vols. (1919), one of the great war books; Baron Beyens, *La Belgique pendant la guerre* (1923), a brief, instructive account; Hugh Gibson, *A Journal from Our Legation in Belgium* (1917); Henry Morganthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (1918); James W. Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany* (1917) and *Face to Face with Kaiserism* (1918).

On American participation in the war see: J. B. Scott (editor) *President Wilson's Foreign Policy,* messages, addresses, papers (1918); (same editor) *A Survey of International Relations between the United States and Germany, August 1, 1914–April 6, 1917* (1917); Hendrick, B. J., *The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page,* 2 vols. (1922), an historical source of the first importance, as well as a fine addition to literature; A. W. Lane, *The Letters of Franklin K. Lane,* (1922); Charles Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War* (1922), is a volume in the Chronicles of America series; Lindsay Rogers, *America's Case against Germany* (1917); J. B. McMaster, *The United States in the World War,* 2 vols. (1919–20); J. S. Bassett, *Our War with Germany, a History* (1919); Chambrun and Marenches, *The American Army in the European Conflict* (1919); Arthur W. Page, *Our 110 Days' Fighting* (1920), a very accurate and precise account of the operations in which Americans were involved; Sims, W. S., *The Victory at Sea* (1920).

CHAPTER XXXVII

Making the Peace

General Books on Post War History:

The *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* new volumes (1922), contain the largest body of historical and biographical information on the last few years easily available for students; Bowman, Isaiah, *The New World, Problems in Political Geography* (1921), the most useful introduction to world politics of the present day, whose value is greatly augumented by its two hundred and eighty maps and its extensive bibliography; Eisenmann, Bourgeois, Fournol, and others, *Les Problèmes de l'Europe Centrale* (1923), an important series of lectures on the historical, political, territorial, economic, and financial problems of Central Europe; H. A. Gibbons, *An Introduction to World Politics* (1922) journalistic, showing marks of haste in construction, judgments often too categorical; Charles A. Beard, *Cross Currents in Europe Today* (1922); Lord Bryce, *International Relations. Eight Lectures delivered in the United States in August, 1921* (1922); Achille Viallate, *L'Impérialisme Économique* (1923) pp. 221–294 on *La Guerre et ses conséquences;* L. Haden Guest, *The Struggle for Power in Europe, 1917–1921* (1921), a British physician's travel impressions and observations; A. Meillet, *Les langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (1918); McBain and Rogers, *The New Constitutions of Europe* (1922), invaluable for the student, contains English translations of thirteen new constitutions as well as useful notes and references; R. J. Kerner, *Slavic Europe; A Selected Bibliography in the Western European Languages* (1918); a scientific bibliography of great utility. While only brought down to the beginning of the war, it is very useful for an understanding of the later period; the works cited deal with the Russians, Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, and Bulgarians; F. M. Anderson and A. S. Hershey, *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia and Africa (1870–1914),* (1918); though only coming down to the war is nevertheless a valuable aid in the study of many of the problems of the subsequent period; B. Potter Pitman, *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization* (1922); Jacques Bardoux, *De Paris à Spa; la bataille diplomatique pour la paix française* (February, 1919–October, 1920), (1921), by a professor at the *École Libre des Sciences Politiques. The Statesman's Year Book, The International Year Book, The Annual Register,* the *Political Science Quarterly* annual supplements entitled *Record of*

Political Events, the *Round Table,* the *Current History Magazine,* the newly founded *Foreign Affairs* and the French weekly, *L'Europe Nouvelle* are extremely useful for a study of current events and problems. Denys P. Myers', *Manual of Collections of Treaties and of Collections relating to Treaties* (1922), of invaluable assistance in finding the text of treaties.

A very convenient and useful collection of material, treaties, correspondence, speeches, bearing upon contemporary history is the Documents of *The American Association for International Conciliation.*

The Conference of Paris:

The most elaborate work is H. W. V. Temperley (editor), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (1920–). Six volumes have already appeared, one more is promised. Invaluable, contains much documentary material, and also historical and interpretative chapters, of uneven quality. Other volumes are C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (1920); contains excellent chapters on the history of and the decisions concerning the most important territorial problems raised by the war; clear, explanatory, and accompanied by helpful bibliographical notes; House and Seymour, *What Really Happened at Paris* (1921), the story of the Conference as told by certain of the American delegates; Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations, a Personal Narrative* (1921) and (same author) *The Big Four and Others* (1921), important books by the American Secretary of State; R. S. Baker, *What Wilson Did at Paris* (1919), uncritical, excessively laudatory; C. T. Thompson, *The Peace Conference Day by Day* (1920); A. P. Scott, *An Introduction to the Peace Treaties* (1920); E. J. Dillon, *The Inside History of the Peace Conference* (1920); Bernard M. Baruch, *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty* (1920). Tumulty, J. P., *Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him* (1921), by the President's private secretary; Rothbart, *Die Grossen Vier am Werk,* presents the German point of view.

R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* 3 vols., (1922); the third volume contains important documents.

The most enlightening account of the growth and formation of the Treaty of Versailles, and its most powerful explanation and defense are to be found in André Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty* (1921). Tardieu was a leading member of the French delegation and was intimately associated with the work of the Conference in all its stages. Other studies and criticisms of the Treaty are:

Léon Bourgeois, *Le Traité de Paix de Versailles* (1919); Charles Benoist, *Les nouvelles frontières d'Allemagne et la nouvelle carte d'Europe* (1920); Louis Barthou, *Le Traité de Paix* (1919); Gabriel Hanotaux, *Le Traité de Versailles du 28 Juin, 1919* (1919). A bitter and exaggerated attack upon the Treaty, very feeble on the political side, is J. M. Keynes's *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919), to which Raphael-Georges Levy's *La juste paix* (1920) is a reply.

The Treaty itself has been published in several forms and is easily procurable. An edition that may be recommended for history classes is that published by the American Association for International Conciliation.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

Germany Since the Revolution

George Young, *The New Germany* (1920); R. H. Lutz, *The German Revolution of 1918–1919.* (1922); Maurice Baumont and Marcel Berthelot, *L'Allemagne, Lendemains de Guerre et de Révolution* (1922), excellent; McBain and Rogers, *The New Constitutions of Europe* (1922), contains translations of the new constitutions of Germany and Prussia; Bowman, *The New World,* ch. X; Edmond Vermeil, *La Constitution de Weimar* (1923), the most important study of the subject that has yet appeared; René Brunet, *The German Constitution* (1922), an analytical discussion and exposition of the new constitution with an explanation of economic and social factors active in the overthrow of the old and the establishment of the new régime. The best treatment of the subject in English. Henri Lichtenberger, *L'Allemagne d'aujourd'hui dans ses relations avec la France* (1922), the most penetrating book that has appeared on post-war German opinion and action. Victor Cambon, *L'Allemagne Nouvelle,* 1923, a detailed description of the actual state of German industries, economic methods, etc. René Lauret, *Les conditions de la vie en Allemagne,* 1923, a carefully documented study; Hermann Brinckmeyer, *Hugo Stinnes,* 1921.

CHAPTER XXXIX

The Republic of Czecho-Slovakia

Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference,* vol. IV, pp. 236–277, excellent chapter by R. W. Seton-Watson; Bowman, *The New*

World, ch. XIII; Haskins and Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference,* ch. VI; Guest, *The Struggle for Power in Europe,* pp. 136–171; Louis Eisenmann, *La Tchécoslovaquie* (1921), best description of the institutions and component elements of the new republic; Louise Weiss, *La République Tchécoslovaque,* preface by Edward Benes (1919); Charles Rivet, *Les Tchécoslovaques* (1921); Edward Benes, *Bohemia's Case for Independence* (1916); T. G. Masaryk, *The New Europe* (1918); Vladimer Nosek, *Independent Bohemia,* an account of the Czecho-Slovak Struggle for Liberty (1918); Etienne Fournol, *De la Succession d'Autriche* (1918); Alexander Broz, *The First Year of the Czecho-slovak Republic* (1921); E. Stern, *La législation ouvrière tchécoslovaque;* Jean Bourlier, *Les Tcheques et la Bohême contemporaine* (1918). Louis Leger, *La Renaissance tchèque au XIX^e siècle* (1911), an excellent exposition of pre-war development; A. Mousset, *La Petite Entente,* (1923).

CHAPTER XL

The Republic of Poland

Haskins and Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (1920), excellent chapter on the resurrection of Poland and boundary problems (pp. 153–200); House and Seymour, *What Really Happened at Paris,* pp. 67–86; L. Haden Guest, *The Struggle for Power in Europe,* pp. 109–135; Ralph Butler, *The New Eastern Europe* (1919), has chapters on Poland in 1917, 1918, and 1919; Askenazy, *Danzig and Poland,* discusses the subject indicated by the title. See also Bowman, *The New World,* ch. XIX. Two instructive books on present-day Poland are Ray Devereux (Mrs. Devereux Pember), *Poland Reborn* (1922) and Marcel Pernot, *L'Epreuve de la Pologne* (1921). See also Bruce Boswell, *Poland and the Poles* (1921), and Charles Phillips, *The New Poland,* (1922).

CHAPTER XLI

Roumania

R. W. Seton-Watson, *Roumania and the Great War* (1915), a discussion of the Roumanian national problem; Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference,* vol. IV, pp. 213–236; Guest, *The Struggle for Power in Europe,* pp. 210–244; Take Jonesco, *Souvenirs* (1919), a volume of much interest; D. Iancovici, *La Paix de Bucharest,*

Mai 7, 1918 (1918), and (same author) *Take Jonesco* (1918), a brief biography of the Roumanian Liberal statesman; Marcel Gillard, *La Roumanie nouvelle* (1922); the most informing book on contemporary Roumania; studies of Roumanian society, ethnic minorities, the economic crisis, the political evolution. A. Mousset, *La Petite Entente;* C. U. Clark, *Greater Roumania* (1922), uncritical, strongly pro-Roumanian, but contains much information concerning the geography, resources, literature and recent history of the country.

CHAPTER XLII

Jugo-Slavia

Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference,* vol. IV, pp. 171–212; House and Seymour, *What Really Happened at Paris,* ch. VI, by Professor D. W. Johnson on *Fiume and the Adriatic Problem;* Kerner, R. J., *Slavic Europe, a Selected Bibliography* (1918), and (same author) "The Jugo-Slav Movement" in the *Russian Revolution, and the Jugo-Slav Movement* (1918); R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy* (1911), and (same author) *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans* (1917); A. H. E. Taylor, *The Future of the Southern Slavs* (1917); H. W. V. Temperley, *History of Serbia* (1917); McBain and Rogers, *The New Constitutions of Europe* (1922); A. Mousset, *Le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes* (1921), the best book that has yet appeared on the Jugo-Slav state. By the same author, *La Petite Entente,* (1923). There is an excellent chapter on Jugo-Slavia in Bowman, *The New World,* ch. XIV.

CHAPTER XLIII

The Republic of Austria

Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference of Paris.* Volume IV (pp. 462–484) contains an admirable chapter by A. C. Coolidge on *The New Austria;* Bowman, *The New World,* ch. XI; Haskins and Lord, *Some Problems of The Peace Conference,* chap. VI, pp. 201–229; L. Haden Guest, *The Struggle for Power in Europe,* pp. 172–188; Jean Kervégan, *L'Autriche en 1921* (1921); Marcel Dunan, *L'Autriche* (1921), in the useful series *Les États Contemporains,* has chapters on the history, the soil and population, the institutions, the economic state, the letters, arts, and sciences of

Austria; J. Tersannes, *Le problème autrichien et la menace du rattachment à l'Allemagne* (1921); Kelsen, *Die Verfassungsgesetze der Republik Oesterreich* (1919); Karl Neisser, *Politische Chronik*, for 1918–1920; and (same author), *Ein Jahr Republik Oesterreich* (1920). McBain and Rogers, *The New Constitutions of Europe*, gives the new constitution of Austria.

CHAPTER XLIV

Hungary Since the War

Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. IV, pp. 485–497, chapter by H. W. V. Temperley; Haskins and Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, pp. 231–262, chapter on Hungary and the Adriatic; Bowman, *The New World*, ch. XII; Guest, *The Struggle for Power in Europe*, pp. 189–209. Tharaud, *Quand Israël est Roi* (1921), is a brilliant account of the Jews in contemporary Hungary, of the revolution of 1918, the Karolyi and Béla Kun régimes, etc. Count Paul Teleki, *The Place of Hungary in European History* (1922), lectures delivered at Williamstown in 1921; point of view that of the ruling Magyar class, reactionary. A. Hevesy, *Nationalities in Hungary* (1919).

CHAPTER XLV

Bulgaria and the Treaty of Neuilly

Léon Lamouche, *La Bulgarie*, 1923, the most informing book on contemporary Bulgaria; Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. IV, pp. 444–461; Haskins and Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, chap. VIII; Bowman, *The New World*, ch. XVI.

CHAPTER XLVI

Soviet Russia

The background to recent Russian history is conveniently furnished by Gregor Alexinsky, *Modern Russia* (1913); R. Beazley, N. Forbes and G. A. Birkett, *Russia from the Varangians to the Bolsheviks* (1918); F. H. Skrine, *The Expansion of Russia, 1815–1900* (1904); T. G. Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia*, 2 vols. (1919),

a remarkable book; MAVOR, J., *The Economic History of Russia*, 2 vols. (1914), the most extensive treatment of the subject.

On recent history see particularly the articles by VINOGRADOFF in vol. XXXII of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica;* M. J. OLGIN, *The Soul of the Russian Revolution* (1917); BARON S. A. KORFF, *Russia's Foreign Relations during the Last Half Century* (1922); SIR PAUL VINOGRADOFF, *Self-Government in Russia* (1915), and (same author) *The Reconstruction of Russia* (1919); S. ZAGORSKY, *La République des Soviets, Bilan Economique* (1921); A. ISWOLSKY, *The Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky* (edited and translated by C. L. SEEGER), 1920; MAURICE PALÉOLOGUE, *La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre;* has been translated into English under the title *An Ambassador's Memories* (London, 1923); PIERRE GILLIARD, *Thirteen Years at the Russian Court* (1922): by the tutor of the late Czarevitch; describes the last days of the various members of the Imperial Family; ROSEN, *Forty Years of Diplomacy* (1922); KORFF, S. A., *Autocracy and Revolution in Russia* (1923).

The literature on Bolshevism is extensive, most of it highly controversial: M. A. LANDAU-ALDANOV, *Lenine* (1919), a brief biography; NICOLAI LENINE (V. I. ULIANOV), *The State and Revolution* (1919), *Land Revolution in Russia* (1919) and *The Great Initiative* (1920); L. TROTSKY, *Our Revolution: Essays on Working-class and International Revolution, 1904–1917,* collected and translated by M. J. OLGIN (1918) and (same author) *The Bolsheviks and World Peace* (1918), present some of the views of the two most conspicuous Bolshevik leaders. Among the more significant books on Bolshevism are: JOHN SPARGO, *Bolshevism; The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy* (1919), *The Psychology of Bolshevism* (1919) and *The Greatest Failure in History* (1920), by an American Socialist; PAUL N. MILIUKOV, *Bolshevism; an International Danger* (1920), *History of the Second Russian Revolution* (1920), *Russia, Today and Tomorrow* (1922), by a leader of the Russian Liberals; BERTRAND RUSSELL, *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920); KARL KAUTSKY, *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (1920), by the leader of the Marxian Socialists; KERENSKY, A. F., *The Prelude to Bolshevism* (1919); WILLIAM T. GOODE, *Bolshevism at Work* (1920); ARTHUR BULLARD, *The Russian Pendulum;* ÉMILE VANDEVELDE, *The Three Aspects of the Russian Revolution* (1918), by a leader of the Belgian Socialists; S. ZAGORSKY, *L'Évolution actuelle du bolchevisme russe* (1922). The Report of the British Labor Delegation which visited Russia is important and has been published by the New York *Nation* (September 25, 1920). K. LEITES, *Recent Economic Developments in Russia* (1922).

CHAPTER XLVII

France Since the War

Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. XXXI (1922); Bowman, *The New World,* ch. III; Raymond Leslie Buell, *Contemporary French Politics* (1920), an informing discussion of post-war conditions, tendencies and problems; William MacDonald, *Reconstruction in France* (1922), precise, detailed, authoritative; Edward M. Sait, *Government and Politics of France* (1921), the chapters on Political Development and Parties have some account of France since the war; A. Fabre-Luce, *La Crise des Alliances* (1922), an able, critical account of Franco-British relations since the armistice; Paul Bureau, *Quinze Années de Séparation* (1921), a study of the law of separation of 1905 in operation, hostile; Michel Auge-Laribé, *Le paysan français après la guerre* (1923): on the political situation and discussions after the war see, A. de Tarde et R. de Jouvenel, *La politique d'aujourd'hui* (1923); Celtus, *La France à Gênes. Un programme français de reconstruction économique de l'Europe* (1922); Robert Veyssié, *La Paix par la Ruhr* (1923); on conspicuous French politicians of today see Etienne Fournol, *Le Moderne Plutarque* (1923) and an anonymous book entitled *Ceux qui nous mènent* (1922). On the colonies see, Albert Sarraut, *La Mise en valeur des colonies françaises* (1923). On Alsace-Lorraine, George Delahache, *Les débuts de l'administration française en Alsace et en Lorraine* (1921).

CHAPTER XLVIII

Great Britain and Her Empire

On the Empire: Bowman, *The New World,* ch. II, on Problems of Imperial Britain; Lionel Curtis, *The Commonwealth of Nations* (1918); George Louis Beer, *The English-Speaking Peoples* (1917); A. B. Keith, *Imperial Unity and the Dominions* (1916); H. Duncan Hall, *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (1920); A. B. Keith, *The War Government of the British Dominions* (1921), one of the volumes of the Carnegie Endowment *Economic and Social History of the War;* J. A. Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion* (1922). On Ireland: Ernest Barker, *Ireland in the Last Fifty Years, 1866–1918* (1919), a brief but illuminating examination of the Irish problem; Horace Plunkett, *Ireland in the New Century*

(1904); *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* vol. XXXI, best treatment of recent Irish history; E. R. Turner, *Ireland and England, in the Past and Present* (1919); Francis Hackett, *Ireland: A Study in Nationalism* (1918); Maurice Joy, editor, *The Irish Rebellion of 1916* (1916); W. B. Wells and N. Marlowe, *A History of the Irish Rebellion of 1916* (1917), and (same authors) *The Irish Convention and Sinn Fein* (1918); Stephen Gwynn, *The Last Years of John Redmond* (1919); D. Figges, *The Irish Constitution* (1922); A. C. White, *The Irish Free State: its Evolution and Possibilities* (1922); R. M. Henry, *The Evolution of Sinn Fein* (1920); Gen. Michael Collins, *The Path to Freedom* (1923). On India: particularly useful for very recent history is Sir Valentine Chirol, *India, Old and New* (1921); discusses recent political reforms, the Gandhi movement, etc.; J. C. Wedgewood, *The Future of the Indo-British Commonwealth* (1922): from the point of view of a radical; Lajpat Rai, *England's Debt to India* (1917): an Indian view of the English occupation of India; L. Curtis, *Dyarchy* 1921; E. A. Horne, *The Political Systems of British India* (1922); C. P. Ilbert, *The Government of India* (1922); On Mesopotamia: see, Miss G. L. Bell's *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (1920), being a British official report giving the views of the chief Arab sheiks toward British administration of Mesopotamia. On Egypt see M. Labry, *La Révolution Egyptienne* (1922), important, standpoint that of an Egyptian Nationalist. On Africa consult F. D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandates in British Tropical Africa* (1922); E. Antonelli, *L'Afrique et la Paix de Versailles* (1921), contains an account of the war in Africa and the recent changes in the distribution of African territory.

CHAPTER XLIX

Turkey Since the War

Maurice Pernot, *La question turque* (1923); Bowman, *The New World,* chaps. XXIV–XXVIII. M. Lhéritier, *La Grèce.* (1922). *Annual Register* and current reviews.

CHAPTER L

Belgium During and Since the War

Baron Beyens, *La Belgique pendant la Guerre* (1923); Brand Whitlock, *Belgium, a Personal Narrative,* 2 vols. (1919) an invalu-

able source of information, by the American minister to Belgium from 1913 to 1917; Henri Pirenne, *Souvenirs de Captivité en Allemagne,* (1920); Belgium's leading historian's account of his imprisonment in Germany from March 1916 to November 1918, his observations, etc.; LeRoy Roussel, *Abrogation de la neutralité de la Belgique. Ses causes et ses effets.* (1923.)

Several volumes of great importance for the history of Belgium are included in *The Economic and Social History of the World War,* edited by James T. Shotwell, and have already appeared or are in press. They are: Ferdinand Passelecq, *Deportation of Belgian Workmen and the Forced Labor of the Civilian Population during the German Occupation of Belgium;* Albert Henry, *Food Supply of Belgium during the German Occupation;* J. Pirenne and M. Vauthier, *German Legislation with Reference to the Occupation of Belgium;* Ernest Mahaim, *Unemployment in Belgium during the German Occupation;* Charles de Kerchove, *Destruction of Belgian Industry by the Germans;* F. J. Van Langenhove, *Economic Policy of the Belgian Government during the War.*

CHAPTER LI

Contemporary Italy

Page, T. N., *Italy and the World War* (1921). By the ambassador of the United States to Italy during the war; Ernest Lémonon, *L'Italie d'après-guerre,* 1914–1921 (1922); very informing; T. Tittoni, *Modern Italy* (1922); Paul Hazard, *L'Italie vivante,* 1923, an extremely interesting book of impressions and appreciations of men and things Italian, having reference particularly to the years 1921 and 1922; by a professor at the Sorbonne. Bowman, *The New World,* ch. V, describes the Italian situation on the morrow of the war. On Fiume see J. N. Macdonald, *A Political Escapade: The Story of Fiume and D'Annunzio* (1921).

CHAPTER LII

The League of Nations

The League of Nations Starts: An Outline by its Organizers (1920), chapters by R. B. Fosdick, George Rublee, J. T. Shotwell, Léon Bourgeois, etc. S. P. Duggan, Editor, *The League of Nations, the Principle and the Practice* (1919); Sir Geoffrey Butler, *A*

Handbook to the League of Nations (1919); Lord Eustace Percy, *The Responsibilities of the League* (1919); Sir Frederick Pollock, *The League of Nations* (1919); J. C. Smuts, *The League of Nations* (1919); D. W. Morrow, *The Society of Free Nations* (1919); D. J. Hill, *Present Problems in Foreign Policy* (1919) and *American World Policies* (1920); C. H. Levermore, *Second Year Book of the League of Nations* (1922); René Brunet *La Société des Nations et la France* (1921); F. B. Sayre, *Experiments in International Administration* (1919); A. Sweetser, *What the League of Nations has Done* (1922); J. L. Garvin, *The Economic Foundations of Peace* (1919); G. G. Wilson, *The First Year of the League of Nations* (1921); H. W. V. Temperley, *The Second Year of the League of Nations* (1922). Among the publications of the League of Nations probably the most useful for the general student wishing to keep informed on the current activities of the League are the *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations* and the *Official Journal.* Many important special reports have also been published.

CHAPTER LIII

The Washington Conference

R. L. Buell, *The Washington Conference* (1922), the only comprehensive account in English; Léon Archimbaud, *La Conférence de Washington* (1923), an admirable treatment of the subject; contains also a hundred pages of documents; W. W. Willoughby, *China at the Conference* (1922), valuable; Ge-Zay Wood, *The Shantung Question; a Study in Diplomacy and World Politics* (1922), an able presentation of the matter, from the Chinese point of view; K. K. Kawakami, *Japan's Pacific Policy* (1922), a moderate statement of Japan's policy at the Conference and the reasons justifying it.

CHAPTER LIV

The Eclipse of the Entente

For current history, the most useful aids are the various annuals published in different countries: in England, the *Annual Register,* published since 1758; in France, Viallate, A., *La vie politique dans les deux mondes,* since 1907; in Germany, Schiemann, T., *Deutschland und die grosse Politik,* since 1902; Glaser, F. W., *Wirtschaftspolitische Annalen,* since 1906; Schulthess, *Europäischer Ge-*

schichtskalender, since 1860; Aegidi and Klauhold, *Das Staatsarchiv. Sammlung der offiziellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart,* since 1861. Now edited by G. Roloff.

The *Statesman's Year Book* is an indispensable source of varied statistical information, concerning all countries. *The New International Year Book,* edited by F. M. Colby, and *The American Year Book,* edited by S. N. D. North, are useful. Particularly helpful is *Record of Political Events,* published by Political Science Quarterly as an annual supplement.

Publications which will be found useful in the study of contemporary history, besides the more popular English and American reviews, such as the *Fortnightly; Contemporary; Nineteenth Century; Westminster; North American; World's Work; Review of Reviews; Current History,* are: *The Round Table; Edinburgh Review; Quarterly Review; National Review; American Political Science Review; Foreign Affairs; Political Science Quarterly; Yale Review; Annals of the American Academy; Economic Journal; Economic Review; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Socialist Review; Survey; Law Quarterly Review; American Journal of International Law; Revue des deux mondes; Revue de Paris; Revue bleue; Le Correspondent; Revue d'histoire diplomatique; Revue politique et parlementaire; Revue de droit international et de législation comparée; Archives diplomatiques; Revue de droit public et science politique; Annales des sciences politiques; Questions diplomatiques et coloniales; Revue générale de droit international public; Journal des économistes; Revue d'économie politique; Revue économique internationale; L'économiste français; L'Europe nouvelle; L'Opinion; La vie des peuples; Revue des sciences politiques; La Revue de Genève; Deutsche Rundschau; Preussische Jahrbücher; Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts; Archiv für öffentliches Recht; Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht.*

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